Pearce is sticking around for an impressively long time. Most guest speakers do a runner after a few posts.

I'm finding transhumanism to be a very interesting idea. I'm oscillating between thinking it's a very good idea and it being complete horseshit.

Surely, it would be rather futile to try to 'force' agreement. — Jack Cummins

The scientific method forces agreement without trying. Philosophy does not have a method that can do that, except perhaps in very tightly defined logical contexts.

There are several mysteries which seem essential to the philosophical quest; the existence of God, free will and, life after death. These seem to be central to philosophy. Endless books have been written on these subjects. However, no one seems to have come up with any clear answers, and it seems to me that they remain as unsolved mysteries. We all contemplate these aspects of life, but it does seem that there are no definitive answers. Perhaps the whole aspect of mysteries is central to philosophy and what keeps us searching. Are they unfathomable mysteries, beyond human understanding? — Jack Cummins

I think they've probably been solved. We just lack a method to publicly force agreement unlike science. I know people still keep denying scientific findings way beyond what is reasonable doubt, but by and large there is such a thing as reasonably settled science.

Many thanks for your excellent answer. It's taken me a while to get back to it.

If you repeat a measurement under the same conditions in an experiment, the goal of that is usually to take an average; establishing concordance and forming a variance reduced estimate of the true value you're measuring. — fdrake

:nod:

If you repeat a measurement under different conditions in an experiment, in part that's trying to find out how the measured response varies with the stimulus/treatment, in part that's trying to find out how that response varies with contextual factors, in part (nowadays) that's trying to assess whether and how the stimulus/treatment's response itself varies with contextual factors. On this level, "repeating a measurement" is pretty much the core of a controlled experiment. — fdrake

Indeed.

If you're repeating an entire experiment, there's some wiggle room in practice regarding what counts as a repeat. There's the hypothetical "exact replication", which is where you do literally everything the same, the "conceptual replication", which is where you try to ape the experimental conditions to be the same but can't do it exactly. I doubt those are an exhaustive typology of replication results, but the purpose of both isn't easily reducible to confirming or testing a previously held hypothesis in most cases, and that follows just because the overall set up in the initial experiment isn't identical, or necessarily even equivalent in all relevant respects, to the replication attempt. — fdrake

I hadn't thought of that specifically, thanks.

That "lack of identity" (arguably) shows up in the difference in replication rates between papers where the initial researcher group is represented in the reproduction team and where they are not. — fdrake

That's interesting.

I would make the claim that the function of reproduction attempts/replication attempts in science isn't to check the reliability of any individual result; most results are false and over-simplifications and everyone knows this; the overall function is to make the process of scientific discovery in the aggregate not spend too long on "clear" falsehoods and inaccuracies, it's a quality control thing. What counts as a "clear falsehood" only makes sense in light of reproducibility. — fdrake

Sure. I think by 'results' you mean conclusions/interpretations rather than data?

Another angle on repeatability is that if you're repeating the experiment, manage it exactly, and the effect doesn't show up the same as before, that doesn't necessarily mean the conclusions of the initial experiment were false - it might be that the response is contextually variable, it might be a contextual interaction - both experiments could be samples of a distribution associated with the "true effect" indexed by contexts and their variables. The latter approach, to my understanding, is the one favoured by Gelman and his group. — fdrake

Another very good point I hadn't thought of.

I think that depends too, the role of a non-repeat, if you see it in the context of a contextually variable interaction, it's not a refutation but evidence that the effect is contextual if it exists (and that starts a process of compensation of making it smaller compared to context induced imprecision, "exaggeration factors" "the garden of forking paths", and analysing true power of the study/broader scientific endeavour), if you see it in the context of everything's really set up exactly the same, the effect's probably not there as it was theorised - but if the "exact replication" must reproduce the contextual ambiguities of the initial one? It still doesn't mean the effect's not there/is 0* if the second one comes out, it could be that the ambiguities realised differently in both experiments.

In that kind of case, if the ambiguities are enough to swamp the signal, it's reasonable to say the treatment as intended or the effect as theorised has little to no evidence that it exists... Probably. — fdrake

Yes, I completely glossed over all that nuance. My initial post popped into my head by considering vague memories of my philosophy of science on falsificationism and confirmationism. I found all that really interesting at the time but forgot most of it.

Thank you, that was really interesting and helpful.

It is aware of itself. — Benj96

That's the contentious one, and the one that either potentially justifies or rules out God-talk. Without consciousness, energy (or the quantum field or whatever) can't be called God or any other god-term that implies agency and will and consciousness etc.

Almost all attempts at this question seem to miss the mark by a huge margin. — Dale Petersen

Your view is a pretty commonly held view as far as I can tell. Looks like a kind of functionalism to me.

Phenomenologically, consciousness does seem very field-like. I think this is prima facie evidence that it is a field, or a property of physical field(s). This fits well with a panpsychic conception of consciousness.

Not at all. Had you been silent we would not have had from you such a gem. — tim wood

Oh! Thanks. I didn't understand. I process what you said when I can.

I can give an example if that would help.

I also think that repeatability in science is to check the results we got previously in our analysis. But, even further than this, repeatability could also help us to improve the hypothesis itself. If you want to make a solid statement I guess you should repeat a lot until you believe is enough proven. — javi2541997

I see, thanks.

The only improvement on these just being silent. — tim wood

Do you mean I should not have posted? Mods can delete if they want.

I wonder if we had given people a choice, how many in the over 50 group would have asked children and teens to give up their freedoms and happiness? — dazed

That's an interesting empirical question. The answer is not to be found on this forum.

So far as I can tell, which is the most certain anyone can ever be about anything. — Pfhorrest

Fantastic! I think you've earned your philosopher badge!

I want to believe only things that are true, and avoid believe things that are untrue. — Pfhorrest

That's bold! Is it true?

Any American will be glad to tell you what his rights are, likely more than you would want to hear. The problem is that most Americans, on the topic of their rights, know as much about them as they know about whether they have an itch to be scratched, or less, but certainly no more. That is, most Americans are uneducated on rights, theirs or anyone else's, but that lack of knowledge and understanding does not slow most of them down even a little.

I, myself, like to think that rights in America are mainly at first cut reasonable and sensible. That is, common sense is a pretty good first guide. Which will get you exactly nowhere with people who lack that basic capacity for common sense, which, alas, is most of us. — tim wood

Thanks, I did wonder if that was what is going on but didn't want to assume.

If there was any real concern that requiring masks, social distancing, and lockdowns were in violation of some rights guaranteed by the constitution, the issue would have been considered by the Supreme Court by now. If there were any cases, I didn't hear about them. — frank

Thanks frank, that's interesting.

I don't know! I'm trying to make sense of claims that covid protection measures breach people's rights. According to UK and EU law, there is demonstrably no such breach. I don't know the legal situation in America. I did a very brief google just to see if it was obvious what rights were being engaged, but I did not spend much time on it. I'm interested to know what rights people in America think are being engaged and perhaps breached.

Do you have a view on this?

Just had a very quick google about American HR law. It seems human rights have found a home in the US constitution via various amendments, is that right? These are based on the UDHR.

I'd be interested in what legal rights, specifically, mask wearing, lockdown and social distancing (as the main covid responses apart from the vaccine) are engaged by these measures? Anyone know?

A hard on presumably. For them to fuck themselves with, as there are no children available.

In the exchange between Tom Storm and Banno, Banno asked three questions of Tom, none of which Tom has yet answered. Tom asked four questions of Banno, none of which Banno has yet answered.

I'd love a bit of software that could analyse discourse to pick out stats like that.

Good question. I'm against the concept of qualia. I think it's confusing and unnecessary. But I definitely do believe in subjectivity in the sense I think you mean it. I don't agree with attempts to explain subjectivity in terms of other things like functions or modelling or phi or whatever.

Better? :eyes: — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Yeah, feels pretty good. I know you mean the exact opposite, but even just seeing the word is something. I can pretend you mean it.

My family in Illinois is going to shake out but my Uncle was denied seeing my family members, he fought to see them and was denied. My Uncle was there 6 out of 7 days a week and he battled the nursing home rules and it didn't matter. He never got a last call, a last visit and no idea how he was. My Uncle learned of Italo's passing by getting a greeting card back saying Return to sender. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I know I'm a bit of an asshole to you and we disagree about more or less everything. But I'm genuinely sorry you have lost people you love.

Pfhorrest, I don't always agree with you, but your posts are very nicely written and clear. You aim for transparency. Indeed that's how I know if I agree with you or not.

Instead, on both sides of the divide, we must resign ourselves to perpetual uncertainty, but there is still hope in that that uncertainty can also be perpetually diminished, by constantly weeding out competing answers that are in one way or another problematic. — Pfhorrest

While I disagree with your analogy, I do agree that meaningful disagreement and agreement on moral matters is possible, and that some kind of intersubjective consensus is often, perhaps always, possible. It's just a different kind of consensus than the consensus regarding the truth about the world.

Remain humble my friend :flower: — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Nah. We're just better than you.

It's fairly simple to do an analysis in terms of Article 8 or the ECHR. I'm not sure what the septics have in terms of HR law.

Article 8 is the right to a private life. It's a qualified right, not an absolute right (the right to life is an example of an absolute right). That means it can be restricted under certain circumstances in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. Here it is in full:

Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. — ECHR

I've highlighted the relevant legitimate aim in bold.

Any restriction of a qualified right must be proportional and reasonable. That's why, in the UK at least, if someone has a medical reason that wearing a mask is difficult, or they have sensory issues that makes wearing a mask very uncomfortable, they don't have to wear one. Also, no one has to wear a mask if they go for a walk outside, as long as they socially distance. This is all reasonable and proportional to the risks and discomfort involved. People are not being asked to wear masks in an unreasonable way under any circumstances whatever. This is not a civil liberties issue. It's well within the law that covers people's right to a private life. As soon as the pandemic is over, the requirement to wear a mask will be lifted. It if isn't, for no good reason, than that might breach Article 8. But at present, it doesn't.

Tell me how many of the 500,000+ dead, my family members among those we lost, would still be alive if President Hillary Clinton had been chosen. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Probably less, and that's all that matters. Requesting a specific number is silly. It's possible some of your family and friends who died would still be alive.

Every guidance on mask wearing I’ve read stipulates that mask wearing alone cannot prevent the spread of the virus. So alone, it is an unreasonable way to prevent transmission. And if preventing transmission is the sole purpose, we might as well do what China did and weld people into their dwellings. — NOS4A2

This would be a good post to analyse in a critical thinking class. No need on this forum of course.

Are we to propose our various ethical theories, which are in some senses arbitrary? — Philguy

I think arbitrariness is the defining feature of the good. What is good just is what we will.

If we are to take “reality” and “truth” to mean something related to the world as it seems that it is to our senses, all of our senses not just any one person’s, then (verifiable) disagreement with (anyone’s) empirical experience is another reason to disfavor some “is” claims versus others. That leaves us with a framework of critical empirical realism in which to work out the details of what is real.

And if we are to take “morality” and “goodness” to mean something related to the world as it seems that it ought to be to our appetites, all of our appetites not just any one person’s, then (verifiable) disagreement with (anyone’s) hedonic experience is another reason to disfavor some “ought” claims versus others. That leaves us with a framework of liberal hedonic altruism in which to work out the details of what is moral. — Pfhorrest

This is extremely interesting and I've been wanting to dig into this properly for ages. I still don't have time unfortunately. I buy the first paragraph but not the second, although I'm not completely sure.

The difference is, I think, that with morality and goodness, the individual appetite reasserts itself even after the abstraction for everyone's appetites has occurred. It has the last word. As a recipe for determining public policy though, I think your account it's fine. But as an analysis of what goodness actually is, it's wrong. I want what's good for everyone, sure. As long as I get a bit more without anyone else knowing. That would be even better. The good just is what is willed, for that agent. And there's nothing in that to say we have to abstract for everyone, although we might want to (or not - depending on what we will).

EDIT: with truth, the abstraction is what we want. The view from nowhere. With goodness, the abstraction is ultimately irrelevant, what is good remains what I want, even after considering others.

Imagine that 3-D scanning and 3-D printing become so sophisticated that you could step into a machine that scanned the exact position and nature of every particle in your body and then send that information to a printer that could reconstitute a body with the same types of particles in the same positions within the body. Assume that the technology is 100% reliable, but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. Is there any reason to deny that the person who steps out of the machine at the other end is the person who steps into it. Would it matter if it wasn't the same person as long as they were convinced they were? — Aoife Jones

In practice it would be terribly easy to know which one was you.

You would be the one whose eyes you can't see.
You would be the one who experienced the world from the inside out, not the one you experience from the outside in.
You would be the one you experienced now, not the one you experienced at a slight time delay
You would be the one whose voice was moderated by bones in the skull, not the one whose voice was conditioned only by the column of air in the throat
etc etc
There is an incredibly clear asymmetry which would leave you in absolutely no doubt which one you were. Even if, to a third person, you were qualitatively identical.

fdrake missed out rivers and the nitrogen cycle

Rich & famous (for the talent of marrying up) colored lady got her feelings hurt, so then fucks off in a huff back to where she came from? And I'm suppose to have more than zero fucks to give about that? Because, y'know, everyday peeps - colored or whatever - don't get treated like that (or usually worse)? Bollocks, mate! Sorry. Pinched-off my daily MegXit this morning, feeling less full of it and quite relieved on that account.

For fuck's sake. :brow:

[How you like my drive-by quasi-Jonathan Pie rant?] — 180 Proof

It is quite Pie-esque

Traveling helps, being exposed to other forms of prejudice than the one at home, which we tend to internalize and be blind to. — Olivier5

I expect you are right. I've been exposed to very little cultural variety. I shock myself sometimes when my internalized attitudes come out unexpectedly.

Assertive Masturbation: Self Worth Through Self Knowledge, Jeremy Fornby

You're talking about types.

A pain is not an analogue of a token. It is a token of pain. An instance of a universal. A token of a type.

I'll just point out that there is nothing in, say, the SEP article on tokens to support your contention that they are private. — Banno

Well fuck the SEP then. Instances of pain are obviously private in the sense that when I feel a pain you don't. OK, lets test this. Which finger did I just stab with a toothpick?

What are you talking abut, Bert? Tokens or pains? If tokens, where is the token in stubbing your toe?

And if I see you stub your toe, I might indeed say "ouch!". — Banno

Tokens. The toe stubbing I did on Tuesday is the same type of toe-stubbing that I did on Wednesday, but they are different tokens.

You might say 'ouch' but in sympathy only. Your toe wouldn't hurt.