At least, a neural network with some task would seem to have a directionality of the sort seen in the aboutness of an intentional act. — Banno

I agree, but if one accepts (for the sake of argument) Feser's distinction of thought from neural networks, then thought is left seeming like the sort of thing which determines properties. For it to then have properties of its own seems unwarranted.

Of course, if one accepts that 'thoughts' and 'neural networks' are the same thing from different perspectives, the problem disappears.

I do agree with Wayfarer that physics is not capable of explaining everything. — Banno

Me too, but possibly not for the same reasons.

if you say that thoughts don't have any inherent meaning then neither does your asking of this question. — Wayfarer

Yes. I've already agreed that my asking of that question doesn't have any inherent meaning. I can, however, have a very high degree of confidence that the meaning you give it will be similar enough to the meaning I give it to make our exchange worthwhile. I can make this guess because you and I both grew up in a culture similar enough to have trained us both to give such a question roughly the same meaning.

Talk of "meaning" is not going to get very far. There's to much baggage, too much variation in the meaning of "meaning"...

The same holds for "thoughts"; so put them together in

our thoughts do have inherent meaning
— Edward Feser
↪Wayfarer — Isaac

And the way forward will be far from clear. — Banno

Indeed. In my opinion, a classic example of expressions whose meaning is not found in an analysis of the words. "Thoughts are inherently meaningful" here seems to mean absolutely nothing about either 'thoughts' or 'meaning' (since neither are defined), but acts as a general badge, a token, that the speaker is of a certain mind about the issue. I think much of the actual expressions used hereabouts just stand in for a general declaration of distaste for scientistic reductionism.

There may be an interesting digression here following Wittgenstein. Rather than looking to the meaning, we might look to the use. What do we get if we paraphrase the Feser quote in terms of use? — Banno

Nice. It does indeed show the cracks.

There is also in the quote an equation of meaning and intentionality, something that ought not go unremarked. But that is a whole new barrel of herrings, red or otherwise. — Banno

Yes. I find it such an odd phrasing of Feser's that he would carry out this general equivalence. That a thought might 'have' a meaning or intentionality in the same way an apple has the property of being spherical. It seems such a messy way of analysing the distinctions.

Something can be. — creativesoul

How? What's the mechanism you propose?

Which premise do you dispute? — Bartricks

That anyone "deserves" anything. — 180 Proof

Yep. As with all antinatalist arguments @Bartricks starts with a bizarre premise with which no-one else agrees and then proceeds to show that it yields bizarre conclusions with which no-one else agrees.

if you say that it requires reflection to find meaning in thought, then all you are really saying is that it requires thinking to find meaning in thought. If thinking can find meaning in itself, doesn't that imply that meaning is necessarily inherent in thought? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how that follows at all. If metal-detecting can find metal in a metal-detector, does that imply that metal is inherent in metal-detecting (or detectors)? No we can make plastic metal detectors and some metal-detecting is completely without metal.

What we call 'a thought' might be things like "I'm cold" or "That's a bus". What we call a meaning might be what emotion something causes in you, what value you assign it, or what you can do with it.

Since the same thought "I'm cold" can have different meanings (to you it might be unpleasant, to me it might be desirable), those meanings cannot be inherent to the thought.

Just like an actual apple has a different meaning (values, emotions, utility) to you as it does to me, so the meaning cannot inhere in the apple.

If you want to say that some apples (those unobserved by humans, for example) have no meaning at all and thus are different from thoughts, then you'd have to demonstrate that there existed no thoughts which were unobserved by humans (thoughts which we're not aware of). Since we're not aware of them, by definition, that's going to be a hard task.

Thoughts just are inherently meaningful. Thinking just is meaning-making. — Janus

If thinking is meaning-making, then meaning is the product of thought not the property. In the same way as building is just house-making. The product of building is a house. We wouldn't say that because building just is house-making building is inherently a house.

Do you deny that "I'm cold" (unspoken) is a thought? I'll assume not. When you think "I'm cold", it has a different meaning to you than it does when I think "I'm cold". As such the meaning of "I'm cold" (the thought) cannot be inherent to the thought, can it? It must be something we construct.

How can there be anything to discuss, then? You’re not saying anything, you’re just making marks that show up on a screen. I might interpret them to mean anything whatever — Wayfarer

I really don't see what the maintained agreement over the meaning of words has to do with this but regardless, it was your own quote which said...

neural processes, like marks or shapes or whatever, have no inherent meaning, but that we read meaning into them. — Wayfarer

So the marks and shapes on the screen have no inherent meaning, you started out agreeing with that.

You’re sawing off the branch on which you sit. — Wayfarer

Throwing cliches isn't an argument.

that model is not what you see; it is you seeing. — Banno

Exactly, otherwise we end up having to define the mechanism which is 'seeing' the model.

So @Wayfarer, in the process of perception from the retinal stimuli to say, a specialised object-recognition cell in the anterior hippocampus - where are you suggesting the 'seeing' takes place and where is the 'model' it's seeing?

A system is only as good as it's implementation. It's not the system that's broken. It's the implemenation. — creativesoul

I don't think the former supports the latter. That a system is only as good as its implementation means that a system which is failing might not be broken (only badly implemented) but it does not show that it is not broken (only badly implemented).

I'm not sure if all the problems with democracy are fixable, but I can't think of a better general system of actual governance. A vote is just one of many means by which we can influence society. Getting someone more amenable to our objectives in power is a very, very small part of politics.

My objection here is over when the soap opera around who is in power is allowed to detract from those other, more important aspects of politics.

Your question has 'inherent meaning' doesn't it? — Wayfarer

I'm afraid repeating the assertion with increasing incredulity isn't making it any clearer. What I asked was a question. It has meaning to you, it has meaning to me. It means nothing to anyone who doesn't speak English, or who doesn't know the words. It means something slightly different to you than it does to me. Exactly the same could be said of a tree. It means something to you, something slightly different to me, nothing at all to someone who blind, deaf and unable to reach it.

You're describing how words have meaning, but that's not the issue. I'm questioning what makes them separate from any other object in the world. It's the 'inherent' meaning that your Feser quote requires as a property of thought to separate it from neural activity, but I see nothing inherent about it at all.

neural processes, like marks or shapes or whatever, have no inherent meaning, but that we read meaning into them. — Wayfarer

I agree with that. Where I disagree is with the further claim...

Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning — Edward Feser

I don't see how our thoughts are any different to the "marks or shapes or whatever" in that they lack 'inherent' meaning. We might find meaning in them on reflection, but I don't see any evidence that the meaning is inherent.

our thoughts do have inherent meaning — Edward Feser

How so? I mean, this is not even a comparable analysis. Thoughts aren't entities capable of possessing inherent properties, and even if they were, what kind of analysis produced the conclusion that they had inherent meaning?

If I look at an ink mark, it has an effect on me that could be described as a 'meaning', it triggers other thoughts related to my history of interaction with that type of mark.

If any 'analysis' of thought were possible (and I'm not sure I'm ready to allow that in any case), then I don't see how it's 'meaning' would be recognised in any different way. It would similarly elicit a set of other, related thoughts based on my history of interaction with it.

How are you arriving at the notion that the way in which thoughts possess meaning is inherent?

It seems perfectly possible that I might think of the number 4 and it trigger all sorts of memories, relationships and intentions that are completely unlike any that might arise from your thinking of the number 4. So, just like an ink mark, there seems, on the face of it, nothing at all inherent about the meaning of the thought "4".

If I understood him aright, Isaac uses the notion of homunculi for methodological purposes in working on neural nets. So (doubtless this is a poor example) for the purposes of examining the net of the optic nerve, it may be understood as sending an image to the homunculi further in the brain.

But my understanding is that despite this, for Isaac and other neuroscientists it's neural nets all the way down. The homunculi are only there to simplify the calculation, and are ultimately dispersed. — Banno

That's right. We might borrow the language but not the function (when I say 'we' here, I perhaps ought to clarify that, in this branch research, I'm wearing my cognitive science hat, I worked with neuroscientists, but I did the cognition bit, not the 'cells and chemicals' bit).

One thing that's quite well-accepted now is that we have a hierarchical system in the brain, that data is 'passed' from system to system rather than a continual flow from sense to action. The use of 'model', or 'image' or such is essentially trying to capture the idea that the data leaving, say the V1 region of the occipital cortex is of a different kind to the data leaving a neuron within that region. Mainly it's to do with the degree of feedback mechanisms within and between systems such that it makes sense to call what passes from V1 to V2 an 'output' where it makes less sense to say that of what passes from a cluster within V1 to another cluster within V1. A person with damage to any specific region might have trouble with the sort of processing that region is responsible for, but it's impossible to predict which actual neurons within that region do what because they keep changing.

All this really just to explain the need for some terminology in a model of mental function which accepts hierarchical data processing. You're right to point out it's just a façon de parler.

I am not uniquely able to define what is and is not part of the 'democratic process,' but I am able to.
Why would YOU need me to or want me to, if you already think it's 'a weaselly fudge?' — universeness

The point I was really trying to make was about policies. Even if we include campaign promises (rather than actual enacted policy), we have this fundamental dissonance between the way policies are devised and the way they're received. The policies of any governmental political body are not designed for the betterment of humanity. That's not a political statement, it's just a statement of fact, there's no cybernetic mechanism in place to carry out that guidance. They are designed to secure power. Again, not with any nasty conspiracy theory in mind, as simple statement of the mechanism by which policies are devised - the cybernetics of the system are about the effect the policy will have on securing power, not on human betterment. As in any essentially chaotic system, network pathways emerge that were not designed by which nonetheless influence data flow. The actual nuts and bolts of an electoral system is one such. There end up being pathway opportunities to the objective (getting into power) which emerge from the mechanisms which form the system that were not part of any human-design of that system (the opportunities - not the taking of them - taking them up is distinctly intentional). In democracy, these are features such as filibustering, flood-advertising, psychological manipulation, swing constituencies, balances of power (where there are, for example two houses of government), the mechanisms of voting (block votes, vetoes, session limits, amendments...), and finally whatever civil service enact and police the policy. All these mechanisms take up on opportunities opened up by emergent pathways which those who are aware of them can exploit. None of them have the least bit to do with the democratic notion of simply asking your populace what policies they prefer.

What you're describing as 'the democratic process' is a complex mechanism which has virtually nothing to do with any means by which people can promote the betterment of their communities. I'd just as sooner have nothing to do with it, and anyone who thinks it's going to save them is seriously misguided as to it's functions.

That’s not nothing. That’s not an endorsement of Clinton, of course, but it’s true nevertheless— I think we can all agree? — Xtrix

As @Streetlight has already suggested, these are campaign promises, not policies. I don't know the ins and outs of the specific manifestos (I'm English, though I follow American politics in the English press), but the political situation is much the same as in any two party state, each knows which section of the electorate are they need to sway to get elected and campaign promises are directed at them. Actual policies, however, are influenced by corporate sponsors and can be stalled, repealed or rendered toothless as required.

Not only do the left-ish parties have a whole raft of tools at their disposal to render their campaign promises non-functional once elected, but they also form part of a political neutering of actual left-wing politics which means that when (inevitably) the right-wing parties return to power, the stage is well set for them to make further their immiserating agenda, free of any real opposition.

I sympathise with the pragmatic intent behind "we'd better choose the least worst, lest the most worst gets in", but I think that the people who are genuinely concerned about positive change are too small a group to make a difference voting (possible in some constituencies, but unlikely). As such there's more political power in a loud vociferous rejection of both than there is in a reluctant acceptance of the least worst.

It's unwise to be derogatory towards that which you claim to not understand. — universeness

Ah, the final question was rhetorical.

But on the off chance you're uniquely able to define what is and isn't part of the 'democratic process' then crack on.

As to my bitter and twisted thinking, that's between me and my therapist.

I advocate for defense rather than attack but I also advocate for change through the democratic process. — universeness

A weaselly fudge of an expression - "the democratic process". What is that exactly?

Of course it doesn't really matter because the two parties are the same party with differing heraldry. — Streetlight

Absolutely. What astonishes me is the godlike status these parties are afforded such that any policy they come up with is waived through as being at least reasonable, but every alternative is treated as if it were utter madness. It's just baffling the faith these people seem to have in the status quo. As if it were designed by benevolent philosopher kings.

Given their unrelenting documented history of utter contempt for ordinary people, that an idea is not on the manifesto of either party is one of the most compelling arguments in its favour.

It's utterly astonishing that as soon as less than 100% support for the Democrats is raised, the alternatives are assumed to be some kind of bloody revolution. I mean, I'm as up for a bloody revolution as the next man, but is that really the limit of these people's imagination?

The split between internal representation and external reality that free energy models depend on amounts to a particular sort of idealism. — Joshs

I really can't see the link you're making here, could you flesh it out a little?

Many people aren't deliberate like this, so being this way has a psycho-socially alienating effect, which isn't to be underestimated. — baker

Yes, I can see how it might. Current social norms do love putting people in impossible catch-22s. "If you try, you're faking it, if you don't try, you're a loser"... There's simply no escaping the issues. As my wife i fond of saying - if there was a solution, there wouldn't be a problem.

But choose between such equally in/effective narratives on the grounds of what? Which one pleases one's ego more? — baker

Yeah, possibly. I prefer more aesthetic grounds, but I don't know that there's much to choose between decision-making methods. Ones I like are - coherence (with other narratives), aesthetic value (usually inspired by childhood stories, to be honest), a preference for simplicity, a favouring of what I think are more 'natural' approaches... But those are just ways that seem to suit me, I couldn't raise an argument in favour of any of them, except I suppose coherence does make one's life easier to navigate, but then again many people seem to live with extremely clashing beliefs and come to no harm by it so...

having said all this, just because there are powerplays doesn't make it ipso facto wrong. — Tom Storm

Absolutely. It does, however, go to a pet interest of mine which is strategies for making decisions in uncertainty (also to answer )...

If we cannot know for sure whether idealism is right or wrong, then we must decide whether to believe it on the basis of something other than the weight of evidence. Such a method is clearly insufficient otherwise our intellectual peers would have already done so.

Thus, factors such as undesirable social consequences become relevant, as actual evidence and rational arguments recede in importance.

It's like choosing between two cars, the most important factor is that they both get you from A to B efficiently. But they wouldn't even be in the car showroom if they didn't do that, so we start to consider the colour, the upholstery, the stereo...

an authoritative and life-altering wisdom — Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong with Ockham?Reassessing the Role of Nominalism in the Dissolution of the West

Within this quote is all that I fear about idealism.

Note how every instantiation of idealism is also a tool of power. It creates, in each instance, a class of people who can 'see' and those who cannot. Usually some barrier is set to 'seeing' (education, religious practice) which can then be used to control (supply of education), or de-humanise (lack of religion).

There's little about idealism not distastefully entangled with the exploitation of unequal power relationships.

"Real" gets its meaning by being contrasted to what is not real. It's real money, not counterfeit; it's a real van Gogh, not a print; it's a real lake, not an hallucination.

What is it that you would contrast mathematical elements to? What is it that completes the sentence "mathematical elements are real, not..."? — Banno

This seems related to the question I posed @Wayfarer yesterday...

you seem to define what is 'real' as if the category were clear (in terms of its membership criteria) and we could assign certain things to it - numbers, logical laws etc. But I don't see how you've arrived at those membership criteria. The set {all things which are real} doesn't seem to be well defined. — Isaac

It seems to me that if 'real' is not to mean something like 'made of physical matter' (which I agree would be too restrictive), then the range of coherent alternatives is limited. To my mind something like 'that which has a state which might at some time be unknown' is one such. But as you say, nothing prevents constructed social concepts from entering this category.

Where and how do you draw the line here so as to be able to make the distinction you’re trying to make between what is constructed and what is prior to and independent of construction? — Joshs

If I may...

I don't think one needs to see this as a question of where the line is - I think that's an interesting question - more that the model requires such a line. The very idea of construction requires raw material from which to build, it's in-built in the model.

The moment you accept that data from outside you Markov Blanket affects the nodes within it, that data must be imbued with properties modulating that effect, those properties clearly do not determine the network's hypotheses from within the Markov boundary, but their parameters will affect the nature of any function of their distribution.

So we might have social constructions around pots, clay, even atoms, but the the distributions of those constructs will be bound by the parameters of the data from outside the Markov Blanket.

the particular synapse pattern associated with "3" that accompanies the 3 apples I see today is not exactly the same as the 3 miles I must drive tomorrow. But some commonality will exist. — Real Gone Cat

Yes, but it will be a commonality of function, not neural pattern. Each neural cluster involved will tend to fire toward clusters which might help form the word for 'three' in your language, others mights trigger images of generic 'threedom' (like three dots in a row, or a triangle), others might start chains which relate to compare 'three' (is it enough, too much?)... But different neurons might carry out this role at different times. Interestingly, they'd usually be in the same general area of the brain and this has to do with the brain's meta-structure, determined, we think, by the history of long term potentiation, but the point is, they couldn't be identified other than generally.

Here's a few important ones:Russia, China, North Korea, Iran. — Relativist

Well then America's shite because they're all still around.

It's more than a little annoying that you keep saying our discussion is over and then respond to one of my posts a few hours later. Would you mind deciding if you do or don't want to discuss things with me and then sticking to it for at least the day. You constantly starting discussions and then refusing to finish them is somewhat irksome.

Those who dismiss the hard problem can do no better than to call a part of the brain consciousness. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You might get a better sense of that sentence if you read it in context. I mean, it's not even buried in some dense prose, the context is literally the remainder of the sentence from which you extracted but part.

To say it's just not true that other humans are very likely sentient is to deploy solipsism. — ZzzoneiroCosm

In what way?

is it basically a matter of a temporally unfolding event ( or series of events ) rather than an instantaneous spatial pattern? — Joshs

Yes, I think so. It's recognising that we must 'slice up' what is, in fact, a continuous process involving the mind and the environment. Not only are these 'slices' arbitrary, but the leave threads hanging. Like if we say such-and such a mental snapshot was me "wanting a drink" we would (if we took the fMRI at the right time) see something of me wanting a drink, but all the flow of data beforehand is lost, as is the flow afterwards, and, of course, the drink itself (which is an integral part of the process). Most importantly, nothing in a snapshot can capture the difference between backward acting suppressive neurons and forward acting promotion ones, they're only differentiated by their function over time in the system.

if so, can such a temporal sequence repeat itself more or less such as to be consistently identifiable as the same, and thus allow a something like a neural process to be correlated with a statement? — Joshs

Weakly correlated, I think, yes. There could never be any strong correlation because of the problem of constituting a temporal pattern as a snapshot. The relevant state is not say, axon1 firing, it's the type of flow from axon to axon. One day that might be carried out by axons 1, 2 and 3. The next day it might be axons 5, 6 and 7. There's really no way to tell except by the outcome (which kind of begs the question). The pattern might be the same, but it's not in the same place.

That's very clear, thank you. I don't agree (obviously) but I think I can now see what it is about materialism and physicalism that you object to.

I think my main objection is that you seem to define what is 'real' as if the category were clear (in terms of its membership criteria) and we could assign certain things to it - numbers, logical laws etc. But I don't see how you've arrived at those membership criteria. The set {all things which are real} doesn't seem to be well defined. Do you have some criteria in mind for determining what belongs in the set {all that is real}?

For example, we might both agree that Unicorns are not real. What is it about Unicorns which denies them membership of {all that is real}?

Then drop the causation and correlation talk. Was my point. It makes dualists think you recognise a second res. — bongo fury

Not sure I fully understand, but I will take the words of caution on advisory.

roughly, metal events described intentionally ("I want to go to the pub") do not have a direct correspondence to brain states. This is, I understand, what one would expect in a neural network. — Banno

Yes, that's also my understanding. We might be able to say there's a brain state which temporarily corresponds with your tendency to go to the pub, but not one which corresponds with "I want to go to the pub". Personally, I see the issue as one of function over description. Both the mental event and the statement are functional, not descriptive. Saying "I want to go to the pub" is not a description of anything (brain state or otherwise) it's just a functional statement in conversation. Mistaking it for a description is where many of these confusions arise. Likewise with mental states. The cognitive functions of the brain are processes, not states, they do stuff rather than are stuff. So you have some neural cluster in your brain somewhere which might be specifically associated with your cat (not just any cat), but it's not a 'representation' of you cat, it's process which triggers further 'your cat'-related functions (which themselves trigger further functions...). At no point is the brain in a 'state' which could be said to correlate with "I recognise my cat", at best we could have "I'm recognising my cat", but since we don't talk that way, something seems necessarily anomalous.

I do wish I'd explored Davidson earlier in my career. I can't say that I agree with all he writes, but some of the issues he draws out would have saved me a considerable number of wrong paths and dead ends in my early work.

That's a great summary, thanks. I was getting mired. What I was trying to draw out is that I could not see a way idealism, as @Wayfarer presented it, was in any way opposed to materialism (other than to sniff at it as somewhat uncouth). As you say, I don't think it's particularly surprising to anyone that we interpret the world with our minds (I contest that it is surprising the extent to which we do this - it surprised me anyway), but it remains that there is a world to interpret and that, most importantly, the activity of interpreting is one going on within that world.

My understanding (which is limited) is that materialism is synonymous with physicalism (since the pure idea that "all is matter" has been long rejected by physics), and that both hold some form of the idea that the physical properties of the world necessitate, cause or simply are, all properties of that world.

So it seems to me that the notion of our minds constructing the objects of reality out of those physical properties is entirely consistent with physicalism. @Wayfarer seemed to disagree, but I couldn't get him to explain why. End of discussion it seems. Unfortunate.

In some respects, I can put the objection down to a distaste of reductionism - a distaste I'd share. Some, it seems want to make the world actually dependent on minds so as to really forcefully lock away any notion that we might ever be able to understand the world solely in terms of atoms and forces. But, of course, understanding how the properties of the world arise from physical properties is not the same as the simple theory that they do.

What still bothers, though, me are things like...

which is exactly what phenomenology set out to do. — Wayfarer

At the end of every discussion in which the failure of reductionism is hinted at, there always seems to be an attempt to switch in something even more vague as replacement. Despite my years attempting to do so, I completely agree with "We cannot ever understand the mind fully via neuroscience, or cognitive science". What I disagree with is the inevitable accompanying "...but we can with phenomenology/dualism/bible studies/LSD/...whatever" Such approaches are no less constrained and in many cases, more so.

Anyway. Thanks for the clarity. Seeing it as Realism vs Anti-Realism makes more sense, wherein I see the most interesting discussion as being between direct and indirect forms of Realism, rather than entertaining any kind on Anti-Realism.

If you are uncertain as to whether it is afternoon, then it seems to follow that you entertain some doubt — Janus

Yes. Some doubt, but more certainty. 10% doubt and 90% certainty to be precise.

Are you vacillating between believing it is afternoon and doubting it? In other words are you vacillating between certainty and uncertainty? — Janus

No. Just one single position.

If it's easier for you, I'm almost exactly 84% sure that I won't roll a one on a normal six-sided die. No vacillation between doubt and belief, just a single belief that there are six possible outcomes, five of which are the ones I'm interested in. My belief that "I will not roll a one" is roughly 84% certain. If I were betting (assuming I wanted to maximise my return) I would but exactly 84% of my investment on that outcome. If I were planning my day based on a dice roll I would invest about 84% of my thought planning for the {not-1} outcome and roughly 16% of my thought planning for the {roll-1} outcome.

People perform this kind of activity all the time, holding two possible outcomes at different levels of likelihood. We used to call that believing that X, but with less than 100% certainty. You want to change that language use, but I'm unclear as to what you want it changed to.

But you retracted. — bongo fury

Where?

So, anyway. You do believe (that it is accurate enough to say) that

such memory logging is consciousness. — bongo fury


? — bongo fury

Yes. Consciousness (in the sense of self-awareness it's being used here) is the process of logging to memory higher order inferences. When you see a cup, numerous inferences are made at increasing hierarchical levels which conclude (at a given point in time - it's a continual process) that what you're seeing is a cup. The conclusion takes the form fo connections firing between object recognition centres and things like action, speech, images etc all related to the object's being a cup. These links are then rehearsed in order to remember them (memory is simply the tendency to re-fire the same links). That rehearsal is self-awareness - you're repeating to yourself "that's a cup". You then re-tell that story as if it all happened at once (yet we can be fairly sure that it didn't, it played out over a few milliseconds).

This all being just one model, of course, and bearing in mind that consciousness (as in "knocked unconscious") is different from consciousness as in "I'm conscious of how difficult this might sound..." That our folk understanding might see them as the same doesn't have any bearing on the matter.

So...

neuro-physiologists are unwitting dualists when they quite unnecessarily call a spade the cause or correlate of a spade. — bongo fury

Positing a thing over and above that which we observe it to be is unnecessary. I can't see how, if consciousness seems to be reported (or indicated) when parts A and B of the brain are active, then the simplest explanation isn't just that consciousness just is parts A and and B of the brain. As I said with 'a race'. If every time there's a race it's just runners all trying to reach a finish line from the same starting point, then we conclude that that's just what 'a race' is. We don't say that the runners and the start/finish just happen to correlate with some other entity that is 'a race'.

Have you said what consciousness is? — bongo fury

You reminded me of that very thing not two posts back. Perhaps your memory is not so good afterall.

I thought you believed that such memory logging is consciousness. — bongo fury

but are entertaining a blend of belief and doubt. — Janus

So what about the afternoon? You're ruling out "I believe it's afternoon" because I don't feel certain. We can rule out "I doubt it's afternoon" because I clearly don't.

So what is the name of my attitude toward "its afternoon"?

To the extent that one is uncertain one does not know, and to the extent to which does not feel certain one does not believe, but rather doubts. — Janus

But that's just not the meaning of the word at all. If I'm 90% sure it's afternoon, no one in their right mind would describe that situation as me "doubting it's afternoon", yet I don't 'feel certain' it's afternoon either.

Why? — bongo fury

Consciousness is an event. When we talk about the cause of an event, we often refer to the combination of latent potential and a trigger of some sort.

If I say 'a race' is lots of runners all starting simultaneously and aiming for the same line, then an answer to the question 'what causes a race?' might be "a load of runners, a finish line, and a starting pistol going off". Put those three things together, you'll have a race.

you don't believe consciousness originates in the brain? — hypericin

That's not what you asked. You said...

Other humans are very likely sentient, being very like us. — hypericin

We were talking about measures of likeness, not of qualification. The question is what it is about a brain which qualifies it as likely to be conscious, not whether brains do indeed qualify.

this process has only been instantiated in human wetware, as far as we are certain. — hypericin

And? The question is whether it has been instantiated in anything else, how to tell, and what to do about the possibility. I don't see how pointing out the status quo answers any of those questions.

I thought you believed that such memory logging is consciousness. — bongo fury

Yes. That's right. I suppose it would be more accurate to have said that the presence of such logging functional components plus the inputs cause consciousness.

You must have a very good memory to have recalled my previously mentioning that. I'm genuinely impressed.

we are similar in the ways we believe are causative and correlative of consciousness — hypericin

'We' do not believe that. You do.

Personally, I believe memory logging of higher order Bayesian (or Bayesian-like) inferences is what causes consciousness. In that sense I'd be alike to a machine which had those functions and unlike a human who (for some reason) didn't.

If your personal belief is that consciousness has something to do with the actual wetware, then obviously you're going to see similarity in wetware as significant.

For those who believe consciousness has more to do with cognitive function then we're obviously going to see similarity in cognitive function as significant and similarity in wetware less so.