If not determinism, then what? Randomness, an easy answer, but we don't want that, do we?

How about a stochastic universe? Then both randomness and determinism can exist.

Consider a case with two, and only two, possible outcomes. Randomness occurs when the probabilities of the outcomes are equal (50% each). Determinism occurs when the probability of one of the outcomes is 100%. A stochastic universe allows for these and anything in between.

But how does that feel? An electron feels pure love for the proton and pure hate for another electron. The latter interaction mixes up the identities of both electrons. What love is supposed to do is actually achieved by hate on the fundamental level

If particles are conscious, I guess that takes care of the observer effect, and physicalism is back on steady ground! Hmmm, maybe there's something to this panpsychism after all ...

There is no escape..

You forgot to add the words : “…from goal-post moving.”

It is of interest to note how car companies test their cars for safety : they take a small sample of cars from the production line, outfit them with car-crash dummies, and crash them into walls at various speeds, recording the resulting forces (like a particle crashing into a silver bromide emulsion). Crash the cars at different speeds, and you get different results. In other words, what is observed is dependent on the choice of experimental arrangement.

Does this not seem akin to being able to detect particles only by effecting their measured position? And, that the type of experiment effects the observed results? The act of measurement can effect (even destroy) what is being measured on the macro scale as well as the quantum scale.

...but it is still we who have set up that camera, captured that image, and interpreted the results.

I was expecting something akin to this response. :wink:

Now what if I could describe a case where measurements are taken by objects that are not man-made?

I can think of two off the top of my head on the macro scale : First, evidence of the existence and extent of glaciation in past ice ages includes moraines, drumlins, out of place boulders, and valley cutting. Second, evidence of ancient climate, droughts, and fires are provided by tree rings. These are natural "measuring devices", not created by humans (interpreted by humans, of course).

It takes a mind to make a measurement…

I know that you feel you’ve already addressed this point, so forgive me for returning to it, but I wonder if we might explore the idea of measurement a little more. I think it’s important to this discussion.

Let me start with this question that might help me understand your take : Suppose a Geiger counter is set up in an otherwise empty space, and it’s sensor detects the decay of an atom. But no human ever bothers to check on the Geiger counter, so no one ever sees the results. Was a measurement taken? And if it’s not a measurement, what do we call it?

And maybe you find the question itself meaningless because Geiger counters only exist while a mind is present, and there is no detection of decaying atoms before a mind shows up.

I think there is a simple solution that I don't ever see mentioned : If it's measurement that collapses the wave (and not the presence of a mind), then as soon as the Geiger counter detects the decay of an atom (i.e., a measurement is made), the wave collapses and the kitty goes to that great litterbox in the sky.

Ah, Schrödinger. I've often wondered how the cat feels about all this.

One of the most famous experiments exploring the observer effect was conducted by the Weizman Institute of Science and reported in the February 26, 1998, issue of Nature (Vol. 391, pp. 871-874). This from ScienceDaily :

Weizmann Institute researchers built a tiny device measuring less than one micron in size, which had a barrier with two openings. They then sent a current of electrons towards the barrier. The "observer" in this experiment wasn't human. Institute scientists used for this purpose a tiny but sophisticated electronic detector that can spot passing electrons. The quantum "observer's" capacity to detect electrons could be altered by changing its electrical conductivity, or the strength of the current passing through it.

Apart from "observing," or detecting, the electrons, the detector had no effect on the current. Yet the scientists found that the very presence of the detector-"observer" near one of the openings caused changes in the interference pattern of the electron waves passing through the openings of the barrier. In fact, this effect was dependent on the "amount" of the observation: when the "observer's" capacity to detect electrons increased, in other words, when the level of the observation went up, the interference weakened; in contrast, when its capacity to detect electrons was reduced, in other words, when the observation slackened, the interference increased.

Do you see the bold? Every time the word observer is used, it is put in quotes. So I agree with Gnomon that we should be calling it the measurement effect. The term observer carries the implication of consciousness (as Fernee himself notes).

So is there an observer effect? I'm a math professor, not a physicist. I'm open to being proven wrong, but can you cite a source that is more than opinion?

Gnomon, I believe Mark John Fernee is wrong. There is no non-physical component to measurement. Sure, you can argue for a non-physical component to interpreting the measurement, or using language to describe the measurement, but unless the electron detector is a conscious being, the act of measurement did not require a mind. Can you elaborate?

Physics deliberately excluded mental phenomena from consideration until it was forced to acknowledge the role of Observers in otherwise "entirely physical processes".

This is why you have been cautioned to be careful citing quantum physics in your arguments. It is not the fact that the observer (I deliberately omit the capital o) is conscious that matters, but that the observer has gotten in the way of the quantum phenomenon. I don't like to cite Wikipedia as a source too often, but I found a few short sentences there that sum up the case quite nicely :

Despite the "observer effect" in the double-slit experiment being caused by the presence of an electronic detector, the experiment's results have been misinterpreted by some to suggest that a conscious mind can directly affect reality. The need for the "observer" to be conscious is not supported by scientific research, and has been pointed out as a misconception rooted in a poor understanding of the quantum wave function ψ and the quantum measurement process.

In fact, the observer effect exists in classical physics as well - to measure air pressure in a tire, we must let out a little air, thus changing the pressure.

God’s mind lays outside the universe

Ah,yes. A paradox that might amuse Bertrand Russell : if the universe contains everything that exists, then where to put it’s creator. I think this means either God ceased to exist at the moment of creation, or God created herself.

I don't know what to make of this :

We can't know the nature of a particle except that already at the fundamental it's love (attraction) or hate (repulsion). We know though what it feels like to be a particle though.

Really? I think this needs further elucidation or at least some citation. You seem to be anthropomorphizing particles.

What do you mean by "those"? God's mind and point particles?

Are you arguing just to be contrary? Of course those. They are the only two you mention. And subsequently dismiss. So list what explanations you do find compelling.

Why can't it be a description of material reality?

Sure it can. I was cautioning Gnomon who seems to imply (the Cheshire Cat post) that quantum physics provides an alternative to materialism.

Ah, sorry. You do not actually think those are valid alternatives. So what alternatives do you consider valid?

I can't see how the immaterialist avoids solipsism. Either the Outside exists or it doesn't. Are we merely discussing what that Outside consists of? Sure, you can say it isn't matter (atoms and such), but whatever you choose as an alternative, you should be able to justify.

And I caution my philosophy-minded friends to be careful invoking quantum physics. Its an abstraction (i.e., mind-generated construct) we use to help us deal with phenomena at the limits of current observation. It is not the Outside. It's a wonderful instrument for explaining certain experimental outcomes, but so is Newtonian and Einsteinian physics at the macro scale.

I think we're generally in agreement, but Gnomon may have struck close to the truth with this quote :

"Immaterialism" refers to the mental functions of embodied brains.

I have always held that minds are not just brains but rather healthy working brains. That is to say, minds are not just the trillions of synapses to be found in the brain, but the firing of those synapses. Where Gnomon goes wrong is to call that entirely physical process "immaterialism".

The mind of God does not reside in our universe and points neither.

Ok, you lost me. You mean we're getting signals from other universes? Interesting...

Sorry to jump in, but this quote bugs me :

Qualia is "what it feels like" to observe a pattern of incoming information.

So there is incoming information. From where?

If there is an Inside and an Outside to existence, then physicalism holds (or at least dualism does). It doesn't matter what form the Outside takes - whether it be atoms, or points, or the mind of God. These are just different names for a thing we can never truly know, but acknowledge must be. The only alternative is solipsism.

I am young and new to philosophy, so please forgive my naivete. Without examining the ideas involved, I have always lived as a carefree materialist. I knew no better - raised by wolves, you will assume yourself a wolf.

But if I am to leave my foolish childhood behind, I feel a burning need to learn more. So I begin with a simple question, no doubt long answered by those who have argued these points before : One may assume you believe that we experience quale. Where do they come from? Not what are they - What is their source?

Um...

The 3 Laws of p-Zombies?

Aargh! Inelegantly stated on my part (I was half asleep when typing it up). Of course modus ponens arguments are valid or invalid but not true or false. To avoid confusion try this :

- synthetic conditional : a conditional whose consequent is not contained in its antecedent
- analytic conditional : a conditional whose consequent is contained in its antecedent

The reason that I am not using a simple conditional/biconditional distinction is because of conditionals like "If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal", which is clearly not a biconditional, but is analytic by my idea. Perhaps there is some existing terminology for this - my PhD is not in philosophy, sorry.

Then, modus ponens arguments constructed with (what I call) synthetic conditionals add something new to our knowledge. But modus ponens arguments constructed with analytic conditionals do not. Modus ponens constructed with analytic conditonals may clarify or emphasize (i.e., someone who has a vague notion of what it means to be a man may benefit from the conditional that has mortality as the consequent), but they do not really add to the understanding when carefully examined.

I stand by my challenge to Chalmers' modus ponens - the conceivability of p-zombies and physicalism-being-false I believe to form a biconditional. First, if physicalism is (known to be) false, then p-zombies are clearly conceivable. Now Chalmers is claiming the converse (If p-zombies are conceivable, then physicalism is false). From this we must conclude that the two ideas form a biconditional. By my reading of the situation, nothing is added to the understanding by his resulting modus ponens. (And this is just another way of saying that to conceive of p-zombies you must already believe that physicalism is false.)

To Michael : Physicalism is usually understood to be the idea that consciousness is physical. Yeah, I guess some other thing could be non-physical instead, making physicalism about that other thing, but no one makes that claim, do they?

To TS : Did I avoid causality this time? It was not my intent to suggest otherwise.

So what do you say about the following :

If pigs can fly, then the moon is made of cheese
Pigs can fly
Conclusion : The moon is made of cheese

Clearly valid. But is there any truth to found?

(This has the danger of going in circles like the discussion with Michael.)

But why is consciousness different from flying? Flying is obviously physical, but consciousness is not?

Sure, consciousness might feel non-physical to you, but that seems like folk wisdom, not a considered argument. You seem to be assuming it as premise. Can you further explain?

Ooh, I think the flying pigs are going to help.

Sure it's possible to conceive of flying pigs, but what if I describe the world of flying pigs as being physically identical to this one, and then ask you to conceive of flying pigs in that world. Then flight must be non-physical! And in that case, you cannot use the conceivability of flying pigs to prove that it is possible for a physical world to give rise to flying pigs.*

This is the problem with Chalmers request that we conceive of a world physically identical but different in regards to consciousness - it establishes as a premise that consciousness cannot be physical. So you are correct that the problem lies with Chalmers' notion of conceivability - he is putting conditions on conceivability that destroy his argument.

*Note : If pigs in the other world have wings, or if pigs there are lighter than air, then they are not strictly pigs, but something else. So you can't get around it that way.

To conceive of a being which is physically identical to a human, but which is different as regards consciousness, it is necessary to believe that consciousness is not part of its physical make-up. Why do you not see that the presumption that physicalism is false is required for this to be possible?

You have to start from a presumption that consciousness is not physical to imagine a being physically identical to a human but which is not conscious. Consciousness has to already be regarded as "something else" or it would be part of the "physically identical" stipulation.

EDIT : To use the phrase "physically identical" is to imply that a physical world exists. But then to assume that consciousness is not part of the physical, is to be a dualist. So dualism must be assumed for p-zombies to be conceived of. And dualism is the case only if physicalism is false. This makes the conclusion a premise, and destroys the argument.

Both arguments are in the form:

If A then B
A
Therefore B. — Michael

You are simply wrong. P-zombies are not conceivable unless consciousness is believed to be non-physical. Believing that consciousness is non-physical means you already believe physicalism to be false.

Well, it's crucial to both Chalmers' and the physicalist's argument. — Michael

The physicalist's argument is not up for consideration. We are only trying to establish whether Chalmers' argument is valid. (This reminds me of how Trump supporters respond to his critics - when his numerous flaws are pointed out, the next sentence out of their mouths contains the name "Hillary Clinton". Its deflection.) But back to the important point ...

How is it different to any other syllogism? — Michael

Because Chalmers conditional is of the form "A implies A". The p-zombie is only conceivable if you already accept that consciousness is not physical. Otherwise, two "physically identical worlds (with) different properties of consciousness" would be a contradiction. So, in this case, the second premise does assume the conclusion.

Ooh, beat you to it!

If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical. — Michael

The problem is that the things we are asked to conceive (p-zombies) are only possible if you assume the conclusion - i.e., that consciousness is not physical. When Hanover asked if a distinction had been made between physical and non-physical, the question is crucial to Chalmer's argument. And as you noted, Chalmers seems not to address the issue.

Look at the argument :

If we can conceive of a p-zombie then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of a p-zombie
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical — Michael

Now ask yourself : Can the p-zombie be conceived of if you do not already accept that consciousness is different from the physical?

And this goes to my much maligned comparison of coherence and conceivability. If you do not define your terms (consciousness, p-zombie, et. al.) - which is what it means to be coherent - then I fail to see how you can meaningfully think about them (conceive of them).

Throughout this discussion, we have long forgotten the question in the OP : Is consciousness a recognizable attribute or an assumption? What does it mean to be just like a real human but to lack a consciousness, when the presumption of consciousness can only be made through observation of behavior? How can one be said to lack what cannot be shown to exist? To believe that such a creature exists (one just like us but lacking internal, unviewable consciousness) calls into question whether consciousness exists in others at all - which destroys the argument.

Are you arguing that a vague, confused, unclear concept is conceivable? All are synonyms for incoherent.

I think of Escher's drawings as visual paradoxes - representations of something which seems real but which obviously can't be, as they are drawn from multiple dimensions. As such they're tangential to the main point, but they do illustrate the way in which something can be 'incoherent' - like, not make visual sense - but still be, at least, represented. — Wayfarer

I would argue that the pictures cannot truly be conceived either. Escher's drawings are visual oxymorons - very complex oxymorons. Sure, you can string together two opposites, but can the result be conceived? I can write "cat-dog", but can you truly imagine such a thing? The linked phrase exists - just as Escher's drawings exist - but can it be conceived of as finished thing? Can you see the duck and rabbit simultaneously? I don't know - could be my Aspergers - but to me, incoherent = inconceivable.

So it seems relevant to the discussion : if p-zombies are incoherent, by my thinking, they are also inconceivable. If you can produce an incoherent concept that is at the same time conceivable, then I must re-assess my position.

I am arguing that if something is in the category of incoherent then it is necessarily in the category of inconceivable.

Look, this is very simple - Can a concept be incoherent and conceivable at the same time? Yes or no? If so give an example.

But can we take in the entire picture, or just focus on its parts?

Can you see the duck and the rabbit simultaneously?

So can something be incoherent, but still conceivable? Concept A is known to be incoherent - can concept A be conceivable?

What is the distinction? If a concept is incoherent can it be conceived?

Where I disagree with the p-zombie argument is that I think the idea is incoherent rather than conceivable. — Terrapin Station

Is it possible for a concept to be incoherent yet conceivable? Can you give examples?

At this time, I don't believe that any machine possesses any degree or amount of conscious experience whatever, so no amount of addition will address that deficiency, a million times zero is still zero. — Wayfarer

But even if a machine becomes conscious one day, how would we ever know? A computer might insist all day long that it is a "real live boy", but that could simply be the result of clever programming, so who will believe it? And this is the point of the OP - we judge other minds to exist, extrapolating from our own, but we don't really know.

I am actually in agreement with your view. This comment you made earlier nicely sums up the problem :

The whole problem with the 'p-zombie' is the implausibility of creating such a device. If you asked it a question which involved how it felt about something, or what meant something to it - 'what is the most beautiful/hideous/moving thing you ever saw?' - then obviously it would have to emulate a response that was emotionally convincing. But this is like the Turing Test taken to a far higher level of difficulty. It would have to fake memories, attachments, preferences, and so on - without any basis for such abilities. They would all be simulated.

So, put another way, how could a device simulate an inner life, in the absence of an actual inner life? What would it take to produce the appearance of a conscious being, in a being that is not actually conscious? What system would do that? — Wayfarer

The notion of the p-zombie is simply incoherent. The idea of a being who acts just like us but exhibits no consciousness simply does not hold up to scrutiny. The p-zombie is an oxymoron - perhaps with poetic value, but not philosophical.

Ah, I got your point after sending the last comment. To use realist language, we might say : Light waves reflected from a tree come into contact with your eye. But what happens at the eye is not your experience of the tree. Your experience of the tree is what happens in your brain.

The unseen gorilla is qualia, what you are aware of is your experience.

How does this amendment strike you : Experiences may be undeniable, but we may doubt qualia. Is that better? What do you think?

Imagine standing before a painting at your local museum. As you study it, you notice finer and finer details - the use of shadow, the brush strokes, the composition. Clearly your experience of the painting changes. But the qualia have not changed - the colors, the shapes. And it is those qualia that you do not have direct access to. (Notice that your experience is what I have been calling narrative - your story of the painting.)

So, whatever is happening inside a person's head at any given moment is their (present phenomenal) experience. That idea is, of course, unfalsifiable - but also useless. Certainly other things can happen inside one's head - memories, dreams, hallucinations - which do not seem to be experiences, or are they?

Hi TS. I had a busy weekend and couldn't get back to you.

First know that, in all that I say, I am arguing a contrarian position and not my own. I am a realist (of sorts) and believe that not only do we have experiences, but that our experiences reflect an external world. I will continue however with the argument I have been making here - that we can doubt our experiences.

I have stated that I believe all knowledge to be narrative. What I mean by this is that we do not have direct access to our experiences. We must place them in narrative form - name them, describe them - in order for our experiences to become known to us.

Have you ever wondered why the Selective Attention Test works? (Just Google it - some great videos can be found.) The unseen gorilla is certainly part of the video, but the first time we see the video, the gorilla does not become part of our narrative and remains unknown to us. So can we say that we experienced the gorilla or not?

You must attend to an experience to make it known. And attending means making it part of your narrative. Otherwise, it is as if the experience never occurs.

Even a trivial version of the argument says you have to add the further thing of "the organisation". Summing the parts ain't enough. — apokrisis

I thought you were trying to say that the organization-of-the-parts was itself a part. So to help me better understand, I must ask : What do you think is meant by the "sum of the parts"? Is it the collection of parts without any organization - perhaps in separate containers? But such a collection is in fact an organization of the parts! (Such a collection is what I termed a listing.) And it will have properties just like any other organization. Thus a particular whole will have different properties from the sum of its parts, but a particular whole is not greater than the sum of its parts - unless we decide to rank the organizations by their properties.

Please let me know what you think constitutes the parts and their sum - it will help me to argue my position clearer.

Sorry to answer a question with a question, but ...

Do you distinguish between experience and narrative? If so, can there be present phenomenal experience without narrative? Please explain.

Oops, gotta run. I'll pick this up later.