Perhaps he endeavored to showcase the pettiness of some of the forum's posters, and in that he certainly succeeded.

The scale of equality and heirarchy struck me as odd, as it implies that equal societies do not favor strong heirarchical structures. I think this is not the case. After all, use of authority is required to enforce equality, as it will not arise naturally.

Also the scale between change and stasis did not make sense to me, as these things are, in my opinion, not goals in themselves and whether I would favor one or the other is entirely dependent on circumstances.

An option that says "no opinion", or something like this, would be great.

Is it ethical to drive a car?

Cars pollute the atmosphere and by driving one we contribute to the suffering of countless living beings in the same death-by-a-thousand-cuts manner as buying animal products.

I'm willing to consider the ethics of things like this, but I can almost guarantee you that the logical conclusions of these ideas are irreconcilable with modern life, and perhaps any kind of life.

So lets have this discussion, but without any attitudes of moral superiority.

How can a man that wishes for evil and does good, therefore doing good by error, be a good man? — Matei

I think the intuitive answer is: he cannot.

Thus, it seems a good action requires both a just intention and the intended result.

We can attribute an unjust intention to malice, and an unintended result to ignorance.

And aren't they both great sources of what is traditionally regarded as evil?

Western youth is taught from an early age to have an unhealthy relationship with sex. "Incels" are one of its many outgrowths. Lets not judge them too harshly.

We can have a very good idea what it might be, humans are not radically different from one another in fundamental preferences. — Isaac

Disagreed.

Making decisions for others (making decisions that will affect future others - I still don't agree with your incoherent wording), is something that humanity has been doing in this context for several million years and overall happiness ratings for the people who have later been affected by these decisions have been consistently quite high. — Isaac

I don't buy this argument. This seems to be based on a severely cherry-picked version of history. There are many things humanity has been doing for much of history, where some have suffered and others and have profited, which we now consider inhuman.

At any rate, regardless of what the ratio might be between happy and unhappy people (it seems silly to reduce one's choice to have children to generalizations and statistics, but this aside), it seems we're arriving at a "ends justify the means" type of situation, where forcing individuals into existence is a "necessary evil" to produce a net-positive outcome. This fails to take into account those individuals who must suffer as a result of it. It is easy for an outsider to say they find the suffering of those individuals an acceptable sacrifice.

Then we have no basis on which to make any decisions at all, since all lack millions upon millions of theoretical data points which are impossible to know. — Isaac

What were you saying earlier about Socratic ideals?

Presuming I cannot possibly access that person's judgement I have nothing else to go on. — Isaac

Then the argument for inaction seems obvious; by your own words you claim to have no idea what you're getting that person into.

No it isn't, because asking that other person whether they'd like a suit is almost always possible and never logically incoherent. — Isaac

You miss the point. Why would one feel entitled to make that decision for someone else in the first place, especially considering the fact that the decision is irreversible and can result in a life-time of misery.

You really think it so strange to choose to err on the side of caution here?

That is not the information I'm referring to. I really don't want to have to walk you through what has already been written. Just read it again more carefully. The data point in question is not about the rusk of harm in general (which is the only rusk I've spoken about considering). It about the rusk of consent violation or displeasure over the matter of existence. — Isaac

Whether that information is unknown or unknowable is irrelevant, because the basis (or lack thereof) for our decision remains the same. — Tzeentch

Any type of information that is lacking only affirms the lack of a basis for our decision.

The benefit. Same as any other risk. — Isaac

And what if your judgement on what constitutes benefit may drastically differ from that of the individual one is making decisions for?

As noted, it's like buying a suit with someone else's money, while not having the slightest idea of what type of suit they may like.

No. It's not that there's no way of knowing. It's not a data point which exists but is not 'knowable'. The data point doesn't even exist. — Isaac

Enough with the semantic games. We are talking about the same thing. You have acknowledged that birthing a child is taking a risk in regards to its future, implying we do not have all the information. Whether that information is unknown or unknowable is irrelevant, because the basis (or lack thereof) for our decision remains the same.

The benefit. Same as the justification for any risk. Why would you think this one any different? — Isaac

Because one is taking a risk on someone else's behalf, obviously. What necessity is there to make such a decision?

I'm curious why you think this is a special case actually. I cannot think of many cases where we take risks with others' wellbeing without permission. — khaled

I guess what it boils down to is the claim that at the point of decision there is no individual whose well-being can be violated, foregoing the fact that we already know such an individual will come about as a direct result of our actions.

It's an odd wall to hide behind.

What we cannot coherently do is wonder if they'd prefer to exist or not because nothing which has that choice is capable if forming an opinion on the matter. — Isaac

One only needs to conclude there is no way of knowing, and make decisions based on that.

Some may want to risk it. Others may not.

I lean towards the latter, but I don't consider the former to be unreasonable. It simply makes me wonder what the justificiation is to take such a risk.

Maybe so.

What justification could you possibly have to drive to the store while being unable to foresee the consequences and unable to verify in advance whether anyone wants to take the risk of sharing the road today with you? — Echarmion

I would say that anyone who feels they cannot guarantee the safety of others while driving should not get behind the wheel.

There is no someone. — Isaac

This keeps being repeated, and it seems to be the last wall to hide behind, but you build your walls flimsy indeed.

Tell me then, for who is it we seek to preserve the planet?

The justification is... being able to foresee the consequences (life is really good - love, sunsets, adventure etc) — Isaac

They are unable. They may believe life is worth living, but there's no way of knowing whether their child will.

we can't possibly check in advance whether they want these things, — Isaac

Indeed. Sounds like a fantastic reason not to force those things upon someone.

Clearly a parent gets to decide whether they want to create children.

The parents don't go around thinking "my child wants to live, therefore I am going to create it". That's not a decision that actually happens. — Echarmion

Indeed. They want a child and therefore they will create one. So what justification is there to make this decision despite being unable to foresee the consequences and being unable to verify in advance whether the child actually wants to experience life?

Noone gets to decide whether they want to live in the first place, — Echarmion

Indeed, the parent gets to decide. And what justification do they have for making that decision? Because the parent was born involuntarily, so should their child? Why? Notice we're talking from the perspective of the decisionmaker, not the (would-be) child.

There is no such thing as a good life. — Echarmion

Then why decide that an individual should involuntarily partake in one?

If you answered it, I must've missed it. — Tzeentch

Apparently you have. — Echarmion

You have objected to the question. You have not answered it.

But enough slithering and crawling. Since you seem so hung up on semantics I'll rephrase my question;

How does one reconcile the fact that when making the decision to have a child, one does not know A: whether the child wants to live in the first place, and B: whether the child will have a good life, even by one's own standards (let alone those of the child)?

What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not? — Tzeentch

If you answered it, I must've missed it.

And isn't it great that the view you have actively argued and defended in this thread is the one "just asking the hard questions" that the other side just "cannot answer". — Echarmion

It is what it is.

Presumably, the only people still reading are the 6 regular posters, and they won't be fooled by airy declarations of socratic ideals. — Echarmion

Good.

So, to clarify, you don't think the anti-natalist position is true in an intersubjective sense, that it should convince people? You just like it for entirely personal reasons? — Echarmion

It's not about truth or liking.

All I know is that it raises questions I cannot answer, and, judging by the tone of our conversation, you cannot either.

This strikes me as a pretty dishonest way of summarizing the thread. schopenhauer1 in particular is one of the most offensively proselytizing users on this forum. — Echarmion

Well, nothing I have read here suggests proselytizing, but maybe I am wrong.

What I have described is the way I look at the matter, at least.

It's weird that you make this question about you, personally. — Echarmion

How so? And why would it be weird?

My "observation" is that an anti-natalist position, ulitmately seeks to end humanity. — Echarmion

I don't think that's inherent to the position, but rather inherent to some individuals' desire to impose their views on others. That's a flaw in those individuals, and not in the position.

The fact that I cannot find sufficient justification to force individuals to exist doesn't mean it is the same for others.

What did "its" refer to again? You never answered but since everybody can read an understand sentences we already know. — Benkei

Oh. It was controversial?

And yet it continually happens in this thread and I've already pointed it out several times. The last time was here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/480046 — Benkei

You inject half way in discussions between other people and take things out of context.

What you quoted wasn't about improving life. It was an attempt to show the absurdity of the earlier premise, by pointing out the absurdity of the implication.

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. — Benkei

If one plans to put an individual into existence, shouldn't one take into account their well-being beforehand, regardless of whether they already exist or not? One knows that it is going to happen, so one acts accordingly. Isn't that how common sense works and how every parent operates?

Wouldn't you say that a view that ultimately seeks to create a universe devoid of subjects that can experience it is self-destructive? It seems hard to ignore this ultimate conclusion of the anti-natalist argument. — Echarmion

Views are not actors, but to follow the spirit of your comment I would say no.

I don't seek to create such a universe. I haven't seen anyone here expressing that they do.

As far as I have seen, the anti-natalist argument as shared in this thread consists of observations and questions to which there do not seem to be any good answers. Every individual can draw their own conclusions and make their own choices based on that.

But yes, if every person on earth were to conclude at once that the questions and observations of the anti-natalist argument are sufficient reason not to have children, humanity would eventually cease to exist. If that is a result of people's voluntary choice not to have children, then what business is that of mine?

I can't say I don't appreciate a little armchair psychology, but this makes little sense.

The anti-natalist viewpoint as I have seen it expressed in this thread is based on A: the idea that voluntariness and consensuality form the basis for moral conduct in regards to others, and B: that childbirth does not fit these criteria.

It has nothing to do with distrust of others, a desire to be left alone, the assertion of ego or self-destruction.

Great comment. I quite frankly don't know what there is left to say.

You just keep repeating that we're "forcing someone without consent" — Echarmion

Because it's at the core of the issue. By your use of the word "we" I'm assuming you are a parent?

but don't explain who that "someone" is supposed to be — Echarmion

The individual one is considering forcing into existence.

or how the decision-making process you envision would function. — Echarmion

Forcing others to do things without their consent needs to be avoided.

And if you make no decision, that also has consequences, right? — Echarmion

Why non-action? There are still consequences attached to this. — Echarmion

Sure.

The reason is simple; even if one intends to do good by birthing a child, the ends (odds for a happy life) do not justify the means (forcing someone without consent).

At those odds yes. You'd previously admitted you have no idea what the odds actually are in life so why would you think such a comparison relevant. — Isaac

At what odds would it be acceptable to force someone to jump from a plane?

Why is it an 'issue'. — Isaac

One would be forcing an individual to experience life, without being able to ensure whether they want to. An anti-natalist would say this is sufficient reason to refrain from doing so.

No one breathes voluntarily either. Is that a problem you feel we need to address? — Isaac

No one forces you to breathe, so I don't think this is a good comparison.

Basic risk assessment. The experience would have to be really good. And yes, people who find the experience really good do take that risk for exactly those reasons so I'm not sure what you think that example shows. — Isaac

Well, everyone is free to make such an assessment for themselves. Things get complicated when we force someone else to jump out of a plane with those odds, no?

So we go back in time or what? How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in? — Isaac

You cannot, which is exactly the issue.

In the context of our discussion those things cannot be seen seperately.

Not being able to get consent for an important decision that is made on someone else's behalf would greatly impact how I would weigh predictions and make a decision, if I choose to make a decision at all.

If I come to the conclusion the decision is too important to be made without consent, then I have no issue with choosing non-action.

What's controversial is treating this prediction as if it was the state of affairs. To use another analogy: Let's say I developed a new flavor of ice-cream. Any given selection of ingredients will taste good to some people and bad to others. These are predictable consequences. But if I hand out my ice-cream to random customers, I cannot possibly attempt to only give my ice-cream to people that will like it. — Echarmion

You don't force people to eat your ice cream.

What kind of answer is that? You said an individual was being forced into something. Now you're saying you don't even know where they are? — Isaac

I'm just being honest. Obviously, I don't know where they are. But I can say beyond a reasonable doubt that no one is born voluntarily.

Then an assumption that they'd absolutely love it is as reasonable as an assumption that they'd hate it. Since we're in a position where we're uniquely unable to ask, what's wrong with taking a guess? — Isaac

Would you jump out of a plane knowing there's a 25% chance your parachute wouldn't work? If not, what's wrong with taking a gamble? 75% chance for a positive experience.

So your own answer to that question would be "no - it's nit that simple because the central issue is consent, not consequences"? — Isaac

No.

What I sought to point out with that comment is that the question whether a child's will, well-being and ability to consent should be taken into account prior to the decision of having children, is a matter of considering the logical consequences of childbirth, which are them coming to be as an individual with those faculties.

Where is this individual who's being forced? — Isaac

Who knows?

This whole argument arose from you claiming that issues over consent were unnecessary. — Isaac

That is not something I have claimed. Consent has been the core issue.

Consent cannot possibly be given, there's no entity capable of consent. — Isaac

Indeed. That is exactly the issue.

In all other situations where consent cannot possibly be given we make an assessment based on a weighing of the consequences. Why are you advocating a different course of action here? — Isaac

If I have to make a decision on someone else's behalf without their consent, my first question would be whether there is some dire need that would justify it. In the case of childbirth, I don't see that dire need.

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering? — Isaac

We don't. We know next to nothing about the quality of their life. It'd be nothing less than an experiment.

What I am saying is that unborn children cannot have standing as moral subjects. — Echarmion

This is not what I have argued.

What you can - indeed must - do is to predict the consequences of possible decisions. In this sense, you can also predict that the child will have a will and interests. It'd just be a mistake to treat this prediction as current fact. — Echarmion

An unborn child developing into an individual with a will and well-being is (generally speaking) a logical consequence once one makes the decision to have children, thus should be taken into account prior to this decision. I don't see why this is controversial.

Why? Since inaction can have no less of a consequence in a dynamic environment, I don't see why you'd favour it over action in the face of uncertainty. — Isaac

Not only is one forcing an individual to do something that has great consequences without their consent, but one is also incapable of estimating the outcome.

Notwithstanding that, hasn't your argument previously been exactly that we can satisfactorily predict the consequences of our actions? — Isaac

Some things can be satisfactorily predicted. Other things cannot. I think the possible quality of life of an unborn child belongs to the latter category.

I disagree. One could come to the conclusion that the consequences of their actions cannot be sufficiently understood. A good reason to refrain from such an action.

This is attributing personhood. — Benkei

It is not.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions.

As I already said, it doesn't imply that such actions cannot be considered wrong or immoral. Only that the moral weight cannot come from the will or interest of the non-existent child. We haven't actually excluded that there is an overarching moral principle hat says to not have children when you cannot adequately support them. — Echarmion

What are such overarching moral principles based on, other than the well-being of would-be children?

You don't control the outcomes though. — Echarmion

Indeed. Isn't that a great reason to think twice before having children?

I don't have a problem with admitting that there are some things I still need to figure out regarding the moral weight of future people. But I nevertheless feel very confident that tying yourself into knots trying to somehow attribute personhood to unborn children while maintaining that they don't exist is the solution. — Echarmion

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future.

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out?

It seems we're playing dumb, pretending that individuals decide to have children and when the child is born and has a will and well-being, we scratch our heads and wonder where all that came from?

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral. — Echarmion

Not quite.

My premise started with an analysis of what child birth is; forcing an individual to experience life without their consent.

Your objection was that an individual that does not yet exist, has no will or well-being to take into account, thus no consent is required.

What I sought to point out is that your objection implies that actions that undermine the well-being of a future child cannot be considered wrong or immoral under your premise, which goes against all notions that I am able to conceive of what is considered "good".

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something, and whether those reasons are "good". Should I follow these reasons in other circumstance? Shoud everyone? Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun. — Echarmion

If you wish to shift morality from being about outcomes to being about intentions, I'll take the next step and state that "good" behavior requires both intention and outcome.

Either way I do not see how this deals with the problem I have presented.