[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered."
[2} "So, to be truly responsible for what we do when we act, we need to be truly responsible for how we are."
[3] "But, we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are."
[4] "So, we cannot be free." — Galen Strawson
[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered."
[2} "So, to be truly responsible for what we do when we act, we need to be truly responsible for how we are."
[3] "But, we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are."
[4] "So, we cannot be free." — Galen Strawson
It is true that we do what we do because we have the power to do it, but to say that "the way we are" prior to our choice predetermines that choice is to assume determinism. — Dfpolis
As Strawson admits before giving his argument, experience tells us that being a free agent is part of "the way we are." To be a free agent is to be the radical source of new lines of action, where "radical source" means that the new line of action is not fully immanent (pre-determined) before the agent chooses. — Dfpolis
Yesterday on a different forum, I was referred to a video in which Galen Strawson purportedly proved that free will is impossible. — Dfpolis
So the argument really is not if an individual act is determined, but if the entire series of acts is determined, which than leads to logical question what or who determined the first act in this series — Rank Amateur
he seems to be conflating what's supposed to be an argument against freedom with comments that are primarily focused on whether we can be considered culpable for our actions. Those are two different ideas. — Terrapin Station
Is he even talking about making choices per se? That wasn't clear to me, which is why I said that "it's not clear what sort of free will he's even talking about." I got the impression that maybe he was referring to free will in more of a murky Dennettian sense, but I wasn't sure. (Dennett is a compatibilist. In my opinion, compatibilism can't be made coherent.) — Terrapin Station
This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead. — Herg
If we lay this out as a logical argument intended to prove that we could in fact have chosen another line of action, it fails:
Premise 1: Approaching the choice, we are aware of L1 and L2.
Premise 2: Approaching the choice, it seems to us that are free to choose between L1 and L2.
Premise 3: After choosing L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.
Clearly the conclusion does not follow from the premisses. — Herg
Instead of relying on someone's summary of a Youtube video, you should read some of Strawson's papers, such as The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994) — SophistiCat
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis
Reading the full argument prompts me to observe that responsibility as something that we practice every day has less to do with "making one the way one is, mentally speaking" and more to do with trying to influence other people, events, and the condition of things. — Valentinus
Were I to take up the task of writing a book on free will again, I would read opposing views extensively, as I did for my book on naturalism. Until I do take up that task, Strawson is not likely to be on my reading list. — Dfpolis
That was the other Strawson philosopher - Galen's Dad, Peter. :smile:with what Strawson wrote in his earlier essay Freedom and Resentment — SophistiCat
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis
I could just deny your second premise. — Noah Te Stroete
I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise. — Noah Te Stroete
What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice? — Noah Te Stroete
Only why would I bother to read what you have to say, whether in a book or in a forum post, given that you don't know what you are talking about? — SophistiCat
I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise.
— Noah Te Stroete
You can believe what you will. The question is how do you justify such a belief? I have offered a justification for my position, and all you have objected to is how I use the term "free will." — Dfpolis
What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete
This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2. — Herg
I justify it by the fact that the limbic system has been shown by neuroscience to be the driver of our frontal lobe's decision making process. — Noah Te Stroete
What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete
This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis
It is not a tautology because you seem to be claiming that we could've chosen something that we didn't want most of all. — Noah Te Stroete
It is predetermined by the limbic system which drives the frontal lobe (the "thinking" or "weighing" part which I said is just like "going through a mental exercise"). — Noah Te Stroete
hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis
Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis
So, it is a tautology to say that "What we choose is what we really want most of all." Of course we do. — Dfpolis
hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis
Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis
And this isn't unfalsifiable? — Noah Te Stroete
Falsifiability is a criterion applicable only to the hypothetico-deductive or scientific method. One cannot apply that method to a hypothesis that is unfalsifiable. It does not apply to either experiential observation or to deduction, which are reliable or not on their own grounds. You presented what, on its face, appears to be a scientific hypothesis. I presented a deductive, experienced-based argument for my position. If you have and experiential/deductive argument for determinism, please advance it. — Dfpolis
Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis
Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis
[1] "When we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered." — Galen Strawson
There is a further experiential point worthy of reflection. Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature. Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails. — Dfpolis
But what is your evidence that it isn't pre-determined? How do you reconcile free will with everything that we know about the natural world? — Noah Te Stroete
All natural phenomena have sufficient and necessary causes.
Choices are natural phenomena.
Choices have sufficient and necessary causes. — Noah Te Stroete
Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis
Are we aware of this? I don't know that this is true. — Noah Te Stroete
If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further. — Noah Te Stroete
So the point to consider here is that the activity of a physical system cannot be explained through reference to its "present state". That would be to make the same category mistake. To explain the activity of a physical system requires reference to the temporal extension of that system, and this means something beyond the "present state". — Metaphysician Undercover
Human will acts concurrently. As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal. Thus, a free will can be the necessary sufficient cause you argue for if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis
If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further.
— Noah Te Stroete
How would following your dictate prove anything? — Dfpolis
if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to. — Dfpolis
You are putting it to the point. You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it?I have argued previously that although all knowing is a subject-object relation, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that focuses on physical objects to the exclusion of the knowing subject. — Dfpolis
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