But most philosophical discussions I witness tend to be evangelical rants in some vague attempt to pick a fight online or some other trivial reason.
When my head feels like burning because I get challenged by really good counter-arguments, I know my knowledge is improving. If not, it's usually a waste of time. — Christoffer
That can be true for personal things, but I don't think it's preferable for philosophy. If people want trivialities, there's Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and so on to be lazy on. Being lazy in philosophical discourses means you really get nothing out of it and just spams discussions with irrelevant stuff. In the end, what do you want to accomplish with participating in philosophy discussions? — Christoffer
It could mean a number of things, but if it means most preferable to you, then you're not being reasonable, you're just being emotional. — S
Hard to do philosophy like that though, especially the hard questions. — Christoffer
I'm not trying to be argumentative with anyone, I'm on psychotropic or psychoactive drugs too. I have to try extra hard not to be argumentative. — Daniel Cox
I don't have any likelihood beliefs about anything that I don't have frequency data for, unless I think either it's 1 ("100%" or certain) or 0--impossible/incoherent. — Terrapin Station
Because likelihood makes no sense if we don't have data re frequency of occurrence. Even then there are problems with it, but we definitely can't reach a conclusion about it without data re frequency. — Terrapin Station
No it isn't. Your questions were wrong. I corrected you. The answer is that it isn't a matter of preference. — S
They're not. — S
It's not a matter of preference. Maybe it is for you, but that would mean that you don't care about the truth or being reasonable. I do. — S
I think the whole idea of likelihood for such things is nonsense. That has to do with what likelihood is. — Terrapin Station
Why? Laziness? — S
I said that you'd commited the fallacy known as an argument from incredulity. — S
I was more interested in talking about epistemology in general, and the idea of likelihood more specifically (although we never ended up getting into that). — Terrapin Station
Sure. I also infer inductively by analogy, but it is not something that ALSO doesn’t rely on an abductive inference that everything you experience is really happening. How do you know that you’re not hallucinating and are delusional all the time? — Noah Te Stroete
The other issue is how we'd support that there would be some sort of mechanistic explanatory model by now. — Terrapin Station
Would you say then that you're also essentially arguing that "If matter could spontaneously collect and organize itself into conscious beings all on its own without some kind of guidance, then it seems likely that there would be a mechanistic explanatory model for that by now"? — Terrapin Station
What makes the supportive/justificational difference between the sentence above and the alternate sentence that you typed? We ask the person above what they're basing their sentence on and they say: "It’s an abductive inference. Abduction necessarily deals with likelihood. " Is that good enough? If so, why don't you believe their sentence over your alternate sentence? — Terrapin Station
Behavior in conjunction with one's first-person knowledge of how one's similar behavior is correlated with mental activity. — Terrapin Station
An abductive inference based on what? — Terrapin Station
I really don't understand when people use "likely" that way. Likely based on what? It seems like it's just shorthand for "based on my intuitive preconceptions . . . " — Terrapin Station
Argument from incredulity.
Perhaps you find this arguement compelling.
— Noah Te Stroete
No, I don't find fallacious arguments compelling. — S
