The issue is generally conceived as metaethical not metamoral. — Constance

I can live with that.

Some call my position moral realism, yet the ontological question refers us to metaethics. See John Mackie's book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, in which he specifically addresses the issue brought up here, though not as I am defending it, and there are lots of others. — Constance

What kind of area would you say you are talking in? Is Moral Realism appropriate? Such categorising may be messy but it is useful to understand the general gist of where you are coming from.

No doubt the practical use goes to dealing with the world, and the point is to do things right. The Greek arete comes to mind; and of course, the principle of utility. But this presupposes the more fundamental analysis: what is ethics? Ethics as such, the essence of ethics, that is, that, if it were removed from a situation, the ethicality itself would be removed. This is value. — Constance

Of course, we judge through values. Ethical judgement is one value judgement of many. The same would be left if we removed what is prudent. My question would then be does judgement about what is prudent come before the judgement about what is ethical. If so, we can then say that what is prudent is the 'essence of ethics' right?

So a scheme of Value < Judgement < Prudence < Ethics < Religion ... not that I believe all Religion is is its relation to ethics in its original formation.

No liking or disliking, to put it generally, no ethics. But what is liking? This is what I will call truly primordial: it is "among" the facts of the world, but it is not a fact. The good of ethics (and the bad) is not contingent, as Witt said. It is not like a good knife, say, contingent because one can explain it. Ethical goodness is very different. Explaining suffering is just a tautological exercise. It is what it is, or, it stands as its own presupposition, an absolute. It is, like logic, apodictic. Kant found apodicticity (apriority) in logic, I find it in value. The latter is far, far more significant. — Constance

No liking, no ethics? Mmm ... I guess so. But that is basically like none of one category of judgement means no ethics. Nothing is surprising there. One would still make other kinds of judgements.

The 'essence of value' is emotion. I think there is something to the whole "boo!" and "hurrah!" of emotivism in regards to moral judgements. Drinking water when you are thirsty is 'good' (beneficial/targeted), while stealing water from someone else is 'not good' ("boo!").

Of course, there is the fascinating post modern complaint that even logic is cast in language, and language is contingent, historical (Heidegger), and even the term 'apodictic' is given to us as part of this. Apodicticity really is a term under erasure because it has no language counterpart. This is a tough issue, so I won't go there unless you want to. — Constance

Probably better to leave that alone for now :D I have been more than aware of the problems surrounding the application of the pure logic heuristic to language.

Nor can one second guess the "bad" of the pain of scorching of live flesh (masochists notwithstanding. Such an issue does not enter into the matter at hand). It would be just as "impossible" to deny the badness of such a thing as it would be to deny modus ponens. — Constance

If my hand is burning it is not an ethical issue. If someone sets my hand of fire then it is "Boo!"

Value as such is not relative or interpretatively derived. It is "the world". Not IN the world. Ethics is IN the world. Metaethics is about the world as world. Our existence is the world. We are IN a world, as well, and we ARE the world. This is something that has to be understood. — Constance

This is so obvious me to I am puzzled why you even have to point it out. I am not entirely sure why there is a fixation on ethics though as you could name other judgements OR just say Judgement instead. Is there something I missed in your meaning?

This, I am guessing, is unfamiliar language to you. — Constance

Not really. I have read Husserl quite a bit and Heidegger.

Religion: If ethics is discovered to be an existential absolute, in its essence, as I am claiming, then the world is a very different "place". Our familiar ethical entanglements are now matters of far deeper significance. This deeper significance is what religions strive to affirm dogmatically. Here, it is demonstrably done, I claim, after all is said. — Constance

You can probably tell by now that I think you missed some significant steps in your reduction. Ethics is layers above what matters. Ethics comes through other value judgements (it is not THE value judgement, if that is at all what you were hinting at), and value judgement is embedded in emotion ... now we do hit a rather hard problem because what emotion is is also a matter of sedimentation.

I came to Husserl via studying the Cognitive Neurosciences, and I am rather inclined to use what I have learned there as a check on what is feasible. I do not really see that Emotion is something that can exist separate from Logic. I have been of the broad opinion for some time that they are effectively two sides of the same coin, each necessitating a kernel of the other to exist.

Much like Kant espoused with his “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise.”, I am inclined to say “Reason without emotion is empty, emotions without contexts are blind. Logic can intuit nothing, the emotions can think nothing. Only through their unison can value arise.”

And the analysis of ethics is the analysis that is about the analysis of moral positions. This is metaethics, and religion is about just this metaethical analysis. — Constance

Surely you can see why I have problems untangling the meaning/position you are trying to convey here?

Take a judgment about ethics, not about reason and logic, and give analysis. What is there that makes ethics what it is? — Constance

Morality and the interplay of reason to distinguish poorly constructed views/arguments (using logic in language). Then there is also the stance that ethics is generally referring to the application of moral principles to society at large - as a means of analysis.

If you will, Moral Laws are morality and Ethics is the investigation into the application of these laws and judgement of them using reason. Meat Ethics is more or less the questioning of the existence of Morals (validity) and the (mis-)use of concepts therein when partaking in this kind of discussion (ie. mistaking what is prudent for what is based on moral beliefs).

This is, again, logically prior to all of this. It is a question of ontology: the question of the being of ethics, a question that is begged in all subsequent thinking about how to think about ethics. — Constance

Ah! So we are looking at the essence of morality then rather than ethics (as I outlined it)? The 'being' of morality rather than ethics? I will need confirmation here.

This is, and Wittgenstein uses this term and it seems to work very well, value, the value dimension of our world. — Constance

I would have to say we are then looking for the root of judgement rather than ethics, as ethics is a judgement as is prudence. Morality is not intrinsic to value. Valuse can emerge in areas that have no prominent claim to ethics or morality.

. He talks like this because "the good" is not an empirical or analytical concept. It is not among "states of affairs." — Constance

I think I am beginning to see what you might be talking about now. I will see if I can articulate this in latter conclusion ...

This is to ask, What is the good and the bad in ethics? It is a metaethical question. — Constance

It is to ask about practical use of rather than an emotional judgement of 'right or wrong' flavoured values.

The "sense" of it lies in the simplicity of discovery. Put a lighted match under your finger and observe. Now ask the ontological question. Religion is ALL about this. — Constance

I cannot even begin to see where/how/if you are trying to insert religion into the scheme, or what you actually mean by religion if you are essentially stating it is synonymous with 'ethics'/'moral laws' (which I still need clarity on also.

Conclusion

I saw an instance where you referred to 'good' in a non-moral/ethical sense. This is certainly a pure value. We can value something as being 'better' or 'worse' by our intentions and direction. If I am thirsty then moving towards water is 'better' but certainly not Moral or Ethical.

The Morals and Ethics proceeds from human interactions in the truest sense that we use the terms Morals and Ethics. At a proposed deeper level the Moral/Ethic begins in the individual. The question is then HOW can Morals/Ethics emerge from an individual in relation to societal interactions? There are obviously some quite basic and intuitive answers to this question that all lead back to the 'better' that stands outside of Morals and Ethics (as presented above with thirst - the prudent).

Note: I am pretty sure I am not hitting the mark here with what you are trying to articulate but hopefully it will allow us to get closer?

Thank you for taking the time to respond :)

People were responding to my last comments generally, then you swooped in there like you owned the place.. Please. — schopenhauer1

Because you were wrong. I will not interact with you any more. My post was directed at the others who failed to understand the AN position. I tried to guide them towards a better understanding that is all.

Bye

Nonidentity is neither for nor against (it is not specific to AN either). It is the question of whether, or how, ethics can be applied to people who do not as yet exist.

The main positions are:

- We have no right to bring life into existence (nonidentity issue involved here in part).
- No harm is better than no pleasure.

I have found nothing much outside of these primary ethical issues worthy of much attention (existential threats, state of society etc.,.) because all of them orbit the two positions I gave the gist of above.

But again, this is my argument, not all of AN. So don't misconstrue that even though I am continuing the debate. — schopenhauer1

I responded to people asking about the AN position is in general. I did that. What your personal position is is your business to explain.

Kant came up with intuitions for knowledge. Are you suggesting there are intuitions for ethics/morals? I would argue that if there are they are sitting directly on top of knowledge not springing from the same point.

Here, I ask, what is ethics? and also discover apriority. — Constance

You discover judgement before ethics? Sorry, the more I look closely at what you have written the less it makes sense.

Here, I ask, what is ethics? and also discover apriority. But ethics is NOT vacuous logical form. It's essence is value, that is, entanglements in the world that deal with pain and pleasure and this is really a dimension of everything: the very event of this trivial occasion to write is saturated with value. Pull me away and I care that I am being pulled away. A glance at the time is implicit interest and meanings subtlety in play. — Constance

Well, I do believe we can use moral/ethic mostly synonymously but in this instance I would have to argue against this as ethics is about analysis of moral positions, and thus is more about the reasoning behind a moral stance than being anything like a means of valuing (other than by unearthing faulty logic and reasoning).

If am I more charitable then, okay, we may call moral positions a means of persuasion to personal will active within a given social framing. Clearly religious moral are part and parcel of something like views in Christianity that we are all familiar enough with.

If your conclusion is something like stating everything is valued ... so what? What kind of value are we talking about? Moral values? What is prudent?

Ethics is not a vacuous logical form because it is dealing with morals. Furthermore, the medium of language in which we deal with them is irreducible in terms of pure logical forms. Ethics applies logic, as best it can, to infinite terms (rather than something like finite numbers).

Obviously there are parts to your thinking you do not fully know how to state or even understand. What parts do you have a clearer means of expressing? Perhaps start there? Otherwise it feels pretty much like I am playing a guessing game unfortunately.

Thanks for trying to clarify though :)

I am still not really getting a clear idea of what is being pointed at by the phrase 'essence of religion'. Are you just saying that Ethics is the essence of religion? Are you saying the unconscious is the essence of religion? What do you really mean by using the term 'essence' and what reason do you have to do so?

I was merely pointing out the gist not giving a thorough analysis.

I pointed to the issue of non-identity (about which there are many positions) and about asymmetry (about which there is more to say too in terms of its implications). Pointing out to those asking that looking at one without considering the other is kind of futile.

You can provide links for them if you wish. I have read, and listened, extensively to the AN position.

My position is that it is VERY useful to look at for anyone considering having children - but not because I believe it will, or should, stop them.

Not really interested in anything you are saying. So I won't waste your time or mine.

I as referring to the general AN positions not your personal ones.

What I said outlined a couple of the main points AN puts forwards. I said no more than that.

The sense in which I am using 'religiosity' has nothing much to do with theism. My perspective is anthropological/psychological in the sense I use that term.

By "essence" of religion, what structures my thinking has led me to this: religion is a mechanism by which we might, at least, "recognize" that the ego is secondary; at best, turn away from ego, if only for a glimpse of the being emancipated from a world of constructions; the ego/Subject/I among such constructions. — ENOAH

Reasonable.

As an aside which will not be explained for the sake of space here, Husserl went far but at the end remained as confused as the rest of his Western Age and identified the "goal" of his exercise as the (transcendental) Subject. It is not. His method seems sound, but the goal is no different than that of this essence of religion: a glimpse into our (you won't like this) "true consciousness," reduced from all constructions. — ENOAH

Not entirely onboard with this. Husserl was aiming to create a 'science of consciousness' that stood apart from empirical science (a new science) as he saw clearly that psychology was not really doing anything of note in terms of qualitive content falling back on empirical data, as it necessarily had to, being framed as a science grounded in objectivity.

How do I know religion does this? Where in religion is this essence found? Briefly three examples but one could provide pages, and I'm simplifying and paraphrasing
Jesus--love god with all your might love your neighbor as yourself; that sums up the scriptures--read abandon ego
Vedanta--Moksa is freedom from ego
Zazen--a glimpse into true nature/no mind — ENOAH

I would look at this as an assumption of there being an 'essence' of religion. What strikes me is that religion (in its beginnings) is assumed to be an object. To echo Satre in regards to the 'nature of an object' what if religion is not an object at all? As in possessing no 'essence'.

I think we do have to be open to a lot of speculative thought here as we only know of religion through our modern lens and from where our modern schematic of religion came (the current Institutionalised edifices). From my own instigations I am convinced that the core of "religion" (or perhaps it is better to say religiosity) preexisted our current views, historic views (literally) and even societal views too. Undoubtedly there are numerous examples of religious rituals and such that expose known methodologies for inducing altered states of consciousness. eg. prayer, trance dancing, repetition, hyper-focused attention, hyperventilation and fasting - all intrinsic to religious passages of rite. Then there is memory and knowledge accumulation that predates written forms of data storage.

I think today the power of religiosity has been reduced to a shadow of its former self.

Since the existence of life is rationally meaningless, rationalism in this field always leads to existential nihilism. — Tarskian

No. Framing the line questioning as a reasonable one is faulty. The mistake is believing it is a rational question. It makes rational sense to distinguish between the kinds of question being asked and how they can be answered, whether or not they make any sense and if it requires an answer.

a) I do not think the question makes much sense rationally anyway. It just appears to be reasonable to ask about a 'reason for existence'.

b) You now have the task of stating what 'spiritual' means - other than saying opposed to the 'rational' which I was originally asking for to begin with.

I'm just saying religion at essence is more — ENOAH

I am still struggling to figure out 'essence' here. I am intrigued by the origins of religion, would that be relevant here?

Since there is no rational reason for the existence of life itself, the absence of a pacifier may very well turn into a problem. Life can be full of suffering. When the going gets tough, why do you even try to continue? In order to perpetuate something that rationally does not make sense to begin with? — Tarskian

I think I need to understand the use of 'rational' here too. If you are not being 'rational' then what are you being? Can you say anything worth listening to without articulating it rationally? If you choose aesthetic means to communicate you do so because it is rationally appropriate (if not it fails).

Surviving does not make sense while having children is simply cruel. — Tarskian

There is a whole other thread where you can argue that. Not here. Needless to say I disagree and fully understand the AN argumentation.

Do you reject religion and mysticism because they do not adhere strictly to reason? — ENOAH

I do not 'reject' them, just view them within their own jurisdiction.

If not that, then why do you reject religious or mystical "contributions" about consciousness outright (which is what you seem to be saying about the former, while relegating the latter to a pacifier, which I read as a useful fiction)? — ENOAH

I do not 'outright' as all experiences have something to contribute to concepts of human consciousness. I just emphasize that one should probably not hold to vague mystical concepts when trying to understand things with any reasonable kind of precision.

What if the best way to "access" consciousness is not the understanding but, like hunger and arousal, by "feeling-doing-being"? What if mysticism--admittedly, some hypothetical particular form--provided the methodology for such access? Would you deny it because it takes a path other than reason? — ENOAH

I am a little confused by what you are saying when you say 'reason'. Husserl does this, but he certainly has to use reason to do so (as do we all?).

Blind grappling for naught is just that.

While I'm not denying the usefulness of reason, is it not possible that on some matters, reason can only go so far before it reaches a bridge which reason cannot cross?ĺ guess, I was suggesting--poorly--that there might be "truths" notwithstanding all of the self serving myth, ritual and dogma. It would be an absurd irony if our strict adherence to reason, rather like a dogma, forever barred us from making headway on the very topic which continues to baffle us. — ENOAH

That makes no sense. If you are in the habit of making no sense that it is of no sense. Obviously?

Since we seem to have gone very far with reason--across the universe and down to subparticles--why is it we cannot understand consciousness? Is it possible that the latter requires some alternative methods of pursuit? — ENOAH

I think you are almost certainly using the term 'reason' to mean anything scientific here? Or so it seems? That may be the disjoint.

I'm not sure what you mean. — T Clark

We can leave that for a another day. Too much of a tangent.

People say that only what are called the "inner chapters," the first seven chapters, are authentic, but I found the rest of them very helpful too. — T Clark

I will have to give it go. Someone I know mentioned it a few years back in a very positive light - I actually bought the book for them when they asked me to buy them 'something interesting'. I have only read snippet of it a long time ago.

Many inauthentic texts are useful. The Hermetica is one I found to be an intriguing read. Even though it has been shown to be a 'fake' of sorts it still has some interesting lines of thought in it.

Again, we're social animals; we like each other; we want to be around each other. But there is no requirement that this be so. And I've tried to make it clear that Taoism rejects consideration of "the order of the societal whole" as a proper guide to behavior. — T Clark

Strictly speaking this is only true beyond a certain point in juvenile development. We require nurturing. I do find a lot of eastern mysticism has a habit of being interpreted as things happening in a Void of sorts.

btw how does Chuang Tzu differ from Lao Tzu? I've only read the latter extensively.

I have no idea what your question is asking if I am brutally honest. Plain speech and less fluff would be nice.

The whole of the linguistic turn sent people running down roads that many have yet to return from. Husserl saw this and pointed it out. Heidegger - I believe - made the journey back ten times harder.

I do not understand what you are saying, and therefore cannot agree with it.

I am not keen on religious doctrines posing as a philosophy of consciousness, nor am I inclined to side with mysticism as anything other than a pacifier of sorts (albeit somewhat essential in its role on mental stability).

The path to woo woo is the way. The destination of woo woo is delusion/madness.

I have said for a long time that ethics is unethical and morality immoral ... it is only recently that I have started to wade through the jargon to find what the accepted terminology is for outlining this better.

I am more inclined towards meta ethics. Emotivism is a useful term for part of how I see things - hence placing Moral Views effectively outside of direct philosophical scope.

Note that language itself is the very Being in question. — Constance

I have my doubts here. Heidegger and Husserl parted ways because Heidegger hyper-focused in on hermeneutical form of phenomenology. Husserl was still reaching for the unreachable (and stated as much). The task is endless.

I do not believe in the existence of objective categories, this includes moral or aesthetic values. — Ourora Aureis

Can you expand on this? especially in reference to aesthetics. Are you stating that aesthetics are merely an expression of the natural condition just as morals are, or something more nuanced?

A reaction to this would be ethical egoism, the ethical framework I follow. It declares that we ought to act according to our values, not the value judgements of others. In this way it seems similar to the idea of personal morality you hold. — Ourora Aureis

This is a hard gap to cross as there are effectively no moral values we can hold outside of social framework. Perhaps all morals are, are instantiated social necessities that communicate shared values systems. Outside of society morals are naught. Of course we are always partially attached through social means because it is nature to be social.

My understanding of morals doesn’t really fit in with those generally discussed here. — T Clark

I think it is more or less about feeling your around how other apply value to certain judgements in certain contexts compared to others. It is then about unpicking the rational claims laid out or, often enough, revealing that there are none whatsoever.

Of course, this is further complicated when those espousing certain moral themes are so entrenched in them (or opposed to moral views) that they are effectively no longer doing anything I would call 'philosophical'. We can still attempt to point this out and find out where they took the wrong path and/or whether there is simply a misunderstanding in the concepts laid out.

The terminology in this area is just as obtuse (if not more so) as every other field of philosophical inspection.

The problem of identity is a real problem, but if we admit this problem to the equation, then there may be no “me” who could fail to prevent suffering either. — Fire Ologist

Well, not really because you exist.

I think we have to insist any AN statement adheres to their moral stance regarding nonidentity of possible future people, as well as their moral claim that no suffering is good and no pleasure is neutral.

It is a utilitarian position in essence, so when questioning the AN this should also be kept in mind and pointed out where we feel necessary.

Wikileaks is a hamster, no?

Because you cannot particularize this prevention of suffering in a particular “you” who doesn’t suffer, AN is acting ethical towards no one, no one who ever exists. — Fire Ologist

You can guarantee less suffering by not bringing someone into the world. This is also underlined by the metaphysical problem of non-identity. Much like our responsibility for considering the kind of world we leave behind for future generations (which we speculate about quite often without arguing about their non-existence).

I think I see what you are asking.

The AN view is asking what right anyone has to create life if they know it will suffer.

Below this isasymmetry argument. The absence of pain is Good whilst the absence of pleasure is Neutral.

There is no factual basis for this claim though as far as I can see.

That life, regardless of change or possible omission of what is currently held in the antinatalist mindset as "suffering" or "negative", creation of new life either, is intrinsically a negative, whether that conviction is held based on the likelihood of even, say, a perfect utopia naturally always reverting to a negative state, or some other generally non-evidential belief. — Outlander

I think this more or less aligned with the Right of the living to bring life into existence.

I am not completely sure I follow this? Can you explain better please?

Not to my understanding.

Existing = Suffering < Neutral < Pleasure
Not Existing = No Suffering/Neutral/ No Pleasure

Only the latter guarantees No Suffering.

Obviously because ANs exist they are prone to argue against bringing life into the world.

From this there is the argumentation of having the Right to bring people into existence. Then we enter into the non-identity problem and metaphysics.

Of course there is much more nuance to it than this but this is the basic frame work. Its proponents will vary depending on other moral stances (including items like moral absolutism, moral naturalism and logical positivism).

Well, you kind of have to understand that position as framed in isolation. ANs are not against existence per se, but there is certainly a disjoint if we project their views as a universal law (which none really seem to do).

It is a moral preference. Of course, if said person believes in moral absolutes then the matter is quite different.

As a means of exploring the responsibility of being a parent I regard the AN position as worthy of serious attention.

Life is way more than suffering. Maybe only human beings can recognize this. Why kill ourselves off because of a little suffering? — Fire Ologist

Because the AN basically believes that not suffering trumps not existing. It is certainly a factual claim that if you do not exist you do not suffer. It is not a factual claim to state that something is better than something else. It is also not a factual claim that suffering is bad unless you have outlined some specific example of the kind of suffering being offered up for discussion.

The arguments for and against the AN position are dependent upon personal views, experiences and metaphysic (The non-identity of possible people is an example of the kind of metaphysics argument used by ANs).

I think it is fair to say that it is an extreme kind of negative utilitarianism if taken as universal law, as the end goal drives towards something like net zero suffering (so net zero existence).

In a more favourable light it is act utilitarianism hyper-focused on a specific aspect of the human experience.

Death is an event that can shape the future. the live has more meaning on the future than your death, but nevertheless your impact will echo into the future in some minute form or another.

It is more a question of asking if life has meaning. If you believe you create meaning then you are more than likely stating that life has meaning beyond its cessation.

And I think I’ve said my peace. Antinatalism seems unneccesssry if it be based on simply suffering, seems anti-ethics while it puts ethics above ethical people, and simply ignores the joy in life. — Fire Ologist

It is a useful to consider antinatalism if you are planning to have children. The reason being it requires you to look at your inner motives and understand the kind of responsibility you are taking on.

Other than that, it is fairly limited in my view for the reasons you articulated (and many more).

@Constance

I would enjoy to here what is meant by Religion and Religious here too?

I think it pays to distinguish what we are talking about and it what kind of historical timeframe too. Religion today is taken to mean a whole range of things sometimes and I am more concerned with common aspects that extend and persist rather than focusing in on any one particular instance or interpretation.

One may experience something so alien to common sense and deeply profound that it requires metaphysics to give an account of it, but to make the claim that the world as it is in all its mundanity itself possesses the basis for religious possibility, this is the idea here; that in the common lies the uncommon metaethical foundation for ethics and religion. — Constance

I am on board with this, simple because if we refer to any totality it is the current totality we know. We cannot think beyond and to say 'beyond' is merely an empty statement that is only actually applicable to different known areas of experience. If you get what I mean? Often the terms used are done so in overextension. An heuristic outside of its useful functionality.

Here, I want to show that this other world really is this one. — Constance

And mysterious ;) Reality is often more surprising than fiction.

So here is a question that lies at the center of the idea of the OP: what if ethics were apodictic, like logic? This is what you could call an apriori question, looking into the essence of what is there in the world and determining what must be the case given what is the case. Logic reveals apodicticity, or an emphatic or unyielding nature. Entirely intellectually coercive. I claim that ethics has this at its core. — Constance

I am not entirely clear what you are stating here. Can you be more specific about this hypothetical IF?

If you are asking where ethics/morals come from - with the assumption of some essence - much like Kant asked about what can be known prior to experience, I am not sure how this could be so. In terms of experience I think Husserl is the best landmark to orientate from given what I have found.

Of course, this is right. It ALWAYS depends on the flexibility of the words we are using. When you start the car in the morning, are you "thinking" about starting the car, or is it just rote action? But you certainly CAN think about it. I think when a person enters an environment of familiarity, like a classroom or someone's kitchen, there is, implicit in all one sees, the discursive possibility that lies "at the ready," as when one asks me suddenly, doesn't that chef's knife look like what you have at home? I see it, and language is there, "ready to hand". For us, not cows and goats, but for us, there is language everywhere and in everything. — Constance

I personally like to frame our intentionality as a form of questioning. What is 'given' is outside the frame of awareness. I like to frame Apodictic as that which we are not consciously attending to (it is a negative sense of being I guess? Hard to express).

For the record I do not view religion as a mere vehicle for ethics. I think the uses of it (especially in terms
of its prehistorical origins) were more far reaching and inclusive of much of human day-to-day experience.

Note: This topic looks like it is right up my street. I am ready for disappointment though as these kinds of discussions rarely go down the kind of path I was hoping for.