How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms? — neomac

The U.S. acts self-interestedly to maintain its position of domination (basic realism).

About the term hubris I would change nothing, because that's exactly what it is. The U.S. has been acting with severe disregard for other nations' interests, and that behavior is now undermining its own power.

All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post? — neomac

NATO expansion.

There is a misunderstanding. — neomac

The only misunderstanding here is that you seem to believe babbling on about cognitive dissonance is going to help your case any.

Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO — neomac

The problem is the one I have described earlier: the U.S. was in the process of turning Ukraine into a U.S. ally on a bilateral basis, completely circumventing NATO.

The Germans and the French had no power to stop that.

Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. — neomac

With the current condition being large-scale war between Russia and what is basically a NATO proxy, their opinions are even more irrelevant than they were in times of peace.

The European powers are a bunch of suckers, piggybacking on the U.S. defense budget and apparently believing that will not completely wipe out their bargaining power.

They're essentially U.S. vassals given the illusion of relevance.

I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine ... — neomac

With the amount of bilateral support it was receiving from the U.S., I would pretty much exclude that possibility.

I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. — neomac

We've got U.S. officials admitting to sending Ukraine billions of USD of support prior to 2014, and to being deeply involved in constructing the post-coup government in Ukraine.

Clearly the U.S. was involved, supported the coup and, as I said earlier, I am still entertaining the hypothesis that the U.S. largely orchestrated it. We know the U.S. is capable of such things, and its fingerprints are all over it.

(why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?) — neomac

You can't seriously believe that the Russians would be content to dangle Crimea by a single bridge.

If any real attempt at attacking Crimea were made, that bridge would not last a single day.

If Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason [...], something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, — neomac

A war of this magntitude requires planning and preparation, obviously. Besides, they did not have the power of hindsight and did seek to exhaust the alternatives. Even late into 2021 the Russians were still trying to pursue a diplomatic solution.

so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable — neomac

The U.S. started arming Ukraine shortly after the 2014 coup and subsequent invasion of Crimea.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/ — neomac

Seems like a rather weak article to me, that presupposes the Russian invasion was a complete failure. While that seems to be part of the western narrative, I see little evidence to suggest it is true.

The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.

Mearsheimer makes that point in detail.

According to Wikipedia, the U2 flies at a maximum altitude of about 70,000 feet and the edge of space is defined as about 300,000 feet. — T Clark

What exactly is considered national air space is up for debate, but the U.S. defines Class A controlled air space as the space from 18,000 feet above MSL up to and including 60,000 feet above MSL.

A good case could be made for extending national air space all the way into space, though.

Whatever definition is being used probably depends on whose spy planes have just been caught and at what altitude they were flying.

I said I don't understand why it is such a big deal. — T Clark

I don't live in the U.S., so I couldn't tell you how it feels when a nation you could be at war with tomorrow was performing reconnaissance over your nation's nuclear missile silos, but I don't imagine it feels very pleasant.

Just to repeat of a small snippet I included in the OP, the last time a confirmed hostile aircraft was shot down over U.S. soil, the U.S. entered WW2.

Obviously this cannot be compared to Pearl Harbour, but it goes to show that an incident such as this one is quite extraordinary.

I think we're already in that period. I'm very worried about where the war in Ukraine will lead. On the other hand, I think the idea that Russia and China will somehow "band together against the U.S. to challenge its position as hegemon," is wrongheaded on three counts. 1) Most importantly, the US's position as "hegemon" is going to over soon whether we like it or not. That's not because of China and Russia in particular but more because other countries, some former third world, are taking a larger role in the world. 2) That's probably a good thing, both for the world and the US. 3) Russia and China are in no position to become hegemons. Russia is very weak except for nuclear weapons. China is still a limited thread, although it is growing. 4) Neither Ukraine nor Taiwan is worth risking a wider war with other nuclear powers. Hey, wait. That's more than three. I could probably come up with more. — T Clark

I see all four points as perfectly compatible with my statement, so I'm not sure why you believe it is wrongheaded. Though I do believe that Russia and China will be the primary players challenging the US. Countries like India and Brazil seem less likely to do so, but will also challenge US hegemony indirectly by simply acting more as independent actors.

This is not true. Look up "U2 incident 1960." — T Clark

U2 reconnaissance aircraft flew on the edge of space, far above what is normally considered "national air space". So technically the U.S. did not invade Soviet air space in 1960.

You'll find a handful of air space violations happened during the Cold War, but exceptions confirm the rule as they say.

I maintain that these are quite uncommon, and at least overt violations are and were avoided because they tended to end very badly for the pilots involved.

I'm not saying it's not important, but why such a big deal? — T Clark

The first reason would be, because it's illegal under international law, just like violating national waters is illegal. Both are essentially breaches of a nation's sovereignty.

The second is that a nation's air space (especially that of superpowers) is heavily surveilled for purposes of national defense and security. All the missile defense systems in the world are not going to help if the enemy launches its attack when it's already ontop of one's cities.

During peace time the risk of an attack is negligible. However in a period like this, where large-scale conflict has already broken out in Europe and can break out tomorrow in the Pacific, an incident like this is not so innocent anymore.

Those balloons could have carried anything. Nuclear devices, biological agents, you name it. And the ballons apparently were carrying some sort of payload. I haven't heard any update regarding the nature, though.

Another factor was that the balloon was spotted over Montana where the U.S. houses a large portion of its nuclear silos. A nation's nuclear deterrent is about as classified as it gets, so having a potential enemy collect information about it is alarming to say the least.

I found this interesting article on the legality of the situation. I'm not qualified to judge it's contents, but it seems reasonable. — T Clark

Interesting to read.

The Chinese claim that the balloon(s?) invaded sovereign air space by mistake seems plausible, though also a bit predictable.

More interesting was how the act of shooting down the balloons was viewed, as the Pentagon apparently on several occasions made statements that would imply the shooting down of the balloon may have been unlawful.

To clarify once more my views, my general argument is not that Americans supported NATO enlargement due to a current military threat posed by Russia to Europe or the US. But that the US did so driven by the need to shape a global order ensuring the American hegemony in a post-Cold War era in the longer term (e.g. by controlling international legal and economic institutions like EU and global market) wrt the evolving security challenges posed by main hegemonic competitors (e.g. China in Asia and Russia in Europe), and pretty aware of all the implied risks (including e.g. overstretch, militarisation, provocation). On the other side, in the post-Cold War era the European interest of preserving/enlarging NATO was to let NATO deal with regional and global security concerns (for historical reasons France and the UK were more worried about Germany, while central-eastern europeans were likely worried about Russia), and to focus on economic development and integration, while being pretty aware of the implied risks (demilitarisation, conflict of interests especially between East and West Europe wrt Russia, provocation, etc.). I tried to roughly summarise the American carrot&stick strategy (economic globalisation vs NATO expansion or US interventionism) elsewhere in these terms: — neomac

:up:

If you ground your expectations on your realist geopolitical views and at the same time you hold moral beliefs fundamentally incompatible with those expectations, then there is a cognitive dissonance. — neomac

Nonsense. I suggest you debate me on arguments rather than attempting to make things personal.

[...] you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac

I'd say it's a fairly accurate description of how the United States acts. I could have used more objective terms.

Here for more details: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report_The%20Kremlin%27s%20Worldview_March%202019.pdf — neomac

I might read this later, but I don't consider these kinds of reports very valuable. In 2019 the inevitability of conflict was already well-understood among political elites, and they were probably already busy "shaping the battlefield".

The writer of that report for example served under the post-Maidan Ukrainian government.

Take the example of the Orange Revolution. — neomac

There's no question that the West and Russia sought to influence Ukraine prior to 2008, but I explicitly used the term "security competition".

On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac

They can't, which is part of the reason why I consider myself a realist. But that doesn't change the fact that any reasonable human being desires peace.

Geopolitical actors simply aren't very reasonable when it comes to that. They are only reasonable when it comes to maximizing their power.

I have no illusions that geopolitical actors will ever pursue policies that are compatible with my moral views.

You can stop spinning your cognitive dissonance yarn now. Didn't I recall you saying something about intellectual dishonesty?

You yourself keep overlooking the fact that for 15 years Russian security concerns led France and Germany to oppose Ukraine inside NATO. Plus, with pro-Russian governments, like Yanukovych’s, the Ukrainian cooperation with NATO wasn’t an issue for Putin, also because it didn’t exclude a strategic partnership with Russia at all. I understand that Putin got more worried when Yanukovych was ousted , however the popular opinion in Ukraine still wasn’t favourable to joining NATO until Putin aggressed Ukraine in 2014 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). As if it wasn’t enough, his “special military operation” is eroding also the support Putin got from the Western Europeans. — neomac

As I have said earlier in this thread, I don't believe what the French or the Germans wanted, or even to a large extent what the Ukrainians themselves wanted, was very relevant to Russia's perception of the threat of Ukraine joining NATO.

And I would agree with that Russian assessment.

If the United States wanted Ukraine into NATO, it was going to pursue that policy whether the French, Germans or Ukrainians wanted it or not, and it would likely have succeeded also.

Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)
MAP is the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.
As a commitment it’s still pretty vague about timing and in any case conditional on a series of requirements which Ukraine must fulfil prior to submit candidature. Not to mention that to realists like Mearsheimer such international commitments do not deserve much credit. — neomac

The official statement was that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

There's nothing ambiguous about that.

Don't come at me with 2022 interpretations of what that sentence meant.

Moreover, NATO explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Bucharest declarations on several occasions. And the U.S. took away all doubt, if any remained, when it supported the 2014 coup d'etat.

Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac

All very regrettable, of course. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders were in the pocket of the West, sometimes in the pocket of the East. It was a delicate balance that they had to protect.

Hard to see this as evidence of "puppetization".

So whatever doubt about Russification/puppetization one might have had prior 2014... — neomac

After 2014 war was essentially inevitable, because from the Russian point of view, Crimea being cut off from Russia without a land bridge was unsustainable for the same reason Ukraine in NATO was unsustainable.

We must see everything after 2014 as the opening moves of war, and not as representative of policies prior, which is what you and many others here are trying to do.

It's a little crazy how quick things seem to be moving in the background, and how little of it reaches you unless you go looking for it.

Practically everything governments have done with regards to the pandemic has been brought into question.

Next on the list:



Good ol' vitamin D. Safe and effective. Who knew?

Well, we all did. Doctors, medical experts, my old granny and my hypothetical 6-year old brother.


Literally everybody knew this already, but so dependent on "experts" have we become that we need to wait until they tell us we can rely on our common sense, intuition and past experience again.


During the pandemic there was an effort to keep people indoors, away from the sun. Lockdowns, a bans on grouping, etc.

Scarcely a word about vitamin D supplementation from mainstream media or the political establishment (though political opposition seemed more aware of alternatives).

Is it really feasible to think that mankind forgot something so simple? What are we really looking at here? Incompetence bordering on the criminal, or was vitamin D simply not lucrative enough? Was it deemed "unhelpful" to give people the sense that they themselves held the key to their health by getting out in the sunshine or supplementing vitamin D?

My view is the same as the governments of Australia, US, Britain — Wayfarer

The "Anglosphere" for short.

It might be interesting for you to research the geopolitics surrounding the Anglosphere, their role as "island nations" and the implications that has for their relation with the Eurasian continent.

Perhaps that might help you perceive these nations less as honest brokers of truth, and more like independent political agents, with interests and agendas other than the benefit of all mankind.

That's a pretty extreme position to take, and there are serious indications that it is wrong.

For example, what do you make of academics and intellectuals that put a significant amount of the blame with the U.S. and the West? (Mearsheimer, Sachs, Chomsky, etc.)

And what about former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett going on record saying the U.S. stopped a truce from being made a few weeks into the conflict, even though both Russia and Ukraine were prepared for serious compromises?

Are they fools? Kremlin stooges? Pathological liars?

What about the (atleast) 15 year build up to this conflict? Irrelevant?

You need to ignore quite a bit of the information that is out there to take your position and I'm wondering about your justification for that.

The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence. — neomac

A-ha.

So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then?

Interesting theory.

That’s also why you are trapped in a cognitive dissonance, because you seem to hold realist expectations in geopolitics that systematically frustrate your idealistic moral standards or your relatable desire for peace. — neomac

Has the time already come for psychoanalzying?

Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that.

First, that Ukraine was “a bridge too far” wasn’t always so obvious as you seem to believe. Here is an interview with Sergej Lavrov by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt (02.01.2005):
Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?
Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on
(Source: https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html)
Although that conciliatory response by Lavrov was questioned by Putin himself, especially in the case of Ukraine, a few months later: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x88b9ii — neomac

During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West.

Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different?

It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years.

Second, what would be the difference between vital interests and sphere of influence in the case of Ukraine? I see the letter as a desirable condition to ensure the former. — neomac

Russian vital interests were protected with a neutral Ukraine. There'd be little to gain and much to lose for them to change that status quo, so incorporating it into their sphere of influence would not have been desirable at all.

... Russia could still keep its access to the Mediterranean through the Port of Novorossiysk. — neomac

Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc.

Besides it’s also up to Russia’s signalling good intentions by acts and words, [...] Unfortunately Russia (especially under Putin) didn’t send the right signals most of the time. — neomac

Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.

It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.

I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West.

What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor? — neomac

Individuals are moral actors.

I see at least 2 issues: 1. How can democratic countries best deal with security concerns of non-democratic countries, especially if driven by hegemonic ambitions (imagine a nazi regime, isis, soviet union, etc.)? Appeasement might be a very risky game 2. Your idea would sound more plausible if every geopolitical agent had a full understanding about the security concerns of its peers, yet any defensive move can be perceived as hostile (NATO enlargement was defensive for the ex-Soviet Republic but perceived as hostile by Russia, but also Russian perceiving NATO enlargement as hostile was perceived as hostile by ex-Soviet Republic, etc.). — neomac

Fair points, and the nature of the security dilemma does not need elaboration.

I shared my perspective in response to your question whether nations have a moral right to a sphere of influence. My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.

Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands... — neomac

That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.

What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.

What I'm explicitly suggesting is that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).

Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links? — neomac

I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that:

"... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."

NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014.

It’s a bit naive to think that Russia would have explicitly demanded the puppetization or Russification of Ukraine in these terms (e.g. “denazification” is Putin’s ersatz for puppetization and Russification). — neomac

If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence.

I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.

Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic. — neomac

I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business.

If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old?

Anyway.

Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician?

it’s just that I’m more pugnacious when I suspect intellectual dishonesty. — neomac

Concerning my “bit of self-awareness”, is the following enough? — neomac

If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here.

You can not say that NATO enlargement doesn’t have to do with threat from Russia, because I brought you evidence that that’s the case. — neomac

And what evidence would that be? The Budapest Memorandum?

However the accusation about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” sounds like a moral judgement which presupposes your moral assumptions (which I might not share). — neomac

Certainly. This is a philosophy forum after all, and realism is one lens through which I might view current events - not the only one.

So American “jealousy for being on the top” seems perfectly in line with what Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism” predicts. — neomac

Indeed. Which is why I've been making the argument that that is the core of why things in Ukraine happened the way they did.

The criticisms were out of fear of Russian reaction in case of NATO enlargement. But why would a superpower like the US fear Russia for NATO enlargement? Russia is no threat to the US right? — neomac

That answer should be obvious: just because the U.S. is/was the hegemon, does not mean they can force anyone to do their bidding, or enter war with anyone they like and come out the victor. That much should be painfully evident from the failings in the Middle-East.

As I said earlier, to the U.S. independence is a threat, resistance is aggression.

We can use such hubristical notions to understand U.S. behavior, but to consider them rational would be an entirely different subject. Moreover, we see now how U.S. hegemony is slowly crumbling as a result of this hubris, so even the realist may start to question the nature of these actions.

Maybe it’s because NATO was interfering with the Russian sphere of influence (euphemistically called “Russia’s backyard”)? — neomac

Let's be frank. Russia accepted most of NATO's enlargement. Ukraine was simply a bridge too far. That has more to do with the way Russia views Ukraine with regards to its vital interests, and less with its sphere of influence, though it would stand to reason Russia would prefer to have Ukraine in its sphere of influence for this reason.

For such a position as yours to make sense, you would have to provide some evidence that Russia viewed the ex-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe as part of its ("rightful") sphere of influence. I don't think you'll find much of the sort.

Why should the US (or neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter) care for Russia to have a sphere of influence at their expense exactly? — neomac

I don't think "sphere of influence" is the right description, as I said earlier, but it's in U.S. interest to understand the vital interests of other big players on the global stage, to avoid getting into conflicts it cannot or is not willing to win. That's what we see now, and in my view it is bringing the end of U.S. hegemony one step closer since it now has to juggle its attention between Europe and South-East Asia.

Does Russia have a moral or legal right to have a sphere of influence? — neomac

Neither of those (moral or legal) are particularly useful lenses to view the current situation through. International law is entirely ignored, and Russia is not a moral actor.

From a perspective of how nations can best coexist peacefully and war can be avoided, it is of vital importance that countries' security concerns are taken into consideration.

Or is it convenient to the US, neighbouring countries or Ukraine for that matter to let Russia have a sphere of influence at their expense? How so? — neomac

It certainly would have been convenient for the Ukrainians had Russian security concerns been taken more seriously. If they had been, many would not have lost their lives and homes.

Or maybe the “conflict was initiated” by Russia when it sought to forcefully preserve the “alleged” Ukrainian neutrality? — neomac

I view this conflict as having started in 2008, with war becoming extremely likely after the U.S. backed coup, and practically unavoidable after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.

What if Ukraine didn’t want any of that? — neomac

What the Russians demanded was Ukrainian neutrality, not puppetization or Russification.

If they were willing to have their country wrecked as a consequence of not wanting to meet the Russian concerns in any way, fair enough.

If having their country wrecked was unexpected, I think their political elite should have thought a little harder about their actions.

At best, they can appease some avg dude’s sense of moral entitlement which on the internet is very cheap and verges on virtue signalling, right? — neomac

I think you're letting a little personal animosity bleed into your realism yourself. :nerd:

On the other side Mearsheimer is an armchair academic... — neomac

Said what I assume is also "some avg dude on the internet"?

A bit of self-awareness would suit you well, I think.

And simply sidelining them here is simply wrong. It's you who is counting 1+1=1, when you argue that everything evolves around the US and the security issues of European countries don't matter in the equation when they have applied to NATO. — ssu

My position is clear.

The U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine are the big players in this conflict, and all the other countries involved (primarily in NATO) play no role of significance. That's not to say they play no role at all, but their influence isn't big enough to warrant paying much attention to.

Maybe you should provide some argumentation why you believe that approach is wrong. Why these smaller countries are worth paying attention to.

Your point seems to be we cannot sideline their agendas and interests. My question would be, why not?

Absolutely stomach-churning stuff.

I'm glad some people seem to have finally had their "Hans, are we the baddies?" moment.

Also somewhat reassuring that the mainstream media are calling this episode for what it is: dystopian, totalitarian stuff of nightmares.

The second link isn't working, by the way. But I was able to find what you referred to via Google.

I think that is the explanation they eventually settled on when maskwearing didn't seem to yield the results they were expecting.

Not surprisingly NATO enlargements as expression of the US hegemony fits very well Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory ("states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals"). — neomac

Exactly. NATO enlargement had nothing to do with a threat from Russia, but the United States jealously guarding its position at the top. The United States, for which any semblance of independence is a "threat", resistance is aggression, etc. case and point: Yugoslavia, Lybia, Russia, China, etc.

This is further supported by the fact NATO enlargement received a great deal of criticism over the years, precisely because there was no Russian threat - in the end, NATO enlargement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That Russia violated by invading Ukraine which is why the United States and the UK felt compelled to react. — neomac

Yes, and that happened under entirely different circumstances. This conflict was initiated by the U.S. when it sought to change Ukrainian neutrality, which was obviously a prerequisite for a robust peace.


Further, Brzezinski is a terrible source to quote in favor of your position, since he basically laid out how U.S. domination of the globe works and how to maintain it, and it fits perfectly into the picture of U.S. hubris.

The point I’m making is that fears of European instabilities due to historical legacies from 2 WWs and the Cold War (from ethnic nationalisms like in Yugoslavia to imperialistic ambitions like from Germany and Russia), were shaping the risk perception of European countries and the US. That’s why Western European (like France and the UK) and East European (like Poland and the Baltic states) welcomed NATO presence. That’s how you get a British lord, H.L. Ismay, the NATO’s first Secretary General, claim that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” or a debate on NATO enlargement by the American committee on Foreign Relations talking about Russian imperialism. — neomac

My argument is that none of this 50-year old argumentation is particularly relevant after the Cold War. It's a completely different situation. There is no threat of European infighting. The Germans didn't need to be "kept down", the Soviet Union no longer existed and the Americans had no military reason to stay in Europe (but of course they had a geopolitical reason to want to be "in"). Russia is severely weakened, the United States is the undisputed hegemon.

There was no threat of war in Europe after the Cold War. You're just making it up.

I presented an argument to explain why your approach is flawed. — neomac

You did none of the sort. You avoided giving me a metric, probably because you're fully aware that they all point towards the same thing - that Russia was weak after the Cold War, and not a threat to NATO.

First, you are contradicting your previous argument. If deltas in “military capacity” is enough to identify "real" threats, then the "real" threat for Ukraine was there even before 2008 (most certainly after Ukraine returned 1/3 of soviet nuclear weapons to post-Soviet Russia in 1994). — neomac

I never argued as much. I gave Russia's military capacity in relation to the West as a measure to support the idea that Russia did not pose a threat after the Cold War.

Second, since now you are reasoning in terms of “threat perception”, then again your claim is very much questionable. The Budapest Memorandum (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum) was proof that Ukraine had legitimate worries from Russia not only for historical reasons but also for the case of Crimea, which became a contested region practically immediately after Ukraine declared its independence. — neomac

How can you interpret this in any other way than a solid commitment to peace and cooperation?

Note that the United States and the United Kingdom also signed this treaty, vowing to respect the sovereignty of its signatories.

... because you need to support the narrative that basically the US started aggressing Russia for no other reason than its hubris. — neomac

Yes, and there are plenty of experts that make this point for me. Mearsheimer explicitly makes the point that the U.S. pushed NATO expansion all the way into Ukraine because it felt Russia was weak and it could get away with it.

“Collective defence and Article 5” is a binding commitment. There is no equivalent for offensive operations. — neomac

Nice words on a piece of paper mean nothing when NATO goes around the world invading countries wherever it pleases. To make the argument that NATO is a defensive alliance in view of its appaling record of expansion and aggression after the Cold War is just detached.

Hilarious, sad and scary at the same time.

This is also to say that it’s not just that US wanted to extend its sphere of influence (say for economic reasons), but for keeping safe and stable a dangerously unstable Europe by their own request too. — neomac

There was no "dangerously unstable Europe" after the Cold War. First off, Yugoslavia hardly represents all of Europe. Second, the U.S. played a major role in destabilizing Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia insisted on neutrality instead of joining the U.S. bloc.

You are clearly playing dumb. — neomac

You are clearly clutching at straws.

First you were talking about threats in terms of deltas in “military capability”, ... — neomac

And when asked for a metric that you would find more acceptable you presented nothing.

Indeed, what was the military capacity of Ukraine wrt Russia prior to this war?! — neomac

Ukraine is not NATO.

What you're doing is using the present situation to retroactively justify NATO expansion in a period that was marked by cooperation, not hostility, between the West and Russia.

When after 2008 it was becoming clear Ukraine might be the stage for a new geopolitcal rivalry, Ukraine was right to fear a Russian invasion.

But who started that conflict? NATO, at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, and through its continued efforts to make good on the promises that it made back then.

So any notions that NATO did what it did in response to a Russian threat is utter nonsense.

Take the case of Ukraine, even its joining NATO defensive alliance wasn’t an actual threat to Russia. — neomac

I'm not sure what to make of the fact you're still referring to NATO as a defensive alliance. I don't know if you've been paying attention, but NATO has invaded several countries post-Cold War, and left ruin in its wake.

Today it is not a defensive alliance by any stretch.

Even more so if such event wasn’t imminent at all. And most certainly so if Germany/France were stubbornly against it. — neomac

There's no point in regurgitating points that have already been discussed at length.

NATO membership for Ukraine mattered because of the role the United States would take in its security. The situation that developed in Ukraine is that the US took that role without NATO membership, causing de facto the same situation. NATO membership, and thus the German and French opinions, became of secondary importance, if of any importance at all.

Even Pax Romana and Pax Britannica weren’t exactly Disneyland. — neomac

Then don't come with bullshit like this:

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac

Do you think throwing money at the aforementioned countries will benefit them. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think throwing money at anyone would necessarily benefit them.

I'm not really sold on the idea of reparations, in case that wasn't clear from my comments.

But you've made clear this isn't what you intended to discuss, so lets move on.

I am mainly concerned with the question of whether someone's descendant can inherit guilt. — Andrew4Handel

I believe a key ingredient for an immoral deed is the desire to cause harm intentionally.

There's a different category of behavior in which one causes harm unintentionally. In that case ignorance is the key ingredient. I believe such behavior to be fundamentally different from immoral behavior.

But in the proposed case of inherited guilt, there is no harm caused by the moral agent, nor any intention to do so.


Is there another definition of immoral behavior (or behavior that leads to guilt) under which inherited guilt would make sense? Without such a definition I don't believe inherited guilt will make much sense.


On the topic of man being inherently sinful or original sin, I think that could be understood more along the lines of the Buddhist concept of "Dukkha", which in simplified terms means that man finds himself in a natural state of dissatisfaction and want, and the drive to satisfy want leads to behavior problematic to both the individual and their surroundings.

It's essentially a replay of the covid pandemic.

This is the denial phase. The phase is prior to the last one, quiet shame.

It makes you wonder how many this circus has to be repeated before people wisen up.

Why get personal instead of answering his question?

On a different topic, Ukraine's frontline is starting to look severely compromised, with pockets closing around Vuhledar, Bakhmut and Krasna Hora, and several cities being at risk of ending up in a similar situation, like Bilohorivka, Avdiivka and the urban area south of Bakhmut.

There are also rumours of a Russian offensive being expected within the month.

Under these circumstances I expect a serious simplification of the Ukrainian lines in the coming week, because this situation seems to be unmanagable. If large portions of defenders are cut off from supply lines this might turn into a disaster, because I am not getting the impression the Ukrainian forces can afford to lose many more troops.

It also makes me wonder why the Ukrainians haven't started a tactical withdrawal yet. It seems to me that the longer they wait, the harder it will be.

Are we just going to ignore that this happened then?



In what world is the U.S. not the primary suspect after such a statement has been made?

The topic of maskwearing was also quite hot in the Netherlands.

Somewhat amusingly (but not really) Dutch government officials went on record first stating on several occasions that maskwearing was completely nonsensical and ineffective, only to make a u-turn a few months later making them mandatory for everybody (after the WHO had already advised against it).

Later inquiries were made into the governmental record to see how these decisions came about. Something that was repeatedly brought up, was how it was believed that maskwearing could cause behavioural changes among the population.

In less euphemistic terms, those in charge believed maskwearing could cause people to become more fearful of the virus.

Anyone know much about this Seymour Hersh beyond Wikipedia? — Mark Nyquist

He seems to have a solid record of uncovering U.S. atrocity, being noted for his investigations into the Mỹ Lai massacre, Watergate and Abu Ghraib, to name a few.

Supposedly he was put on the NSA watchlist for this.


The story does sound believable (the U.S. role in the bombing was already widely speculated) and for a journalist of Hersh's caliber I cannot imagine him implicating high-profile people by name if he was just making things up.


On a somewhat related topic, the West's role in the war in Ukraine seems very impopular in Israel. We've recently had Israeli former PM Naftali Bennett stating in an interview that a truce was on the table very early on in the conflict (with major concessions from both Russia and Ukraine), but this was sabotaged by the West.

Recently there was also a Turkish news agency that reported casualty figures of the Ukrainian war which it supposedly had based on a report by the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. These figures were very different from what is commonly accepted in the West, but the veracity of this news article was also very questionable.


There's a chance people are just making things up. There's also a chance the "accidental" leaking of unwelcome information is an act of quiet disapproval.

There are so many clear cut cases where it's practically undeniable the U.S. government owes people compensation. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. - countries that were invaded and thoroughly wrecked, with no justification.

If people were interested in justice via reparations, how come we never hear about those? Mind you, the victims of these events have never even been in a position to bring their case infront of a court.

These things make me skeptical. What are these reparations discussions really about?

It's not crime and punishment, otherwise it would be discussed infront of a court instead.

Genuine justice? Well, if that were the case why do we see a selective interest for vague, grey area cases and the blatant, undeniable injustice is simply ignored?

Is justice only interesting when one can profit from it?

Morally speaking, probably not. However, I'd say a direct link between the benefit and the crime should be present for it to be immoral.

If you want my opinion, a person shouldn't be punished for a crime they didn't commit.

Did the U.S. ever pay reparations to Vietnam? Or one of the many countries it destroyed during its crusade in the Middle-East?

Am I doing it wrong?

This forum has practically no audience. It's just a few posters. There are more moderators on this forum than posters on any given day. — frank

Hey now.

Then your terminology is misleading:
Hard power encompasses a wide range of coercive policies, such as coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, military action, and the forming of military alliances for deterrence and mutual defense. — neomac

After the Cold War, NATO became something different from a military alliance that pursued deterrence and mutual defense, since there was no enemy to defend against.

What happened after the Cold War is that the Americans collected their prize.

It became a different name for the European part of the American sphere of influence, and a soft power tool to control Europe, even if it's original nature was a hard power deterrent towards Russia.

That change in character is well-documented and part of the reason why NATO went through several identity crises post-Cold War.

This isn't misleading language, this is simply understanding the purpose of NATO post-Cold War from the American perspective.

There are many factors that shape threat perception in geopolitical agents military capacity being one of the most important, but not the only one (and notice that in the case of Russia things are complicated by the fact that Russia is not only the 3rd rank country by military capability but also the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, relevant to the defensive/offensive military capacity balance, and that it’s military/offensive capacity can sum up with the Chinese one in case of a anti-American alliance). Military capacity is important because it concurs to shape “security dilemmas” but for that also aggressive intentions count (signalling strategies and ideological convergence may help in mitigating the issue), so geopolitical agents are prone to detect and anticipate potential threats based on other geopolitical agents’ past/current behavior and their dispositions/opportunities for alliance and conflict.
Reactions may be defensive or offensive (pre-emptive): especially, hegemonic powers may certainly not wait for threatening competitors to be strong enough to attack, before reacting against them. As I wrote elsewhere, geopolitical strategies can involve long-term goals covering decades and generations to come (so timing is important too). Any response implies risks, because of uncertainties induced by mistrust, complexity/timing of coordination and unpredictable events (like a pandemic).
Now let’s talk about “threat perception” for the American hegemonic power (which, not surprisingly, is perfectly in line with “offensive realist” views [1]):
”Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.
"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (source: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html)
Pretty diabolical, isn’t it?! Yet in the last 30 years, Europe got richer and less committed (in terms of security/economy) toward the US, and at the same time Russia and China got much richer (also related avg standard of life improved), more militarised and assertive abroad, in the hope of extending their sphere of influence at the expense of the US. Europeans, Russia and China abundantly exploited the institutions and free-market (the soft-power!) supported by the Pax Americana after the end of Cold-War era. While anti-Americanism grew stronger. What could possibly go wrong given those “security” premises by the hegemonic power? — neomac

Right, so it was never about actual threat perception. It was about pre-emptively protecting U.S. hegemony. That's basically what I've been saying all along.

While you (like many here) keep focusing on arguable failures of the American interventionism in middle-east (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.) and whine over the drawbacks of American imperialism (as if any avg dude on the internet could plausibly offer a better and realistic alternative), you close an eye over the part of the world that abundantly profited from the Pax Americana (or, if you prefer, the neoconservative liberal democratic capitalist Blob military-industrial-complex satanist American foreign policy). This intellectually dishonest attitude reminds me of a famous Napolitan maxim: “chiagne e fotte”, it roughly means “whine (over injustice of the system) and keep screwing them (the system) over”. — neomac

Ask the people of Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lybia, and all the other nations the United States invaded and cast into the fires (a long list it be) what they thought of that "Pax Americana". :vomit:

That's a huge topic, which I am not going to go into detail on because A) I don't believe you're genuinely interested in what I have to say (I'm not an American, after all), and B) it would derail the thread.

Go do your own research.

Here's a place you could start:

Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment

The foreign policy establishment. Do you live in America?

No.

In one way or another, probably so.

There are plenty of scholars who make the argument, and I find it quite compelling.

Foreign policy and geopolitical strategy are things that may take years, even decades, to unfold. It makes no sense to leave such things to the political squabblings of camp red and blue. Moreover, US foreign policy over the decades does not give that impression, and tends to be cohesive over long periods of time.

The power of the various lobbies also is well-documented, and you can research that yourself.

NATO is not expression of soft-power — neomac

Because the point of NATO is to military defend a country against aggressors. — neomac

United States controls Europe through NATO. That is to say, it controls Europe through (in this case) political means not dependent on coercion.

The nature of soft power is the lack of a coercive element.

Your point seems to be that a military alliance cannot have a soft power dimension. I don't see any reason why that would be the case, and I think NATO is a clear example to the contrary.

No one forced the Europeans to neglect their militaries, with the end result of making them completely dependent on the United States for their defense, and thus greatly increasing United States influence. The Europeans did that completely voluntarily.

What a beautiful example of soft power at work.

“historical grievance” was treated just as pretext — neomac

That's an assumption on your part.

In my mind there's no question that ex-Soviet republics joined NATO in large part because of their history with the Soviet Union, and that the United States made use of that fact to expand NATO beyond what could be rationally explained by a foreign (Russian) threat.

What’s your argument? A comparison of US military capacity and Russian military capacity is enough to make your point? — neomac

Essentially, yes. What would you like me to compare instead? GDP? Think it'll paint a different picture?

You and I disagree about whether or not people in a vegetative state are people. — T Clark

If hypothetically WBGD would be possible with a deceased body, would that change your mind about whether it's permissable?

It seems pretty morbid to me either way, but not as morbid as the opt-out part.

How did we end up with a situation in which the government owns your body unless you pay the ransom?

To clarify once again my point, I asked you "Why would the US care to protect the EU against a potential aggression from Russia?" and your answer was roughly that the US needs to control Europe and its “immense powerful nations” from becoming its own great power or fall under the control of another foreign power. — neomac

I tried to give you an explanation for why the United States is worried about controlling Europe, which it evidently is.

If your argument is "they shouldn't be", then that's something you'll have to discuss with the policy makers in Washington, I suppose.

I find your reasoning pretty confused. — neomac

My point was that NATO was a tool to expand US influence, not whether the Europeans' feelings of historical grievance and/or fear were justified.

Your confusion would probably lessen if you paid more attention to what I write, and less to what you believe I am implying.

A part from the fact that you start underplaying the influence of US presidents over foreign policy, ... — neomac

Yes. Let there be no doubt about my position on this: US presidents don't have much influence over foreign policy at all. Many tried. Obama for example, who famously failed and admitted this in his exit interview. Trump also.

The neoconservative lobby, aka "the Blob" is probably the most powerful entity in US politics.

The “bombastic words” by Trump were taken so seriously by the Congress representatives themselves to the point that:
Such concerns led the House of Representatives in January 2019, to pass the NATO Support Act (H.R. 676), confirming Congress' support for NATO and prohibiting Trump from potentially withdrawing from NATO. On December 11, 2019, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill to be put in front of Congress which would require congressional approval for American withdrawal from NATO
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO — neomac

You're making my point for me. Trump (might have) wanted to leave NATO. The establishment ensured he couldn't. Who is in power here? Not Trump.

What did you just write?! — neomac

NATO has a clear soft power element in terms of the relation between the US and it's allies. I don't see what's controversial or hard to understand about that. It's pretty obvious.

You make no sense to me. On one side you claim: “when powerful nations are close to each other, conflict is bound to arise. And the United States' sphere of influence was inching ever closer to Russia. Powerful nations care greatly about what the other powerful nations are doing in their backyard”. So it’s all about Russian threat perception , that you seem to find definitively justified being Russia a powerful nation, even though NATO is defensive alliance, Russia is 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, Germany/France were against Ukraine within NATO (and cozying up to Russia), Russia had already annexed Crimea easy-peasy and whatever military support Ukraine got prior to the war wasn’t significant enough to pose any threat to Russia.
On the other side, when it’s time to assess the Russian threat from Western perspective, Russia is all of a sudden a small great power, nothing new or special, just busy serving their interests militarily all over the globe (but apparently not its borders despite all pretexts for territorial disputes and Russian minorities to protect) whose military build-up posed no threat to Europe (in other words, very powerful nation but not so very powerful nation after all, and let’s bother us over the fact that we are talking about the 3rd rank country by military capability with the largest stockpile of nuclear warheads in the world, very much active in the Mediterranean Sea & North Africa, Middle East, East Europe and Baltic sea, so all around Europe!) and whose nasty political/economic leverage in the West wasn’t used to mess with America’s backyard at all. — neomac

Yes. Russia was not a threat to NATO at any point between 1989 up until now. Clearly that doesn't mean it wasn't still a powerful nation. Just not in relation to US/NATO.

Oh so now the US doesn’t want to control Europe (hosting “immensely powerful nations”) because Mackinder/Brzezinski say so, it wants to lead it down the path of its own destruction?! — neomac

You're just putting words in my mouth.

I guess I'll have to state the obvious; the US wants to control Europe. And in its desire to control, the US frequently destroys nations. Vietnam, the entire Middle-East, etc.

Ukraine is going to be the next addition to that list, I'm afraid.

What you are so surreptitiously yet so clumsily trying to do is to support the idea that the West had no reason to fear Russia, and Russia had all reasons to fear the West. — neomac

I'd probably put it in slightly more nuanced terms, but that's indeed the part of the point I have been making for a while now, and unapologetically so.


Your posts seem to degenerate into walls of text worth of ravings. Can you try to make your points in a straightforward fashion? And try doing so without putting words in my mouth or assuming that I am implying all sorts of things which I am not.

Seems unlikely, — jorndoe

It's hard to make sense of it.

It basically signals that the Ukrainians fear an offensive from the north, while the chance of such an agreement being signed seems very low.

Perhaps it's a way to test whether the Belarussians are planning to get involved in the war. Declining would imply yes, agreeing would imply no. Though even if they weren't planning to get involved they would probably still decline for the sake of ambiguity.

Maybe the goal of the action is the signal itself; to feign weakness.

Or maybe the goal is simply to confuse.

But I admit here: my objection to reproductive use of the undead is aesthetic and practical, rather than eithcal. — Vera Mont

My most obvious objection to it would be that we have no idea what the consequences are for the child of being gestated in what is essentially a corpse, as opposed to in a living, loving, breathing mother.

A dead person has no 'interests'. — Vera Mont

What happens to one's corpse? It's either buried/cremated and in both cases, perfectly working organs are destroyed when they could actually save lives. I say we harvest organs of dead people. Why would they mind at all? — Agent Smith

I suppose we might as well have an opt-out system for having one's dead body used as a high-quality sex doll for necrophiliacs. Who would pass up on such an amazing opportunity to make others happy after their death?

To some degree, that has always been the case. ... — Vera Mont

Regrettably so. Luckily we as free individuals have a choice to resist such unethical practices!

But the present question concerns power over dead bodies, ... — Vera Mont

Note that 's idea seems to extend not just to the dead body, but to the whole person even while alive.