The slightest hint of non-adherence is enough to invite hostility, because the cheerleaders realise how flimsy their views really are, and that they do not weather criticism very well. — Tzeentch

I may have been inclined to disagree with this earlier, when it seemed there were two equally viable opinions and my main beef was that one of them was being branded pro-Putin without any justification. Now, however, as seems to be the way with these internet fads, it's starting to come unravelled and I think you're right. there's a desperate clinging to the narrative they felt they had some authority repeating (Washington-Post-and-New-York-Times-bestowed authority no less), but now even the likes of the those known warmongers are openly running articles about the risks of escalation, the need for diplomacy and the low chances of Ukraine winning back much more land.

The faddists become ever more desperate and start citing each other's tweets, having run out of any expert opinion at all, those all having jumped the sinking ship, having a little more foresight.

In a year's time they'll be back to Ukraine stories about growing Nazism, corruption and black market arms dealing, US stories about rampant militarism and lobbying powers, and they'll pretend they never thought otherwise, but they leave behind trails of people still vomiting up the previous stock narrative who aren't as fleet of opinion as the modern media.

to Isaac, it doesn't matter at all to Ukraine and the Ukrainians if they are in control of their own country or under Putin's de-nazification program. All the killings, the forced evictions, the fake referendums and the Russification measures in the occupied territories are totally meaningless for Isaac. Because all that doesn't matter to Isaac. — ssu

Nothing in the quote you cited either latterly or formerly says anything about what may or may not matter to Ukrainians. I can't think why you'd imagine I even have an opinion on what matters to Ukrainians. I really don't give a fuck what matters to Ukrainians, why would I? I don't judge right and wrong by vote.

What I'm writing about is what I think is right based on my humanitarian principles. Which is all any of us can do in an ethical discussion. I don't think the Ukrainian government should be making decisions that cause more suffering, I couldn't care less if they have 'agency' or not.

Perhaps it doesn't matter because it's not done by the Americans (and then it would matter a lot to Isaac). — ssu

The reason none of those matter is written in the fucking quote...

Option 2 has fewer dead. — Isaac

...and no, the Ukrainian government doesn't get the right to commit more of it's people to death and misery just because it has 'agency'.

the US will choose the interpretation that fits their existing policy choice. — boethius

Yes, this will be a litmus test for when the US plans to hang Ukraine out to dry like they did with Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan once they've milked the situation for all they think they can get out of it.

What's different this time is that I don't think anyone planned for the huge multiplier effect of social media. Governments and corporations only have to seed social media with the germ of idea now and it will, virtually free of charge, multiply and foment into two warring camps, one of which can then be declared 'misinformation', and voila - you have ready-made virtually fanatical support for whatever you wanted to do.

That's a weapon they've not had before.

Well Russia are saying it isn't them and Ukraine are saying it's a Russian conspiracy to even say it was Ukraine. So we're left with no good options.

If it was Russia (or people believe it was), then they've now attacked NATO, it's basically World War Three.

If it was Ukraine (but Ukraine deny it - rather than say "sorry, accident" - and continue to blame Russia), then Ukraine have deliberately fired into a NATO country to try and drag them into their war with Russia. Ukraine loses it's Golden Boy status and the arms supply, which was getting less and less secure in the long term dries up. Ukrainians have to fight an even longer, more drawn out war, or surrender.

If it was a third party, then terrorists have already got hold of some of the shitload of untraceable weapons now on the black market in Ukraine and are using them to provoke international conflict.

Either way...

It's not like shooting them down is going to kill anyone — jorndoe

Shooting them down literally did kill someone (two someone's). That's the entire point.

It is relevant to any deal because the annexations make the terms of any compromise to be about how much territory Russia is willing to cede to Ukraine to stop the war. — Paine

But why would Russia need to negotiate to stop the war? It doesn't make any sense. If Russia could have staked a claim to those territories merely by negotiation, then it would have done so. IT has no leverage at all other than war, that's why it went to war. A negotiation is an exchange of promises, with each party feeling that their promises are worth the assurances they get in return.

So in your scenario, Ukraine are 'winning', Russia want to stop the war because they're 'losing'. So Russia's promise would be what? "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas"? That's not going to work, because in your scenario, Russia were going to stop shelling Ukraine soon anyway. What are Russia going to offer in this scenario which might make Ukraine inclined to give up Donbas?

Alternatively, Russia are 'winning', they can now claim "We'll stop shelling you if you let us keep Donbas" and Ukraine might well accept that offer (maybe with a counter offer like "OK, but only if you pay for repair in Kiev"). But to make this offer, Russia don't need to say anything at all about Ukraine's legitimacy as a nation. It's irrelevant. The deal is about which government makes laws where and what each government is going to tell their armies to do.

The Ukrainian state was not accepted as a legitimate governance of any of the territory up to the western borders. Having gone this far resisting the Russians, it would be ridiculous for the Ukrainians to let this condition continue. — Paine

It's ridiculous to save thousands of lives?

That is why any possible agreement has to start with recognizing a Ukraine that is something more than a tool of foreign powers. A place where Russia does not have the right to remodel the government to its liking. — Paine

That doesn't follow at all. An agreement merely has to declare a promise not to attack said region. It doesn't have to say anything about its legitimate right to be there.

I think it's useful for us and people following this thread to note that international relations are not legal relations, which has already been discussed by is worth repeating.

There is no guarantees in any international agreement as there is no world court and world police system that enforces agreements. — boethius

Yes, absolutely. All the more pertinent when set against this talk of 'requirements' which must apparently be in place for a negotiation to be possible. As far as I can see there are no requirements at all. As you say, a party might enter a negotiation for all sorts of reasons and a second party might agree to those terms (or merely appear to agree) for a completely different set of reasons.

There's literally nothing stopping two countries coming to any kind of agreement they each consider to be in their immediate best interest. The idea that some kind of ideological hurdle regarding the definition of statehood prevents a party from making an agreement is frankly silly.

Not really, no. — Olivier5

Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova said that there has never been any forcible transfer of refugees to Russia, noting that those accusations "are all lies."

At least make the bare minimum effort to ground yourself in some kind of reality.

Russia has annexed the oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea. The Kremlin today: "This is Russian territory." — Paine

But that would only be relevant if the deal were to stop Ukraine invading the 'new' Russia ie the deal involved the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia. Is that something you see being part of the deal? If so, then how might such a deal be struck whilst Russia also recognises Ukraine's territorial integrity?

Agreeing to a cease fire is far from negotiating an end to hostilities. It is like agreeing to exchange sets of prisoners or to not bomb grain ships. Brokers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia permit minimum contact between the enemies in such cases. That is hardly the stuff of mutual security guarantees. — Paine

OK so change my offer to...

"We don't recognise your right to rule over Donbas, but we will never attack this location ever again if you stop shelling us" — Isaac

You can't say that's not a peace deal. What prevents Russia from making such an offer?

Even ethical discussions have to be logical. Ethically, Russia should withdraw its troops and try and negotiate a peace agreement. with Ukraine. Logically, it cannot do so without first recognizing the entity called Ukraine. — Olivier5

Go on. What is the logical barrier?

the issue of illegally displaced people and adopted children would have to be addressed in any such peace agreement — Olivier5

It would have to first be established that it actually took place. Moscow are denying it. Logically, how can they make a peace deal involving the return of children they don't agree are even in Russia to be returned?

It was not a peace agreement. — Olivier5

It was also not a twenty-first century agreement. Tell me how that's a difference which makes a difference.

I'll ask you the same question @Olivier5 keeps dodging. With whom was it agreed that Yugoslavia should no longer exist? Who was the 'other party' in that agreement?

The observation was to underscore a minimum concession from Russia that could possibly interest the Ukrainians from stopping their fight. — Paine

I think it's Ukraine that want Russia to stop their flight. Ukraine are no threat to Russia right now, they're not invading Russia.

From this perspective, the organization calling itself the government of Ukraine is not a nation protecting its interests but an instrument of foreign powers. The only parties to negotiate with are the foreign powers. Your idea that one could make a deal with a state but not recognize the people speaking for it is not possible in practice. I am not sure it is even an idea.

In any case, since the invasion of Ukraine was based upon this rationale put forward by Putin, how could any deal be made without specifically withdrawing the claim? Otherwise, the only deal possible would be between the "West" and Russia to partition the lands in dispute. — Paine

Make an argument then. What exactly is preventing Russia making the following deal with Ukraine...

"We don't recognise your right to rule over Donbas, but we will withdraw our forces from there if you stop shelling us"

What physically stops that deal from being struck?

The UN cannot enforce anything. Therefore, there's no enforcing piwer here. Therefore, your conceptual framework doesn't work. There's no supplicant here either. In an international treaty, there are parties, the signatories, and they strike a deal, an agreement. And since you cannot agree anything with someone who doesn't exist, the first step in drafting such an agreement is usually some form of mutual recognition, which often features in article 1 of the agreement, for this reason of logical anteriority. — Olivier5

Ah, the usual switch.

Loose ground on arguments about what is the case, switch to moralising "virtue signalling is just ethics".

Loose ground on moral arguments switch to what is the case " that's not how things are done".

It's transparent and tiresome.

This comment began this section...

How much should Putin + team be allowed to get away with scot-free? — jorndoe

"Should..." An ethical argument about what ought to be the case.

If you now want to discuss what actually is the case, make a new point, don't hijack this one.

would tolerate — jorndoe

let them get away with it? — jorndoe

...you're still not specifying what 'not tolerating' consists of. What action indicates 'not tolerating'?

I'm guessing most would be behind the Ukrainians here. And that would set out a limit, thereby answering my comment. Different from one you'd put forth? — jorndoe

I'm afraid I just don't understand what you're saying here at all. It seems you're talking as if there were some obvious understanding between us which need not be said out loud, but there isn't. I cannot make any sense out of that paragraph.

Countries are presently a political reality. As mentioned, you may deny that reality, that just isn't very helpful. — jorndoe

No one is denying that countries exist, not even the worst Russians. They're claiming Ukraine didn't ought to exist. Not that it currently doesn't. Indeed, the fact that it currently does exist seems to be their main beef.

I'm also not claiming that countries don't exist. I'm claiming they don't have a right to exist. They may exist, cease to exist, or change the nature of their existence, entirely according to whatever is best, there's no intrinsic right.

Ok so your "supplicantS", plural, would be Russia and Ukraine. Who would your "enforcing power" be? — Olivier5

Not quite. One article might contain a promise from NATO. Who the supplicant is depends on the commitment the article is about.

As to enforcing powers, the UN pass for the closest thing we have to a global legal system. An agreement endorsed by the UN has a greater staying power than a bilateral one.

What "inforcing power" do you have in mind, and what "supplicant"? The latter term is odd in the context of a negotiation between equals. — Olivier5

The supplicant changes depending on the term. Article 1 might make Russia the supplicant (we promise we'll remove our troops behind this line), in article 2, Ukraine might be the supplicant (we promise we'll not launch any attacks over that line).

All that matters is that each party has to power to carry out that which they promise, and (usually) that there's some enforcing power to mitigate any lack of trust.

Neither need agree that the other ought to have those powers, only that they do.

But the further point I was making is that article 2's supplicant (in my example) need not even be Ukraine. Any party with power to commit acts Russia may prefer not committed would do. NATO, the UN, the US...France...

You realise that the concept of 'agreement' implies two (2) entities agreeing on something, right? — Olivier5

Yes. The supplicant and the enforcing power. Neither need be a state.

Again, United Nations Security Council Resolution 777 agreed that Yugoslavia no longer existed. With whom did they agree?

You can deny them all you like (maybe even come up with a better world without them of some sort), yet that's our present world. — jorndoe

If peace negotiations have to agree to the legitimacy of the current political map in order to take place, then how are border changes ever legitimised?

Russia aren't denying Ukraine exists in the sense that they'd say "what country, I can't see any country". They're saying that it didn't ought to have the borders it currently does (some are saying that it didn't ought to exist at all - just like Yugoslavia). No one is saying that currently there's no such thing as the Ukrainian government and therefore nobody to negotiate with. They're saying that the current powers of that government ought to change.

am I then to understand that the situation with the children, by your take, is irrelevant, does not figure in any limitation where

The limits are between what to tolerate and not to tolerate, what they may get away with and not get away with — jorndoe

I can't answer that question because you've not answered my request for clarity on it. 'Tolerate' how?

Are you asking me if I tolerate child kidnapping morally? If so, what an absurd question, I simply refuse to dignify it with an answer.

Are you asking me if we ought to do something about the accusations of child kidnapping? - If so, I've already given that answer - yes investigate it as UNICEF are already doing.

Are you asking me if (assuming the accusations are true) we ought do something to Russia (militarily) we're not currently already doing? - If so then I've already given you that answer too. No. We're currently doing all that it's possible to do (and much more) without risking making the humanitarian situation worse.

I can't find an interpretation of your question I haven't already answered.

What is illogical, for you about the statement "I believe that Russia ought to be in control of all the land up to the Dnieper, but I agree not to shoot or bomb anyone in that area nonetheless". How is that not a peace agreement?

It is a requirement IFF you want to make peace with said entity. Logically speaking, you cannot make peace with a non existing entity, can you? — Olivier5

You don't have to 'make peace' with a state. Stop shooting people, stop bombing people. Just don't shoot and bomb. Job done. Peace. No 'states' required.

How do you explain United Nations Security Council Resolution 777? With whom did they agree that the state of Yugoslavia no longer existed?

Stop funding Russia’s nuclear weapons
— Henry Sokolski; The Hill; Nov 13, 2022

:D Like a catch-22 with Rosatom sort of sitting comfortably in the middle. A good time to go green? (OK, with current tech that won't do, I think.) Switch to other import, gradually at least? Where will the produce end up if the imports are canceled? Either way, it seems capitalism and slowness to change have made the decisions for now. — jorndoe

Just interested in how you square this within your narrative. As I see it, Biden's fighting this war because the arms lobby lobbied him to. He's funding Russian nuclear weapons because the nuclear lobby lobbied him to.

If you (presumably) think Biden is fighting this war, not because the arms lobby lobbied him to, but because it's 'right', then why is he also funding Russia's nuclear weapons? Is that 'right' too?

If Biden sometimes does things because they're 'right' (but powerful lobbies just coincidentally happen to benefit), and yet sometimes does things solely because those powerful lobbies benefit (no 'right' involved), then on what grounds do you think he chooses? And most importantly of all, why do you believe that (as opposed to the much simpler explanation that his actions are guided in both cases by powerful lobbying interests)?

If anything, the act of signing a peace treaty usually requires the exact opposite belief. One cannot consider territorial changes as part of a peace deal if one concurrently believes that borders are fixed in perpetuity by the existence of 'states' who occupy those spaces.

In order to question whether the Ukrainian government ought control Crimea, it is necessary not to hold the view that there exists a geographically bounded entity called 'Ukraine', otherwise the question is meaningless. Likewise for 'Russia'.

If one holds the view that there exists a geographically bounded entity called 'Ukraine', then the question of where it's borders ought to be is already answered - wherever the edges of this entity called Ukraine are.

Negotiations over borders only make sense in the context of governments who recognise that the question of who controls what parcels of land is one entirely settled by international agreements such as the one under consideration.

You can't make peace with someone without acknowledging the existence of said someone. So when Russia signs a peace deal with Ukraine, it will have to recognise Ukraine as a fact. — Olivier5

Go on. Explain your argument. A Russian diplomat is prevented from signing a document (and thereby constraining his government to act in accordance with that document) by what means? What exactly stays his hand?

Peace means an end to fighting. Russia could end fighting tomorrow even if the entire country had collective amnesia and forgot Ukraine even existed. Acknowledgement of the existence of spurious entities such as 'states' is not a requirement for peace.

To have peace, the Russian government would have to commit to a series of actions (such as withdrawing troops behind a line clearly marked on a map attached to the treaty).

All they need is GPS.

Seeing the distance between what people in this discussion think is happening, it seems like any possible talks would have to start with some very basic steps toward living in a shared reality. The Russians would have to explicitly acknowledge that Ukraine is an actual state with the right to protect its sovereignty. — Paine

Do you think that this should have happened in Chechnya? Do you think the Chechen separatists ought to have recognised that Russia was an actual state with a right to protect it's sovereignty? What about East Timor? Should they have acknowledged that Indonesia was an actual state with the right to defend its sovereignty? Kosovo? South Sudan? Ought these places too have respected the right of their previous states to protect their sovereignty?

It's not idle ad hoc speculation here, in this thread. — jorndoe

So you're asking a hypothetical? The answer would be the same.

What you call context is indeed downplay/diversion. — jorndoe

It's not made so simply by you saying it. You have to argue the case. In what way does comparing Ukraine's situation to the situation in other countries 'downplay' it? I've not lied or hidden any truths about either situation. I've not made that comparison for no reason (I stated the reason clearly), so I'm lost as to why it might be considered 'downplaying', other than it not toeing the current party line.

In order to respond to my comment (limit'ry), you don't have to wait for evidence; presumably your response wouldn't change. — jorndoe

I'm not saying I'd wait for evidence before responding to your question. I'm saying "wait for evidence" is the response to your question. That's what I think we ought to do (in this case). Investigations are underway, they ought to be allowed to complete their work.

If it turns out that thousands of children have been forcibly adopted, then UN diplomats ought to support local authorities in securing their return, just as they ought do in all those other countries I mentioned which are suffering from a similar problem.

Maybe a peace criterion could be a guarantee to return all such children otherwise unharmed no later than a month after a cease-fire? (Just tossing something out there.) — jorndoe

Under what threat? You (nor anyone else on this thread) have given absolutely no reasons why Russia would accept any terms at all, let alone the undoing of this 'repatriation' they've apparently just done. For whatever reason, Russia wants these children in Russia (assuming they're doing what they've been accused of) and your solution is to say "please don't"?

I take it then that you downplay that Ukrainian situation, "collateral damage accepted", nothing further to see here? Is that in/correct? — jorndoe

It's not downplaying it to place it in context. The question of what we do in Ukraine can't be answered without answering the question of what we do that instead of. We only have one army, one front page, one pot of charitable giving, one pot of 'sanction tolerance', etc. So, yes this thread's about Ukraine, but the question is always "Is the situation in Ukraine, more important than the situations elsewhere that would otherwise be calls on our attention/resources?" That's still a question about the Ukrainian situation, still very much on topic.

As to your specific question about child kidnapping, as I've said, there's no confirmed collateral damage to accept at this stage. There is the 'credible' possibility of collateral damage, as yet unconfirmed. That matters because the consequences of what we do about it need to measured against cold hard facts, not media flame wars.

So to answer your comment directly. Yes. A limit I would definitely place on lethal force is that we at least have some evidence beyond word-of-mouth that the atrocity we're punishing actually took place. It's good that UNICEF are investigating, and I agree with the use of limited force to allow them to continue that investigation (should they find themselves blocked), but I think it's madness to go in guns blazing in response to reports from a situation where both sides are engaged in heavy propaganda.

Remember the 'credible' 45 minute WMDs?

I prefer to think of it as rhetoric, but 'ramble mode' if you like. The point is not eradicated by the elimination of any particular methodology. It doesn't answer the question. If not nukes then what? and more importantly, why Russia, why now? Why not Uganda, Nigeria, DRC, Iraq... Because Russia is the bogeyman of the day, should our response be based on the latest social media efforts?

Up to 2,000 children might be involved in the Russian 'kidnapping'.

Across Yemen, 2.2 million children are acutely malnourished, including nearly more than half a million children facing severe acute malnutrition, a life-threatening condition. In addition, around 1.3 million pregnant or nursing mothers are acutely malnourished. — https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/yemen-acute-hunger-unprecedented-levels-funding-dries

2.2 million.

That's a thousand children for every Ukrainian child who (at this stage) might have been kidnapped.

Wars aren't free, front pages have limited space. So our capacity to act is not infinite. Which should be our priority? How many poor starving black kids do you get to one western-looking white baby in media attention these days, anyone know the going rate?

seem to be implying that we're holding back some sanction we have available — Isaac


I'm not in particular. — jorndoe

You folk are reading extras into my comments here. — jorndoe

Then I'm afraid the point you're making remains opaque. Is having your children abducted horrifying? Yes. Did we really need to point that out?

Are the child abductions acceptable collateral damage, and so there's nothing further to be done here? — jorndoe

This is a good example of the limits of our knowledge. there have been no child abductions. UNICEF's director for emergency operations, Manuel Fontaine, said during a press conference that the organization does not have any evidence at present to back up Kiev's accusations. There has possibly been child abductions. The UN said it found the reports credible.

So what are you suggesting we unleash?

Flatten Moscow because it credibly might have abducted children, if and when we actually get any evidence?

Pre-emptive nuclear strike just in case?

So Uganda?

in Northern Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has abducted an estimated 10,000 children since mid-2002. The rate of abductions over the last two years has been the highest of the Northern Ugandan conflict’s 18-year history. — https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/29/abduction-children-africa

Ought we have bombed them too?

Nigeria? DRC?

in Nigeria, the UN estimates that at least 950 students have been abducted from their schools by armed men since December. Over the past six weeks alone, nearly 500 children were abducted in four separate incidents across the central and northwest parts of the country. Many of these children have not yet been returned. It is hard to fathom the pain and fear that their families and loved ones are suffering in their absence.

“In the DRC, in the first quarter of 2021 alone, more than 3,400 violations against children such as recruitment to armed groups, abduction and killing were verified, representing 64 per cent of the total number of violations verified for the entire year of 2020. — https://www.unicef.org.uk/press-releases/concerns-deepen-over-attacks-against-children-and-child-abductions-in-parts-of-west-and-central-africa/

NATO boots on the ground there too?

We're sure going to have our work cut out.

In Iraq

the abduction of children has become a serious and common social problem in Iraq. This summer, a UN report confirmed that 1,496 Iraqi children have been abducted during the past 36 months and few have been seen again. — https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/09/child-kidnapping-abduction-iraq.html

Hey, maybe we ought to invade!

For example, what to do about the destruction, if you don't think they should get away with it? — jorndoe

I think I've made my preferred solution quite clear - end the war, cede territory if need be, then support those Russians (and newly 'Russian' Ukrainians) who are fighting for regime change in Russia. And while we're at it, do the same in America so we're less likely to get into this mess again. Reduce nuclear weapon stocks to near zero. Reduce our reliance on oil (truly at the heart of all this). Oh, and end global capitalism.

As @boethius points out, you seem to be implying that we're holding back some sanction we have available to use for if Putin does something really bad. He's already done something really bad. He's invaded another country and taken little to no care over the civilian casualties caused in doing so. Did you think we were in some way OK with that? There's literally nothing we can do that wouldn't make matters worse. We're already making matters worse just by profiteering, but that has tolerable consequences (tolerable to them, that is).

What is this punishment you think we've been holding in reserve for child abduction that we we decided would have been 'too much' in response to Bucha?

We allowed a kleptocrat to inherit a stockpile of world-ending scale weapons and did nothing about it. Not only did we do nothing about it, but we encouraged him to make more, and then poked him with a big stick to see if he'd bite. The Ukrainians are now lying in the bed we made.

Surely there are limits somewhere as to what can be tolerated, though I'm guessing it differs depending on who you ask including what the responses should be. — jorndoe

Exactly. "Or what?" Is the only relevant question. Putin ought no get away with so much as throwing litter if the punishment is easily administered and without undesirable ramifications.

The whole point of this debate is the cost and method of preventing the humanitarian harms Putin's actions cause. It's no good preventing them, for example, if the humanitarian cost of prevention is higher than that which is being prevented.

It's a common propaganda trope to present only the negative which the campaign de jour is against, never the cost of the campaign itself.

"What ought we let Putin get away with?" is a pointless question without it's counterpart - the consequences.

Personally I'm not up for sitting in a nuclear wasteland with nothing but my schadenfreude at Putin's defeat. Somehow I think that as the next Putin-a-like takes up the reins of tyranny left behind, the value of that smugness might fade.

As ↪Olivier5
pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. — ssu

The opposition paries are not banned.

... — SophistiCat — Olivier5

Love the way you guys are so buried in your own reality you've had to start quoting each other.

These are false alternatives. One could simply argue that his position is more plausible than yours. That’s what I’m doing. — neomac

No. One couldn't. Not unless one is a qualified economist. Neither you nor I are in a position to judge the relative plausibility of economic theories.

Same goes for military analysis, geopolitics... All the other issues you seem to want to try this on. You are not qualified to judge them on their technical merits, no matter how much things seem clear to you.

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of my of assessment of the Cowen article? — neomac

Because we are qualified to judge those matters. There's no body of knowledge about things like this, every human is just as qualified as every other. Rationality, ethics, art, values, ideology... We can, and do, discuss the relative merits of these matters because we're all equally qualified to do so.

If you disagree with Cowan's ideology we have a matter for discussion (though I too disagree with his ideology, so it might be quite a short one). If you disagree with his conclusion I couldn't care less, because you're not qualified to judge the validity of his conclusion.

As ↪Olivier5
pointed out, there isn't actually credible nuclear ransom. — ssu

What kind of answer is that? I've supplied a stream of qualified experts talking about the very real risk of escalation to nuclear weapons and your counter is to cite some nobody from an internet forum? Is that the best you can do?

Probably you missed a couple of things about the expert you cite, Tyler Cowen — neomac

Why would I care in the slightest about your assessment of the Cowen article? If I want an economist's critique, I'll ask an economist, not some nobody on an internet chat forum. You're not qualified to say to what extent Cowen's conclusions are reasonable.

I made a point about post war reconstruction being always an opportunity for profiteering, you said that wasn't true because of the Marshal plan. To maintain that critique you have to show that it is not possible that it's true - ie that no experts think that. Not that some experts don't think that. All that latter shows is that there's disagreement. I've stated a position and supported it with relevant expert opinion. You're also entitled to your opposing position supported by expert opinion.

If you want to start claiming my position is actually wrong, or untenable, then we have an asymmetric argument. To support my position I only need to show it's plausible. To support yours you need to show mine is actually impossible. A much higher threshold of evidence.

Now we could argue ideologically about which of the two opposing plausible positions we ought to support. But we cannot argue technically about which position is most plausible. We're not economists (at that level). If a fully qualified, peer-reviewed economist thinks the Marshall plan did not significantly contribute to the successful reconstruction of postwar Europe, then you are not in a position to gainsay that, no matter what your little Google-Scholar trawl dragged up.

I personally think the fear of nuclear war is based on the idea that Russia is losing in Ukraine. Given the fact that Russia still seems to hold the areas that are strategically most relevant to it, I am skeptical about how desperate they are. — Tzeentch

Yes, I agree. I don't think it's a coincidence that the estimates of nuclear escalation were similar to the estimates of Ukraine taking Donbas. I think they might be linked.

I would expect several rounds of escalations to have to happen, which would likely have to include NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, before initiating a nuclear attack even becomes a serious possibility for Russia. — Tzeentch

Maybe, but as Samuel Charap warned "Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt." A lot of the fear is about misinterpretation of events not intended to provoke (but close enough).

What is likely happening is that Russia is using nuclear threats to manipulate the foreign public - fear mongering, to erode domestic support in NATO countries. — Tzeentch

Yes, I think that's true, but given the risk/benefit environment, it would be nothing short of criminal recklessness to call that bluff.

Yeah, right. So the top performing superforecasters from the US Government IARPA Good Judgment Project were asked "Will a nuclear weapon be detonated in Europe as an act of hostility before 30 April 2023? "

The results are...

The aggregate forecast was 9%. That’s an extraordinarily high risk for a (just-over)-six-month period – if that level of danger was constant, there would be less than 20% chance of making it through any given decade without a nuclear explosion. The likelihood that the 75 years since the Second World War would have passed without any atomic bombs going off would be minuscule.

But that group’s forecast hides a reasonable amount of variation. Some felt it was as low as 5%; others as high as 20%. — https://www.swiftcentre.org/will-russia-use-a-nuclear-weapon/

...but you know, they did forget to consult a couple of messianic dicks off the internet, so perhaps just "some knee-jirking western pundits" after all, eh? I'd get down there sharpish to deliver your Delphic armchair 'reckon', they'll be keen to lap up such informed wisdom.

Incidentally, they were also asked "Will Ukraine retake all Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine?"...

Ukrainian forces taking any part of Crimea, even for 24 hours, seemed unlikely to the forecasters. “Crimea was not pro-Ukrainian and has a major Russian submarine base on it”, wrote one forecaster. “It is heavily defended and has only two main land access routes. A loss to Crimea would likely be the end of the war for Putin and the area where he is most likely to make a final stand”.

Another thought it was unlikely Ukraine would even try: “I don't think this is likely to happen at all; I don't think the Ukrainians are likely to try to reclaim Crimea offensively, since it doesn't seem militarily or politically tractable”. The group’s combined forecast was 11%.

Once again, though, even if it were to happen, the forecasters did not feel it would change the nuclear risk in a predictable way. “If Putin is backed into a corner as a result of this, a hostile nuclear detonation would be a risk”, wrote one. “On the other hand, if Russia hasn't already detonated a nuclear device by that point, why would they do so after losing territory in Crimea?” The group assigned a 3% chance of a nuclear weapon attack for the month following Ukraine’s capture of Crimea.

Driving Russian forces out of Ukraine altogether was considered even less likely, at 4%

It's just your peace at all cost immediately sends the wrong information: if you are losing, your way out is to use nuclear blackmail. — ssu

So? A nuclear armed state can hold the world to ransom. So much the worse for nuclear arms proliferation. Perhaps America should have thought of that before it pursued such a risky strategy as the massive anti-nuclear proliferation campaigns have been warning them about for decades.

Now what? What would you have us do? Pretend that Putin can't hold us to ransom just because we don't like that fact? Risk 90 million dead in the first few hours because Putin's a bad man and your limited imagination can't think of any other way of dealing with that than fighting him over territory?

What's your plan to deal with the very real risk of escalation the experts are warning will arise from us not giving Putin a face-saving off-ramp?

Are you seriously suggesting that Putin not getting the slapped wrist he deserves is a comparable risk to nuclear holocaust?

Going just to ad hominems — ssu

You've repeatedly insulted my intelligence ("you don't know much if anything", "you don't understand"...), and my morality ("support Putin", "putinistas" - a known war criminal), and you have the gall to start bleating about ad homs...

And no, it's not just ad hominems. It's expert, after expert, after expert, all denying your imbecilic claim that we don't need to worry about nuclear escalation.

Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s deputy secretary general from 2012 to 2016, said that Western leaders had concluded that Russian plans to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis were sincere, raising the risk from any accident or misstep that the Kremlin mistook for war.

With Russian forces struggling in a Ukraine conflict that Moscow’s leaders have portrayed as existential, Mr. Vershbow added, “That risk has definitely grown in the last two and a half weeks.” — Reported in the Telegraph

The escalation dynamics of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia could easily spiral into a nuclear exchange — Dmitry Gorenburg, an analyst of Russian military policy

A lot of the pieces of their nightmare are already coming together,... Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania...they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt. — Samuel Charap, Russian foreign policy analyst at the RAND Corporation

Scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine make it clear that Putin would probably use a nuclear weapon if he concludes that his regime is threatened.

In most games, Russia still responds with a second nuclear attack, but in the games that go “well,” the United States and Russia manage to de-escalate after that, although only in circumstances where both sides have clear political off-ramps and lines of communication between Moscow and Washington have remained open. In all the other games, the world is basically destroyed. — Christopher S. Chivvis Senior Fellow and Director American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment

the original idea I was addressing was about post-war reconstruction as "corporate opportunity to screw everyone". To question it, it's enough to prove that the post-war reconstruction supported by the Marshall plan was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded. — neomac

That's right. Yet what you've provided is evidence that some people think "it was not just a corporate opportunity to "screw everyone", because to some extent and in some cases it succeeded". I already knew that.