I believe morality stemming from evolution is a case of the naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy is a case in which a normative conclusion is drawn from just a descriptive claim. Claiming a behavior is morally permissible just because it is adaptive is exactly this. We are arguing that because something promotes our survival or well being (descriptive claim) then it ought to be morally permissible (normative claim).

1. If a conclusion expresses a normative claim, it cannot only be supported by a descriptive claim.
2. Any claim about evolution or natural selection are descriptive claims.
3. Any claim about moral systems are normative.
4. Therefore a conclusion about a moral system cannot only be supported by a claim about evolution or natural selection.

Additionally, the lines we draw when considering adaptive behavior into an ethical system are arbitrary. For example, most moral societies do not subscribe to social darwinism. Instead, it is considered moral to help the less fortunate in many situations. Another example of evolutionary behavior we consider immoral is violent anger. Anger can be considered an adaptive behavior because it can convince an individual to seek change and because of the physical effects it has on the body in certain situations. However, we actively seek to suppress and not act upon anger in a civilized society, despite it being one of our most evolutionary behaviors. It isn’t always incorrect to base a moral system around evolution. Some adaptive behavior can be considered morally good and some maladaptive behavior can be considered morally impermissible. What is wrong is to classify a behavior morally good or bad solely because of evolutionary reasons. In conclusion, any ethical system that bases itself only around evolution is fallacious.

Should Christians use revisionary pronouns? Many have argued that religion gets in the way with the transgender movement, and most of the arguments are vague at best. In this article (http://www.dennyburk.com/bruce-or-caitlyn-he-or-she-should-christians-accomodate-transgender-naming/) the author argues “transgenderism is a denial of God-ordained differences between male and female (Gen. 1:26-27). It is an untruthful suppression of the sexual binary that God has encoded into every cell of our bodies.” His argument takes a similar form to this:

1. It is necessary for Christians to tell the truth.
2. Transgenderism is an untruthful suppression of God’s creation.
3. If a Christian were to refer to a transgender individual by revised pronouns or names, they would not be telling the truth.
4. Therefore Christians should not use revisionary pronouns.

There are several issues with this argument however. First of all, with premise one. Is it really necessary for Christians to tell the truth at all times? I don’t believe so. In cases where telling the truth is harmful, it may not be necessary to tell the truth just for the sake of itself. For example, telling someone where someone else is hiding if you know they plan to murder them. It would not be defensible for a Christian to tell the truth in this case. The transgender situation can be analogous to this in that collective misgendering may lead to violence against transgender individuals. Another problem with the argument is premise 2. If God intended to create a sexual binary for humans, then why are some people born as intersex? This goes against the idea that we are on a sexual binary, and it must only exist through the will of God. So is it necessarily problematic for Christians to use revisionary pronouns for transgender individuals?

My main objection with the argument is within premise five. There’s an underlying assumption within your argument that God’s omniscience implies knowledge of the future, and if God does have knowledge of the future, then human actions are determined (libertarian free will does not exist). Additionally you claim there is a causal link between God’s knowledge and what occurs (“if anything God knows must occur necessarily”). The claim that if God has foreknowledge of an event, then it is determined, is not necessarily true. God can know the outcome of an event, but his foreknowledge is not the cause of that outcome. It can be true that both God knows the outcome of an event, and a person chooses and acts freely. God has knowledge or holds beliefs because they are true, his knowledge or beliefs do not create truth. Additionally, it is not necessarily correct to claim God has foreknowledge of an event, provided that we understand God as existing outside of time. If God exists outside of time, then his knowledge of an event does not exist before the event happens. If his knowledge of an event does not exist before an event happens, but exists outside of time, then it would be more correct to claim God knows everything that will occur and has occurred, rather than anything God knows must occur necessarily. The former has no causal implication, and leaves open the possibility of libertarian free will. Additionally, there is a problem with premise four. If premise four is true, then God can’t have separate traits, only one all encompassing trait. If that’s the case, then all of God’s traits are necessary, but what he gets from them may not be. It could be the case that God’s omniscience is necessary, but that doesn’t mean everything he perceives with it is as well.