As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...? — Fooloso4

A mystic is someone who knows or thinks to know something but refrains from uttering it, for various reasons. Mysticism's main tenet can be summed up in the proposition: "'Whereof one dare not speak thereof one must be silent". But Hegel was pretty much verbose, unless he kept silent about a lot of stuff.

So, Kant would argue that in a truly moral world, there is absolutely no room for lying. And even the smallest lie destroys his precious categorical imperative. So, Kant would say, if a killer came to your house, looking to kill the man hiding upstairs and asked where he was, you'd be obliged to tell him. In his perfect world, you know, you couldn't lie.

Yeah, I can see the logic that if you open the door, even just a crack, you accept a world where lying is permitted.

Okay, then, then you'd say if the Nazis came to your house, hiding Anne Frank and her family, and asked if anyone was in the attic, you'd say, "Ja, the Franks are upstairs." I doubt it. Because there's a difference between a theoretical world of philosophy bullshit, and real life, you know? Real, nasty, ugly life that includes greed, and hate, and genocide. Remember, if you learn nothing else from me, you should learn that much of philosophy is verbal masturbation. — irrational man

Maybe, just maybe, using a bit of sophistry, or other techniques, the categorical imperative can be salvaged. But in any case, what difference does it make, what does it matter, if people suffer and die as a result? I mean, philosophically speaking, Kant could be right, and his CI alive and kicking, like they say, but the people dead and buried, what is it that we really want here?

If you want to treat prove as an object, but l don't think wittgenstein would allow it. — Wittgenstein

Sure as hell Wittgenstein wouldn't allow it, at least the early one, but I am not so certain about the late, I think he would allow any kind of game.

It is because you said:

I don't think we can understand wittgenstein unless we apply his philosophy on practical examples to see his theory of proposition becoming alive and clear. — Wittgenstein

Well, I gave you just that, I think, why won't you take it? But if you want to be loyal to the Tractatus, like Fooloso4 does, who is loyal in general, then what sort of examples can we give? I don't think the Tractatus, carried out strictly, leaves much room for play. Loyal or renegade, what say you?

Well it is clear a proof consist of more than one proposition, is it simple, I dont think so.Further can we l dont think wittgenstein says object and proposition are same, let alone a set of proposition and an object.I could be wrong though. — Wittgenstein

I am talking about proof's form in general, a proof of something. For example, a mathematical proof like Fermat's theorem, proof about who the murderer is, proof that your wife is cheating you, whether it is raining etc. Proof can be combined with these, but it cannot combine with, lets say, what the best colour is. If you wanted to picture "proof", as a concept, how would you do it? Or if you wanted to explain it to someone ignorant, what would you tell him?

I have to disagree, he does mention what objects are in the tractatus.
3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)
The question remains that are the names universals or particulars ?
Can you clarify on pictorial form ?
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.
2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.
How can we know a pictorial form since it is outside the representational form, are there rules in which object combine to form a proposition ? — Wittgenstein

Continuing from what I wrote before, let us take the concept of proof and treat it as a tractarian object. We have a name for it, called "proof", in english, in other languages it is called otherwise. But however it is called, the meaning is the same - the object (proof) is the name's meaning. What is its pictorial form, how do we know it, and how does it combine with other objects to form propositions?

cool, but what about the other series, Legion? You haven't told me.

He clearly states the proposition "P is not provable has to be given up ". — Wittgenstein

I think that he was just trying to clarify what the concept of "proof" really is, and what does it do. Wasn't it in this section that he wrote that squaring the circle with just using only compass and straightedge was proved impossible, or do I remember incorrectly? And that this proof stopped people from further trying? So, if I remember correctly, he said that proof ends all further attempts, this is what proof actually does to you. And my take is that he was afraid that, once people accepted Godel's theorem, taking it as a proven fact, they would stop further inquiry into the matter. oof!

But if it is such that God is connected with meaning, then I think that the act would have to be that of giving meaning to one's life, to find purpose, to make one's life meaningful, to make it worth and mean something, whatever that may be, and what happens afterwards, as a consequence of this act, this is not related to God's will in any case. And furthermore, a meaning-giving act is something most godly, holy and divine (good willing) that brings about happiness - a hallowing, whereas a meaning-removing act something most ungodly and unholy (bad willing) that brings about unhappiness - a wallowing. Such that the value of the action is in the act itself, like you said, the act being a meaning-creating one, in contrast to a meaning-destructive one, both acting on the ethical plane, and not on the facts of the world. Who would support the notion of a meaningless God anyway? So it would appear that Wittgenstein is telling us that it is God's will to give ourselves a purpose in life, but not specifying which. — Pussycat

Yes, a wallowing of sorts... But, there's something to be said about wallowing, coming from a professional wallower. In that to wallow is to appreciate and prioritize or value what one does already have. The act of endowing meaning onto the world is in some sense solipsistic and egotistical. As if the ant or pig, which we step on or eat, didn't have a personal life of its own, which it might as well have. — Wallows

Hey Wallows, in regard to these, have you watched the series "Hannibal"?

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2243973/

No wonder Wittgenstein was suicidal.
My goodness, you tried to tear me into pieces. — Wittgenstein

Yes, well, sorry, I like to dissect to see what's inside, don't take it personally! :)

Since we are talking about earlier Wittgenstein, this was before Godel came with his incompleteness theorem which by the way, Wittgenstein rejected even in the latter days.He couldn't have meant that when he wrote back then but you can take his wordings differently to get the accurate interpretation. — Wittgenstein

I remember reading about Wittgenstein's efforts to understand Godel and his incompleteness theorem, Wittgenstein used, as usual, a dialectical approach, like a child, and wrote his thoughts in his notebook. After seeing this, Godel exclaimed: "Has Wittgenstein lost his mind?!" :D But I don't think that we should see Wittgenstein's remarks neither as an affirmation nor as a rejection of the theorem.

What I meant by certainty was a relative certainty in science compared to absolute uncertainty in ethics,metaphysics ( these 2 ).If you look at Wittgensteins mathematical philosophy, he considered them to be tautologies which do not belong to this world. — Wittgenstein

You know, "absolute" and "relative" do not make much sense. But there is surely a difference between scientific and ethical matters. Current situation in mathematics is that to prove stuff, a mathematician must make clear what system and what axioms are going to be employed. A theorem that is proved in one system, might be disproved or be not provable in another, and I think that most mathematicians have stopped trying to conform maths to reality, seeing their science as a game, sui generis. Whereas in physics, we are at a standstill, with all these tens or hundres of interpretations of quantum mechanics flying around, each giving its own view of how things stand, the physical reality I mean. So pretty uncertain there, not to mention the uncertainty principle. Now, ethics is something else, I doubt that we can even use "certain" or "uncertain" to describe it. And I don't think that Wittgenstein used the term "tautologies" for ethics and metaphysics, but for propositions of logic.

Tbh, it was a complete intrepretation but it had flaws too.
There are countless ways to read the Tractatus, I dont think any viewpoint is totally wrong.There are flaws and advantages.Can you explain how it is incomplete. — Wittgenstein

I think that the logical positivists paid no attention to the last few pages of the Tractatus, treating them as mere nonsense, as if they outright discarded it. Which is why I said "uninterpreted", but yes of course, you can say "misinterpreted" as well. So either "complete (and flawed)" or "incomplete", logically it makes no difference anyway, the difference is only a psychological one, it is what it is, like they say.

On the last point, the tractatus talks of states of affairs which are essentially all the possible combinations of objects, and the possibility is written in the objects themselves.We get the picture theory from it and in my opinion, the picture theory favours taking objects as tangible things for lack of better word.He describes somewhere that we cannot think of a geometrical object without space to further elucidate his picture theory. — Wittgenstein

I will take these two propositions from the Tractatus:

2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
2.0251 Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.

So objects are entities, things. And if their form is space, time and colour, something pretty abstract that is, then we can only imagine what objects really are. Not anything tangible anyway.

Also:

2.021 Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not any material properties. For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects.

Substance, which is related to objects, does not have any material properties. Which is where logical positivists I think got it wrong, assuming that objects are something like elementary particles, with elementary propositions describing how these particles are and behave.

So I see that Wittgenstein took tractarian objects as an auxilliary hypothesis, like those used in philosophy of science, dark matter, for example: "we don't know what/how they are, but we are certain that they exist, we hope that future examination will give us more insight into these". But of course Wittgenstein was forced later to drop all talk about elementary propositions, and objects too, I suppose. (a picture held us captive)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter#In_philosophy_of_science

How old are you btw, it seems you are older than me. — Wittgenstein

I will tell you, since you ask, but let us see first if you can guess my age?

If you want to know about my last statement you can check this out. — Wittgenstein

Thanks, I read it, I tried to find what your opinion is on these simple objects, but I can't say that I have.

Wittgenstein, the Man himself? :lol:

But we can still have certainty in the knowledge of mathematics and science according to logical positivists. — Wittgenstein

Knowledge of mathematics and science have been somewhat shaken lately.

This movement has died but it is nevertheless an intrepretion of tractatus. — Wittgenstein

It cannot be a complete interpretation though, since it leaves many things discussed in the Tractatus uninterpreted.

The limits of the world are anything other than these two, as they go into the the region beyond logic and language, such as ethics and metaphysics. — Wittgenstein

which two you mean?

But this is only possible if we regard objects as something we experience. — Wittgenstein

Say what?

Yes, if the "limits of my language are the limits of my world", then solipsism seems inescapable. Have you watched the series "Legion"?

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5114356/

If for God, solipsism and realism are one and the same, then I find it odd that Wittgenstein would say this in the Tractatus, in the part where God is out of context. But just like he says, "God does not reveal himself in the world", the same holds for solipsism, in that it cannot reveal itself in the world, there are neither divine propositions nor propositions that equate solipsism to reality. Also, if all this is correct, then being closer to God means being closer to solipsism.

yes of course, God is obviously inexpressible anyway, just because we talk about God, doesnt mean we express something meaningful. But do you think that God is also a narcissist, besides a solipsist and an egotist?

Well, if God started doubting, then we would be fucked, wouldn't we? But I was thinking in terms of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein says that in solipsism, if it is strictly carried out, then it coincides with pure realism (5.62 - 5.641). Do you think that W. describes God's situation there?

And, let us not forget that God is the ultimate solipsist. — Wallows

What do you mean by that, God is not a realist?

Yes, a wallowing of sorts... But, there's something to be said about wallowing, coming from a professional wallower. In that to wallow is to appreciate and prioritize or value what one does already have. The act of endowing meaning onto the world is in some sense solipsistic and egotistical. As if the ant or pig, which we step on or eat, didn't have a personal life of its own, which it might as well have. — Wallows

Wallowing was a poor choice of wording, as it generally does not convey what I was trying to say. I thought twice about putting it here, but at the end it seemed to me a good idea, since it rhymes with hallowing, and, well, because of you. But to make things right, lets just say that there are two wallowing principles, the weak and the strong. The weak is the one you describe above, where there is some sense of value, albeit a peculiar one. While in the strong, both meaning and value are absent, the world for the strong wallower is completely void of these two, one's existence is utterly meaningless and pointless, a nihilistic worldview. This feeling and willing I say above that is ungodly and unholy.

One can do what one wills, but your are right, he actions would be facts. Wittgenstein says though that it is not a matter of the consequences of the act in the world. He places the value of the action in the act itself. (6.422) — Fooloso4

(I'm back, wow time flies, I didn't realise that 2 weeks have passed!)

But what about the aforementioned act, what could that be, if it is not connected with the facts of the world, and if consequences do not matter? I mean, one can save or take lives, help the poor, the rich or noone at all but oneself, be good to one's parents or ill-mannered, etc, whatever one does, God's will has nothing to do with it, since God's will is not concerned with happenings, whatever happens in the world, this is just something contingent that could also be otherwise, no matter what our will is - if it is, so called, good or bad.

But if it is such that God is connected with meaning, then I think that the act would have to be that of giving meaning to one's life, to find purpose, to make one's life meaningful, to make it worth and mean something, whatever that may be, and what happens afterwards, as a consequence of this act, this is not related to God's will in any case. And furthermore, a meaning-giving act is something most godly, holy and divine (good willing) that brings about happiness - a hallowing, whereas a meaning-removing act something most ungodly and unholy (bad willing) that brings about unhappiness - a wallowing. Such that the value of the action is in the act itself, like you said, the act being a meaning-creating one, in contrast to a meaning-destructive one, both acting on the ethical plane, and not on the facts of the world. Who would support the notion of a meaningless God anyway? So it would appear that Wittgenstein is telling us that it is God's will to give ourselves a purpose in life, but not specifying which.

Do you think that we can infer all this much from the text?

So if God's will is not concerned or connected with happenings in the world, and since whatever happens in the world is just something contingent and accidental that could also be otherwise, what does really concern this will, where is it focused?

So in other words, for Wittgenstein, without God, there is no meaning, there cannot be one, the world is meaningless without God. No God = no meaning, there is God = there is meaning, as simple as that.

And as long as the will cannot be transformed into actions - because these actions would then be facts, which would mean that they could be described by language, something that Wittgenstein deems impossible (for ethical facts to be part of the world) - then we reach the conclusion that God's will cannot ever be shown in the world, one way or another.

From all the above, I understand that Wittgenstein equates or rather links the meaning of life to God (the meaning of life/world, we can call God), and good willing with being in accord with/doing God's will. No judgement intended, but isn't this what theologians have been arguing for centuries?

Amity! Why did you change Harrison's name to Wittgenstein??? Got me fooled there for a moment.. :smile:

Yes, I am sorry for wronging you, but you were right that sometimes it was a bit of both. Anyway, I don't think that in order to understand these things, the transcendent or transcendental, how is it that they are called or whatever the hell they mean, I doubt that one can or should go about them alone, this is where I think all these great minds like Wittgenstein erred, and why. Wittgenstein most probably realized this at some point, but with noone in sight to accompany him, designed all these games in his Investigations, to be played by everyone, we are playful beings after all, like cats and dogs.

You set the adversarial tone several months ago. — Fooloso4

Yes I did, I am no angel myself. Nevertheless, I gave you the benefit of the doubt, if you remember, whereas you did not. A lot has changed since, and it seems that the tables have turned. But I don't want any benefits, just to be treated fairly. I used to take your judgement seriously, but now it saddens me that I cannot do that anymore, since I believe it has been compromised by empathy towards my person. Unfair!

I will let the record speak for itself. — Fooloso4

Well let it, because statements like this one: "the only things that you have pointed to is where you have gone wrong", don't seem to do that, but rather speak on behalf of the record, or otherwise manipulate it.

What teamwork? What part of the heavy lifting did you contribute when I went through the text? — Fooloso4

On several occasions I tried to help you make your points clearer, either by paraphrasing them myself through my own eyes, or with my questions. On others, not so much. But I feel that you haven't given me this chance for my own contributions at all.

You seem to be unaware of the extent of my patience, even after it has been pointed out by another member. — Fooloso4

Ah yes, Amity, she fell sick of our bickering, and eventually left. To which I responded that she should look at it from my perspective as well. I mean, I certainly appreciate your efforts, as well as of others here, or elsewhere, regarding these so important existential matters, but what about me, what about my efforts, my patience, my world? Just because it hasn't been pointed out, it doesn't mean that they are non-existent, or otherwise worthless and meaningless. In any case, Wittgenstein said that all propositions carry the same value, as they cannot express anything higher.

How you say, it's the bollocks man! :yum:

You have been struggling to find where my interpretation goes wrong and/or where Wittgenstein's does, but the only things that you have pointed to is where you have gone wrong. — Fooloso4

Is this what I've been struggling to do? Because I was under the impression this whole time that we were working as a team, trying to figure out the text. Never crossed my mind that we were playing crossbows and catapults, with myself in the role of the attacker and you the defender. Are you in for teamwork or do you prefer going solo?

Well, it is such a common thing that discussions regarding ethics lead to the most violent of clashes, that would make anyone wonder what ethics is really about, what is really going on here. So much love, so much ethos, it's really mind blowing, I must say! :) One thing is certain though, no love is lost amidst the brotherhood, or the sisterhood.

If you reach the end of the Tractatus and still hold to that assumption then you have not understood the text. — Fooloso4

If you have read what I have been saying with due care and attention that is not a question you would ask. — Fooloso4

You are so nice! :) You should have been a teacher or something similar, if you are not already, that is. But your approach to discourse resembles very much that of Wittgenstein's - I would say it is of the same form, logical or otherwise - at least in his early years, where he would beat the shit out of people, literally or metaphorically; Like he wrote to Russell at some point: "It distresses me that you did not understand the rule dealing with signs in my last letter because it bores me beyond words to explain it. If you thought about it for a bit you could discover it for yourself! I beg you to think about these matters for yourself: it is intolerable for me to repeat a written explanation which even the first time I gave only with the utmost repugnance".

One could say that this would be somewhat justified, if criticism was just, or the will good, but I don't think this is the case here.

That may be your assumption but it is not an assumption that informs any part of the Tractatus. — Fooloso4

I don't think it is just my assumption. I mean, in our time and in Wittgenstein's time, there is a vast amount of ethical propositions before me and him, so in order to examine them, we need to take them at face value, what these ethical propositions purport themselves to be, regardless what you, me or anybody else think of them. But anyway, little does it matter.

It is not simply lacking form but lacking logical form, which means they do not say anything about what is the case. — Fooloso4

So there, you agree that they lack form or logical form?

6.1264 Every proposition of logic is a modus ponens presented in signs. (And the modus ponens can not be expressed by a proposition.)

So are propositions of logic indeed propositions, or something else? Do they have the same form as elementary propositions?

There are no ethical propositions. Once again — Fooloso4

Yes, this is the conclusion, but we start our investigation assuming there are.

All propositions have the same form - logical form. It is not that ethical propositions are formless, it is that statements about ethics are not propositions — Fooloso4

Yes I suppose you could say that. Why can you not say that ethical propositions are not propositions because they lack form?

There is only one kind of proposition. Elementary propositions are logical propositions — Fooloso4

What about logical propositions such as the modus ponens? Does it represent a state of affairs?

They are alike in that neither can be represented, yet you want to keep talking about them. — Fooloso4

Yes, because there is something about them that bugs me.

In factual propositions, facts can be represented - their content, but not the representational form. In ethical propositions, nothing can be represented.

I can extend something that is in analogy with something else. But here, factual propositions are not in analogy with ethical propositions, so I cannot extend, sorry. What I can do though, is similes. For which Wittgenstein says in the Lecture, if you remember, that once the simile goes away, then you are left with nonsense.

There are three kinds of propositions in the Tractatus: elementary, logical and ethical. They do not have the same form, in fact I think that ethical propositions are formless. But later on, Wittgenstein was forced to abandon elementary propositions, I guess this had an impact on the ethical as well.

Extend this to the whole realm of the ethical and maybe then you will catch on and the misguided questioning will end. — Fooloso4

Can't do that, since the ethical is treated differently: ethical propositions are not like factual propositions where we can talk about the facts but cannot depict their form. But rather they are alltogether senseless, in form and content both. Maybe this is where you are confused.

The form of all propositions is the same. The form of all relations between objects is the same. Just because we say things about both houses and cows does not mean that houses and cows are the same. — Fooloso4

Yes, in the Tractatus it was put forward that all propositions have the same form, however this was abandoned later on. Anyway, what both houses and cows have in common, according to the Tractatus, is the pictorial/representational form, and so they can be depicted, we can form pictures of them, portray them in language. But we cannot make a picture of the pictorial form itself, and thus we cannot talk about it in the same way, or maybe at all, as we do with what this form represents, which was a common error made by philosophers.

Of course not, but rather if black and white are colours, then they must have something in common, they must share a connection, so they are essentially the same, although different. In tractarian terms, their form is the same, but their content is different.

You can call it my own sermon if you like, but they are all things that Wittgenstein says, all things that were referenced. As to why you think calling it a sermon serves any purpose, I will leave to you. And as to why you drag Copleston into this I will also leave to you. — Fooloso4

Right, leave everything to me then! :) If it looks like a sermon, acts like one, then it is what it is. Copleston was dragged because I think he expresses the same views as yours regarding the ethical part of the Tractatus. I put in bold the parts that I find relevant.

Wittgenstein would not agree. He does not regard God as an object, objective/transcendent or otherwise. — Fooloso4

Whether God is that transcendent/objective object or otherwise, he (Copleston) certainly attributes religious/mystical experience to God, one way or another. Whereas, in your reading of the Tractatus, this mystical/ethical/religious experience is attributed to ethics. But then again, you seem to link ethics to God as in the sermon above, so essentially, these two different views are the same.

Well for one I very much doubt that all the above are things that one knows. I said previously what I think W. meant by the world of the happy man, and in the case of religious experience: that one speaks in similes, relating happiness to God or some divine providence, but this is not to be taken literally; and as we do not have words for God or the divine, similarly we do not have words for this happy experience. But as you said we went over this. So you agree that it was your own sermon?

But I think you are claiming the same for the Tractatus and for Wittgenstein as Father Copleston did, in his debate with Russell I linked to before. In there he writes:

http://www.scandalon.co.uk/philosophy/cosmological_radio.htm

C: ... Well, perhaps I might say a word about religious experience, and then we can go on to moral experience. I don't regard religious experience as a strict proof of the existence of God, so the character of the discussion changes somewhat, but I think it's true to say that the best explanation of it is the existence of God. By religious experience I don't mean simply feeling good. I mean a loving, but unclear, awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencer as something transcending the self, something transcending all the normal objects of experience, something which cannot be pictured (huh, it's not a picture) or conceptualized, but of the reality of which doubt is impossible (what one knows)-- at least during the experience. I should claim that cannot be explained adequately and without residue, simply subjectively. The actual basic experience at any rate is most easily explained on the hypotheses that there is actually some objective cause of that experience.

and

C: ... I'm speaking strictly of mystical experience proper, and I certainly don't include, by the way, what are called visions. I mean simply the experience, and I quite admit it's indefinable, of the transcendent object or of what seems to be a transcendent object. I remember Julian Huxley in some lecture saying that religious experience, or mystical experience, is as much a real experience as falling in love or appreciating poetry and art. Well, I believe that when we appreciate poetry and art we appreciate definite poems or a definite work of art. If we fall in love, well, we fall in love with somebody and not with nobody....

Just as Copleston says that the objective/transcendent object and cause of religious/mystical experience is God, so you say that for Wittgenstein, the condition for these kind of mystical experiences is the ethical. Which is also the condition for beauty - poetry and art, right? And that this is what Wittgenstein was getting at in the Tractatus, well at least in these two pages of his book?

And what was this then?

It is quite clear that there is ethical experience. One knows what it is, according to W., to be a happy man. One knows what it is to be in agreement with the world, with one's conscience, the will of God. One knows what it is for life to have value and meaning. One knows what it is to live in the eternal present. One knows the mystical (it makes itself manifest). One know how to see the world aright and what it is to see the world aright. One knows how all things stand, how it is all related, that is, God. — Fooloso4

Something that someone just knows but cannot put into words? I am asking, because it looked like a sermon to me, and I wouldn't take Wittgenstein to be a preacher.

Right, so number 1 is that, whether for W. meaning and value are actually the same, whether they are essentially the same - same same but different like the asians usually say (same same, in short) -, and whether they have the same source (ethics).

Now number 2 relates to happyness, if, again for W and the Tractatus, it coincides with "good willing", which coincides with doing God's will, for whatever that means, and seeing the world aright, in which case I think we may call this particular interpretation of the Tractatus as the "stairway-to-heaven" interpretation, with the rungs of the ladder referring to this stairway.

The same distinction in use can be found with Bedeutung. In English we also use the term 'meaning' in different ways. — Fooloso4

So you are saying that 'sense' in 4.022/4.031 and 'sense' in 6.41 mean different things? But yes, because I cannot see how the "sense of the world" would represent some situation. So in 6.41, value is meant as "sense"? And in that sense, does he see value and meaning as essentially the same? Is this why you said to me previously:

So I see here W argue in favour of amorality, just like Nietzsche, the opinion that ethics is non-existent, in thinking or in saying, in this world or beyond.
— Pussycat

Here you betray your lack of understanding not only of Wittgenstein but of Nietzsche as well. What they have in common is the fundamental importance of value and meaning for life. They differ, however, in where that is to be found. For Nietzsche it is the revaluation of values. — Fooloso4

I mean to express the position that: if one discards ethics as the condition for value, then one has to discard meaning as well. That is, the world cannot have a meaning, one's life cannot have a meaning, but be utterly meaningless, if one does not accept at least some value coming from the ethical.

If Wittgenstein was correct in claiming that happiness is the reward for the good exercise of the will and it was true that he was not happy, then that seems to be a correct conclusion. If you read Monk's biography and well as comments made by Wittgenstein in Culture and Value and elsewhere it is clear that he sometimes is critical of his actions. See also his comments about confession. — Fooloso4

Yes, I remember reading it some years ago, but diagonally like they say, some excerpts only. Wittgenstein said he wasn't happy, in several occasions, but in any case this is evident. Nowadays, he would have been diagnosed with some mental illness, for sure, bipolar disorder, manic depression, OCD most probably.

hey hi Wallows!

Woof!

We need to make a distinction between meaning as Sinn or sense and meaning as significant or of value. — Fooloso4

Alright, can you bring an example that clearly shows this distinction?

Happiness is said to be a reward for the good exercise of the will (6.43) — Fooloso4

So if that is the case, combined with the fact that W. was not happy in his life, we can safely infer that he did not exercise his will in a good way, and thus he was not rewarded, right?