It is only debatable if you are a global skeptic. I don’t know why it would make you anxious, and I don’t know how to convince someone that they’re not being tricked by an evil demon. Do you understand how ridiculous that sounds to be tricked by an evil demon? Or that you are a brain in a vat? What is more likely? I believe it is most likely that the world is real.

So what? How does that make you anxious?

I could be mistaken about a particular belief, but I like to believe that most of my beliefs are consistent and coherent with the rest of my beliefs. They justify one another, and they are justified by sense experience.

Epistemology Is the philosophical study of knowledge

That goes against all epistemic theory.

So what? How does that affect the way I live?

So what? How does that affect my life or the way I live?

But I would never believe that I missed the show as I could tell you what the show is about. How does it affect my life or how does it make my life any different if nothing that I experience is certain? I still live my life the same way.

So you are a global skeptic. Why would you want to live your life that way, and furthermore, how does that affect the way you live?

It’s on page 2 of “all discussions”

It’s an original post, probably on Page 2 or three of the “all discussions”

Let me put it this way: reductionism or supervenience Could still be true, and we could never prove it at the same time

Why can’t you just read it? It’s on this forum for all to see

I wrote about this in the thread called, on solipsism and knowledge.

Are you trolling us? Certainty is not required for knowledge

Let me just say this: whether or not reductionism or supervenience Is true is one thing, and whether or not they can be known is another thing.The two aren’t necessarily related

I will try to explain further later what I am thinking after I fire up the computer. I’m trying to type on the phone right now and it takes a long time

Whether or not supervenience or reductionism is true is a metaphysical issue. Whether or not supervenience or reductionism is able to be known or discovered to be true is an epistemological issue.

As someone, I think it was macrosoft, said in another thread, we act as if we both have and do not have free will. It doesn’t matter whether or not supervenience or reductionism are true or not.

I think you’re confusing epistemic and metaphysical issues.

It was something I wrote a couple of years after school.

We studied Augustine when I went to Loyola University Chicago for a semester. Never got to Saint Aquinas. I probably will get around to him, but I wanted to start reading the Wittgenstein thread first.

I guess you could call me a Protestant, but I do admire the Catholics for their devotion to tradition.

During a recent discussion of philosophy, a fellow philosopher called me a Romantic Philosopher.

This is perhaps because I believe Aquinas' classic Proofs Of God with all my heart.

Are you also a Romantic Philosopher?

Why or why not?

I am trying to find others. — hks

I don't know what kind of philosopher I am. I believe in God. I believe in Jesus' precepts, but I don't think you can "prove" God's existence through linguistic expression. I believe God is only accessed through faith and love. I also don't believe in free will as being defined as having the capacity to do other than what you did do. I believe it's a matter of God's grace whether or not you believe with love in your heart (as unfair as that might seem, I don't know how to reconcile free will with everything else I believe about the natural world).

So what kind of philosopher am I?

If I had a frontal lobotomy (which I'm considering after this exchange), then I couldn't speak coherently no matter how much I willed it. So, is not the will dependent on the physical-natural brain which operates according to necessary AND sufficient causes?

if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis

I'm saying it's necessary AND sufficient. Not just sufficient. Where am I going wrong? I'm confused.

Human will acts concurrently. As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal. Thus, a free will can be the necessary sufficient cause you argue for if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis

"As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal."

Of course! This is a tautology. It's like saying, "As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to will my goal." So what is will?

"it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to."

So the will is uncaused. How did you refute Strawson again? I'm genuinely confused here. Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused?

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further.
— Noah Te Stroete

How would following your dictate prove anything? — Dfpolis

Because you felt compelled to put me in my place.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further. EDIT :Or, give up philosophy altogether. Or do you feel compelled to be a philosopher?

Falsifiability is a criterion applicable only to the hypothetico-deductive or scientific method. One cannot apply that method to a hypothesis that is unfalsifiable. It does not apply to either experiential observation or to deduction, which are reliable or not on their own grounds. You presented what, on its face, appears to be a scientific hypothesis. I presented a deductive, experienced-based argument for my position. If you have and experiential/deductive argument for determinism, please advance it. — Dfpolis

All natural phenomena have sufficient and necessary causes.
Choices are natural phenomena.
Choices have sufficient and necessary causes.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

Are we aware of this? I don't know that this is true.

So, it is a tautology to say that "What we choose is what we really want most of all." Of course we do. — Dfpolis

Then we choose. But what is your evidence that it isn't pre-determined? How do you reconcile free will with everything that we know about the natural world?

hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis

Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis

And this isn't unfalsifiable?

Edit: I believe it is a better explanatory model to say that the limbic system drives our decisions, then to simply assert that we are free agents.

If you treat self as just the conscious train of thought of your mind, you can say 'you think, therefore you are' as when you are in a conversation, it is clear that the other 'voice' is a separate train of thought and thus a separate individual by the definition I used. So on this basis I think you can dismiss solipsism. — Devans99

That's true, Devans, but if I just said that, then I wouldn't have a whole paper. ;)

I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise.
— Noah Te Stroete

You can believe what you will. The question is how do you justify such a belief? I have offered a justification for my position, and all you have objected to is how I use the term "free will." — Dfpolis

I justify it by the fact that the limbic system has been shown by neuroscience to be the driver of our frontal lobe's decision making process.

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis

It is not a tautology because you seem to be claiming that we could've chosen something that we didn't want most of all. It is predetermined by the limbic system which drives the frontal lobe (the "thinking" or "weighing" part which I said is just like "going through a mental exercise").

Thanks, Dingo! I'm pleased that you appreciated my post. :)

2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis

I could just deny your second premise. I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise. What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice? I mean you could've gone out or you could've stayed on this forum typing your post. That is true in the sense that the options occurred to you. However, you really wanted to stay and post more than you wanted to go out, so you were really compelled by your emotions to choose what you chose. It's all in the limbic system.

(Now, I know you won't agree with my assessment as philosophers rarely agree on anything, but I welcome your response.)

Thanks! :)

Thanks!

Got it now. Thanks!

Even the pursuit of truth 'beyond emotion or bias' itself motivated our biased toward this truth. — macrosoft

Your response was really interesting and awesome. However, I am having trouble parsing this last sentence. Could you clarify, please?

Thanks for the thoughtful response, Diego.

I no longer believe in reductionism, but prefer the idea of supervenience which you seem to be explaining here.

Thanks for reading my essay.

I should state that I no longer believe in material reductionism. Free will is a matter that needs to be better defined.