The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock

That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?

So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu

I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.

But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:

- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.

Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.

Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu

You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.

They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.

Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.

The 31 BTGs, roughly equivalent to 21,000 troops, comes from an ISW report, which in turn gets the figure directly from communications by the Ukrainian General Staff on the days of the invasion.

The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.

That of course doesn't add up.

If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.

One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.

We saw nothing of the sort.

Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.

Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.

Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.

The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.

Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.

Still no sources. I've already given you mine.

Also, what losses are you talking about here?

If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. — ssu

Sources, or no bueno.

The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! — ssu

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on").


Anyway, your source provides nothing in the way of troop counts, so I'm not sure what you believe it proves.

First of all, where do you get the number 20,000? — ssu

It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.

The Russians hoping to take Kiev with 20,000 troops is a laughable fantasy.

Sorry. but it can't be put in any other way.

It's pretty obvious that the Russians in terms of territory aimed for south eastern Ukraine. However, admitting as much would mean admitting the Russians may have achieved some sort of victory, which is of course anathema in western media.

I prefer your sense of humor over your interpretation of the facts.

A diversion, most likely.

There's a strategic element to it as well, where the West might've been persuaded to the negotiating table upon Kiev being threatened. That's in fact what happened in the early stage of the war, but the US blocked negotiations.

A shame, because back then purportedly a peace agreement lay on the table that kept Ukraine almost entirely intact in terms of territory.

Kiev is well outside of the realm of reason. Let there be no misunderstanding about that based on my last reply.

The plan was to take Kiev, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odessa, possibly Dnipro. If it suceeded, there would be little to no resistance, as the entire government structure would collapse (with Lviv being the only remaining bigger center). Ukrainians would have no choice but to accept peace on very unfavorable terms, most likely with puppet Russian government installed. How exactly does that 'dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war'? — Jabberwock

The dismissal happens when I measure your narrative to the 190,000 figure, and conclude that there is no way a 190,000 troops could have achieved the goals you purport the Russians had.

In fact, had the Russians intended to take and hold Kiev, 190,000 troops would barely be able to achieve just that, assuming 60,000 Ukrainian defenders (which is roughly what sources seem to agree on).

And they would have been able to achieve nothing else.

However, we know only ~20,000 Russsian troops participated in the Battle of Kiev.

You see a discrepancy here?

The Russian army went into Ukraine with at the very most a 190,000 troops. There is absolutely no way the Russian army, comprised of a 190,000 troops, could conquer all of Ukraine. — John J. Mearsheimer

I'd just like to point out how absolutely pivotal a piece of information like this (that has been public knowledge for a while) is to deciphering the actual goings-on vis-à-vis Ukraine.

For many months now I have defended the position (leaning quite often on Mearsheimer's arguments, I will admit) that the Russians never intended to take over all of Ukraine with their initial invasion.

Unless someone wants to argue the 190,000 figure is false, we can essentially dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war. I hope people realise that.

Present Russia is a prime example of a country where it's leaders are so seduced about it's imagined greatness they will ruin everything absolutely everything. — ssu

Ironically, this describes Washington equally well.

For once in America's recent history, it's realpolitik goals and the morality of the situation happen to intersect: helping the Ukrainians is the right thing to do. — RogueAI

The Americans played a principal role in causing this war. They have no moral high ground to speak of.

This reminds me a little of the Chinese balloon incident, which many claimed was merely a story purposely blown up to divert attention to various failures of US policy.

Having said all that, if I was the Russians I would be very very nervous because, in the immortal words from the opening scene in Patton : "Americans are winners, we hate to lose and love to win" And in this instance winning is going to require something from left field. — yebiga

And not just the Russians.

The US empire spanned the whole globe, and it's unlikely the Americans will let it crumble without a fight. The key question is where that fight is going to take place, since it seems the US is already weak to a degree that it cannot fight on all fronts.

In my view, it won't be in Ukraine, since the United States shows no real commitment to a Ukrainian victory. Besides, Ukraine holds no direct strategic value for the United States, and its involvement there has more to do with attempts at hamstringing the Russians, which already seem to have failed.

Then there's the Persian Gulf - the most important geopolitical area to the US, outside of the American mainland. Again, no sign of a reaction from the US while the area completely seems to slip from its grasp, into the hands of its former adversaries and geopolitical rivals. This is perhaps most shocking of all, and way more significant than anything that happens in Ukraine from a geopolitical point of view.


The only place where the American sphere seems more or less intact is the Pacific, and with China being the real peer competitor to the US (not the Russians or the Iranians, etc.), this is where I believe the US will make its stand.

However, in typical fashion the Chinese are biding their time, essentially waiting for the US to weaken further, as it's unable to commit to other threats to its sphere in fear of losing its grasp over the Pacific.

In an ironic twist the Americans' trump card - Taiwan - seems to have turned into its achilles heel, basically requiring constant attention under threat of a Chinese invasion, disallowing them from turning their attention to other flashpoints.

The UN voted a few times prior, but the suggestion of peacekeepers and votes could depart some from that, or at least perhaps bring more of what the parties want out in the open.
Worthwhile? Try? Waste of time? Futile? — jorndoe

The UN General Assembly can vote, but such votings have no actual power. Only Security Council resolutions do.

So until both sides are interested in a truce, these types of proposals should be seen as more political in nature. A way for nations to signal their stance on issues.

As long as one or both sides are interested in continuing the war, UN involvement is practically impossible. For one, because Russia can veto any UN resolution it doesn't like, and secondly, one of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping is to have consent of all involved parties.

I'm sitting across the table from a self-identifying incel of the virulent online kind I've earlier described. Let's call him a friend of a friend I have just met. He brazenly begins to expound on his misogynistic world view. What do I do? Is silence complicit? Is compassion complicit? Is polite debate legitimizing? Is opprobrium counter-productive? I'm reminded of Nietzsche's advice that to spare someone shame is the greatest charity but this someone is so immersed in shame and so apparently in love with it, it seems that neither further shaming nor compassion can work. What can work? We don't want them leaving the table thinking talking this way has no consequences but we can't batter them into submission either. — Baden

It depends on what one's goal is.

If one genuinely wishes to help a person, anything that might nudge them in the direction of self-reflection would be enough. Rather than attempting to convince a person of their faulty ways in one fell swoop (such an approach virtually always fails), a single thought-provoking question may be enough to get a person to reflect. Note that asking such a question may signal one's disagreement in a non-judgemental way.

If one's goal is to punish or discipline, then probably one ought to consider first whether it is one's place to do so.

If one is defending against what one perceives to be a threat to one's own beliefs, then the issue lies as much with oneself as it does with the other person.

The latter two goals are in most cases not going to be constructive. One's energy is best spent elsewhere.

Going by the comments I have read on this thread, most seem to pursue the latter two goals, hence the lack of constructivity.




For those interested in the wider social context of this 'incel' phenomenon I would recommend this documentary on Japanese 'hikikomori'; young, socially isolated hermits.




The Japanese generally seem to have a more 'enlightened' way of dealing with social problems. Perhaps the fact that Japanese society at least makes an attempt at helping these people urges them to reflect rather than become resentful, which seems to be what happens in the West.

Uhh, actually no.

It's not so simple, actually. — ssu

I never said it was simple.

I said the fact that Russian air defense systems being able to take down anti-radiation missiles is a critical difference which your example doesn't account for.

The real issue is fire discipline and the ability for the radar operator to know when to shut his radar off. The survival of a SAM unit isn't in it's ability to shoot down missiles, it's simply to understand when to not use the radar, when not to engage when to engage. Move and conceal your SAM's and use them only when the situation favors you. — ssu

Air defense systems have a purpose: to defend critical targets.

When they have to turn off their radars and reposition to dodge incoming missiles, SEAD is effectively Suppressing the system while (assumedly) other air assets are taking advantage of this.

Thus, being able to take down these incoming missiles rather than having to relocate is a big advantage.

Obviously you need both, but once you have the air force capable of winning air superiority, then you don't need so much GBAD. — ssu

Since Ukraine and probably also Russia will not meet that criterium at any point during this conflict, I don't see why this would be relevant.

Ok, first an S-300 or S-400 system is quite useless without it's radars working. — ssu

Of course. The key here being that radars can be replaced. To destroy these modern systems it would take a lot more.

Old iron bombs were used in Vietnam, so even that can work (if one is very careful). — ssu

Unguided bombs versus an S-400?

I pity the pilot who gets that job.

If the Ukrainians were keen on losing their F-16s as fast as possible, they'd use this approach.

A great example is Israeli attack on Syria GBAD in the Bekaa Valley during "Peace for Galilee" operation named Operation Mole Cricket 19. The Syrian systems weren't so old in the early 1980's. — ssu

You're comparing two different eras.

The Syrian air defenses weren't able to engage the anti-radiation missiles fired by the Israelis, because ground-based anti-missile defense wasn't really a thing back then. All their anti-air systems (coming from the '60s, mind you) were built to engage air planes.

Russian air defense can engage incoming missiles, and the AGM-88, even the G variant, falls well within its maximum target velocity.

This is of course a crucial difference.

No, it is true. Just look at history: if you have a capable air force that can gain air superiority, then most of the kills will be done in air-to-air combat. Air superiority is the single most important factor in
deciding the outcome of a modern conventional war. And when either side cannot gain air superiority, well, you have a war that likely will go on for a long time. Hence for the Ukrainian air force as it is smaller than the Russian air force, it's first objective is simply just to exist. — ssu

Exactly. And not having any combat aircraft is a huge disadvantage: even having a small contingent of aircraft that are sheltered and not used are basically a fleet-in-being. As long as they exist, it limits the actions of the other side.

First of all, GBAD cannot gain air superiority above enemy territory. Hence aircraft are crucial in winning an air war. An effective GBAD will result in what basically has happened in Ukraine: the other side simply won't fly in the area where there is the effective GBAD. That's what GBAD can do. But it won't destroy the enemy air force if the enemy doesn't fly. In this war both sides have opted just to use artillery, fire missiles at each other from their own airspace protected by their own GBAD. — ssu

The idea that an air force is a "more effective" method of air defense is untrue, as I explained. It functions as part of an air defense network, and it won't function on its own.

But you simply can have early warning system and get the jets into the air to intercept them. — ssu

All my objections assume early warning.

My country's own air force has dealt with this from it's birth and has never assumed to gain air superiority. For some reason, you never saw them flying high during the Cold War, but dashing on treetop level when flying from one place to another. — ssu

Even if the S-400 has a great range, again basic physics comes to play as you remarked to Boethius. The Earth is round and also Ukraine a big country. Hence you can do the math just how this effects target acquisition of radars and their ability to track low flying aircraft. — ssu

This is obvious.

You don't seem to understand that flying low severely limits the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, especially for a nation like Ukraine which is starved for resources.

Your argument was that the weapon system was old. — ssu

No. My argument was that modern Russian AA like S-300 and S-400 can shoot the AGM-88 down.

Why don't you do your due diligence and figure out what type of AGM-88 the Ukrainians are receiving and how that relates to my argument?

Fighters are an integral and important part of air defense. Naturally you need GBAD starting from securing the airfields of the fighters, but the fact remains that you can fight against enemy aircraft with your own aircraft. — ssu

Note that you stated fighters are "a more effective alternative" - something which is simply untrue for the reasons I gave.

Of course fighters can play a role in air defense, in the context of a modern army which also features various forms of ground-based / mobile air defense.

On their own fighters would be terribly inefficient.

You think fighters are (or would be) kept 24/7 in air? How about having them up when you have enemy aircraft up in the air. — ssu

Without the capacity to keep fighters in the air 'round the clock, the enemy would simply wait for all to be grounded before launching their attack.

Considering these planes would have to be stationed quite far from the frontline, scrambling them only when there are threats in the air also seems unfeasible due to time, fuel and weight constraints.

It's quite rare to have fighter aircraft on CAP 24/7. — ssu

Yes. Because, as I said, it's extremely inefficient. And modern militaries have ground-based systems to ensure such a task doesn't fall squarely on aviation most of the time.


It seems you don't really understand the practical problems of using air planes in a defensive role in the conditions the Ukrainians would be flying under.

Flying at low altitudes is essentially a given due to the threat of Russian anti-air systems. This means flying at decreased speeds (due to higher drag) and thus increased reaction times. It also means lower fuel efficiency.

All of this translates into increased reaction times, low time on station. lighter weapon loadouts, etc.

Are they now? AGM-88E came into service in the 2010s. AGM-88G is coming to service only now. — ssu

This is not an argument.

First, find out which version the Ukrainians have received. Then, look up what specifications these upgrades altered. Finally, figure out how that relates to my argument, namely that Russian AA can shoot down AGM-88s.

For reference, S-400 has a maximum target velocity of between Mach 8 and Mach 14.

However, a small number of expensive planes can't be risked to conduct air strikes. — boethius

I don't see why not.

Every use of these F-16s will incur some risk.

One advantage the Ukrainians will have is the intel they are getting from the US and other nations will probably allow them to craft a fairly accurate picture of the Russian AA network and use it to their advantage.


The other proposed roles for the F-16s I don't find so convincing. The Russians barely use their air force over Ukraine, and taking down missiles with fighters is not ideal for the reasons I mentioned.

Are they going to put a 40 million dollar plane into the air to swat a handful of 20,000 dollar Iranian drones, with missiles that each cost a million also?

Maybe they're anticipating a heavier use of air power by the Russians, however again I think planes would not be the logical choice if their intention was defensive use.


Unless they're planning to keep them grounded, which I doubt, I think air strikes and bombing raids is what they plan to use them for. They might take a page out of the Israeli book. They are pretty crafty with their air force as well.

For, the Russians can't risk much their expensive planes either, so as long as Ukraine has planes with missiles that can get into the air and shoot missiles then this is a big risk to Russian fighters. — boethius

I don't remember who it was, but don't the Russians have ~1,000 4th and 5th generation fighters lying around? Why wouldn't they be able to risk those?

The F16's are better than having no planes at all, but everything you explain just emphasises they cannot get near Russian forces and their use is severely limited. — boethius

Depending how they operate, they can.

AA systems may have hundreds of kilometers of range, but the radar horizon is a severely limiting factor when it comes to low-flying targets.

Assuming the term 'incel' refers to this specific, somewhat radicalized internet group, the numbers probably aren't terribly high.

But the amount of people who suffer under the same social problems is probably quite high, especially among the youth whose upbringing has been dominated by the birth of the internet.

Since WW1, it has been obvious that ground based air defence GBAD has a more effective alternative, namely fighter defence, other aircraft. And this is why GBAD has usually played the second fiddle in wars. The machine guns fitted to biplanes then were as potent or actually statistically more potent to shoot down enemy aircraft than artillery pieces on the ground. Nothing has changed since then as this is a matter of simple physics. A missile shot from an aircraft has already speed, doesn't need to climb as high and obviously the pilot with his speedy weapons platform can change places far more quicker than a land based one to get the optimum firing solution. — ssu

This is an inaccurate idea of how air defense works.

Fighters are not efficient at air defense at all.

Consider the amount of resources it would take to keep fighters in the air 24/7 in sufficient numbers to cover all important areas in Ukraine. Multiply that number by three to account for the fact that for every plane in the sky there are two on the ground (repairs/maintenance, refitting/refueling). Couple that with the fact that fighters are able to carry only a handful of anti-air missiles to stop salvos of dozens of Russian missiles/drones.

For the Ukrainians this would be completely unfeasible, even without taking the threat of Russian anti-air into consideration.

Hence if Ukraine wants cut off the land bridge to Crimea or some other do outstanding stuff, it is extemely difficult and perhaps impossible without denting the Russian GBAD. The are only few MiG-29s now capable of firing HARM missiles with the Ukraine Air Force. — ssu

Also suggesting a somewhat inaccurate idea of how SEAD works.

AGM-88s are no magic bullets. In fact, they're pretty old.

Modern anti-air systems like S-300, S-400, Pantsir, etc. can shoot these missiles down, and it would take absolutely massive volleys to get through a layered defense like what the Russians use. (Not to mention anti-radiation missiles only destroy radar transmitters. To actually destroy an AA installation it would take a lot more).

Again, considering the resources the Ukrainians have, it is rather unlikely their aim is to degrade the Russian air defenses in any serious way.


What SEAD might be able to accomplish for the Ukrainians is to provide temporary defensive cover to accomodate air strikes.

And in line with what Mearsheimer argued, I think this is likely what the Ukrainians plan to do with the F-16s.

Again, I think this incel problem is indicative of a wider trend among all the young (not just males) - increased isolation and social atomization, increased anxiety, depression, etc.

The 'digital age' is doing a number on kids and young adults, by completely socially (and mentally) disregulating them.

Perfectly normal people are unable to find a mate, and are looking for answers why. Predictably, some become very resentful.

My sense is that a certain subgroup of people - extravert, confident, etc. - are still able to go about their social needs through the dating scene/dating apps/clubbing, whereas the more introverted, shy types completely miss the boat, since those types have always relied on a more gradual type of relation-building - something which is becoming harder and harder.

Because of pacification of the held areas, Russia isn't advancing? — ssu

That's my view, yes. Taking too much territory would greatly increase the risk of an insurgency materializing, which is almost certainly what actors like the United States are trying accomplish in the background.

How about the simple fact that neither side has the capability for large-scale maneuver warfare [...] — ssu

That's compatible with my view. The Russians may not be in a hurry to rebuild their offensive capability if they're not planning on lauching a new offensive in the near future.

It should be noted though, that the Russians have mobilized several hundred thousand men and have an elaborate arms industry, so I think the question of whether Russia is currently capable of lauching a new offensive is somewhat ambiguous.

How did that Russian winter offensive go? Ah, they got Bakhmut! — ssu

Bakhmut wasn't an offensive, and there haven't been any real offensives since the initial invasion.

Bakhmut was more like a siege. A slow strangulation. Mainly attrition warfare. More than anything it looked opportunistic, taking advantage of weaknesses in the Ukrainian line the Russians took the area around Soledar and Krasna Hora, after which they partially encircled Bakhmut and sent Wagner in to do the dirty work.

It will take time for Russia to transform into a wartime economy, [...] — ssu

I'm no expert on the Russian economy, but according to Mearsheimer Russia isn't mobilizing to a war economy.

And as those Ukrainian air defence systems have been mainly from Cold War stocks and the factories for additional missiles lie in Russia, Ukraine is urging for fighters and seems that the US obviously has noticed this problem and will start to give those fighters. — ssu

F-16s can't fill the role of ground-based anti-air systems, so I would probably look for a different explanation. Especially since Russia sports one of the most sophisticated AA networks in the world, and the F-16s would have to contend with that.

Mearsheimer speculates that the F-16s are brought in to compensate for the lack of Ukrainian artillery, since (according to Mearsheimer) the Americans have ran out of artillery they can spare.

A recent talk by John Mearsheimer on the Ukraine war, in which he delves into quite a bit of detail:



Some interesting points he makes:

- Mearsheimer believes the Russians will aim to (eventually) annex a little under 50% of Ukraine, including Odessa and large parts east of the Dnieper river.

- The war has turned out to be a classic war of attrition, that the Russians stand to win due to factors of population and artillery imbalance. Mearsheimer estimates casualty exchange ratios to be roughly 2:1 in favor of the Russians. This is likely a conservative estimate as he also cites sources stating 3:1 or even 4:1 (in favor of the Russians). The 7:1 exchange ratio in favor of the Ukrainians that is regularly cited in news media he considers a bogus claim, considering Russia holds between a 5-10:1 artillery advantage. (Artillery being the primary factor in a war of attrition.)

- In the Q&A Mearsheimer explains the role of the Biden administration in the outbreak of the war, pointing out that Biden was in charge of the Ukraine portfolio when vice-president under Obama, and was notoriously hawkish. He also notes that upon his election Biden likely took this view in relation to Ukraine further, 'doubled down', causing the increase in tensions shortly after his election in 2021.

I personally think 'the Daltons': Biden, Sullivan, Blinken and Nuland, are the individuals who bear the primary responsibility for the outbreak of this conflict. They have been involved in Ukraine (and with each other) and sown the seeds for conflict for over a decade.


I would add to Mearsheimer's second point that it's somewhat clear why the war turned into a war of attrition during this stage. Russia is not looking to take large chunks of territory while the occupied areas are still being pacified, and thus with more or less stationary fronts attrition is the way the Russians can still erode the Ukrainian fighting strength, which they seem to have been successful at.

I mean, take a look at the posts in this thread. The stigmatization should be obvious.

I wonder how many incels are also virgins. I don't think it's healthy for people to stay virgins for too long into their adolesence (unless they really want to). Sex will start to take a mythical place in one's mind, that in my experience it really doesn't deserve. Love does, but sex doesn't.

Maybe incels should muster the courage to visit a prostitute at some point. :grin:


I was referring to the social stigmatization. The rejection these men experience probably can't be called abuse in most cases, but their suffering is real. Unresolved suffering may lead to abuse, and an environment which is unable to recognize the dynamic will perpetuate and worsen that cycle.

I'm not rooting for any team. I think you are, and that's why you're so eager to project that onto others who post here when things don't go the way you want them to.

The frustration is palpable, but it is yours.

Keep it to yourself or express it in a less passive-aggressive way. Don't burden others with your emotion.

Bakhmut has finally fallen it seems. Both sides more or less confirmed it.

One thing that popped out to me about the last weeks is the barrage of misinformation from both sides. From an apparent Russian "crisis of command" featuring Prigozhin, to the Ukrainians 'pushing the Russians back', mere days before the final push for the city. In hindsight, it all seems phoney to me - attempts at shaping the information landscape or playing the public.


The coming period will be interesting, to see if and where the Russians may continue to push for ground.

My guess is that they will, since there are other Ukrainian cities in precarious positions, like Adviivka. Adviivka is under threat of being encircled, much like Bakhmut was, and has been subjected to Russian attacks for a long time.


There was also the matter of the Patriot - Kinzhal encounter. Very interesting from a military perspective, since they're both modern missile systems.

My guess is the Ukrainian forces received either Patriot PAC-2 or PAC-3 , both of which have been designed with the purpose of ballistic (read: hypersonic) missile defense. Therefore, if this weapon system was able to take down Kinzhal missiles it should come as no surprise. In fact, countering Kinzhal probably was the reason Patriot was shipped to Ukraine.

Typically, when roughly equal missile systems compete, the attacker will seek to saturate the defending missile systems in order to overwhelm it. In this case it seems Kinzhal managed to overwhelm a Patriot battery with some ~six Kinzhal missiles. Five were reportedly shot down. Possibly other types of lower generation missiles were included in this salvo as well, but those are details we cannot access.

All in all, very interesting but not very shocking.

I don't want to be an apologist for their behaviours either. — ChatteringMonkey

Problematic behavior almost always stems from suffering, and in the case of incels that's pretty clear. Recognizing that doesn't make you an apologist.

The incels represent a resistance to the liberation of women, but this is its self-image, its ideology, a manifestation of an underlying problem--and, I would say, a self-consciously countercultural reaching back to a patriarchal worldview that they have not in fact developed naturally from their communities. — Jamal

I would interpret it differently.

Incels' resentment towards women probably has little to do with any real social theory, and more to do with something as simple as continuous rejection, or the perception of such. "You hurt me, I hurt you."

I say perception, because probably a great deal of these 'incels' aren't quite as undesirable as they believe to be. As many have pointed out, people of all shapes and sizes find partners and get married, and that has always been the case. So the question is where they get these notions of worthlessness and undesirableness.

Perhaps it's communicated implicitly through popular culture, which floods the young with artificial imagery of what success looks like. Perhaps it's through lack of a father figure or male role models. Maybe it's a combination of both.

Why do they choose to be miserable? — Vera Mont

The social stigmatization, which is on full display in this thread, is probably a large part of the reason.

The term 'cycle of abuse' comes to mind.

The addictive, 'social contagion/social pressure' dynamics of social media also play a big role. I agree.

It probably doesn't help that social media software is almost exclusively designed by the nerdy types that are mainly interested in numbers and maximizing the effectiveness of algorithms, and seem to lack awareness that their products are affecting are actual people.

They shouldn't be expected to do it all on their own. What happened to their support network? The adult mentors and community organizers, coaches, teachers, scout-masters, den-mothers, big sisters and brothers, and church-ladies? — Vera Mont

A good question.

My take on this is that parents are more overworked than ever, and lack their own support network to fall back on, which in previous generations was provided by for example grandparents and the extended family, perhaps even an entire neighbourhood. Again we see social atomization.

The more people who are genuinely involved, the more balanced the child's upbringing will be. For today's young it's more likely to be the opposite; that only their parents are involved.

If they even have both parents. The number of single parent households have been steadily increasing over the last decades, and I'd be interested to see if there's any link between that and the many problems plaguing today's young. I'd wager a bet that there is.

In essence what it does is widen the community to which one must conform to he seen or heard. Thus expectations are much higher across such a broad sphere than they ever would have been in a small close knit circle of friends.

Being aware of global society from our phones, we are aware of greater heights of beauty, greater depths of skill - from extreme sports to cooking to all sorts. We see the best of the best in every discipline going viral. — Benj96

It's an interesting dynamic, but I'm not convinced of its importance. For example, weren't high standards of beauty already available to everyone before the era of social media, through things like magazines and TV?

I think the more important dimension is the one you address here:

What used to be genuine popularity for your authentic self has become being a brand, self promoting, being all things to all people, and if you can't, fake it till you make it/edit the shit out of yourself, and this just isn't a true social relationship like the ones that evolved for millenia. — Benj96

And on social media platforms, what one shows to the outside world is malleable.

It encourages young people to adopt fake personas - something that almost always goes hand in hand with the rejection of the authentic self and leads to a myriad of mental issues.