Okay. So what's your point? — 180 Proof

That you made a mistake

To prevent life =/= to prevent suffering — 180 Proof

I'm not an antinatalist, but x has to exist before it can suffer.

apple-an-sich — jorndoe

I think that's an oxymoron, no?

>>Consciousness is the capacity for experience<<

What do we think? — Wayfarer

I think that's a pretty good definition. It leaves open the conceptual possibility of consciousness with no content, which some find absurd, but I'm OK with.

I think my criticism of your criticism is that you assume that consciousness is like a discrete thing that just pops up and then disappears under certain circumstances. — Apustimelogist

That's not my view, but that is exactly the view of emergentists. Emergentism just is the view that consciousness arises in some circumstances and not others. Emergentists also typically endorse the vagueness of the concept of consciousness to allow for gradual emergence, they don't generally think of consciousness as all-or-nothing.

I don't think there's any evidence for this.

I think there is evidence of this on other senses of the word 'consciousness', but not in the sense we mean here. For example, waking up from sleep happens gradually under some circumstances. But we're talking about any phenomenal state at all, not the difference between waking and sleeping.

What differs non-conscious from conscious things is how they behave as dynamical system...

I disagree. How do we derive, conceptually, consciousness from behaviour?

...and it doesn't seem to make sense to say that consciousness is some additional thing that pops up on top of that, under pains of a kind of epiphenomenal redundancy (see sections 4.4, 5.3, 7 of Chalmer's Conscious mind for details, full pdf available on internet).

I agree epiphenomenalism is wrong. I think consciousness is likely causal, possibly even uniquely so. And then the causal closure of the physical is an idea we have to tackle. If panpsychism is the case, we might be able to replace the concept of law with that of will, perhaps, honouring both phychological causation AND the causal closure of the physical.

Indeed, the commitment to a principled distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive systems, or living and non-living ones, commits to a sort of élan vital, wherein the substance and laws of learning, perception, and action should not be grounded in the same laws of physics as a stone, as though they provide a different, more implacable sort of organization or coherence of states [108]. — the author you mentioned

It's emergentists who are implicitly dualistic, in my view, and create the hard problem by saying that consciousness was a late arrival in the universe. Ironically I think this is what @apokrisis does. Panpsychism is one way of undermining the physical/phenomenal divide. There must still be conceptual distinctions of course, having the capacity to feel is not the same thing as having physical extension in space, but both these properties can be in everything, perhaps, so there is no need to derive one from the other.

I don't think we can have a theory of consciousness in the way you want, not only because there is no fine line between conscious and non-conscious, but we are simply limited to describing what living things do (or what things we deem as being alive do) and nothing more.

I don't especially want a theory of consciousness, I don't think consciousness needs explaining. But when people disagree with me and say consciousness emerged, I'm interested. How exactly? The emergence of consciousness is very much in need of an explanation.

On the question of the difference between consciousness and non-consciousness being sharp or fuzzy, I think it's clearly sharp. I'm with Goff, Antony and Schwitzgebel (and not doubt many others)on that.

And it is certainly correct that the neural correlates approach flounders to the degree it represents Cartesian representationalism – the story that the brain is somehow generating a "display" of reality.

That way of thinking about the problem of consciousness just bakes in the Hard Problem. It begins with the unbridgeable divide as its premise. A display needs someone looking at it. Experiencing it. Homuncular regress is the only option once you trap yourself into a neuroscience of "mental display". — apokrisis

It's not at all clear who you are arguing with here, either on this forum or elsewhere. It's very generic. Names?

And yet in practice, there are procedures developed by neurologists to determine brain death in hospital situations. — apokrisis

While of considerable practical utility, this does not help us with developing a theory of consciousness.

Brain scans can tell if you are thinking about tools or animals. Whether you are day dreaming or focused. Happy or in pain. Not yet an exact science and may never be, but further along than you seem to suggest. — apokrisis

I have actually heard of that. But these are observations of correlations. There's no theory that explains the relationship in a principled way as far as I am aware.

So you are coming at what science can be expected to do in a simple-minded fashion. — apokrisis

I'm not expecting anything of a disembodied 'science'. I'm expecting an explanation of consciousness from people who claim to have one, like you for instance!

There is no one answer to the question you have - give me a theory that tells me both what consciousness is and also why I am experiencing exactly what I am experiencing right now. A theory that collapses the general and the particular, and which is somehow then useful to anyone. — apokrisis

I don't especially require a single theory for both these questions.

As I noted, this is not a theory, it's a standard you apply to an existing phenomenon to decide if it is living. — T Clark

I don't think @apokrisis meant it as a definition or criterion of demarcation, but of he did then it's of little relevance as an explanation of consciousness.

This isn't a theory, it's a definition. — T Clark

You won't find @apokrisis theory in a dictionary. It's not what we mean by 'consciousness'.

What does it mean for a theory to specify what conditions necessitate consciousness or any other phenomenon? What does it mean that a theory has force or is robust? Why must a theory specify what conditions are necessary for a phenomenon rather than just sufficient? — T Clark

I'll see if I can explain with a simple example (it has to be simple because I don't know much science):

To what temperature do I have to heat this water to get it to boil? Prediction: it will boil at 100 degrees provided the following necessary conditions are met:
- sea level atmospheric pressure
- and all the obvious ones like having a heat source and a container that conducts heat etc
...when all these necessary conditions are met they will be jointly sufficient for the water to boil at 100 degrees. That is to say that even if one of the necessary conditions are not met then the water will not boil, and if all the necessary condition are met, they are jointly sufficient, which means the water MUST boil at 100 degrees. It can't not.
Further, a theory which tells a story about pressure and temperature of different materials and states of matter and so on will then explain why we get the result we do, and will be flexibly able to predict the phase changes of different materials under different circumstances, and that's how we test it: we make a bunch of predictions and then do the experiments. The theory will spit out the necessary and sufficient conditions for each phase change.

Applied to consciousness, a well-fleshed out theory will tell us the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness to arise at all, and perhaps even go further and tell us what particular experiences a conscious thing will feel under what circumstances. So to take @apokrisis preferred theory, the necessary conditions for x to be conscious are:
- models environment
- makes predictions based on that model
- for the purpose of building and maintaining itself as an organism (sorry if I got that wrong)
...and I presume these are taken to be jointly sufficient for consciousness. That is to say, if they are all met, x is most definitely conscious, it can't not be. (It wouldn't be much of a theory if they weren't jointly sufficient. That would be like saying "Water needs to be at atmospheric pressure at sea level before it will boil at 100 degree, but sometimes it just doesn't, even when those conditions are met. Water is weird like that." That's an incomplete theory, no? It fails to predict.")
So @apokrisis preferred theory makes a great reasonably clear prediction, because it specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions. The trouble it shares with all theories of consciousness is that we can't test it. We can use it to predict a human being is capable of being conscious, and predict a rock isn't. But we can't check, because we don't have a consciousness-o-meter. And if we use the theory to check, (i.e. we look to see if the organism models the world to make predictions in order to create and maintain itself as an organism) then we have just assumed the thing we are trying to show.

EDIT: this is why I keep asking variations of "So why can't that happen without consciousness?" The analogy with water is "Why can't water just stay unboiled at 100 degrees at sea level pressure?" And of course the theory answers that, it says why the jointly sufficient conditions necessitate that the water be boiling. It's not enough for a good theory to merely observe that water does in fact always boil at 100 degrees. There needs to be an explanation. And the situation with consciousness is even worse, we can't even agree on what to observe to detect the presence of consciousness - we don't even have an undisputed regularity of nature to explain. If we did have a consciousness-o-meter, that would give us a huge head start in developing a theory. We do have reports of human beings and the inference to other minds by abduction, that's a start, but it only tells us other humans are likely conscious, it tells us nothing about rocks (not without making a bunch of assumptions anyway).

According to Chalmers, at least as I understand him, the hard problem is how to get from a physical, biological, neurological explanation of cognitive functions to experience. — T Clark

Yes, either by a theory or by redefining these things as experiential.

I don't think physicalists deny the existence of experience nor do they say that experience must accompany cognitive functions. Or have I misunderstood you? — T Clark

I don't think you've misunderstood me, but you may have misunderstood physicalism. A theory of consciousness should ideally be able to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to be conscious, and explain why those conditions result in/constitute/realise consciousness. A physicalist theory, if it is to have any force, must specify the sufficient conditions, that is, what conditions necessitate consciousness, and explain why. Otherwise it's more of a speculative possibility than a theory with persuasive force.

It's not. — T Clark

We agree!

Who says they can't? — T Clark

Physicalists, specifically functionalists

I'm not sure I know what that means, but I'll try this - can a robust theory of chemistry reliably predict which chemical systems are alive? Again, no. — T Clark

A robust theory of chemistry will predict which systems are chemical systems. A robust theory of life will predict which systems are alive. (Although there may be an issue about the difference between definition and theory here.) For example, @apokrisis theory is that a system is conscious if and only if it models its environment and makes predictions based on that model (I've probably oversimplified that, apologies apo). So this theory could in principle perhaps be used to create an artificial consciousness, and the theory would predict that the resultant creature would be conscious. It would be hard to test that prediction though, as notoriously no one has yet invented a consciousness-o-meter.

I don't see how that differs significantly from the previous question. — T Clark

The hard problem is how we get from no consciousness to some consciousness. This problem only exists for emergentists.

The other problem is the problem of explaining how one functional system is reliably correlated with one experience rather than another. This problem exists for every theory of mind.

.

Thanks, that's helpful.

Physicalism is a metaphysical position. — T Clark

Yes I agree, sorry I made a typo. Corrected above.

(Or do you no longer deny that there is evidence for physicalism?) — wonderer1

I think I might deny that there is no evidence for physicalism. I'm interested in what people think is evidence for physicalism.

EDIT: Confusing typo inverted my meaning. Apologies @T Clark Fixed.

I've just tried to explain panpsychism to someone IRL. They said 'A treehugger?'

Yes, that's the hard problem. It's the general question: "How is it exactly that experience is caused by/realised by/is identical with the functions of complex systems? Why can't all these things happen without experience?" A robust theory on consciousness will be able to reliably predict which systems have experience of some kind or another.

OK, lets assume we've answered that question. There is now a further question: "Why is it that such-and-such function causes/realises/is the taste of chocolate instead of the smell of coffee?" A really robust theory of experience should be able to predict in a principled way what a particular function feels like to be instantiated. And this problem remains for everyone, including dualists, panpsychists, and new-agers, because no one denies the correlation between physical systems and what in particular we experience.

Still physicalism is where progress in understanding is being made, whereas dualism and panpsychism seem to dismiss the possibility of progress being made altogether. — wonderer1

Panpsychists and dualists probably do typically dismiss the possibility of explaining consciousness (in general terms that would constitute an answer to the hard problem) in terms of complex systems. But this dismissal for many is exactly what motivates them to place consciousness elsewhere in nature than just an emergent characteristic of some complex systems. For my money, the fact that a growing number of philosophers take panpsychism seriously is progress. Bypassing the hard problem instead of trying to solve it is progress. Not that I object to physicalists continuing to theorise, they come up with interesting stuff. Just not a solution to the hard problem. (And before Galen Strawson tells me off, he insists he is a physicalist and a panpsychist at the same time, which last time I read it made sense to me but I've forgotten much of his reasoning.) I personally think the problem of what consciousness is is not hard, I think we know what it is, and we only have to introspect to find out. But the problem of the relationship between consciousness and systems is very obscure for the reasons Hoffman mentions, and I do think science can play a useful role in that.

On the other hand, a lot of progress is being made, in understanding that things like the smell of coffee are a function of coordinated activity in arrays of neurons, and that expecting to find a "particular neural event" accounting for the smell of coffee evinces a lack of sophistication in considering the subject. — wonderer1

Sure, but that doesn't make the problem any easier does it? If it does, please do explain.

The problem of why such-and-such function is correlated with this experience rather than that is not the hard problem.

One point Hoffman makes very well is that we have made no progress whatever in explaining how it is that a particular neural event is (or causes or realises) a sensation of the smell of coffee rather than, say, the taste of chocolate. And this problem applies regardless of one's view about consciousness - dualists and panpsychists are no further forward on this than physicalists.

Interesting. Didn't know that

Looks like a gem of an article, but I can only see the first page on JSTOR. 1974, well before Chalmers. Makes the same point I did about skepticism raised by @apokrisis.

The 'Dan' he refers to...

Still no ought, intentionality, consciousness or value

Oh! That's interesting. Which is the most recent convention? Are you being old fashioned or current street?

Berkeley had a clear position. — Janus

He did and he deserves a lot of credit for that. I wish he'd gone panpsychist like Sprigge instead of wheeling God in to look at things when we weren't.

The subject of my present experience is the laptop screen and text — Banno

Surely that would be the object of your experience? I suppose either would work. Brits abroad.

You mean experimentally? - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys3343

As a bone of contention? - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04251-x — apokrisis

I'll read these after you have stood on your head for half an hour. I want a video to prove it.

Fair enough

[1]So for some reason it is OK for you to use commonsense to make inferences about things you can’t directly know, but science as a formal method for making such inferences does not enjoy the same privilege? [2]It is defeated by the zombies in which you don’t believe? Curious.

[3]So what does your commonsense tell you about the consciousness of the chair you are sat on? [4]Given the zombie argument that is so legit, how can you know it is either conscious or not conscious[?] It might be just keeping very quiet and still. It might be aware but suffering locked in syndrome.

Your commonsense is this magical power that transcends mere scientific inference. Please clear up these deep riddles of Nature. — apokrisis

I'm not sure if these questions are rhetorical or not. I'll have go anyway, I'm a sucker for a quiz.

1) You introduced commonsense and science, I was just going with your terms. The inference from analogy, which I suggested was done instinctively by most people (or maybe not, maybe people develop theory of mind some other way, it doesn't matter) might be called commonsense, or it might be philosophy. It doesn't matter. The point is that it isn't a theory of consciousness. It's a conjecture of which other things are conscious. Scientific theories of consciousness are typically functionalist ones, such as yours, the IIT, and others. They do make predictions about what other things are conscious based on the structure and function of those things (less so by analogy, although that may be part of it), but those predictions are not checkable except perhaps by reference to our instincts or common sense or philosophical arguments from analogy. It's entirely understandable that when commonsense and functional theories yield the same predictions, they are considered plausible. Neither are testable though, because we don't have a consciousness-o-meter. And the functionalist theories are wrong, and the inference to other minds is not taken far enough.

2) The functionalist theories are defeated by the zombies in which I don't believe, yes, because the functionalist theories seem consistent with there being no experiences present. So they might be valuable in some way, but not as explainers of consciousness.

3) That's an interesting question. My commonsense instinct is that they are not. Of course, what constitutes commonsense I suspect is somewhat culture-relative. I do think they are conscious though, just not in a way that particularly matters to me. I suspect that the content of the consciousness of my chair is so minimal to be of no interest to anything, possibly including the chair.

4) Several reasons. I have rehearsed the argument for panpsychism from the non-vagueness of the concept of consciousness many times on the forum. There may be an argument from psychological causation and non-overdetermination of the physical, but I have yet to develop that. It's important to keep in mind the broad landscape of theoretical possibilities. Out of those panspychism is the least problematic of the three basic possibilities: panpsychism, emergentism and eliminativism. Eliminatism is false by introspection. Emergentism is extremely problematic for a number of reasons already rehearsed. Panpsychism is problematic, but less so.

Is it simply the case that idealists are able to accept more 'supernatural' claims because they have determined that nature is ultimately no longer limited by laws of physics? — Tom Storm

Does idealism break physics?

But the larger problem here is that a genetic fallacy is still a genetic fallacy. Bad motivations don't make someone wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sticky this please mods!

The Hard Problem pretends to have its ontic ground - zombies as a real possibility despite all that science and commonsense says - but it simply devolves to standard Humean epistemic issue that “we will never really know” that bedevils all rational inquiry and which became precisely the reason for pragmatism becoming standard as the way to move forward after that. — apokrisis

The point is that what you call science does not rule them out, or indeed in. It has nothing to say on the subject of consciousness itself, although there's still plenty of interesting work to do peripheral to that, like scientifically studying the neural correlates of particular experiences. We don't doubt that other people are conscious because of commonsense (as you say), not science. We infer others are conscious because I am conscious and other people seem to be like me and do roughly similar things under similar circumstances. It's the best explanation of their behaviour. You don't have to do any science for this, and commonsense does it instinctively. So if we know that other people are conscious, but we can't derive that from their structure and function, then that is a clue that examining structure and function may actually be insufficient.

It's not about unwarranted doubt. We don't doubt. It's about finding a plausible explanation for what we don't doubt.

Very interesting! Thanks.

I'm skeptical of the idea that Daniel Dennett believes anything these days, but anyway, that appears to be gratuitious slander.

From Wikipedia:

Some physicalists, such as Daniel Dennett, argue that philosophical zombies are logically incoherent and thus impossible, or that all humans are philosophical zombies;[4][5] — wonderer1

I've just realised we may be talking at cross purposes. I've bolded the relevant bit. Eliminativism is exactly the view that nothing is conscious, so humans are philosophical zombies. Dennett oscillates (as far as I can tell) between eliminativism and perhaps a kind of functionalism. Not sure exactly. I only got about a third of the way through Consciousness Explained.

Yeah, I've never been able to get to grips with his stuff. I don't think I'm the only one.

And yet you think it is your gotcha… — apokrisis

The point about zombies is not whether or not you believe in them (nobody except Daniel Dennett does), but whether a functionalist account like yours plausibly rules them out. Your account of an organism that models its environment and makes predictions based on that model is good, I like it. But the question of whether such a creature is conscious or not remains open. I see nothing in that account that rules out the creature being a zombie - it seems to me all the functions you have described could just as well occur in a creature with no experiences. Using the word 'zombie' is just a convenient and intuitively accessible way of making the point. And being lazy, I like that. As a theory of the self I think your account is much more plausible.

@Wayfarer

I should have just said ontological idealism generally instead of specifying Berkeley. Berkeley is just the original ontological idealist. Religious/spiritual views sometimes find their philosophical justificatory wing (almost exactly like Sinn Fein and the IRA) embracing ontological idealism. Not that I have anything against that.

What can you say to folk who claim to believe in philosophical zombies? — apokrisis

No one believes in them.

EDIT: except eliminatavists I guess