"The only results I see from philosophy are a world in which we are: unable to have peace, unable to eradicate poverty and hunger, and a world in which a well-balanced coexistence with our environment and among ourselves is but a pipedream!" (from How I Understand Things. The Logic of Existence). Why is this? — Pieter R van Wyk
That said, I have to confess: I don't like Popper as a political philosopher. While his falsification theory of science was groundbreaking, his reading of Plato is a caricature. — Benkei
I think Italian theorist Franco Berardi with his idea of poesis and rhythm as paths of resistance forms a useful bridge between Schiller and Byung-Chul Han. — Baden
I do wonder if we might not now be facing the opposite risk though (although one Schiller might still help with), a sort of "fear of the utopian and principled," a "lack of faith in logos (the life of reason)" paired with an outright fear of thymos (the life of spirit/honor/excellence). — Count Timothy von Icarus
[...] should not be ruled by nature exclusively, nor should reason rule [...] conditionally. Both of these systems should remain entirely independent of each other, and yet be perfectly as one.
- Schiller, 2006, p. 94
Thymos degenerates into cannibalistic appetite at the limit and everyone loses in the long run. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This places aesthetic reason forever at odds with practical and theoretical reason, whereas I would tend to say they are three facets of the same Logos. — Count Timothy von Icarus
My pitch would be: Beauty relates to the whole. Intelligible beauty is higher than sensible beauty. Beauty is that which "pleases when known." — Count Timothy von Icarus
so that could is something I would like to hear more about too.Virgil's Aeneid — Count Timothy von Icarus
It cuts down quite dramatically on the bullshit. Quite a relief, actually. — Banno
If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno
We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says. — J
Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? — J
One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration. — Banno
The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be. — Banno
Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing? — J
We may not know our reasons before we act — Antony Nickles
(I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") — J
Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things? — Banno
Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience. — Banno
4 CONCLUSION
It has been recognized that certain states are hard to categorize, that even though they are belief-like, they do not behave as the standard philosophical view of belief says they should. I have proposed instead that we view these examples as exposing that this view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude these states as real beliefs. I have here argued that a way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Even if one has not been convinced, I hope the discussion has revealed that reflection on these problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.
If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond? — J
What does it mean to believe? The traditional philosophical view of belief is that it's a rational cognitive affair, evidence based and directed toward truth. According to this account, things like delusion and religious belief are "edge cases", exceptions that prove the rule. But this week we're considering not only that belief may be closely tied to emotion, but that it may actually be a form of emotion itself.
what part of belief is cognitive, what is connotative, and how do they relate? — Banno
Rather I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings. — Banno
All reflect Nozick’s suspicion of planned outcomes and preference for spontaneous association. — Moliere
Reading list:
Isaiah Berlin – Two Concepts of Liberty
Hegel – Elements of the Philosophy of Right
Hannah Arendt – The Human Condition and In Between Past and Future
Charles Taylor – Sources of the Self
Judith Butler – Precarious Life; The Psychic Life of Power
Michel Foucault – Discipline and Punish; The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1
Karl Marx – Capital Vol. 1
Robert Nozick – Anarchy, State and Utopia — Moliere
Nozick assumes property, contracts and social status can be justified without examining how they arose. But our capacities and entitlements depend on historical contexts that shape access and recognition. — Moliere
I have not read this fully yet but a quick skim brings up some trouble I have found recently when reading philosophy from a broad spectra of authors.
I have had something of a strange experience reading Byung-Chul Han year past year or so and it resonates with a lot of what is being said here.
Although I found a lot of his views intriguing there were also that seemed to be nothing more than baseless assumptions. The somewhat poetical style I am not too fussed about as long as they are then firmly translated into a formal description. As an example, Kant did use an analogy or two but very sparingly. I have seen quite a number of of philosophical pieces written over the past few decades that tend to lean far too heavily on metaphor and analogy. — I like sushi
Opinion and belief are the catalyst to philosophical enquiry, but without clear justification based on logical reason and solid evidence, philosophy will degenerate into multiple factions forever at odds with each other. — Moliere
This reflects the classic liberal view of negative liberty, as defined by Isaiah Berlin: freedom from external constraint or coercion. The ideal subject is left alone to pursue personal goals. But this idea, though rhetorically powerful, proves conceptually and practically inadequate. — Moliere
Modesty rules pre-existed Victorian times obviously, going all the way back to the time when Adam draped his junk with a fig leaf. — Hanover
