"Exegesis" is the wrong word (sorry for the pedantry) but yes, he is giving a genealogical account of what it was that "drove the philosophical Spirit towards the system." Since he does this in terms of class analysis and ideology, the appropriate conception of the philosophical Spirit becomes "the bourgeois consciousness." — Jamal

Guess it was, funny, it sounded fitting at the time.

Nice angle. But how far we should take literally the claim that in the 17th century the philosophical Spirit qua bourgeois consciousness expanded its autonomy into the system and exercised its freedom in thought to produce the Monadology, Cartesianism, and Spinozist pantheism, because it feared it was not able to produce the freedom it had promised in the real world—whether that should be taken literally is another matter. — Jamal

Well, I don't know, but it seems plausible, at least. I will attempt to break it down.

In the history of philosophy the systems of the seventeenth century had an especially compensatory purpose.

The first thing that comes to mind when reading "compensatory purpose", is that of the rich guy that compensates for his minimalistic sexualia with a big car. But in the paragraph above, we also note:

According to Nietzsche's critique, the system documents only the narrow-mindedness of the educated, who compensated for their political powerlessness by means of the conceptual construction of an administrative right-of-domain, as it were, over the existent.

So, Nietzsche's view is that system builders are those wishing to compensate for their political inexistence with totalizing structures over existence, using philosophy to do so. Adorno disagrees, as if he defends philosophy's systematic need:

But the systematic need – that which prefers not to disport itself with the membra disiecta [Latin: dissected members] of knowledge, but achieves it absolutely, whose claim is already involuntarily raised in the conclusiveness of every specific judgement – was at times more than the pseudomorphosis of the Spirit into irresistibly successful mathematical, natural-scientific methods.

Adorno believes that the attempt to glue seemingly heterogeneous pieces together unto a unifying whole, is not always purely psychological (like Nietzsche believes), in that it is not driven by envy of the success of the other divisions of labour, mathematics, physics, politics etc. Spirit still pseudomorphises into evidently successful scientific theories, but there is also something else, something involuntary, compulsory even, amidst this move.

And then he goes on to explain that this other was fear: fear of chaos, and fear of the new ruling class being displaced, just like it did itself to the previous one, they would be the ones to know! So basically self-preservation, a defence mechanism, towards the "strengthening of the social order", by imbuing itself into the system it created.

I'd probably be interested in Baudrillard's criticism of genealogy but I don't understand it from what you've quoted or from the interview it's taken from. I did, however, nod along to the mention of "the mysterious point where he [Foucault] stops and finds nothing more to say."

His portrayal of Adorno and Benjamin as both dialectical and non-dialectical fits quite well with my understanding. It's his way of describing their anti-Hegelian kind of dialectics. Adorno himself says he is doing dialectics but without the progressive unfolding of reason in history. This negativity is what Baudrillard is talking about. — Jamal

What I've gathered from Baudrillard, a prima vista, is that he is over pessimistic over the current affairs. I think he means that genealogy, however valid it may be, has been sublated, appropriated by the dominant system. The same he thinks of dialectics, the one between subject and object, that it is no longer working, since both subject and object do not point to anything real, and we would be doing dialectics between fake images, resulting in the loss of dialectical critical power, and basically of critique in general. He believes that this lament over the loss of dialectics is evident, a presentiment, in Adorno's writings, giving rise to a profound melancholy through nostalgia, what was once great, or what could have been, but has since died. Needless to say, I don't like it, I don't like him at all!

But I was trying to find whether any subsequent thinker continued Adorno's work on negative dialectics, which led me to thinkers like Foucault and Baudrillard. I thought that they would represent the next generations of critical theory or the Frankfurt School, but it turns out I was wrong, the established view is that Jurgen Habernas is 2nd, and Axel Honneth 3rd, and they all have a teacher-student relationship. But it is true that a lot of people engaged, criticized, interpreted and were influenced by Adorno, however none of them actually followed in his steps, not even his so-called successors, his thinking wasn't explored by the next generations. Because who practiced negative dialectics, who did put emphasis on style and content as critique, who gestured towards the non-identical, who did all this, in all, who played the game? Nay, Adorno stands alone.

Hegel, Nietzsche, and Foucault all do this kind of thing (though not from the same political perspective), and we call it genealogy. I'm very partial to it, myself, — Jamal

Well, Jean Baudrillard criticized Foucauldian genealogy, in that it loses (or has lost) its critical power:

For a time I believed in Foucauldian genealogy, but the order of simulation is antinomical to genealogy. If you take this logic to the extreme, what you get is the reabsorption of all genealogy. That's why I believe Foucault was unable to make the leap. What interests me is the mysterious point where he stops and finds nothing more to say. — Baudrillard

But then again, the same he believes for Adorno's negative dialectics:

Benjamin is someone whom I admire deeply. In addition, there is a striking similarity between the tonalities of both periods- a very original combination, in Benjamin as well as Adorno, of a sort of dialectics with a presentiment of what is no longer dialectical: the system and its catastrophe. There is both dialectical nostalgia and something not at all dialectical, a profound melancholy. There is indeed a sort of testimony to the fatality of systems ... — Baudrillard

I make a note of all this not to criticize Adorno, but because you invoked Foucault and seemed sceptical about genealogy. Moreover, from what I read, Foucault is supposed to be 2nd generation critical theorist, and Baudrillard 3rd. I think it is interesting to see how critical theory has developed since the sixties, well, if one believes there has been continuation.

But to return to the matter in hand, at the end of the beginning paragraph of this section, Adorno writes:

In a historical phase where the systems, insofar as they take content seriously, have been relegated to the ominous realm of thought-poetry and have left only the pale outline of organizational schemata behind, it is difficult to really imagine what once drove the philosophical Spirit towards the system. — Adorno

Do you think that in the later passage that you quoted, Adorno is trying to provide an exegesis for exactly that?

how literally are we supposed to take it? — Jamal

Quite literally, I would say. If we take Adorno's "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, remains alive because the moment to realize it was missed", seriously, together with his demand that philosophy becomes conscious as to what it's been doing (to the non-conceptual), then I think we can safely conclude that all philosophies prior to negative dialectics were unconscious reactions to stimuli of their time.

There is another quote that you also might find of interest:

Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of non-identity. It is not related in advance to a standpoint. Thought is driven, out of its unavoidable insufficiency, its guilt for what it thinks, towards it.

It seems to me that what Adorno is saying here, is that guilt is an integral part of philosophy. That without guilt, there would be no philosophy. Or, if negative dialectics is the engine of philosophy, then that guilt would be its fuel. Then maybe guilt is the criterion that delineates a good philosophy from a bad one (at best), or from a completely aphilosophical one (at worst).

The full quote is:

This may help to explain why portrayal [Darstellung] is not a matter of
indifference or external to philosophy, but immanent to its idea. Its
integral moment of expression, non-conceptually-mimetic, becomes
objectified only through portrayal – language. The freedom of
philosophy is nothing other than the capacity of giving voice to this
unfreedom. If the moment of expression tries to be anything more, it
degenerates into a point of view; were it to relinquish the moment of
expression and the obligation of portrayal, it would converge with
science.

From this we/I gather:
1) Philosophy is only mediated through language, language is its only portrayal. No images, gestures, music etc.
2) Philosophy is free as long as it pictures the unfreedom that the non-conceptual suffers under the concept, ie it portrays (its) suffering.
3) There are 2 dangers in this picturing:
a) If philosophy tries to do anything more, eg. justifying it, redeeming it, affirming it, renouncing it etc, then it degenerates into a point of view. It is an imperative from Adorno to let philosophy only be interested in the portrayal, and leave all other matters - consequences, implications, interpretations etc - open. As if it is not philosophy's job to settle the suffering, by direct approach, at least.
b) If philosophy abdicates from its role of giving voice to suffering, from its obligation, then it pseudo-morphises into science.

EDIT: I think for Adorno there are like two philosophies: philosophical science and philosophical philosophy. It seems to me that he is only interested in the latter.

Poor Jamal, I imagine him saying "I asked for a reading group, and all I got was a metaphysician and a smelly cat!" :grin:

I've been thinking for the last few days of an analogy of what Adorno is saying of dialectics, and its relation to physics, namely thermodynamics, the similarities seem to me more than metaphorical, but I can't get my head around it. So I figured I would post these thoughts to the community, as it would know best what to do with them.

So it is basically dynamics, between object-subject, much like thermodynamics, the cold object and the hot subject. Positive dialectics transfers power from the subject to the object, while negative dialectics is the reverse, energy transfer from the object to the subject, with philosophy being the discipline or activity that both describes and affects these two processes.

Also, Adorno seems to be saying that the whole system is isolated, in that no new energy may come from outside the system, ie no "Heraclitean essence", no metaphysics, no transcendence, no divine intervention, no aliens, there ain't no help, the cavalry stayed home: philosophy must work through contradictions within the system, not posit a naive outside, liberation doesn't come from without, it must be immanently worked through.

Objects and subjects, both compete for power, between each other and between them, but since this is an isolated system, it is a zero-sum game we are playing, energetically speaking. The object cannot grow unless it drains power from the subject, and vice-versa, it is the antagonistic whole.

The whole, Adorno says, is an illusion, it's not real. It is what he would want us to resist. It is what Hegel posited in his famous "The true is the whole". We do not discover ourselves in the whole, but we are negated and alienated by it, in a sense we discover ourselves in it, but by negation, because the whole is broken. The object, society, is not passive, it is a negating force that antagonizes us, that in thermodynamic terms burns us with contradictions. Object and subject feed off each other.

And then, there is the thing with entropy. Entropy is related to uncertainty, (dis)order and information loss. Positive hegelian dialectics induces an information loss to the non-conceptual, that much is clear. And so Adorno's negative dialectics, that wants to recover it, can be seen as negative entropy, or negentropy, "a measure of distance to normality".

The thing with entropy in a closed system, as we learn from physics, is that, if no work is done, then the system tends towards maximum entropy, uniformity and statis, ending in a heat-death, a form of unfreedom, where the particles are so distant and alienatied to each other, that no further energy can be produced, in Adornian terms, it is total domination, the "totally administered world". Differences, contradictions, non-identical elements are flattened or neutralized, everything is reduced to exchange value. Subjects are reduced to just cogs in the machine, the object, without meaningful agency, where even no dialectics is possible, no critique and critical theory, nihilism. The throne of Spirit is empty and without meaning, it died due to the maximization of entropy.

Entropy presents us with a paradox, not unlike the one that Adorno is professing: entropy is chaos and disorganization, our institutions - society, the object - prevent against that, by control, at the cost of life and difference, by reducing everything to exchange value, input and output. This very effort reduces entropy, by alienation, which increases entropy in the individual, which then reflects on society, and thus entropy is globally increased. And so philosophy, according to Adorno, I think it has to do with solving this paradox.

Finally, I am thinking of cybernetics, something new and relatively unknown in Adorno's times, with its feedback loops and its rationality for control, but I cannot say, I am new to it.

Well, on reflection, maybe not, since negative theology attempts at something positive. For example, when they say "god is not unjust", it is evident that they mean that "god is just", and so they are playing around with the law of contradiction. Does Adorno warn against this misuse of negative dialectics? But maybe I misunderstand negative theology. But also maybe, these folks somehow understood the violence done to the concept of god via positivity, and so decided to refrain from it, perhaps immaturely.

Seems like negative/apophatic theology, but without the divine and metaphysical connotations.

I don't think we are doing anything but. :joke:

Nice! I put a spell on you! :) I think I read somewhere in the lectures that Adorno was saying something like detachment while still being attached, or something like that, but I can't seem to find it right now.

I am clueless to what it is you are saying. Nevertheless, how does all this follow from the text? I am not saying you are wrong, but maybe you are getting ahead of yourself, like I did with Jamal the other day, and unwittingly confused him.

I think the “this” is either the ludicrousness of philosophy’s confusion of the scholastic with the world-concept, or the retrogression itself (retrogression of philosophy to the scholastic or narrowly scientific).

So Hegel knew this as a mere moment of reality, an activity among others. And he knew it “in spite of the teaching of the absolute Spirit to which he assigned philosophy”.

Adorno is saying that Hegel, though officially claiming that philosophy is the culmination of absolute Spirit, representing total knowledge, actually knew that philosophy was a finite, socially situated activity. I’m not sure how he thereby restricted philosophy, though: just by knowing this about it? Or evidenced in the philosophy? — Jamal

So I guess we agree that, on Adorno's view, Hegel saw philosophy as an activity among others and thereby restricted it. How? I don't know either, I guess we have to take Adorno's word for it, that he wasn't trying to inflate philosophy as to dominate over the other divisions, but to help them emancipate - society, people as well. The fact that he ascribed absolute Spirit to philosophy, doesn't mean that he himself knew everything, but that his method could eventually lead to total knowledge, theoretically. Practically of course, this may never have happened. Hegel believed that his method of (positive) dialectics was the sign of truth, the process through which all divisions of labour, if they would only adopt it, could lead them to all positive things, like knowledge, freedom, happiness etc. Also of note is the fact that Hegel's system is closed, in that, in theory at least, total knowledge is possible, irrespective of the fact that humanity could never attain it, due to its inherent limitations or whatever other reasons. But both socially and historically, philosophy, in Hegel's time, Hegel might have said that it was at its very beginning, after his great discovery of how nature works, in dialectical terms. Hegel even tried to apply his method in science, like mathematics or physics. An interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics named after physicist David Bohm, who was inspired by Hegel (he carried the Encyclopedia wherever he went), is based on his philosophy.

In the previous paragraph, it’s not just that the attempt to use outdated concepts seems futile, but that it seems futile to those who attempt it. So the line we’re discussing now refers back, implying Hegel knows that philosophy is somewhat futile, or at least is more restricted than he claims outwardly. — Jamal

Here I have to disagree, I know of a few stalinists that certainly don't think that their attempt is futile! :) And also I doubt that Hegel thought that philosophy was futile, quite the opposite. As to the restriction, I think I clarified it above.

This would be more interesting if Adorno explained how this shows itself in Hegel’s philosophy. There is a clue in lecture 9, where he says that in the Logic Hegel writes…

that philosophy is itself merely one element in the actual life of mankind and should therefore not be turned into an absolute.


Unfortunately, the note says that this statement has not been found in the Logic or anywhere else. However, we could assume that Adorno has not just dreamt up this view of Hegel’s, that it might actually be found in his work, though perhaps not stated so clearly as Adorno remembers. I’m not enough of a Hegelian to know. — Jamal

This would be a nice thing to know, or a way of doing critique to Adorno himself, as he would have wanted it, but I don't think that it would benefit us at the present time.

To be clear, I am trying to interpret Adorno. So I think he is saying that philosophy is just another human activity, like politics, science, sociology etc., and that Hegel knew this, and restricted it to just that: to an activity, on the same level as all other activities, the divisions of labor. But then something happened, and philosophy forgot its own restriction, and imposed itself onto the other activities, by means of domination, a power move. So as long as it doesn't recognize this move, doesn't let go of its pretentious dominance over totality, it will never find its immanent truth, which is side-to-side to its brothers and sisters, and not over them.

I am thinking it in terms of separation of powers, much like in the political sense, where each are left to grow on their own terms, with philosophy not intervening, but criticizing and keeping them in check, like journalism for example. Things changed when philosophy forgot this, as being purely critical, and subsumed their role and identity, interwining with them. With "instead of
recognizing how very much its immanent truth depends on such, down to its innermost composition", I believe that Adorno is saying that philosophy, as critical theory, depends on the various "divisions of labours", because without them it would have nothing to be critical of, and by forgeting its limit, it monopolized their content matter.

It had me thinking, if Adorno believes that conceptual thinking is some degrees away from understanding, then how many degrees further would he say is thinking in outdated concepts?

But I think you missed a part:

Hegel knew this, in spite of the teaching of the absolute Spirit to which he assigned philosophy, as a mere moment of reality, as an activity in the division of labor, and thereby restricted it. Since then, its own narrowness and discrepancy to reality has emerged out of this, and all the more so, the more thoroughly it forgot this delimitation and expunged it from itself as something alien, in order to justify its own position in a totality which it monopolizes as its object, instead of recognizing how very much its immanent truth depends on such, down to its innermost composition.

Its where he discusses the scholastic and world-concept of philosophy. I am not quite sure what he meant by "Hegel knew this", what did Adorno believe that Hegel knew? Was it the ludicrousness of philosophy confusing the scholastic with the world-concept? Is Adorno advocating the former or the latter? Or neither? What do you think?

In the face of an immeasurably expanded society and the progress of positive cognition of nature, the conceptual structures in which, according to philosophic mores, the totality is supposed to be housed, resemble remnants of simple commodity society amidst industrial late capitalism. The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each Spirit and power, strikes the attempt to comprehend this hegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood.

A lot has changed since Hegel and Marx. The classes of Victorian era don't exist anymore. Back in those days, a merchant, no matter how wealthy, could hardly compete with a bankrupt aristocrat, there was discrimination. Whereas nowadays, money talks, in a language that we all understand. Markets were mostly small and isolated, no comparison to today's global economy. The world expanded to the moon and beyond. Science and technology, population, and much much more. It is futile to try to understand today's world using outdated concepts, since they no longer fit, it is merely a power move that won't yield any knowledge.

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover


I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

After having read the SEP article on Adorno and more specifically this:

Principles of rational morality, as in Kant, are tailored to the self-reflection in which the modern autonomous subject engages, which simultaneously separates insight from action, exemplified, for Adorno, by Hamlet.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. Hamlet, deeply knowledgeable of the intricacies and perplexities of his situation, was still unable to decide on a proper action. And so it seems that, for Adorno, knowledge, even if complete, does not necessarily inform on action, this has to be treated separately, theoretically again. For example, the revolutionaries in his time looked up to him and expected him to lead the revolutionary movement against establishment. How must they have been disappointed, to say the least, when he decided to turn them down, only to lend a hand to established educational systems. So there is a difference between knowing and acting upon this knowledge, my guess is that Adorno anticipates this, and he will have a lot to say about that.

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could we say that the above critique applies to all universal principles, irrespective of their content?

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does. — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it, I think! So instead of "meaning is use", you would replace it with "my meaning is my use", right?

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct?

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

In general, I am thinking of the non-identical more as the non-dominating aspect of nature, rather than the irrational.

There's a type of activity, which is sort of passive, what Wittgenstein called idling. Wittgenstein criticized this, but he was wont to demonstrate in his use of words, what he criticized with the meaning of his words, in a sort of hypocritical way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle?

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework.

I used to think so too, but now I’m not so sure. Is one pointing at the same thing when one says it's unsayable as when one says that concepts are distorting it by the exclusion of particularity? One is pointing at the unrepresentable, while the other is pointing at the misrepresented. The former is transcendental, the latter is immanent. So their differing views on what to do about it can be seen as presuming different ontologies, i.e., a different "it".

Take the example of pain. Adorno would say that the pain scale does conceptual violence to pain by reducing particular suffering to numbers—the pain as experienced is nonidentical with pain as measured (this is not to say he was against its use in medicine). But Wittgenstein would not say that pain is unsayable or mystical; that one cannot “say” one's private experience is unproblematic, because that's not what language does.

I’ve alluded in this post to both early and late Wittgenstein without distinguishing them. It might matter but I’m not sure. — Jamal

Yes, you are right, I think I misspoke when I said "same" or "similar", hmm "closely related" might be more appropriate, as this is ambiguous enough to leave room for interpretation and representation.

I am attempting a syncretism of various quite different schools of thought, the result of which is, more than often, dubious, not to say ridiculous.

Nonetheless, I didn't have pain in mind, or other such private and subjective experiences, but was alluding to the original concepts from the TLP, like values, beauty, meaning, the sense of the world as a whole. Are these misrepresented or unrepresentable? More importantly, what happens if we lump them into the same category as pain?

If we ask, "oh, but what is pain", LateW would tell us: "don't ask 'is' questions, see how pain is being employed in context". But if we try to divide pain into different kinds, then we could say there are 3 kinds of pain: physical, psychological and intellectual (Or maybe a 4th - as existential). I take it that identity thinking is when an experienced pain in each kind is being reduced to a measure or number. Even worse, when pains from different kinds are mixed together in the one and same concept of Pain. This reduction of pain, and thereby reality itself, to a system, fails to do (it) justice. And with no justice, there can be no vindication, for anyone or anything. And Lord Pain goes on laughing in our face.

But is it identity thinking when an unspeakable tooth- or heartache, is treated the same as matters of beauty, by virtue of their common unspeakability?

That's roughly right as far as it goes, but I think it probably minimizes vast differences, between (a) the nonidentical and the mystical, and of course (b) what to do about it. — Jamal

Sure, there are differences, first and foremost because they belong to different traditions.

However, both thinkers seem to be pointing to the same thing or structure, each from their own perspective, and each demand that it is recognized as the most important.

Wittgenstein, in TLP, suggests that once every sayable, scientific, and logical question is resolved, when language reaches its limit, what remains is not nothing, but the mystery itself, which is not expressed - because it is beyond propositional knowledge - but revealed, shown. This might explain his insistence on linguistic clarity.

Adorno, on the other hand, thinks that a thing can never be fully grasped by a concept, the non-identical is the residue, what remains, of whatever is beyond the limit of its own concept, which is revealed through negation and critique.

They are both playing with limits and are in the business of demystification.

What to do about it is certainly different, Adorno is active, whereas (early) Wittgenstein is passive. I think that early Wittgenstein was/became disillusioned with philosophy, that it cannot be salvaged, believing in its purely epistemological/scientific nature. This of course later changed in his Philosophical Investigations. Whereas Adorno never lost faith, believing that philosophy can be restructured so as to yield what it was always meant to and promised, negative dialectics being the way forward.

But this particular mention of Wittgenstein is not actually one of the egregious ones, and it highlights important differences between them. Adorno is unwilling to give up on philosophy's great goals (in some strange version anyway), whereas for Wittgenstein philosophy helps to fix bad thinking but the really important stuff is outside of its domain, except to achieve clear description. For Adorno, the meaningful in life remains a matter for theory, but for Wittgenstein it doesn't. — Jamal

Isn't Adorno's non-identical similar to Wittgenstein's mystical, in that both resist conceptualization?

Wittgenstein, early at least, suggests quietism, while Adorno believes it will be revealed via negative dialectics.

I think it is the kind of promise that is central to faith. Faith involves an unspoken, invisible promise, one that is not made by ourselves, but by the other, e.g. god, science, philosophy, tradition, institutions, other people etc. Evidence is circumstantial or, better, just informative, in that it helps shape, understand or explain the faith in something. Also, given the immense ambiguity and subjectivity of what counts as evidence in such cases, I would discard evidence altogether from any definition of faith.

Of course, faith can be broken, for example when a trusted friend proves to be a fraud. No matter if the friend promised that they would be forever loyal to us, we assumed and believed that such a promise was made in silence, and therefore it is this promise that is in fact broken, puting at risk our faith in friendship in general.

I think that faith is linked to some promise.

Ok, far tooo long for a response, and I am sorry.
Moreover, I forgot what I was going to say...
Anyway, here goes.

I don't doubt that in the text Socrates is depicted as one fearless to death and remorseless about the live he has lived, having lived it as best as is humanly possible. What I do doubt though, is if there can ever be such a man. The belief in his existence is what I call dogmatic, which, as it seems, follows necessarily from the whole of socratic/platonic philosophy. Have we been misled into believing that there is even a slightest chance that all this is possible and true, with Socrates as the main perpertator of this misleading? Is Socrates, in our eyes - and not in his, deified, having reached a status of apotheosis? In Socrates' own eyes, isn't his own deification a hubris?

Socrates, suddenly plagued by the thought that he might’ve misunderstood the daimonion, the divine whisper. That he may have mistranslated the music-dream. What if his whole life's pursuit of dialectic, of reason, was a grand detour? What if the divine meant not logos, but lyre? Not reason, but rhythm?

Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream?

“Make music, Socrates. Make music.”

I thought the search for truth was song enough.

But what if it wasn’t?
What if the gods spoke plainly, and I—clever fool that I am—interpreted instead of listening?

What if they asked for song, and I gave them syllogisms?
What if they meant laughter, and I gave them logos?

I persuaded so many…
Turned the youths from the poets to the philosophers, from the myths to the arguments.
Did I lead them away from the chorus, from the dance?

But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
The daimon never told me what to do—only what not to do.
And he was silent all through this path.
That must mean something. Doesn’t it?

And thank the gods I left no writings.
So that my truth may live as rumor, echo, myth.
Living inquiry is better than dead scripture, anyway. — Socrates

SHADE:
Hello, Socrates. Long have we awaited your return.

SOCRATES:
...

SHADE:
I am sent here to inform you that you are to stand trial for your crimes. I hope that you have fully recovered from your earthly trial, regain your strength my friend, you 're going to need it.

SOCRATES:
Why? What are the charges?

SHADE:
The charges are numerous, but they all stem from this:
That you gave philosophy a bad name—for all time.
And as you yourself once said, it’s better to pull out one’s eye than to lose one's name.

SOCRATES:
What! You can’t possibly pin that on me!
Just because I talked to a few blokes in the Agora, doesn't mean—

SHADE:
I’m afraid we can.
And we have ample evidence.
Tell me—do you remember a man named Plato?

SOCRATES:
Plato? Of course. Nice fellow. Didn’t talk much.
A bit of a recluse, if you ask me. Always lurking in the back. No friends around.
He hardly even looked at me.

SHADE:
Yes, well… that may be because he was recording you.
He developed a system of stenography. Quite advanced.
He recovered, wrote, and distributed most of your talks.

SOCRATES:
Wait, he did what?
That sneaky basterd!

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness. — Patterner

In physics, the mass of an elementary particle is believed to be generated by its passing through a Higgs field:

A vacuum Higgs field is responsible for spontaneous symmetry breaking the gauge symmetries of fundamental interactions and provides the Higgs mechanism of generating mass of elementary particles.

And

In the Standard Model of particle physics, the Higgs mechanism is essential to explain the generation mechanism of the property "mass" for gauge bosons. Without the Higgs mechanism, all bosons (one of the two classes of particles, the other being fermions) would be considered massless, but measurements show that the W+, W−, and Z0 bosons actually have relatively large masses of around 80 GeV/c2. The Higgs field resolves this conundrum. The simplest description of the mechanism adds to the Standard Model a quantum field (the Higgs field), which permeates all of space.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgs_mechanism

Do you think that something similar happens with consciousness, with matter passing through a field to rise?

Babysteps, besides we are also talking about experiences and feelings, apart from consciousness. An objective map of all feelings to physical processes would be nice to have.

I just wanted to point out what he sees as

an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness

: the paucity of objective data. But by monitoring the general population, this problem is solved. Why not invest time and effort in doing that, instead of theorizing? Well maybe Chalmers has a theoretical inclination, but why should the rest of us?

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness ...

Thanks.

I sort of skimmed through Chalmers' essay. At some point he says:

There is an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness, and that is the paucity of objective data. Conscious experience is not directly observable in an experimental context, so we cannot generate data about the relationship between physical processes and experience at will. — Chalmers

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences? Can't it be done in a controlled environment, like a lab, or in everyday life, via the use of wearables - wrist watches, holter equivalents, helmets etc? Subjects must be sincere to report their feelings of course.

Do you think that we can safely rule out reductionism, as far as consciousness is concerned?

Wow, that was quite a ramble! :smile: What on earth was I thinking, where was my consciousness at? Lots of it is was not even readable. Also co-pilot didn't do well in translating.

Anyway! Maybe it goes to show the effects of being out of tune.

6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.
6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would
doubt where a question cannot be asked.
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question
only where there is an answer, and this only where something
can be said.
6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science,
i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then
always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other;he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy;but it would be the only strictly correct method.

This is like the Gordian Knot, that Alexander the Great thought untiable, and so he just cut through it with his sword, problem solved. Same is with philosophical problems. Just as some may not see Alexander as truely untying the knot, just the same many may feel that the problem was not really solved.

Hegel certainly thought very highly of himself. But how could he not? I mean, his discussion of world-historical figures, combined with the confidence in the validity of his system - as representing the culmination of philosophical thought and a comprehensive understanding of reality - necessarily leads to him being the greatest of great. And so Hegel crowned himself king, he must have been very proud, absolutely. This pompousness, like you say, certainly puts some people off, to the point of disregarding him completely. But not you, apparently. What is it that you saw in Hegel, despite of his arrogance and lack of shame, that prompted you to invoke this thinker? And to answer your question with yet another question, don't you think we are flogging a dead horse?

Mythical creatures like dragons also constitute a reality, a logical reality, and not a physical one And usually, dragons are admired, as in the song from the movie "Flight of Dragons" performed by the renowned artist Don McLean, for being free and unencumbered, undisturbed to fly in the skies and go wherever they want. The form presented here is similar to the form sought by the logician when he says that he wants to explore all possibilities of thought within the realm of logic, dissolving any illusions or pseudo-problems, restoring certainty and order where confusion and chaos reign. Thus, the dragon, as the pilot of imagination, carries this symbolism.



Or for a more instrumental version



I feel that the logician wants to put herself in the eye of the dragon. But what is the dragon, really?

And finally,

From all of the above, it seems that in the realm of logic, there is an unrestricted freedom of movement, or at least much greater than in any other space. This freedom is constrained and restrained, like (in) a funnel, the opposite of the Big Bang, as we move "down" to the other two spaces, while the mouth and end of the funnel can be considered as physical reality. Because many of the things that logic encompasses, ie whatever we can think of, do not exist in the natural world, just as many of the things described by geometry about the nature of space do not. However, logic, much like geometry, can examine everything, all possible states of affairs, without commitments and limitations, as long as it is bound only by itself, which doesn't tell us much, or rather, absolutely nothing.

And so, if anything conceivable is logical, anything we can think of, then the illogical has no place in our world; since we cannot think of anything illogical, but if we can conceive it, it automatically becomes logical. With such a broad definition of logic, no person is illogical, ever. But then, what about all those people that are confined, or not, to institutions, that seem to have lost their minds? Are they illogical? By our previous analysis, certainly not.

If we were to make an assumption in accordance with the above, we would say that their problem is not the lack or absence of logical thinking, but rather an abundance, or rather an overabundance of it: they are overly logical. Similar problems are faced by individuals with autism. Just as an autistic person absorbs a huge volume of information from the natural environment without being able to process it adequately to be what we call functional, similarly, someone labeled as "crazy" absorbs a massive amount of information from the realm of logic but cannot correlate that information received there to things and situations seen and felt in the realm of nature. Thus, they are not functional either, but rather constantly confused. Essentially, the confusion arises from the movement of thought as it moves between logical-geometric-physical space. But not only confusion, but all other feelings and emotions, such as fear and security, joy and sorrow, hate and love, interest and indifference, etc., can be explained in the same way. For example, when faced with the unlimited choices and possibilities as mentioned in the case of someone considered "crazy," they may feel fear at the prospect of this boundless freedom, a fear at some existential level, from which other things arise, such as a kind of mania. Therefore, we could say that they are not ultimately becoming illogical, but rather they are thoroughly logical, although I do not know how much this would help them. Laughter might also arise from the mixture of different logical forms among themselves or with natural forms, the result of which appears funny as they blend together. Art and music effectively does the same for us sane people, however under (some) control, because they both have the ability to move our thoughts to anything that can be conceived, along old or new paths, offering e-motions, thereby expanding our world.

Now, the mechanism or mechanisms behind all this, do not fall under, and are neither the scope of the science of logic, to find and expose them, but rather of other sciences. For instance, psychology will talk about how what is called the human psyche is influenced when thought moves from one object to another, what happens within us, what is the psychological relationship between what we say, what we think, and what we mean, why and how various psychological compulsions are created, etc. Or a biologist/pharmacist will search to find the materialistic mechanism/organ in the human body that makes people think, sometimes more or less logically, constructing substances and drugs to address problems. Such inquiries do not concern the logician, at least not in its pure form. For this reason, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, did not delve into psychology, biology, or the theory of evolution because he wanted to insist and remain in a purely logical analysis of phenomena, considering it rather the most important, and that anything else follows this or can be reduced to it, as if it doesn't make much sense to explore secondary issues. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, however, he leads the reader to the same or different ideas through a psychological experiment conducted there. The therapeutic character, both of his early and later work, has been highlighted many times, by many thinkers, because, as they say, many of the problems that humans have, are ultimately dissolved, with his method, into being pseudo-problems. Through philosophy and the critique of language, as he uses them, functioning as therapy, a kind of speech therapy.

Therefore, as long as the various spaces are distinguished and hierarchically arranged as defined above, we can say that geometric space is constrained by its dimensions, physical space constrained by the aforementioned geometrical space, as well as of all the properties of physical reality, while logical space is the only unlimited one that encompasses all those possibilities expressed in the other two spaces plus anything imaginable. Mathematicians explore geometry by creating spaces with any number of dimensions and different curvatures, while physicists have their theories, attempting to explain the interaction between bodies with various field theories. When it comes to logical space, one way to study it, is when it is examined independently of physical sciences and mathematics. This is done, for example, by science fiction authors, comic creators, poets, and artists. According to our analysis, what we call fictional or imaginative must directly draw its examples from logical space. Like it happens in dreams, where natural and geometric laws are lifted.

But also, the consciousness of someone with, say, a vivid imagination, who ponders all imaginable possibilities, it is in logical space where it floats. Similarly, individuals on the autism spectrum, for whom it is said that they have an inability to focus on something specific, their minds may well constanlty contemplate logical space, unable to do anything else, overwhelmed by information.

I am sorry Banno, I am on a mission :grin: to finish this, won't take long.

3.04 An a priori true thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its truth.
3.05 We could only know a priori that a thought is true if its truth was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison).

Thought, as the logical image of events defined earlier, contains only the possibility for that thought to be true. According to Wittgenstein's system, a fact can be either right or wrong, true or false; there is no middle ground, the principle of bivalence holds. Thus, thought, by itself, cannot determine the truth of its events. Within logical space, everything appears - and is - logical; everything exists as possibilities in logical space. What thought knows is that something will either be correct or incorrect, true or false. If thought wants to see which of these possibilities holds true, it needs to leave logical space and go to some other space, the space of geometry or of natural science. There, it will discover what happens in relation to the new space it finds itself in. The object of comparison is already in these new spaces. In the case of geometry, it could be a coordinate system or coordinates, while in the case of physics, it could be the various physical laws presupposing the physical system, such as the law of energy conservation.

In summary, the hierarchy of these spaces, as presented by Wittgenstein, is as follows:

a. Logical space, logical image, logic, science of logic
b. Geometric space, geometric image/shape, geometry, mathematics/geometry
c. Physical space, physical image, physics, physical sciences

The lower spaces contain the forms of the higher ones: geometric space includes logical forms/possibilities, while physical space includes both geometric and logical forms. Altogether, they exist under the dominant and primary sphere of logic, the all-encompassing logic.

Below, we see inspector Gadget doing his thing, perfectly logical, albeit somewhat paradoxical, in his attempt to apprehend his counterpart, Dr. Claw, and his organization, MAD.