Descartes’ dualistic ontology is fairly standard, I’d say. Even on the forum. — Mikie

That's interesting. I'm definitely not a substance dualist. I don't think @Wayfarer is, he's an non-dualist, although he might not identify as a monist exactly. Bartricks definitely did seem like a substance dualist. So is @Hanover I think. I can't think of any others off the top of my head. Maybe a few of the overtly religious members. But I'd say generally substance dualism is very non-standard, even on the forum, for good reason.

One motivation for suggesting that mind or consciousness precedes being is the view that it seems impossible that consciousness emerges from systems the components of which are severally non-conscious. However it seems to me there is a similar problem with putting consciousness as primary, namely his hard to see how extension, locality, differentiation and so on can emerge from consciousness alone. I think we need more than one property at base. At least two it seems to me, maybe more, I'm not sure. So I'm a substance monist but probably a property dualist, possibly triplist or more, depending on how few we can get away with. Is consciousness plus spatiality enough? I don't know.

interesting article, thank you

I picked phenomenological as the subject to which philosophy has the most relevance, but logic and conceptual cleanliness is perhaps the next. And then all of them.

This thread isn't about Dfpolis's paper any more is it?

"conscious experience appear to be magical"! — Nickolasgaspar

Literally nobody ever says that. Not that I've heard anyway.

ok bert........... — Nickolasgaspar

Hi!

Lectures - talks
Alok Jha: Consciousness, the hard problem? - Presentations
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=313yn0RY9QI

Anil Seth on the Neuroscience of Consciousness, Free Will, The Self, and Perception
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hUEqXhDbVs — Nickolasgaspar

These talks don't seem to support what you're saying. For example, Anil Seth defines 'consciousness' just in terms of subjective experience, at least to start with.

but I see no reason to rule some notion of God in as a matter of principle. — Fooloso4

Dfpolis says he concludes God, not assumes God. In any case it's not particularly relevant for this thread.

Perhaps he is concerned that if he make clear his theological grounds it would lead to rejection of his argument. — Fooloso4

...maybe, and if so it seems he'd likely be right!

The idea is logically no different than the idea that all things are in the Universe...in which case not everything is in the Universe...or the Universe is just a thing in the Universe...can't see how that works either. — Janus

Thank god you got there before me. I was dreading having to make this very simple point.

Idealism says, one way or another, that to be is to be related in some way to some mind. If you hold there to be a "human-independent nature of reality" a part of your metaphysics, you are not an idealist. — Banno

That's wrong Banno, as I thought you'd already agreed. There can be non-human minds that underwrite the existence of human-independent bits of the world. Have I missed your point?

Always happy to help!

Whatever. I don't see a point to this conversation. — Banno

Righto. I haven't offended you have I? Just unsure of tone.

Cite evidence of "minds other than human minds" that does not beg the question of 'what is "mind"?' whether human or not. — 180 Proof

I'm not exactly sure what you are asking for, but I'll offer this. As other minds are not directly perceptible (I suggest) they have to be inferred, if we are to rationally think they exist (or maybe there are other methods to know, but I'm offering one here). We can make an analogy based on similarities with my behaviour, perhaps. So the behaviour of other creatures might count as evidence. Consider:

1) I yelp when stuck with a pin and run away from the pin-sticker (one half of the analogy)
2) I do this because I have a mind and find the pain unpleasant and want to get away from it (assumption - I know you think this is false)
3) The dog yelps when stuck with a pin and runs away from the pin-sticker (the other half or the analogy, this constitutes the evidence)
4) (Optionally list a whole load of other ways dogs and humans are similar, to support the similarity)
5) therefore, the dog yelps and runs away because it has a mind and it wants to get away from the pain

Within the context of that inference, does the dog's behaviour count as evidence? As evidence that does not beg the question of what is mind? (I haven't actually done this experiment, but I hope the dog's behaviour is sufficiently plausible. Maybe I should pick an example that actually happened instead of making one up.)

A silly argument. Let "Humans" include aliens if you want. Or dogs. Whatever. As I said,
Anyone you wish to include. — Banno

We are talking at cross purposes, it may have been my fault. When I asked you who you were thinking of, I meant which idealist philosophers.

Also, when you said 'us' I assumed you meant human beings. You meant anything with a mind.

Is that all cleared up now?

Yeah, maybe

OK, so even on your own conception of idealism, this criticism fails because idealists don't just believe in human minds.

Are you now going to say that the same skepticism about the external world from a human point of view must also apply to non-human minds as well, on pain of contradiction or special pleading or something?

EDIT: that's a perfectly good point to make, but you have to be explicit about it if you want to actually succeed in making an argument against idealism rather than an argument against, say solipsism, or human-mind-only idealism. Most Idealisms are not solipsism or humanocentric.

The core of idealism seems to be something like that the ultimate foundation of the world is somehow mental. How's that pan out? — Banno

Sure, that's fine. There's nothing about 'us' in that characterisation you just gave. Yet your criticisms of idealism, if I recall, usually do centre around objects not depending on humans for their existence.

us — Banno

Idealism isn't necessarily about our (human) minds. It's about any minds. Minds other than human minds are invoked to account for object permanence.

Indeed, the quote as a whole seems to me to presuppose that we are part of a world that is independent of our accounts, and within which our accounts might evolve. — Banno

Again, that's not idealism. No idealist I'm aware of talks only about human minds. Not that I'm well read on it. Who are you thinking of?

Another day, another thread I think! Thank you for sharing your views. I don't want to pollute Dfpolis's thread with a whole load of stuff about definition vs theory. I should start my own thread. If you want, you could jump in on this thread, although it is old now:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11467/poll-definition-or-theory

However, qualia are not subjective awareness, but contingent forms of sensory experience. — Dfpolis

Yes, I think that's right. It's why I don't use the term 'qualia' - it creates too much confusion.

However, consciousness of abstract truths, such as ‘the square root of 2 is a surd,’ have no quale. Only sensations have qualia, and not even all of them. Blindsight and proprioception have none. — Dfpolis

That's interesting and not something I've thought about much. Not sure if I agree - proprioception seems to have a feel to me, although I don't doubt there's all sorts of things going on which I'm not aware of. I think perceiving a logical contradiction has a feel to it. Indeed, I'm not sure how we could know it was a contradiction if it didn't feel wrong in some way, a sort of offence to reason.

Similarly, metaphysical naturalists project nature onto an a priori model defined over a restricted conceptual space. With historical myopia, they tend to see dualism as the as the sole alternative to physicalism. — Dfpolis

That seems right to me. It really makes discussing a topic hard work. @Nickolasgaspar might be a case in point, assuming we want to bring back the Gods and the ether.

Sorry, I just don't think you've grasped the distinction between definition and theory. You're not the only one, there's lots of people here who struggle with this. I grant that it's not always possible to clearly separate the two. But if your opening gambit in someone else's thread is to insist they change their central definition to something else, you've not engaged in dialogue, you've changed the subject of discussion.

"awareness of intelligiblity" — Dfpolis

That's interesting. Sorry I still haven't read your article in detail yet, but I'm curious on where you think this definition likes on the spectrum of theory to definition. How theory laden is this? Is this what people in general mean, when talking about the hard problem? Is this what Chalmers means, for example?

The first part of my definition is descriptive. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, this bit is reasonably theory free, and can more or less serve as a definition (I'd leave out the arousal bit):

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self,... — Nickolasgaspar

...whereas this bit (whether it is true or not) is pure theory, even if it has become so accepted in the community you refer to as to be, for practical purposes, a definition:

....which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex (Daube, 1986; Paus, 2000; Zeman, 2001; Gosseries et al., 2011). "
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/

This is a philosophy forum, not the community you are talking about. So we can't take this as definition here. This must be treated here as theory, to be shown, not assumed.

From what I understand he is proposing a different ontology for the same phenomenon.(Consciousness). My attempt was to point to our current scientific ontological framework. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, that's no problem. Your theory contradicts Dfpolis'.

If he promotes a different ontological framework then his philosophy is problematic at best because a. his epistemology is not up to date and b. his Auxiliary philosophical principles governing his interpretarions are not Naturalistic(Methodological).

OK, more work need to be done than just tell us we're out of date. We're unlikely to slap our foreheads and say "Whoops! Thanks Nikolasgaspar for correcting us. No more philosophy of mind. Problem solved."

Is your objection about our different ontological frameworks when you say "That's not the definition he's using!"?

Not at all, no. Once we have agreed on the subject matter we are talking about (consciousness) then the disagreement about the nature of it can begin. :)

IF not then tell me what is your objection. What is his definition that I missed?

I'm not sure if he's given one, I've only skimmed the paper so far. But it's the same definition that is talked about in any discussion of the hard problem. Something like "Consciousness is that by which X can have experiences" or something like that. I've tried to put that definition in an as theory-free way as I can.

Before starting the deconstruction I always find helpful to include the most popular general Definition of Consciousness in Cognitive Science so we can all be on the same page: — Nickolasgaspar

That's your page, not Dfpolis' page! That's not the definition he's using! This is a discussion based on his concept, not yours.

Is mind ontologically separate from / independent of (the) world? — 180 Proof

I don't think so no.

Does mind correspond to Being and ideas to Beings (well isn't Being / mind also an "idea" – the one we're discussing)?

Yes, perhaps, depending on exactly what you mean. And yes there is an idea of mind or Being.

I don't really like using a capitalised 'Being' though, it's unclear and a bit wanky.

My article is now published. Polis, D. F., "The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction," Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research. (14) 2, pp. 96-114. https://jcer.com/index.php/jcj/article/view/1042/1035 — Dfpolis

That's exciting! A proper paper on my favourite subject by a TPF user. If I can manage it I might start a thread on it if that's OK with you.

A definition should include a description of the Property(Phenomenon in question) plus the ontology (mechanisms, type of substance,process) of it. — Nickolasgaspar

That's not right, and it's really important. A definition sets the limit of the application of a term, and it enables you to be able to use a word in a conversation, hopefully. It picks out, as efficiently as possible, the thing you are talking about. A definition typically contains far less information than a theory. What you are asking for with this is a definition plus a theory.

Your 'definition':

Definition.
"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex "
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/
So this the biological process that enables our ability to be conscious of stimuli(internal or external). — Nickolasgaspar

...is a theory. The reason I know it is a theory is because I disagree with it, YET I still know how to use the word 'consciousness'. There's few things that piss me off more than someone with a theory insisting that I must agree with them because that's what a word just means!

That's not to say that the line between theory and definition is always easily drawn, I accept that. I made a thread about it here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11467/poll-definition-or-theory

OK, what are your "terms" for discussing a novel philosophical worldview? — Gnomon

That's a good question, thank you for asking it. I think on a philosophy forum like this, I'm looking for arguments. I want to know why a position is wrong, and why a proposed solution is better. The subject matter of your view is perfectly philosophical, it concerns the nature of substance. You say it is information, and you may be right. I don't think that's a particularly controversial view actually, and I have no opinion on it. I haven't read very many of your posts, and I have only briefly looked at your website, but what you seem to be doing is expressing your opinion. What's wrong with that? It's not very philosophical. Philosophy is about arguments and justification. We typically want to know why one answer to a problem is better than another. Indeed, before we get to that, we want to know what problem a particular view is an answer to in the first place. From your website, the main view you set up in contrast to yours you call 'materialism'. You characterise this in a very old-fashioned 'atoms in the void' way. Modern materialists don't usually think like that any more. That's one thing that puts me off reading further. What might be more interesting and fitting on a philosophy forum is if you looked at a topic, said why the existing answers are unsatisfactory, and narrowly and specifically say why enformationism is different and peculiarly suited to solving the problem. Maybe you've already done that and I haven't noticed. You also say that you are not proposing any new science or new concepts. I guess I'd like to know what it is you are contradicting with your view. What is it that we are all getting wrong exactly, and why is it wrong? If you can convince us there's a problem with a particular view, and show us how enformationism fixes it, that might be of more prima facie interest. Showing, not telling, I suppose. I suspect the hassle you are getting is not because of your view (which may well be right for all I know), but because you're not playing the philosophy game.

I think the predicate "external" in this context is assumed to be synonymous with "independent of any minds". I don't see in what sense you / idealists mean that an "external world" might not be "independent of any minds" — 180 Proof

You may be right, but to my mind 'external' could just mean 'not me'. On a Berkeleyan system, there is a world external to me, and possibly external to my mind, but not external to God's mind. On a Spriggean idealist panpsychist scheme (which may satisfy realist intuitions better), there is an external world, but the entities in that world exist by virtue of their own minds. There's a lot of possibilities that hold that there is a world out there that is independent of me, and perhaps independent of any one particular mind, but each thing in that external world is itself dependent on one or more minds in one way or another. So idealism, depending on how it is construed, can be consistent with the existence of an external world. I think it important to distinguish these two senses of external (external to me or a particular mind, and external to any/every mind) as I think idealism is sometimes wrongly dismissed because people think it rejects the idea of a world external to me. Not that I'm necessarily an idealist, I'm undecided.

Since he won't listen to me — Gnomon

You're not the only one he doesn't listen to, but nor is he the only one that doesn't listen to you. I struggle with your posts, and I suspect others ignore your stuff too. I briefly looked up Enformationism and it's just you as far as I can tell. Which is obviously fine, but you have to do a lot of work to get listened to. If you feel underappreciated on the forum, I'd recommend engaging with people on their own terms. Take this from your website:

"One thing that all of these examples of leading-edge science have in common is a prominent role for Information. Not the mundane stuff you get on Google, but the essential stuff, as defined by Claude Shannon. In his analysis of communication, he saw that ideas can be converted into abstract digital numbers. What he called Information2 was found to be equi-valent to potent Energy as opposed to depleted Entropy. Yet in a larger context, its power-to-enform also has the ability to give meaningful & useful & valuable Form or shape to some raw, unformed substance. Hence, Information is packed with Potential, as opposed to the emptiness of Entropy. Inspired by that compelling metaphor, along with some insights from Quantum Theory, I have concluded that Causal Energy actually consists of Elemental Information3. On the most basic levels, such as laws of physics, that invisible “en-form-action” is analogous to the numerical relationships we call Mathematics4."

This is diving straight in with no thought for the reader. Why would anyone be interested in this? It's inviting being ignored at best, and being gadflied (twatted) and mocked at worst. What are the Random Capitals doing there? We're assholes on this forum, we've heard a lot of bullshit, and this, at first glance, just looks like more. Give us a reason to read it.

I'm not sure why idealism is on there. Idealism is not a position on whether or not there is an external world, but about whether that world (external or not) is independent of any minds.

If you think the answer is yes, then do you think that the following is emergent:
In the future we will
1. 'Network' our individual brain based knowledge.
2. Connect our brain based knowledge, directly, to all electronically stored information and be able to search it at will, in a similar style (or better) to a google search.
3. Act as a single connected intellect and as separate intellects. — universeness

Regarding 1 and 2
I have no idea what humans will manage to do or not, but I'm not sure if the idea of emergence is quite the right idea to capture such developments. There are several concepts of emergence, but taking it as the idea that complex systems instantiate properties that were not present in the several components of that system, then arguably what you suggest does not constitute emergence. People's brains have always been linked together through communication, then there was the explosion of shared information with the invention of printing, then again with the internet. But I suggest that this is an evolution of degree and not of kind. What novel property do we see now that we didn't when, say, the printing press was invented? Isn't the difference just one of degree?

Regarding 3
This might be a case of emergence, depending on what you mean. It's conceivable it's already happening I guess. Are you suggesting the barriers that individuate people dissolve, such that we become one person, with pooled experiences and thoughts?

No, they wake sleepwalkers (or disturb their 'dreaming'). — 180 Proof

Sophists are sleepwalkers? And you're awake presumably in this metaphor?

Gadflies hassle the powerful, no?

Gnomon is hardly the establishment though is he? But you're right, I haven't read it all.

Don't mind me, though, I'm just another one of those persistent gadflies buzzin' around this agora – swat me away if you can. — 180 Proof

Do you really think that's what you are doing? That's so weird.

Why do you think that? — Isaac

That's a hard question to answer. I suppose it's partly because I'm a panpsychist, and I think that an experience happens when something undergoes a change (@unenlightened helped me with that idea a bit). Any act of perception involves a change to the perceiver's body (I'm taking that as a given - counter-examples are welcome if you can think of any), that change constitutes the perception in the most direct and visceral way. Of course we can then go on to model a world based on these, I don't doubt that. And then we talk about perceiving in its more usual sense, like me perceiving a tree, in which the perceiver is separate from and largely conceived to be independent of and unaffected by the object of perception - we build a model of the world that isn't the world. And out aquaintance with those objects, if they can be called objects, is mediated by this process of construction. Questions of consistency, illusions, object permanence and so on that bedevil various realisms are then reducible to how useful and accurate our models are. Not sure what that makes me really, apart from a wanker. Does this view have a name? I'm not totally convinced I'm right, but it seems the most coherent line to take to me at the moment.

I typed all those

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