Describe a society without taxes, ... — Christoffer

Sure, but before I do, do you agree that taxation is essentially taking people's things at gunpoint?

If we can't agree on that, there's no point in discussing an alternative because you don't seem persuaded that there is any necessity for an alternative.

In the US you could (conditionally) get 5 years behind bars, ... — jorndoe

That's assuming you would start paying taxes after the sentence.

If you don't pay taxes, you'll spend your life behind bars.

By the way, Somalia has no taxes, but I wouldn't recommend going there. (Hint?) — jorndoe

I suppose the next time someone brings up gun violence in the US I will recommend them to immigrate somewhere with stricter gun laws. :snicker:

In almost 60 years of paying various taxes, I never saw a gun. — Vera Mont

There are literal guns stashed in the police office down the road, and they will literally be used if you don't want to go to jail after not to paying your taxes.

Let me emphasize that taxation is completely dependent upon very real and literal threats of violence.

yes

I addressed that comment. You seem to believe the Russians may have wanted Kiev, I stated that taking Kiev was never feasible given the size of the invasion force.

I skipped over the bit about Kremlin propaganda, because obviously I'm not going to try and decipher the 'true' meanings behind Kremlin propaganda.

If there are more points hidden in there, you'll have to state them more clearly.

To be clear, I'm not going to read through several articles to try and figure out what point you're trying to make.

↪Tzeentch, that wasn't quite the point. Maybe then switch to the term "commune" (or "collective" or something) instead of "state"? — jorndoe

There would be no such thing in any offical capacity, or it would just be the state under a different name, and thus totalitarianism under a different name.

What communism proposes as its end stage is quite idyllic. No one possesses anything. The "commune" doesn't possess anything. The leaders don't possess anything, no secret state that we now call a commune that continues to levy taxes, etc.

People living together in harmony, producing what they can and taking what they need.

Conflating selfishness and individualism is a collectivist canard as old as the word itself, and flips the dictum that man is a social animal on its head. I can’t take anyone who repeats it that seriously because it posits a glaringly false anthropology, that man is a fundamentally anti-social animal—as soon as individuals were set free from the bonds of subordination and are afforded rights they’d become hermits and care only for themselves. — NOS4A2

Well said.

I'll try to sprinkle some more in my opinion's and in my view's in there, but if you find the logic to sound authoritative then draw your conclusions I suppose.

... while seemingly ignoring other parts of the story. — jorndoe

Just state plainly what you would like me to address.

Without the crucial step of the almighty state abolishing itself, communism is literally just totalitarianism, and sadly previous attempts at reaching the stateless utopia have stranded in exactly that situation.

Had it not been for the obvious flaw in this plan, I would have been a communist myself.

No state, imagine that!

There is no state in the end stage of communism. No state to own things, no state to levy taxes. No state, period.

Pretty much everything discussed in this thread is speculative.

If there's something specific I haven't adressed please state it plainly, because your posts aren't always easy to decipher.

Must be tough hearing a spade being called a spade all the time, huh?

Against taxes (along the lines of NOS4A2)?
That would rule out communism and whatever socialist aspects of society. — jorndoe

Yes and no.

Taxes are literally taken from you at gunpoint. I am against taking things from other people at gunpoint, whether it's done by a common thug or a state.

I'm not against voluntarily contributing to one's community.

Communism proposes the absence of a state and self-governance. That doesn't imply taxes.

Obviously an almighty state will never abolish itself, so the communist utopia is pretty much a pipedream, but that's a different discussion.

This doesn't explain continued offensive operations against Bakhmut. If the goal is to sit back and consolidate gains, why keep attacking? — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are myriad possibilities for why they continue to pressure the Ukrainian lines.

Securing local tactical advantages, degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability, pressuring the Ukrainian forces to keep them off balance and unable to recuperate, etc.

Since they've been at it for several months, my impression is that whatever it is, they probably believe it's working in their favor.

This is inconsistent with continued Russian offensive operations. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I think it is definitely consistent.

That they do not intend to take large amounts of territory does not mean there aren't many other purposes those offensive operations might have, some of which I already listed.

But Russia isn't sitting back and waiting for Ukraine to attack entrenched positions, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's probably because the Ukrainian forces lack any offensive capabilities, and if the Russians had any intention of further degrading the Ukrainian fighting capability they would have to bring the fight to them.

Given the shortage of armored vehicles and of well-motivated, well-trained troops on both sides, I would consider regiment-scale operations (3,000-5,000 soldiers) to constitute major efforts. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's besides the point.

In my view, we haven't seen any large-scale offensives intent on taking large amounts of territory since the initial invasion.

No one is questioning that there is intense fighting going on around Bakhmut. The question is what purpose that fighting serves, and the capture of territory to me seems an unlikely explanation.

If their goal is to hold all of Kherson Oblast, ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Some point needs to be made as to its strategic relevance weighed against the cost of holding it. We can make guesses towards the former, but for the latter we simply lack all relevant information.

However we can use the Russian actions to make an educated guess and my view is that the Russians leaving Kherson voluntarily points towards it neither being particularly stragetically relevant, nor the Russians being willing to pay a high cost for holding it.

Russia withdrew from the Kyiv and Sunny axes. It left Kharkiv retreating past Kupiansk because of a general rout in which it turned over warehouses full of munitions and hundreds of vehicles. It withdrew from Kherson City and the general environs, .... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure.

I don't see how that would be incompatible with the theory I've put forward.

I am not sure how Russia failing to take meaningful amounts of territory for almost 12 months, despite carrying out large scale offensive operations, while also losing control of meaningful amounts of territory, is not evidence that they can't take more territory. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The theory is pretty straightforward.

1. Russia invades, threatening Kyiv to force negotiations, while occupying the most strategically relevant areas in the south (land bridge to Crimea).

2. Negotiations fail, so Russia switches gear for prolonged war. The Russian army was overstretched and pulled back its lines to something more stable. This was mistakenly perceived (or deceptively marketed?) as a "Ukrainian offensive", which it clearly wasn't.

3. With the prospect of prolonged war and having to take parts of Ukraine by force, Russia's primary concern becomes the prevention of an insurgency. This means it will seek to pacify areas it occupies before conquering more territory - the 'bite-sized chunks' approach. This could take months, or even years.

4. Meanwhile local tactical battles are fought, with the primary goal of degrading the Ukrainian fighting capabilities.

Some other points:
- Neither Ukraine nor Russia has carried out large-scale offensives since the start of the invasion.
- It's debatable whether the territory lost by Russia was meaningful. Some argument has to be put forward as to why these areas would be strategically relevant. The fact that the Russians gave up most of that territory without a fight implies the opposite. Movement patterns of the Russian forces across the areas of northern Ukraine also do not imply the intent to hold for prolonged periods of time. You can still view these patterns on sites like https://liveuamap.com.

That's the positive side of individualism, but the negatives like social fragmentation, inequality, egoism and selfishness, lack of social responsibility, loss of meaning and connection. — Christoffer

What I'm trying to get across is that those negatives aren't necessarily the result of individualism.

Individualism first and foremost states that the individual has inherent value, and from a moral perspective cannot simply be bulldozed by states or collectives. In my opinion, that idea is the very cornerstone of humanism. Wherever the value of the individual is not acknowledged we find, pretty much categorically, inhumanity. Human rights and constitutions are based on the idea that individuals have rights. I could go on.

This is why I find it deeply disturbing that people on this forum have taken such an adversarial stance towards individualism, apparently attributing to it all the negative traits of our society.

Individuals left to their own devices will generally seek voluntary, mutual beneficial relations with others. They will pursue happiness, but that happiness often includes the happiness of others. They will prefer coexistence over conflict, etc.

Note also that individualism understands every individual to have inherent value, so self-aggrandizement at the expense of others - egotism - has nothing to do with individualism.

It's not individualism that is a sham. It's our western society pretending it works for the benefit of the individual that is the sham.

In fact, there's nothing individualist about our society. In the west it is not uncommon for half one's income to be taken directly in the form of tax. Meanwhile governments infringe pretty much at will upon individuals' constitutional and human rights whenever it suits them.

These are signs of a deeply collectivist society. We simply do a good job at hiding that fact, because governments have no interest in furthering ideas that would seek to limit the powers of government. Likewise, people who seek power over others have no interest in futhering ideas that seeks to take that power away.

Better pretend that philosophies of individual worth and freedom are the problem.

ChatGTP seems very good at pencil pushing, and considering that's what 99% of the scientific field seems to consist of these days, I see a match made in heaven.

Also, whenever I hear of programs like ChatGTP, I like to imagine the future relation between humans and AI will look something like this:

As I stated, occupying and holding Kiev against a defending force would be an extremely costly operation in terms of both manpower and time. To me it seems completely infeasible and I think it is unlikely that was their goal.

My view is that by threatening Kiev they hoped to bring the West / Ukraine to negotiate about Ukraine's position. Given the geopolitical situation between the US and China, it's not surprising they thought the West would be open to this as opposed to prolonged war.

Negotations did take place in the early stages of the war, and purportedly a peace plan was close to being signed when the US blocked the negotiations.

If negotations failed, the operations in the north would double as a diversion for operations in the south, which is where the Russians' primary territorial goals would lie in case a diplomatic solution was impossible.

It has zero track record on a large scale. A label is not a system. — Vera Mont

This sounds like the "not real communism" argument.

Communism, as stated earlier, is a clearly defined way of governing states.

As such, there are clear examples of it. The Soviet Union, Maoist China, Vietnam, Cambodia, etc.


I'm assuming you have an idealized version of communism in mind, that (hopefully) doesn't include all the atrocity.

What you need is to put a new term on that idealized, non-horrific version of communism and call it something else, because there's no point in trying to defend something that has been so utterly and completely poisoned by its real, real-life implementations.

Put an incorruptible AI administrator in charge instead of self-proclaimed leaders who seek power, glory and wealth.
It isn't the system that corrupts the organizers; it's the organizers who corrupt the system - every system. — Vera Mont

I agree with the last part wholeheartedly - we (humanity) are for the most part trying to limit the damage done by the corrupt organizers.

Whether AI is the solution is a question I'll leave for another thread.

The Kyiv Axis utilized 70,000 soldiers and 7,000 vehicles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That figure is nowhere to be found in, for example, the ISW day-by-day campaign assessments.

Those instead speak of 31 BTGs (which would roughly amount to between 19,000 and 25,000 troops) being committed along the operational direction of Kiev.

Do note that I'm less interested in their assessments, and more interested in the information they are sharing.

If one axis out of six has one third of your entire invasion force, it's unlikely to be a diversion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Given the relatively small size of the Russian invasion force (outnumbered from the start), it's unlikely occupying and holding Kiev was ever their goal.

If Hersh's figure of ~60,000 Ukrainian defenders was accurate it would have taken the entire Russian invading force and likely a months-long battle to take the city.

And was Kharkiv just a longer diversion? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Kharkiv showed much the same pattern as Kiev, with few casualties over a two-month period, not indicative of intense fighting. The order of battle here too implies no sufficient numerical advantage for the Russian side, thus unlikely a committed assault to occupy and hold.

By this logic, Russia began shelling residential blocks in the suburbs and pounding Kiev proper with missiles "just to make their diversion more realistic." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yea, sounds like a textbook military diversion if you ask me.

A bit odd that you seem to be implying there's something off about the logic there. That's exactly how it would work.

So lets look at the basic facts around the Battle of Kiev as we know them.

The Battle of Kiev lasted a little over a month, with few known casualty figures, only that around 15 March, almost a month into the fighting, the Ukrainian side listed 162 soldiers killed.

What we know of the order of battle is that between 15,000 and 30,000 Russian troops participated in the battle.

Of the Ukrainian side we know some ~18,000 irregular forces participated, and a conspiciously "undisclosed" amount of Ukrainian regular forces.

Anyone with an iota of military understanding sees what picture this sketches.


- 162 killed after a month of combat implies low intensity fighting, entirely uncharacteristic of a classic blitz for the capital.
- 15,000 - 30,000 seems like a very low number to occupy and hold a city the size of Kiev - a city with 2.8 million inhabitants.
- With a classic blitz one would expect the attacker to aim for a 5:1 or at least 3:1 force ratio in order to ensure offensive success. The Russians weren't anywhere close to that.


In fact, they may have been outnumbered:

In one of his interviews, Seymour Hersh quotes a source saying Kiev was defended by some ~60,000 Ukrainian troops (unclear whether that included irregulars or not).

That would certainly explain why the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed, wouldn't it?

Hence, the diversion theory.


So , I don't see where you get the idea that "it's pretty clear" that the Russians wanted to take Kiev, when the available data certainly doesn't point to it.

Too much beating around the bush here. Communism is a well-defined system of governance, and one with an absolutely disastrous track record at that.

I understand that some people may sympathize with its ideals. I myself do too to some extent. Who wouldn't want a fair, idyllic, self-governed society that is the envisioned endgoal of communism?

Nirvana, however, is not for this world. And that has been made painfully clear throughout history.

"Not real communism", yada yada. We've heard it all before. Somehow the total centralization of power never seems to end in the state's abolishment, but instead, predictably, with totalitarianism.

If we want to discuss certain elements of communism, and how in a different setting they may benefit human societies, that's all fine and good. But right now we seem to be stuck in a state of cognitive dissonance between the pretty ideal and the ugly reality.

Lets answer the question: "is communism a feasible method of organizing states and large communities?" once and for all with a definitive 'no' (I mean, how many more corpses would it take to convince you?), so that we may move on to new, hopefully more constructive ideas, that may or may not contain aspects of communism.

Let's definitively decouple our ideas of a better, fairer society from what is tried and tested communism, and forever close the lid on that abomination, so humanity doesn't have to repeat its blackest chapters.

I've put my arguments forward for all to criticize, and I'll happily defend them.

I gave you the opportunity to do just that, and you refused, hence my comment.

You've developed a habit of blowing hot air in this thread, and this seems to fit right into that trend.

Odd. Individualism seems to have been turned into a caricature, to be kicked by radicals who seek to justify their disagreement with people's individual choices.

I think you're confusing the collective with the state. — unenlightened

Communism as a means to organize states or similar large communities is the topic of this thread, so I'm not sure why you believe this is the result of confusion.

As per usual the individualist denies their responsibility for others and ignores their dependence on others. — unenlightened

This has nothing to do with individualism, which is a theory pertaining to the relation between states and individuals, bringing us things like individual rights, etc.

Individualism, if anything, points towards the state's responsibility for its citizens. It doesn't deny the responsibility of citizens.

Pictures and milbloggers don't sway me. That type of "evidence" is entirely compromised in today's day and age.

I stick with data that remains more or less undisputed, like troop numbers participating in certain battles, losses which were incurred, etc.

In my view, the Russians didn't seek to take large amounts of territory after the initial invasion.

They are instead seeking to pacify the occupied territories to avoid an insurgency from materializing. I believe that's the main goal of Russia's strategy in Ukraine, and I believe it is consistent with the theories I have shared in this thread thus far.

The actions on the ground after the initial invasion have largely been aimed at gaining local tactical advantages and degrading the Ukrainian military, which I think they have been successful at. (Even if the casualty ratios would favor Ukraine, Russia can simply afford to lose a lot more than Ukraine can).

A future invasion of Lithuania to connect to Kaliningrad is also not unthinkable. — Tzeentch

However, the idea that Russia is in a position to start a second war, one in which they essentially declare war on Finland, Turkey, Romania, Poland, France, the UK, and the US at once, while attacking through Belarus, thus making them protect a large area with no real military force of its own, is absolutely preposterous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note the use of the word future.

_______________________________________________________________


How come you never replied to:

↪frank
What are in your eyes some clear indications of China's power in the Ukraine conflict? And in a similar vein, what are in your view some clear indications of Russia's "future submission" to China?

Any specific events in which the Chinese influenced the war in Ukraine to their benefit? Or events in which Russia was made to serve Chinese interests as an indicator of China's influence over Russia? — Tzeentch

I think you're confusing individualism and atomization - the latter signifying the disintegration of social bonds, individuals thus becoming atomized, isolated, 'groupless', etc. - a situation most individuals find highly disagreeable.

Atomization is made possible because the state takes over roles which were previously fulfilled by social networks, and exacerbated by things like digitalization and mass media.

As per usual, the state (the collective) is the problem, and not the cure.

To make a long story short, we disagree on some key points.

Most importantly, I believe the situation for Ukraine is a lot more dire than western media are letting on.

Second, I believe the Russian approach of occupying parts of Ukraine in 'bite-sized chunks' is a deliberate strategy.

Feasible as what?

As a form of government to nation states?

We've ample examples where that didn't work - in fact, it created about as close to hell on Earth as we could ever be. And it wasn't a fluke either. It managed to produce that on multiple occasions.

If I had to make an educated guess as to why communism applied to nation states seems to end up that way, it's because of the amount of centralized power the state acquires upon abolishing private property. Since everything still has to be controlled, you end up with the same flawed individuals running the institutions, but this time with near-godlike power.

The problem is those flawed individuals running the show. It's the same folks everywhere. And the difference between hell and limbo seems to be how much power we give them.

What are in your eyes some clear indications of China's power in the Ukraine conflict? And in a similar vein, what are in your view some clear indications of Russia's "future submission" to China?

Any specific events in which the Chinese influenced the war in Ukraine to their benefit? Or events in which Russia was made to serve Chinese interests as an indicator of China's influence over Russia?

I think the most significant player on the scene now is neither the US nor Russia. It's China. — frank

I disagree, but I would like to hear what you believe China's contribution to this conflict is, that warrants being called the most significant player on the scene.

What I think is important for Europeans and Ukrainians to consider, is that the more adversarial our stance towards Russia becomes, the greater their territorial ambitions will become.

A lot of the political situation we see in Eastern Europe today is a result of a past mutual understanding between NATO and Russia. This included Ukraine's independence, and for example political anomalies like Kaliningrad and Transnistria.

If these mutual understandings disintegrate further, these situations will become new hotbeds for conflict.

I'm quite convinced that Russia will seek to connect to Transnistria if some form of agreement cannot be reached in Ukraine.

A future invasion of Lithuania to connect to Kaliningrad is also not unthinkable.

I doubt the Russians would voluntarily initiate such hostilities, but if relations with the West become highly adversarial they will likely feel like they have no other options, which is essentially what happened in Ukraine.

The idea that if we just push hard enough the Russians will back down is in my opinion a foolish and very dangerous misunderstanding.

However, this contradicts the apparent policy to prop up Ukraine as long as possible without ever negotiating. — boethius

Well, the people in the Pentagon aren't dummies either. My guess is by now they have fully realized Russia's plans to take it as slowly as it needs to in order to avoid an insurgency. Perhaps the Pentagon even understood this before the war fully got underway. If we can conceive of these ideas, so can they.

If they knew Russia was going for a 'bite-sized chunks' approach, then they don't have to do much in order for Ukraine to hold out for a long time, since it's already baked into the Russian strategy. I imagine the pacification of the occupied areas may take months, perhaps even years.

Additionally, for all we know the Russians may not desire any more land beyond what they have occupied now, at which point any further support for Ukraine would be pointless.


So I think the view I've shared fits very neatly into this picture of the Pentagon not seemingly overly fussed about supporting Ukraine, even in terms of bare necessities like ammunition.

The western strategy so far seems more preoccupied with public opinion and appearances than it is with the actual situation on the battlefield.

I agree that there was never a plan to occupy more territory than the Russian speaking regions they currently have, but I'd also agree with ssu that plan A was a negotiated resolution with Kiev. The purpose of encircling Kiev to bring the war to the capital and put the diplomatic pressure for a negotiation, and if not, then it occupies the large majority of Ukrainian forces (i.e. is also a giant fixing operation, as the capital is always the priority) while the Southern regions are occupied and pacified. — boethius

I don't want to toot my own horn, but the advance on Kiev having been a dual-purpose operation is a theory I've been sharing here for close to a year now. (And I still believe it is true, so we're in agreement there).

I'm glad more people are starting to see it that way, since initially it was met with a lot of skepticism.

While it seems clear the goal is to prop up Ukraine and never negotiate, the commitment to that long term seems low, as ramping up production of munitions doesn't happen and sooner the better and simply maintaining the status quo on the front requires constant supply of munitions.

There's report now of batteries simply running out of shells and having no resupply for days, and very little when it comes in. One counter narrative is the shells are being saved for the big counter offensive, which I guess is possible but is still not a good position to be in.

It seems to just be taken for granted by Western powers that they can't produce all that many shells.

This whole running low of ammunition is honestly a confusing part of the situation. It doesn't seem possible as an oversight, and that it's industrially impossible for the entire West to produce more shells seems implausible, and if it's a deliberate decision then it's difficult to make sense of. If it's policy, then my best guess is that it was calculated that Ukraine simply cannot sustain their operation beyond a certain date (in terms of casualties and all sorts of other supplies such as AA missiles) and there was therefore no use in increasing production of shells. Or then maybe it's all a ruse. — boethius

My guess is that the situation is a lot more dire than western sources are letting on, and that even copious amounts of ammunition would not make any significant difference on the battlefield.

A lot of folks seem to believe the Ukrainian forces have "ground the Russians to a halt", but I think that's wrong.

I think the Russians have for the most part stopped pushing for territory, and are now consolidating what they have taken.

This was likely their plan from the start, since the threat of a Ukrainian insurgency was ever-present, and taking too much territory that they couldn't effectively control and pacify would be a guarantee for such an insurgency to materialize. A while back I shared a CSIS panel discussion in which the panelists outright stated that is what they (the Americans) could and would do. The person from the panel who claimed this apparently played a major role in the American-led insurgency against the Russians in Afghanistan.

When/if the Russians will at some point in the future seek to take more territory from Ukraine probably depends on multiple factors, the most important of which is whether the West can be made to acknowledge Russian security concerns vis-à-vis Ukraine.

If the West refuses, either because the US strongarms the EU, or because the EU remains ignorant, likely more Russian aggression will follow. Though even then it remains to be seen whether their aim is to take all of Ukraine, or only those areas which are strategically relevant - it's even possible that what they hold now is all they intend to take.

Note that the US doesn't care about instability in Eastern Europe - it in fact believes it to be instrumental to their goals among which are unity and remilitarization of Europe. Ironically, Europe seems to be the key to peace.

If you're interested in this kind of thing - human peak experiences and how they relate to reality, metaphysics, etc., I would highly suggest getting into Plato and the Neoplatonists.

They essentially sought to explore and understand the peak experience without the religious hooey.

Macron on Taiwan: 'An ally not a vassal', says France leader

Not directly linked to the Ukraine war, but since Europe's position of subservience towards the US has been discussed here many times, I thought I'd share it anyway.

Can we finally expect to see Europe steer a more independent course? What possible consequences could that have for Europe's involvement in Ukraine?

For anything substantial to happen, Germany would also need to be on board, and it still suffers under a weak leader.