That's an ontological claim, but it doesn't amount to making an ontological commitment. — Terrapin Station

I see. So the difference between an ontological claim and ontological commitment is that the former just simply arrives at or states, for example, that P, without necessarily accepting or rejecting that P, whereas the latter would involve accepting, rejecting, or being neutral that P. Is that what you're saying?

The problem with discussing stuff like that with me is that I'm a subjectivist on meaning (as well as a subjectivist on truth for that matter), and whether something is analytically true, on my view, is simply a matter of how individuals think about the propositions in question. I don't buy any sort of objectivist analysis of how language works. I think that that whole approach is a huge gaffe that's led to a lot of effectively useless work. — Terrapin Station

Well I'm an internalist on meaning, justification, truth etc. too (I was the one who recently initiated the "Rigid Designators" thread with the claim that RDs are based on linguistic convention, btw); so since there's no problem from my side re "meaning" and "language", would you feel more prepared to share your thoughts re Quine's "Two Dogmas"?

Not that you'd disagree with this (hence your "at least"), but I think it's important to stress that there aren't just those three. — Terrapin Station

Indeed, I'd also say there is such a thing as phenomenal certainty in the current/present moment, and faith.

Further, the latter type is necessarily supported by the former. In other words, ontology and its commitments is necessarily based upon epistemology. — numberjohnny5


I don't agree with that. In my view it depends on the philosopher in question. Different people start in different places, see different things--if anything--as foundational. — Terrapin Station

I see. Maybe it's because it's unclear to me what ontological commitments actually are relative to epistemological claims (or what they are at all, for that matter), but I assumed that in order to make ontological commitments about what there is, you'd necessarily need to have an epistemological "channel" in which to based them on.

I wouldn't say they necessarily are. Ontological claims could just be from a logical perspective. That if x is the case, then y follows ontologically. That doesn't have to be a commitment to y. — Terrapin Station

So in your example, ontological claims can refer to how a particular logical statement obtains (in light of a particular logical system)? So ontological claims can refer to the reasoning that occurs in different systems/branches of philosophy without having to commit to the particular claims any of those systems/branches are making.

The only interpretation where I'd say that's ontologically necessary is when we're simply talking about logical identity: A=A. — Terrapin Station

As an aside then, do you reject the first of Quine's "Two Dogmas" re analyticity? It seems to me that there are some necessary a priori truths that can't be modified or refuted, so the analytic-synthetic distinction obtains after all.

I wouldn't say that logical identity being ontologically necessary relies on empirical claims. It's strictly a logical matter in my view. — Terrapin Station

So in other words, ontological necessity is a priori, in your view?

Rigid designators are about the criticism of the theory of descriptions. "Aristotle is the author of Metaphysics" is contingent. Aristotle could not have written Metaphysics. This implies that descriptions might not be the contents of names. "Aristotle is Aristotle" is necessary. Aristotle could not have failed to be Aristotle himself. — mosesquine

I agree with that, hence why I view RDs simply as signifiers or signposts in terms of law of identity (LOI) claims like "Aristotle is Aristotle".

This implies that the contents of names are the referents themselves. — mosesquine

I don't think so. The "content of names" is different than the referent of names. In my view, the content of a name is just the connotations one assigns to a name. A name is not identical with a referent or external object (and a name doesn't have to refer to any external object either in order to be a name: it can just have connotations about the formal structure of the symbols that make up a name, for instance. The name "Rhonda" or "thc$^&gian", for example, can be used just as a visual and/or auditory image unto which I assign a colour, a type of sound, a texture, and so on. In that sense, the name "Rhonda" both holds said connotations and is the referent of those connotations, i.e. it's self-referential as a symbol that doesn't refer to objects external to my thinking about the name "Rhonda" or "thc$^&gian").

The title of the book written by Kripke is 'Naming and Necessity'. It's about naming and necessity. Suppose that I name someone as 'Fred'. Then, subsequent uses of the name by me continuously refer to the same person in every possible world. The first is naming, and the second is necessity. — mosesquine

Again, I generally agree that that's all RDs seem to be doing: people using proper names to posit LOI claims relative to non-LOI claims. And you could change the name "Fred" to "Jo" to refer to the same person, with both "Fred" and "Jo" either having the "same" connotations or different connotations. So "Fred" and "Jo" and any other name you use to refer to the "same" person are useful signifiers or signposts that imply the LOI.

It's not that hard people, rigid designation means the individual denoted is invariant over worlds of evaluation. That's it. — The Great Whatever

What makes some x invariant in all possible worlds is that that x is that x, implying the LOI.

Yea. But a strong adherence to the LOI is a route to hard determinism, which is a feature of human thought, but the opposite is also there, manifest in words like could, would, and should. — Mongrel

I don't quite know what you mean by "a strong adherence to the LOI is a route to hard determinism". LOI is just the application of a logical concept that says some x exists/obtains in different instances of time in which x is identical to itself in every instantation of x.

That's... really not it but OK man — StreetlightX

Well could you explain to me why it's "really not it" and what "it", as in RDs, really are then? The whole point of me starting this thread was to understand and get to grips with RDs, and anyone whose help I receive is appreciated.

Truth, dude, truth. The whole payoff of the theory has to do with truth. — StreetlightX

Indeed, and the LOI is necessarily true, hence how RDs just "pick out" or signify some existant among and relative to others in lieu of LOI obtaining.

So... If the law of identity didn't obtain, the concept of the rigid designator wouldn't be useful as a signpost that the law of identity obtains? — StreetlightX

Yes, as I said in previous posts, the law of identity is implied when using RDs to refer. I can't think of another use for RDs in terms of what's entailed if and when they're employed.

I still don't understand your conditional: "if the law of identity didn't obtain the RD wouldn't be useful"... But useful for what? — StreetlightX

Useful as a signifier/marker/signpost that the law of identity obtains for existents insofar as one can make references to existents. That's the only use or function I see RD's having.

~(A=A) would be conventionally read as negating identity in general. Rather you'd be saying something like (∃w) (~A) & (A-->(A=A)) . . . Although that last part should be more along the lines of "insofar as there is A in any world, then . . ." but there's no way to formalize that that I known of. — Terrapin Station

Ah, thanks for letting me know; I've not studied predicate logic yet.

Wait, it wouldn't be denying identity in those possible worlds. — Terrapin Station

It would be acknowledging that in some possible worlds A = A for some particular X relative to some possible worlds in which that X doesn't exist (¬(A = A)).

Hmm, I'd say the theory is 'existent-neutral' though: it applies to Pegasus no less than it applies to the Eiffel Tower. But perhaps I'm using the word 'existent' in a different way than you. Perhaps a counter question to understand where you're coming from better: what matter if the law of identity is acknowledged or not? Like, what difference does that difference make? — StreetlightX

I'm including fictional existents too, like Pegasus, for instance.

The law of identity matters in virtue of this discussion because if it didn't obtain the concept of "rigid designator" wouldn't be useful. Rigid designators only work if the law of identity obtains, and insofar as the latter obtains, rigid designators can be employed. But then, if that's true, then rigid designators are simply signposts that the law of identity obtains in all possible worlds when referring to some X.

If my parents never had children then I would never have been born. The term "I" here is a rigid designator that either refers to a person who doesn't exist in the possible world in which my parents never had children, or doesn't refer to anything in that possible world. — Michael

So in the possible worlds where you don't exist, all the rigid designator is doing is acknowledging ¬(A=A), therefore, ¬A relative to the possible worlds where you do exist i.e. A = A or A.

To clarify, necessity here qualifies truth - it is necessarily true that this is Earth - by virtue of it being called that. I'm not sure what it means to speak of "a particular exist[ing] in the way that it does", so I can't really comment on that. Again, naming, not 'existence', is at issue. — StreetlightX

Naming some thing is about using a sign/symbol to refer to some thing. Rigid designators name some existant, no? They refer to some particular thing - a thing that exists in all possible worlds. The law of identity is necessarily true for any particular existant thing, no? The identity of some thing can be relayed as A = A. So rigid designators simply signify that some existant thing exists, implicitly acknowledging the law of identity when it does.

The importance of Kripke's intervention though (imo) has to do with the way in which he tackles questions of modality - that is, necessity and contingency with respecting to naming. For Kripke, a name is necessary - but this necessity is itself contingent (upon what he calls a primal baptism). It's no accident that Kripke more or less invented modal logic. — StreetlightX

A name is necessary in virtue of what? Insofar as rigid designators are used, they appear to me nothing more than signifiers or markers that a particular exists in the way that it does, and that includes possible worlds.

The Great Whatever — The Great Whatever

Did you manage to read my other longer post (above) re "So it seems, then, that rigid designators are just "markers" of some sort that reflect, acknowledge, or represent the law of identity of a particular (which is implicit within Kripke's notion of rigid designators)...." ? I'm interested to know your thoughts about it.

Rather, it is a matter of language: because language functions in this stupid, tautological manner (in which a thing is called what it is because it is called that), rigid designators mark the same thing in all possible worlds. — StreetlightX

I wrote a post above along those lines -- that rigid designators are akin to signfiers a la Mill's non-connotative proper names, in which they just represent the law of identity of a particular.

First off, there's no what it means 'to you' or 'to me.' There's something the words mean by convention, and you can't arbitrarily decide what that is. There's something you claim it means, but it remains to be seen whether this is right. — The Great Whatever

For the sake of argument, let's say that wasn't true: that instead words are used as signs/symbols that individuals assign private meanings onto; and that a common or shared meaning by individuals was just a sign/symbol being used conventionally but that involved individuals attempting to match (via guesswork) what everyone is using that particular sign/symbols for.

How would that alter your view (if at all) of rigid designators?

Another idea is that a rigid designator could be just implicitly stating that the law of identity is necessarily true and using particular/objects/etc. to exemplify this idea.

It seems to me that, at least in some respects, rigid designators are like signifiers similar to Mill's notion of non-connotative proper names.

If a rigid designator is more or less a signifier of some sort, then any sign, symbol, pattern, behavioural cue, and even combinations of the above could be used as rigid designators. In other words, rigid designators aren't restricted only to proper names. A sentence or paragraph could be used as a rigid designator, or a piece of architecture could be used as a rigid designator, or a unique sort of handshake, for instance.

Now, in all possible worlds the identity of a particular/individual/object remains constant or doesn't change: A = A obtains in all possible worlds and is therefore necessarily true. We can say that that possibility is one of rigidity, i.e. involving no change or involving absolute consistency. That premise has to obtain for the idea of rigid designators to obtain, that is, rigid designators obtain iff rigid identities obtain.

So it seems, then, that rigid designators are just "markers" of some sort that reflect, acknowledge, or represent the law of identity of a particular (which is implicit within Kripke's notion of rigid designators). Persons construct the associations between a marker and the law of identity of a particular. Those associations are constructed by persons and shared in common making them conventional and contingent, and the law of identity of a particular is, obviously, necessarily true.

So I think the notion of rigid designators is equivocating the associations between markers of some sort with the (implicit) law of identity of particulars.

Are you referring to "it's not the definition that's true or false per se"? (I make a distinction between meanings and definitions, by the way. Meanings are the inherently mental/private/subjective relations in your head. Definitions are the expressions, for example in words--text or sounds--correlated to those meanings.) — Terrapin Station

Although I'm aware you're making that distinction there, would you also agree that definitions can be or are mental since they have to be constructed via minds? Definitions generally are, after all, just sentences, and sentences I think are also mentally constructed.

Also, by the way, my guess was correct. It turns out that you're yet another representationalist/idealist/solipsist-if-you're-consistent. What the heck is going on that there are so many of you folks around lately?

You're not alone; I've noticed a similar thing on other forums. The ones I've interacted with seem to believe that internalism is necessarily a solipsistic position.

I see what you did there!

But can one argue out of this contradiction if they believe the first claim to be true?

And that outlook sets the stage for mind-body conundrums. Externalism is explicitly an attempt to fly free of those issues. There's a good SEP article about it: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/ . I found it to be a can of worms... the questions just keep rolling.

Thanks for the link. I've read more on semantic internalism/externalism than epistemic so this is helpful. I'll need to digest the subject-area more, but at a glance, it seems that one is necessarily dependent on or influenced by external factors (a la externalism) for all aspects of knowing or perceiving; that seems like a given or truism. However, I think that the mode or kind of justification one adopts for knowledge is necessarily subjective and is also necessarily mentally organised/constructed, which convinces me that internalism or possibly mentalism makes more sense.


I have never heard of Sellars. I'll give him a read and hope to get back to you.

What belief would be justified by sensory experience? Give me an example. — Mongrel

Sure. As I mentioned in my initial post: "I am aware [or believe] that some experience is occurring as I type this," or "I sense [or believe] things in this moment".

That would be knowledge-internalism. The opposing view is knowledge-externalism. Both views have strengths and weaknesses. — Mongrel

To be honest, I haven't read much about the Internalism-Externalism debate, but the reason I probably side with the Internalism side is that since beliefs are mental and knowledge is a subset of belief, then knowledge is mental (along with its constituent parts, of course).

Hi Mongrel.

First, I want to clarify what I mean by "know" or "knowledge", just so that we're on the same page. I'm using the common philosophical definition (at least in analytic circles) of knowledge as justified, true belief. So knowledge is a type of or subset of belief. I also think that those constituent parts of knowledge (i.e. justification, truth, and belief) are subjective and thus relative. Moreover, justification refers to a method of reasoning for a belief (like empiricism or logic); truth refers to the correspondence theory of truth; and belief refers to "confidences" in something.

Now, usually I don't think we need to be certain of what we're claiming with regards to knowledge to be able to call it "knowledge"; that is, we don't need 100% (or absolute) certainty on any knowledge claim when saying, for example, "I know my name" or "I know I'm not a brain in a vat" or "I know we're not in the matrix and this is some simulation of reality" or "my car is parked outside". So in this sense, certainty with regards to knowledge is a red herring. I can be maximally certain (that is, up to 99.99% certain) of knowledge claims, but never 100%.


So with that in mind, I'm trying to determine whether we have any 100% knowledge of anything in reality. My view is that we can but only within a phenomenological-in-the-moment-sense-experience-of-something, and not with anything in which time separates the "presentness" of experience.