Also, I believe p-zombies can lie, just as some future robot/AI might. That is, they can say something that contradicts their own beliefs for some instrumental aim. This is all cognitive, none of it depends on consciousness.

Maybe not. I was thinking of the case of a p-zombie living among humans.

Would they have subjective experience or self-awareness beyond that of a robot that we can build that reacts to stimuli? — Patterner

By definition, no.

Do you think they would have beliefs and knowledge? — RogueAI

I think so. I think these are cognitive, not dependent on subjectivity.

I say the TE is invalid. If they were only receiving imput from their senses, from inside and outside their bodies, and only reacting to the stimuli as the laws of physics allow and require, they would not be thinking of consciousness, or saying they have it when asked. — Patterner

They are "thinking", in the information processing sense, the same way that we are. It is just that these thoughts are not accompanied by the same phenomenal experiences ours do (i.e. vocalizations, visualizations). Their thoughts may take the form of sentences ("I will take a shower soon"). They just don't experience these internal sentences, any more than they experience external sentences.

Do they think about consciousness? They would be puzzled by the concept, that is for sure. But so many here are puzzled by it too. No great difference. They might equate it to awareness. They are aware of external stimuli, because they respond to them, and they are aware of internal stimuli, because they act upon them. Therefore, in their "minds", they are conscious.

This argument still seems very relevant today because I would think that most people who embrace computational theory of mind or integrated information theory very much would like to compare the mind to a harmony or melody. It is an "emergent informational process." But for that emergence to be causally efficacious, you need some sort of "strong emergence" that gets around Plato's trap, and that is hard to come by. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Harmony or melody is not really an adequate metaphor, and as you say it implies epiphenomenalism. A much better one I have seen is virtual machine. Mind is to the brain as a virtual machine is to the underlying physical hardware. When the virtual machine is running, it is in control of some or all of the operations of the computer, even though everything it does is causally reducible to operations of the underlying hardware.

I also suspect that it is rather a straw man version of what idealist philosophy really means. — Wayfarer

Very possibly

In any case, thanks for you comments, appreciated. — Wayfarer

:up:

I think that is one version, which I call "strong". Which is not your version, as I pointed out.

That without mind, matter is not scattered about in space in any way at all.

Or maybe in your version, that reality is so bound up with subjectivity that there is nothing we can say about the matter?

Either way, these don't seem to correspond to the Pinter quote, which you nevertheless cite as an exemplar of your position. Hence my feeling that you vacillate.

Is that ‘indirect realism’? — Wayfarer

To my understanding, yes actually.

Without minds, "Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now", but "Objects ... have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds."

I think it is empathy. I suspect humans, as a social species, are hard wired for empathy which is likely foundational to morality and human rights. I — Tom Storm

Not empathy, or not just empathy. Remember that empathy is hard-wired, based on mirror neurons. Whereas our notions of social equality have changed radically in mere decades and centuries.

I think moral progress is social, and primarily consists in expanding the circle of who gets to be a moral agent, worthy of empathy. Moral regression is just the opposite, constricting that circle.

The poor are always a hotly contested area in this regard. There are always those who consider them unworthy, unimportant, deserving of their condition, and fundamentally unequal with their economic betters.

What about that equation ‘looks spherical?’ Rhetorical question of course but makes the point that a sphere can be perfectly described by an equation as can all of the primitive elements described by mathematical sciences without ‘looking like’ anything. Its appearance as spherical is imputed by the observing mind - which is not to deny that it is spherical, but to recognise the constructive contribution of the observer. — Wayfarer

Is this not just indirect realism? We agree that appearance is mind-created. Here we also seem to agree that the appearance is a perspective on mind-independent reality.

But contrast with:

hat is one example of an empirical fact. As I said in the OP I don't deny empirical facts. What I'm criticizing is the attempt to absolutize them as self-existent in the absence of any mind. The nature of the universe absent any mind....well, what can be said? — Wayfarer

Why is the equation describing the sphere mind independent, but the equations describing planetary orbits somehow dependent on there being minds?

Methodological naturalism can be, in fact should be, circumspect with regards to metaphysical questions, of which ‘the role of the mind in the construal of experience’ is an example par excellence. — Wayfarer

Sometimes I feel you vacillate between a kind of (weak?) idealism and indirect realism. An indirect realist would also emphasize the ‘the role of the mind in the construal of experience’, while acknowledging external reality. You do as well. Is the difference between your position and indirect realism just a difference in emphasis? An emphasis on the mind's role, and a deemphasis on the determining role of external reality?

How do you think that something other than a mind could mark a frame of reference? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sentence "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" , the sun is the frame of reference in which the relation "further" operates. It takes a mind to formulate any proposition; in this one, the Sun is marked as a frame of reference, without which "further" would be meaningless. But does the proposition hold independently of minds, or not?

Isn't positing 'a frame of reference' without their being a mind to conceive it, merely speculation? — Wayfarer

Speculation? I don't see how. It takes a mind to mark something as a frame of reference. But it takes a mind to formulate a proposition at all. Does that imply that the truth of all proposition are mind dependent? In what sense would "the Earth is further from the sun than Venus" no longer be true when sentient life is gone?

The little dots do not conspire together to give rise to Grandma’s portrait. The portrait comes to exist in visual awareness when the whole of it is seen from an external perspective. The existence of an object as an individual whole is always something external to the object, not inherent in the object itself. — Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter

How is it then possible for the picture to inform? Suppose I have never seen Grandma, and the portrait includes the hairy mole on her cheek. Now I know it is there. If there is no mind independent feature of the picture as a whole, how can it tell me something that was not previously in my mind?

Similarly I had know foreknowledge that you would reply to me exactly as you did. Now I know your reply. Does that knowledge come from me alone, merely my personal interpolation, when in truth the words on my screen are just assemblages of pixels?

So what is thought to be 'inherent in the object' such as its perceived roundness, does not exist on the level of the primitive constituents of that object as described by science, but is imputed to it by the observer. — Wayfarer

This division between "simples"/primitive constituents, and "Gestalts", seems to be doing exactly what this quote says is impossible:

it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” — Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Dan Zahavi

For my part, I don't see why the roundness of the bowling ball should not be included among the " primitive constituents of that object as described by science". The roundness determines its Newtonian behavior, after all.

As I said at the outset, we can imagine an empty cosmos, but that imaginative depiction still relies on an implicit perspective, or else there is nothing nearer or further, larger or smaller. — Wayfarer

Are you conflating a frame of reference with a mental perspective? Nothing can be nearer or further, larger or smaller, independent of a frame of reference. But a frame of reference is not a mind, even though a mind can furnish one.

A boulder and a stump is not inherently nearer or further. But if I drive a stake in the ground, the boulder might then be nearer to it than the stump. Similarly, the stake might be taller than the boulder and shorter than the stump. But a stake is not a mind, merely a frame of reference.

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds — Introduction

It is clear that appearance is something created by minds. But shape? I struggle with that. Shapes unlike colors have properties that are mind-independent. Bowling balls roll by virtue of their shape, whether or not a mind is there to observe it.

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle. — Wayfarer

Meaningless to us, whose every thought is conditioned by our perspective. We are perceptive and limited creatures with central nervous systems, and as you point out perspective is deeply woven into the fabric of our understanding. But just because we cannot truly think beyond perspective, isn't it injudicious to thereby conclude that reality itself is incoherent outside of perspective?

We might be talking past each other a little bit.

My point is that "emergence" in itself offers no explanations. Nothing happens because of emergence. Rather, emergence describes a situation where nontrivial dynamics between simpler components produce surprisingly complex effects. This situation happens all over the place in nature, but "emergence" doesn't explain anything. It merely describes. You still have to understand how it can be that the complex effects can emerge from the simpler inputs.

Lacking explanatory power, I don't really see what emergence has to offer in this thread's argument. It does nothing to bridge the explanatory gap. If a crude dualist argument were offered, that "like must come from like", emergence could be deployed against that. But I don't see anyone doing that. Therefore, afaict emergence just seems to cloud things with a false veil of mystification.

So far we've only asked a few short lived heads: — Christoffer

I've always been skeptical of that. People pass out from far lesser interruptions to cerebral blood flow than the total catastrophe of beheading. More likely it was some involuntary muscle contractions, fancifully interpreted.

We do not yet know if it is impossible to predict or merely that the prediction is too complex for us to compute it. If it were, would that then be an explanation? — Christoffer

No, why would it? The only thing at stake would be whether the term 'emergence' would be used, which is not super rigorous.

It only becomes a description if we can conclude it fundamentally impossible to be predicted. — Christoffer

It is only ever a description. Name one physical phenomenon where emergence functions as an explanation.

Emergence is a giant red herring in this discussion. Emergence is a description, not an explanation. If a complex phenomenon manifests properties that are not present in its components, and could never have been predicted by studying the components, these properties can be described as emergent. But this doesn't explain anything at all.

If physicalism is true, conscious is undoubtedly emergent from neural activity. But so what? This just characterizes the relationship between consciousness and neural activity. You still have to explain how consciousness can emerge from neural activity. Emergence itself is totally incapable of doing this. In all other emergent phenomena the explanation is known at least in principle, "emergence" is never an explanation.

But this isn't really a challenge to physicalism, since plenty of people who would claim that information is ontologically basic would also go with Landauer's principle, "information is physical." — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems like you can make a strong case that it is not, that it is more akin to mathematics. Consider digital information. Two digital objects are identical iff their sequence of bits is identical. Sequences of bits are just (potentially enormous) binary numbers.

What is constant as information moves from one media to another is numerical. Everything that is not constant is physical.

One of the enjoyable aspects of natural and real life is the challenges and adversity it can sometimes present and our ability to deal with such adversity which would help an individual build character and resilience. For me then the simulation would be a cop out. — kindred

This sounds good, and there is probably truth to it. But I'm not sure people actually act according to it. By this logic, you should refuse a gift of a million dollars, because that would automatically resolve a lot of valuable adversity. Most wouldn't even if ideologically they value adversity.

Moreover, you have total control of the character of the simulation. You can absolutely build in adversity, the kind of adversity that is most suitable for your personal growth, rather than the actual adversity that can so often tear us down.

Interesting, I never thought of this. But it is most definitely true.

Now, which part of the wheel is moving twice the speed? I guess that would be the top of wheel. — Lionino

It is the point where the wheel's velocity wrt the ground is maximized. At every other point there is some vertical motion as well.

Here is the solution that occured to me, and it might not be very good. But let's say that all sorts of things do start to exist, at random. Why should we expect that different sorts of things that start existing would be able to interact with one another? Maybe stuff is popping into being all the time and it just makes no difference to us. A premise in the framing of the problem seems to suggest that if anything starts to exist, we will be able to observe it. But is this premise warranted? After all, nothing can determine what is uncaused. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is a reasonable solution. Suppose there is a "global, " higher-dimensional universe, and it has always existed. For whatever reasons, maybe quantum-like fluctuations, maybe due to other unfathomable causes, 4D spacetimes like ours pop in and out of existence all the time. Nothing inhabiting these 4D spacetimes is able to travel outside of it, and so these universes don't interact at all. Moreover, there might be a first cause, but that cause existed outside of the 4D spacetimes, so from the perspective within a spacetime, there is no first cause at all.

What? A cohost? So is the OP question yours or not? Are you are real person? :wink: Something seems off to me. — Tom Storm

I am friends with YiRu, she is quite real, and the post is completely her own. She is Taiwanese, not a native English speaker, and she can be intimidated especially by the language, and so she tries to get me involved. Hope you understand, I couldn't imagine trying to post in a forum like this in say Spanish, let alone Chinese!

Anyway, I wonder if the term "inequality" is throwing people off. This term is very suggestive of social and especially economic inequality in English, whereas I think the concept she is going for is "difference". But, that is just my take, @YiRu please feel free to respond in your own words.

:cheer:
garbage poster

The meaning we create in reality is closely linked to making a mark on history. It does not need to be noticeable or make you famous, rather it is about being part of this entropic universe. As I live in this reality I am in sync with the entropic forces of this universe, I am part of something and that has meaning, however minute that meaning is to us and how essentially meaningless that is within the context of what we consider having purpose. — Christoffer

I don't think I agree. Making your mark in history doesn't mean leaving a mark on the entropic universe. It means, making a mark on other people. Consider writing a novel. The words on the page are a change of the universe (assuming the novel is print, not digital, where the physical change is pretty rarefied). What matters though, is that people read it, that it affects other people. Would you rather print a million physical books that nobody reads, or have a million digital copies of your book read?

I think other people is what is crucially missing from the simulation, not a physical universe. If the simulation was populated by other people, then no problem, I would happily enter, even though I would still leave no mark on the physical world. But imagine a novelist entering the simulation, to finally have time to finish that novel. Oops.

Taking that the machine operates based on its programming, and not on the laws of nature, you would not really be uncovering true reality, but a subset of it. — Lionino

I would say, for the purposes of the thought experiment, that it is a reasonable enough facsimile (should the user choose) such that philosophical conclusions drawn from experience in the simulated world are valid in the real world.

Ok, in that case, I'll enter the simulation when I'm declining in my terminal illness — Vera Mont

But waiting until the very end is waiting until the stakes are lowest. What about now? Would you consider even the third option?

Of course. My main concern is to uncover the true nature of reality — Count Timothy von Icarus

What if you uncover the true nature of reality, and no one is there to appreciate it? Wouldn't it be better to live a simple, contemplative life in the real world, if that is all you are after?

Because the alternative is death. If I could opt for virtual experience of my own choosing, why would I prefer no experience of any kind at all? — Vera Mont

No, the alternative is not death. The alternative is living out the remainder of your life naturally. You will die in the simulation, when your physical body dies.

Yet the distinctions we make between hallucinations and veridical experiences are not so dependent on whether one can spot experiential differences between two supposedly identical experiences. What distinguishes hallucinations is that nothing is experienced, hence the word 'hallucination'. To call it 'experience' is a fallacy of ambiguity. — jkop

It is not incorrect to call a hallucination an "experience". Hallucinations have experiential content. The sort of experience/hallucination proposed in the OP has no real-world equivalent, we have not collectively assigned a word to it yet.

But, suppose you were completely immersed in a computer game, to the point where at least part of you believed you were actually experiencing the virtual world. Would you use the word "hallucination"? No, I don't think so, "experience" would be more apt. "Hallucination" denotes that the experience originates from within the brain, probably from some temporary or permanent brain disorder. Whereas the "experience" of the computer game, or the OP's simulation, arises externally from the brain. Whether it is veridical doesn't matter.

You fixed the only thing anyone can object to. But I was fine was fine with the original. — Vera Mont

The main objection to me, and to some others here, is that you are condemning yourself to live in a solipsistic world. Why wouldn't that bother you?

As one has had parents, a sibling, a spouse and children, I can tell you that's one of the worst ideas, ever. Think of what you have had to hold back. — Vera Mont

:lol: True.

It is also very disrespectful to the people you love and people who love you. I can't think of anything more selfish. — JuanZu

Oh indeed, check my story.

It all reads like an exercise in destroying oneself and leaving an abomination in its place. — NOS4A2

Perhaps. But that abomination is probably leading a more satisfactory inner life than you or I. Surely that counts for something.

I edited in a third option. Would you take this one? Unfortunately I can't add a poll.

Maybe. Of course, nobody changes or achieves anything, so the relations, tearful reunion once over, are static and the whole exercise is pointless. — Vera Mont

Or is that just an inaccurate, cartoon version? Perhaps every relationship in heaven evolves into its deepest, maximum potential? Everything left unsaid gets to be said.

Plus, they risk discovering which loved ones are missing — Vera Mont

Or, the benevolent deity provides a perfect simulacrum in these cases. Maybe not as good as the real thing, but less painful for the deserving souls.

That's why I think losing oneself in forgetfulness is a deal-breaker for many.
Just think how terrified we all are at the prospect of senility. — Vera Mont

Yeah, in my stupidity I didn't think it through. I don't actually want that tension mucking with what is to me the central question. I edited in a third option, what do you think?

The idea of Heaven doesn't seem to bother Christians or Muslims, so why should a disembodied dream trouble an atheist? — Vera Mont

But Heaven is presumably a real place, importantly populated by other real entities, such as dead loved ones. You get to resume your real relationships with these people. Whereas with the simulation, you would be condemned to spend the rest of your life with very advanced, animated chatGPTs.

The conditions under which the two experiences arise are radically different, and beer drinking is certainly more than the experience. — jkop

Is it though? Why does it matter under what conditions they rise? Experientially, according to this thought experiment, they are identical.

On the other hand, what guarantee do we have that we are not plugged in in a machine right now? — Lionino

We have no guarantee, but personally I consider it highly unlikely. Whereas, if you enter the machine, you would have an absolute guarantee.

The vote distribution makes me suspect people did not understand the question. They would be more willing to go into the machine IF they kept their past memories and knew they were living a lie? Odd. — Lionino

Yes, I thought that too. But maybe the point is that people much prefer to keep their memories than to abandon them? — Pantagruel

Yes, I honestly didn't consider this aspect. I wish I could reword the poll, or create a new option. You get to keep your memories, and yet not know you are living a lie. So for instance, they erase only the memories of signing up, and even the memories that the simulation tech exists, and then create the memory of getting sucked into a magical portal or something, so you think that your experience of old and new world is continuous.

At the first place: why is ordinary life so bad?

Aren't we here for others too? — ssu

A true denizen of the happiest country on Earth.

That third challenge is hilarious. — Michael

https://www.pressherald.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2023/12/Trump-Challenge-Paul-Gordon-20231208.pdf

:rofl:

probably the point — petrichor

:up:

If, instead, every single human or animal entity would be "inhabited" like my own avatar, that might be a different story. — petrichor

"No sir, I'm afraid that the technology just won't allow for it."

I wouldn't enter for this reason alone. — petrichor

"But sir, might I remind you of our forgetfulness package? We have done studies, our clients which purchased the package are slightly *less* troubled by thoughts of solipsism than meatwalkers like us! This speaks to both the fidelity of our agent simulators, and the fact that they are just having too much fun to be troubled by such notions!"

A "fully-immersive simulation" prosthesis (with no off-switch / exit) = a lobotomy plus continuous 24/7 morphine drip. — 180 Proof

But a lobotomy + morphine can only offer dull, undifferentiated pleasure, whereas the simulation can be of the richest, most vibrant and stimulating world you can dream of.

Offered an alternative of my choice, I'd certainly opt for my version of Utopia. But I would still like to remember everyone and everything I liked about this life. — Vera Mont

You would prefer keeping your memories, even if they meant knowing that your existence was a lie? How much would the artificiality and meaninglessness of your life bother you?

No, I would not agree because I would not trust the technology to not have a bug which might lead to a nightmarish experience. — Art48

This kind of misgiving, while undoubtedly accurate (who wouldn't have such fears?), nevertheless seems to sidestep the larger question. Like you say, lets presume that you know with complete certainty, from God or otherwise, that the simulation is exactly as described.

In this case, I have a question: if I picked “could forget,” would there be any discernible difference between my experience of the world now, and my experience after the procedure? — Art48

None at all, save that the world as you know it now is probably not arranged in a way that you would have likely chosen in the simulation.

f I could not distinguish the two types of experience, then maybe I’d accept the procedure because, for all I know, I might currently be in a simulation, and so I would merely be trading one simulation for another, more enjoyable simulation. — Art48

But is your conviction that we *might* be living in a simulation now high enough to be a factor in this decision? For my part, I think there are pretty good reasons for presuming that we are *not*: a simulation is necessarily a vastly more complex explanation for what is, than a world that is as it seems. Therefore, the simulation explanation should be discarded. That is a topic for another thread.

Why do brains create consciousness? Its the same as asking why do two gases at room temperature combine together to form a liquid that we need to drink to live. — Philosophim

Not the same at all. The question about gases can be answered in a satisfactory way. The question about conscious cannot.

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. — Michael

The question "Why should I be moral?" presumably means, "Why should I act in accordance with my moral beliefs?" In any epistemic domain, we only ever have access to our beliefs, not to facts themselves. Morality (presuming non-naturalism) is not somehow unique here.

Then, either our beliefs are (or can be) informed by moral facts, in which case the moral facts matter. Or, they cannot, or the facts do not exist, in which case they don't matter.