The meaningful difference is this: He who spits at you is doing something to you. He who smokes weed is not. In the former case, he is doing it to you. In the latter case, you are doing it to yourself. — James Riley
Some folks victimize themselves if they are offended by the mere existence of another. It's not the other that is victimizing them. — James Riley
Well, everyone on the planet is a victim then, because everyone gets upset about something. I just don't think the rest of the world has to walk around on egg shells because of a few thin-skinned individuals. It's better to create a society that's a little tougher, and a little more respectful of the rights of others. No one is forcing anyone to smoke pot or patronize a store. Internalize your costs and "mind your own business" is a good philosophy in my book. — James Riley
If any harm is derived from seeing others smoke weed, or knowing that a dispensary exists in the neighborhood, it is entirely self-inflicted. The bellyacher is both perpetrator and victim. — NOS4A2
That's a no-go. First, that doesn't qualify as "harm." That's unreasonable. Your family may get upset if you date someone of another race or religion. So what? "Family upset" is irrelevant and I don't think it constitutes a reasonable standard. — James Riley
That would be a zoning issue and should only be a consideration after proof that a nuisance would occur. Make a record, on evidence. Then find the least intrusive way of regulating the store(s). — James Riley
Asphyxiation is a ghastly way to die, but even if death were instantaneous, there is something rather chilling about an ethic that seems to say pain-ridden Darwinian humans would be better off not existing. — David Pearce
but even if death were instantaneous, there is something rather chilling about an ethic that seems to say pain-ridden Darwinian humans would be better off not existing. — David Pearce
Such calculated deceit is probably the recipe for more suffering. So it's not NU. Imagine if Gautama Buddha ("I teach one thing and one thing only: suffering and the end of suffering”) had urged his devotees to practice deception and put vulnerable people out of their misery if the opportunity arose... — David Pearce
And it’s precisely because I’m strict NU that I favour upholding the sanctity of human and nonhuman life in law. Humans can’t be trusted. The alternative to such legal protections would most likely be more suffering. — David Pearce
Imagine if people thought that NU entailed letting toddlers drown! Being an effective NU involves striking alliances with members of other ethical traditions. It involves winning hearts and minds. Winning people over to the abolitionist project is a daunting enough challenge as it is. Anything that hampers this goal should be discouraged. — David Pearce
Negative utilitarianism (NU) is compassion systematised. NUs aren’t in the habit of letting small children drown any more than we’re plotting Armageddon. I’m as keen on upholding the sanctity of life in law as your average deontologist. — David Pearce
If a small child were drowning, you would wade into a shallow pond to rescue the child – despite your professed dislike of small children, and your weaker preference not to get your clothes wet? — David Pearce
If asked, a great many people are relaxed about the prospect of less suffering in Nature so long as suffering-reduction doesn’t cause them any personal inconvenience. Hence the case for technical fixes. — David Pearce
Maybe preference utilitarianism plus biotech could do so too if enough people were to favour a biological-genetic strategy for ending suffering: I don’t know. — David Pearce
Either way, any theory of (dis)value or ethics that neglects the interests of nonhuman animals is arbitrarily anthropocentric. — David Pearce
Even if we prioritise, preference utilitarianism doesn’t work. Well-nourished tigers breed more tigers. An exploding tiger population then has more frustrated preferences. The swollen tiger population starves in consequences of the dwindling numbers of their prey. Prioritising herbivores from being predated doesn’t work either – at least, not on its own. As well as frustrating the preferences of starving predators, a population explosion of herbivores would lead to mass starvation and hence more even frustrated preferences. Insofar as humans want ethically to conserve recognisable approximations of today’s "charismatic mega-fauna", full-blown compassionate stewardship of Nature will be needed: reprogramming predators, cross-species fertility-regulation, gene drives, robotic “AI nannies” – the lot. From a utilitarian perspective (cf. https://www.utilitarianism.com), piecemeal interventions to solve the problem of wild animal suffering are hopeless. — David Pearce
The preferences of predator and prey are irreconcilable. So are trillions of preferences of social primates. The challenge isn't technological, but logical. — David Pearce
Either way, a transhuman world without the biology of subjective disvalue would empirically be a better world for all sentience. — David Pearce
You say you're "mostly an ethical egoist". Do you accept the scientific world-picture? Modern civilisation is based on science. Science says that no here-and-nows are ontologically special. Yes, one can reject the scientific world-picture in favour of solipsism-of-the-here-and-now (cf. https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#idsolipsism). But if science is true, then solipsism is a false theory of the world. — David Pearce
Granted, from my perspective your suffering is theoretical. Its inaccessibility doesn't make it any less real. Am I mistaken to act accordingly? — David Pearce
First, the consequencialist (i.e., outcome-based) approach, wherein philosophers pay particular attention to the results of an action or a behavior in order to make a moral judgment. As you might put it, the proponents of consequentialism represent many moral philosophers who focus more on consequences when thinking about what constitutes moral behavior. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
There is a particular mode of action, a mechanism, or a means whereby the ethical framework of each of these three normative approaches is either focused upon, or is making a fundamental connection to, actions or behaviors. For example, within a deontological framework (i.e., a duty framework), the focus is on moral duties and obligations with the ethical modality towards performing the correct action. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Virtue ethics is connected to action because a moral exemplar, or virtuous person, is defined as such by practicing such acts as being honest, being just, being benevolent, being generous, being wise, etc, thereby developing the requisite behavior and moral character necessary to be a virtuous person. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
It is reducible to a tautology since the term 'Repugnant' can easily be defined as: "Unpleasant or disgusting" and thus to say something is repugnant is to describe something with an adjective that is synonymous to 'Bad' or similar adjectives that likewise evaluate a noun in negative or otherwise implicitly immoral terms. It is analytically equivalent to the argument "Rape is bad because rape is bad". — Cartesian trigger-puppets
On a separate note, whether or not someone prefers non-consensual sex over consensual sex has nothing to do with the issue of whether rape is good or bad. One could prefer consensual sex over non-consensual sex and still perform the act of rape. Furthermore, such a preference one way or the other doesn't provide us any information about whether rape is good or bad. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
To make another tangential point, this is a very naive understanding of why people sometimes rape. It fails to consider the perspectives of those unfortunate individuals who are extremely unattractive in either physical appearance, social demeanor, or both. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Also, people who suffer from pathological afflictions that prevent them from participating in otherwise normal social interactions necessary for sexual relationships, yet experience normal, or even hyperactive sexual drives. It also fails to consider rape through a psychopathic perspective or a sadistic personality or under the influence of schizophrenic delusion, etc. Please prioritize my main points over my tangential ones. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
This commits you to a consequencialist position with regard to this scenario. It also commits you to hold the position that a rape can be justified so long as it results in an approximately more favorable outcome of at least one order of magnitude or greater. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
We can imagine a scenario such as human organ trafficking or the forced organ harvests of humans where one human is sacrificed in order to save five or more other humans who would otherwise die without acquiring the organs of the human who is being sacrificed. Since according to such consequentialist logic, one such reductio that would be necessarily entailed would be the view that such actions are justified so long as it results in favorable results (such as sacrificing one to save five). — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Such logic promotes the notion that some humans are worth less than others and that human life is just another commodity with a price. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
This commits you to support forms of slavery and forms of genocide so long as the end results in a net positive gain that measures at least in a 5:1 ratio. So, it follows, then, that a majority of a society's population consisting of at least 80 percent of the society's members could justifiably enslave the remaining 20 percent of the society's members who make up a sufficient minority of the society's population, so long as there are favorable results gained by the 80 percent thereby compensating for the unfavorable results endured by the 20 percent. Moreover, it additionally follows, then, that an entire nation or ethnic group could justifiably be completely exterminated, holocausted, or genocided, so long as the unfavorable outcome endured by the single group also resulted in favorable outcomes for at least five other nations or ethnic groups with a relatively equivalent number of individuals contained within or with a relatively equivalent capacities to experience suffering or pleasure in totality. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Putting these normative ethical dilemmas aside, I want to know what your answer is with regards to the meta-ethical question: is rape moral, immoral, or amoral—or otherwise under your evaluations considered to be good, bad, or neutral? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
For context, consider the previous ethical dilemma of causing the rape of 1 woman in order to prevent the rape of 5 women—with just that information to work with. What is your decision? Why is rape, in general, moral—otherwise considered good or immoral—otherwise considered bad on your view alone? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The value is attached to the belief that the subject holds and thus is not dependent upon the metaphysical truth that the belief expresses. If you believe you have a guardian angel protecting you, then you likely value the comfort and ease of mind that such a belief is likely to bring. The fact that you feel comfort and ease of mind by virtue of holding this belief is an objectively true assessment of your subjective states. So, yes, it is possible to have an objectively true evaluation of a belief
that is metaphysically false. Of course everyone is right regarding their evaluations, as long as you keep in mind that their evaluations are based in subjectivity, contextually bound to a moment in time and the set of values which arose as a result of the one's totality of experiences that lead up to the moment, is not necessarily compatible with others, and is not applicable outside of the subjective state of an agent—though it may be similar enough to be compatible between any number of agents that hold similar values. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Would you agree that the essence of morality lies in it's connection to action? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
For example, what are my intentions for going on a date with Sue? What are her expectations? What kind of girl is she? What is the context of her life? And the same with the bar of philosophy forum, a broader context is needed in order to evaluate one action to another and weigh outcomes and reasons for each action, in order, and within a more cognitively accessible duration whereby this sequence of events takes place. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What is your view on rape, in general?
If you had the ability to stop a typical rape from occurring, without risking any personal harm, would you stop it? If so, why? If not, why? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
If you had an opportunity to save five women from getting raped, by taking action with no risk to yourself, but at the cost of another woman getting raped, a woman who would have otherwise not been had it been for your involvement, would you? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
With regards to the rest of what you said in this same post, what do you mean when you say you don't have a moral system? Are you morally indifferent to rape? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What if a rape had a positive effect for everyone? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What if a rape had a positive effect for everyone except you? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Would you be indifferent to a rape in every imaginable context? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What do you mean by an act or a consequence related to "betterness" or "worseness"? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Some of the most well-known prudential values to be built into social structures or give rise to the social principles underpinning a society include: the prudential value of personal autonomy, built into the structure of society as the sacred concept of freedom, which gave rise to the principle of liberty; the prudential value of self preservation, built into the structure of society as the belief that life is sacred, which gave rise to the principle of the right to life; and the prudential value of fairness, built into the structure of society the sacred concept of justice, which gave rise to the principles of equality adopted by the Civil Rights Act. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
So your basically a platonist when it comes values and morals? I get lost when you say that values exist and are objective. I can agree with you that values exist if I understand what you mean by "exist" to be the same thing as thoughts, language and mathematics, but I would not be able to use the term "exist" in the same way I would use it to describe physical objects without committing an equivocation, and this would require me to define a special kind of existence wherein such entities can be ontologically categorized. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The term "pretty" implies a positive value judgement that generally refers to the pleasantness experienced by visual perceptions. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
An ought claim is a statement used to express that an agent has a moral obligation to perform a certain action. It is an authoritative statement for a course of action to be followed, however, this authority is based on (as you argue for) the consideration of prudential values relative, and subsequently applicable, to an individual subject. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
An ought claim captures an agent's motivations, which are influenced by the agents values as the agent reflects upon the behaviors or decisions that are consistent with them. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
An ought claim is a statement that prescribes a given action either because the given action is, in itself, when considered in isolation from the actions surrounding context or the contribution the actions causal influence has towards a resulting effect, morally right to do; or, as an alternative, that a given action should be done because a particular state of affairs is morally right to exist and what gives rise to the existence of such a state of affairs, as an effect thereby produced, is causally dependent upon the influential contribution of the given action thereof. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
An agents values are a unique manifestation that arise and develope as a result of the complex, dynamic interactions between the agents subjective states and how the agent experiences the surrounding physical and social environments. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
If we imagine the sequence of experiences that uniquely unfold throughout the life of each being and consider how each experience influences the beings agency (how agency conforms to structure) which uniquely molds them in a way that gives rise to subjective variation, it becomes clear that every evaluation is dependent upon the authority of the subject. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What is the argument that the consequence is bad? Let's say prison time is the consequence: what makes a prison bad? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Besides, you are naming the consequences of an act that you say is morally bad. This would imply that it is bad even if there are no consequences involved at all. Is rape bad even in the absence of any such consequences one would worry about? If so, how is it bad? What property of badness can we find of it? Because an act has negative consequences does not mean that the act is necessarily bad. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Because an act has negative consequences does not mean that the act is necessarily bad. For example, is falling in love bad? It can result in very negative consequences. Or, as another example, is driving a car bad? Plenty of negative consequences result from such an action. We must separate the consequences of an act from the moral status of the act itself. If rape is only bad when it results in negative consequences, then we are utilitarian on the matter. If rape is bad in itself no matter what the context may be, then we are deontologically entrenched and would act in accordance with such a rule no matter what the costs may be. If rape is always bad, but certain exceptions can be made in order to avoid results that are far worse, then we are taking the view from threshold deontology. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
To you, an action should always be avoided because, to you, it always causes, what you see as, negative consequence in your life. It is completely coherent and easy to defend from the view that considers such evaluative statements to be relative,
thus only be applicable to, the individual subject in which it is indexed beside within the structure of the proposition. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I would say that it is objectively true that I hold a subjective preference towards one thing or another, but not that I should act in accordance with my preferences. It is true that I hold the belief that my pleasure is good, however this does not mean that I can justify an act based on my pleasure, or that my pleasure is necessarily good. I would say that it is a psychological fact that I desire my own pleasure and that I helplessly act towards that goal because my actions are so determined by them and not by my own free will. I may seem to act in accordance with my preferences but such preferences stem from my desires and I am never free to choose that which I desire. Even if I resist my desire to eat a lot of sweets, it is not a product of my free will, but rather the pull of a stronger will, perhaps one of health or fitness, that moves me from a weaker desire—none of which am I the author of. I never choose what I will desire. It emerges seemingly at random and to be undergoing constant fluctuations that I am unconscious of. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
First of all, your question is loaded with a false premise, as I do not hold that view. I hold the view that moral or aesthetic evaluations are dependent upon the individual subject who is reflecting upon them. I think that raping is almost always considered worse by many and since there is such a majority view, then the act of rape has been institutionalized as a bad thing and this is usually a dogmatically held belief indoctrinated upon us through society (which I think at least brings favorable consequences). — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I think that in order to maintain a consistent philosophical view of ethics you must ground moral principles in subjectivity rather than objectivity. I think it is silly to say that something out in the universe informs us as to how we should behave. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I don't think you are appreciating the context of my example. The statement is "Plants are pretty" with the noun "Plants" being the subject of the sentence and "are pretty" being the predicate verb attaching the subject of the sentence to the adjective describing the noun. The statement is talking about plants. (What about plants?) That they are pretty. Now, if you want to express the fact that plants have prettiness attributed to them by others from a third party perspective, then we could say something like "Plants have been considered pretty by many" since otherwise we are describing the plant through our perspective. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The contradiction would form when the principles with which we construct a framework for our moral system contains both of the following propositions. 1) Rape is wrong; and 2) Rape is not wrong. You either must (a) concede that your moral system produces a contradiction when it comes to evaluating rape; or that (b) it contains some level of arbitrariness by viewing rape as deontologically wrong, even if it produces positive consequences, but nonetheless can be morally justified if the positive consequences it produces surpass a given threshold; or that (c) a rape is justified so long as the rape results in a positive net gain in hedonic utility. I bite the bullet with arbitrariness. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
We aren't talking about the evaluations of other people, we are talking about your position on rape. You said, "I would say that almost nobody should ever rape..." then went on to list the reasons why as both because nobody derives pleasure from rape and nobody could get away with it. Also, as a tangential point, a persons belief that they will get away with something must necessarily mean that they, at least on their rationality, think they have overcome the barrier which prevents most people from raping on your view. People are not omniscient, but they do become certain of things no matter how false they actually are. People are limited by their beliefs and cannot avoid acting on said beliefs while still holding to them. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
I believe that accurately captures what your saying. If so, then I would challenge premise 1, because it is not clear to me how the derivation of pleasure combined with the belief that one can escape any negative consequences necessarily entails that one should rape. When you say that almost no one should ever rape, it is as if you are saying that the act of rape is sometimes just and sometimes not just, which is contradictory. Is there some kind of deontological threshold that makes some rapes justified and others not? That was my critique of hedonic utilitarianism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Also, getting away from the legal consequences seems to imply that rape is not bad, but just happens to entail the risk of some negative impact on ones life. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quite the contrary, there are many reasons, but they are dependent upon the agents current preference and attitude toward a thing. Many of us have empathy towards one another and can relate to the suffering others feel. On my view, there is no external reference whereby the moral status of an act can be determined objectively right or wrong. We can, however, reason internally based on how we feel towards an act. In fact, many do and reach similar enough conclusions to legislate against such things as rape. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The problem entailed by such logic is that it suggests that we have a justified reason to act so long as the act is of the Good, and that which makes an act an act of the Good is an overall increase of relative pleasure that the act derives; or, to quote you, that we have reason to act on opportunities for hedonistic improvement, is that it provides a justification for acts that, im sure, you would not find just. For example, if a rapist derives a sufficient amount of pleasure from the act of rapping a victim, that it offsets the overall suffering the victim endured, thereby resulting in an overall net gain in hedonic utility, then, on this view, the rape is justified. That is quite a reduction to absurdity, and a bullet that im not willing to bite in order to hold that view consistently. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
My point was that the statement "Plants are pretty" is subjective and is a value claim because it is to say of a thing that it is pretty (sensually appealing relative to other things), which implies that its prettiness is a thing of value. It may, nevertheless, have other properties of which we evaluate as unappealing to us that makes us feel that the thing is, overall, unenjoyable. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
whereas an ought statement contains a prescriptive component that suggests a course of action, which makes it deontological. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
We can objectively state that you hold a particular subjective belief insofar as the content of the belief is a property of you, the thinking subject, and not a property of the object of thought. The problem with grounding such statements still remains though. For example, I can make a hedonistic argument for my desire of pleasure "I desire pleasure" (an objectively true subjective statement), "Acting in accordance with x results in the satisfaction of my desire for pleasure" and then a conditional "If I wish to satisfy my desire for pleasure, then I ought to act in accordance with x" then affirm the antecedent "I do wish to satisfy my desire for pleasure" and, finally, the conclusion "Therefore, I ought to act in accordance with x". Everything seems valid and deductively sound, right? Well, there is a problem. Just because we desire something doesn't mean that we ought to act in accordance with our desires. Perhaps we could eliminate the component of free will to support the premises "We have no control over our desires" and "What we desire is pleasure" but the problem remains with how to generate a prescriptive "ought" from all of this. Just because something is out of our control does not mean that it is morally right or ought to happen. We cannot avoid our death. So, does this mean that our death is a morally good thing? Is it a moral obligation to die? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
What I mean by 'proven' is that a claim is demonstrable or verifiable through empirical evidence or logical necessity. Absolute, 100% knowledge is something only the most naive of people would consider possible. We have systems of knowledge built through rigorous methodologies that get pretty close to certain—that is, insofar as they predict future phenomena and overlap with multiple fields of research. If you can provide me with testable evidence or a logical entailment, that would suffice for me. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
No. There are people who see beauty in what to them is beautiful, notwithstanding the popular appeal to the contrary. They don't approve of something because of the disapproval they have of it, but rather they have developed an appreciation for something that commonly is not appreciated. It feels as if you are appealing to some external property that objectively has value, which would make you a Realist. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The cultural components that have been evolving, at least, since the emergence of the genus Homo has been the influential force that molds us from our natural, savage proclivities. These forces are learned mostly through empathy and are universal as they appeal to basic instincts such as self-preservation and both fosters and facilitates our desires for well-being in a way that is now functionally dependant upon the social dynamics of the group. In order to enjoy the benefits of society we must participate in the effort to maximize the prevailing values of the society; which means sacrificing a portion of ourselves toward whatever ends are most socially desired. Although, given the random nature in which our environment shapes us, both physiologically and psychologically, and that this process has continued across generations for billions of year's, even the most ubiquitous of human values could easily have evolved quite differently from what they are now. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Values exist in the same way that phenomenal experiences do but by no means do they have the same existence as something empirically accessible or conceptually tethered to physical reality—and that is the meaningful difference that distinguishes language that is concrete and empirically-based from language that is abstract and phenomenologically-based. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
With this in mind, would you consider your position to affirm or deny the proposition "Values cannot be empirically proven true or false"? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
But the courts do, in fact, treat evaluative claims differently from non-evaluative claims, right? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Which of the following statements would rank highest among your various epistemic states? Statement a) "Plants release oxygen" or, statement b) "Plants are pretty"...do you hold a belief, do you know, are you unsure, or do possess a complete understanding that the latter claim is true or false—and, what is the justification to hold such an epistemic state? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
he problem with having evaluative facts is that there is no method to substantiate them or evidence to support and confirm them. They necessarily depend upon the agent to express them, either directly or indirectly, for substantiation and the only evidence there is that suggests they are true is contained within the privacy of the agents subjective mental states. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The court would appreciate the statements regarding a fingerprint, eyewitness, and footprint because these statements correspond with how we experience reality. If what is stated has the semantic content that most members of a language associate with a concept which corresponds to the way we experience the world, even with varying degrees of accuracy, arbitrarily defined by human standards such as limited sense perception and inconsistent cognitive processing, it is what we call a fact. The type of fact that is most compelling and that most pressure us to adopt a new belief. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The premise is simple; if something can be empirically verified, then it is factual and thus descriptive. For example, if I make the statement that "My right hand has 4 fingers with 1 thumb," it provides a description for the way things are. A statement such as this can be checked and verified through empirical observation. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Prescriptive statements are a subset of evaluative statements, which is the only distinction between the two that I am aware of. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Are you making a case against the general consensus amongst analytic philosophers who differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive statements based on the reasons I have thus far offered? Most people understand that there is a very different kind of thing being described when it comes to value judgements. Something that extends beyond merely describing that which corresponds with empirical observation. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Even so, you seem to be aware that there is a distinction between statements that describe stuff and ones that describe stuff and stuff related to value. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
First, that it is not entailed that every agent will classify the experience within the same category. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Second, the category itself is based on an arbitrary measurement that is phenomenally dependent. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Because they do not report something that is observable or falsifiable, and that is what facts are supposed to do. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
so you must do one of a few things: you must suppress the memory of your shameful thoughts or actions deep enough that they barely ever touch your consciousness (and conscience); or you must explain them to yourself (and, perhaps, to others) in a light that makes them look less reprehensible... — Todd Martin
This is, of course, trivially true and tangential to any point that I have made. The is—ought divide expresses skepticism that an inference can be made between a descriptive "is" statement and a normative/evaluative "ought" statement. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
The statement that "the road ought to be visible now because the fog has cleared" is not the kind of ought statement we care about here. We don't care about inferences deriving an "is" from a descriptive "ought", but rather we are concerned with inferences deriving an "is" from a prescriptive "ought". — Cartesian trigger-puppets
It is, in fact, not a descriptive statement because the term "best" here is evaluative and prescriptive which makes the statement loaded. Try forming an is—ought inference with your examples and see the issue reveal itself. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
P1. If you have options, then you ought to choose the option that is best; — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Just because we have options doesn't mean we should choose any of them. For example, if I had the options to burn my hand, cut my hand, or freeze my hand—I would choose none of these options. This makes the premise false. It is not necessarily entailed that we must choose any option at all. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Why should we brush our teeth? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
How is it morally obligatory? — Cartesian trigger-puppets
P1. Brushing your teeth makes them clean
Therefore, C. You ought to brush your teeth.
This is deductively invalid. The conclusion is not entailed by the premise. It is possible for the premise to be true and the conclusion be false. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
But what does being close to someone mean if you hold something far away from them? If you say,”I am very close with my” mom, or sister or brother or best friend, but withhold secrets that would enable them to understand the character of your soul in its fullness, how close can you be? How can you be close to someone who knows the least about you? — Todd Martin
with whom would you be willing to share your innermost secrets? — Todd Martin
Is there someone in your life that you trust that much? — Todd Martin
Wouldn’t anyone long to have such a one? If anyone would want to have such a person in their lives, wouldn’t there be a general term we use to describe him, to characterize him (or her)? — Todd Martin
Are you willing to answer it or not? — Todd Martin
But whether you should tell your mom about your girlfriend depends on several things, doesn’t it? What if it would upset her? Surely you wouldn’t want that to happen just because of some abstract ideal of an “increased level of honesty” b/w you two? But maybe, though it would upset her, by telling her, you would be sending the subtle message that this is YOUR life, and you’re gonna live it the way you want to, regardless of what she wants. — Todd Martin
And “concern for your welfare” might extend to concern for the sort of women you might be getting involved with? — Todd Martin
As far as curiosity goes, I attempted to argue in my previous post that no one is just curious: there is always a motive, however subtle or hidden, for one asking or exploring. — Todd Martin
You know your mom a lot better than we do: When she asked where you were, did you immediately think, “Mom suspects I’m up to no good”, or did you think rather, “Mom’s just concerned about my well-being, as any mom would be”?
Which is it, O Hedomenos? Doesn’t the honesty of the answer you gave, that you were at the library, depend upon this question? — Todd Martin
For example, if your mom asks you, as she’s leaving the house, to sweep the floors, and while she’s gone you sweep all the dirt under the rugs, you have already been dishonest without ever saying, “I swept the floors”. Indeed, she would have no reason to ask you whether you swept them: she can see whether they are clean or not...unless she fears you may have acted dishonestly. In which case she might suspect you might have swept the dirt under the rugs, and therefore surreptitiously check underneath them.
On the other hand, if you collect the dirt you have swept from the floors and throw it in the trash, then you have acted honestly... without saying a word. — Todd Martin
surely dishonesty is the antonym, that is, the opposite, of honesty. Why, it is so by definition, My Child, is it not? — Todd Martin
Now let’s consider this scenario: your mom calls you and asks where you are and, instead of answering, “I’m at the library”, you instead answer, “Why are you asking me that question, Mama? Do you think I would frequent a disreputable establishment, as well as you raised me to discern wholesome from unwholesome places? Do you fear I am heading down the road to perfidy despite the excellent upbringing you gave me to avoid it?” Do you think this answer would have been more or less honest than the one you actually gave? — Todd Martin
No one is ever justified in believing any moral claim that uses an argument which includes the same moral claim in its conclusion as the moral claim in its premises. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
If the entire chain of justification is not present for us to form a belief, then we can never know if we can be justified in believing it. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Descriptive claims attempt to state the facts and give an account of how the world is through non-evaluative observations. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Objectivity describes a feature of the world that is independent from the specificities of a mind, whereas subjectivity describes a feature of the world that is conditional on the specificities of a mind. Therefore, for a claim to be objective, it must be empirically falsifiable and describe mind-independent features of the world. — Cartesian trigger-puppets
Why even presuppose an objective moral ontology in the first place? I mean, given the subjective nature of human psychology, it seems that our cognitive and evaluative capacities do not require a philosophically objective foundation. — Cartesian trigger-puppets