there is a point in raising what is a non-trivial problem that had been ignored. — Banno

Absolutely. I see it from a pragmatic, rather than logical angle (though the same problem, I believe). There will forever be a need for some language which can be used to discuss how things ought to be . We can say "morality is just a biological urge to reduce harm" or some such similar oversimplification, but then we'd just need a new word to use when we ask "ought we follow such an urge or not?" So we might just as well stick with the one we've got.

Reinforcing this point is well worth doing, especially in the face of the myth of competition found in capitalist ideology. it also perhaps serves to demonstrate the pathological nature of egocentrism and sociopathy. — Banno

Yeah, Karen Wynn is married to Paul Bloom (another Psychologist - we're all married to each other, it's quite unseemly!), and he works a lot on opposing that very narrative, so I think it's part of that, certainly is for me.

Far from resolving moral questions, these studies simply demonstrate the deeply embedded reasons why we ask those questions in the first place - essentially we have multiple, complex prosocial proclivities and, typical of our species, we try to resolve them socially. It's unfortunate that some (including some of my less enlightened colleagues) confuse the reason for asking a question with its answer.

it's down to laziness. — Banno

Probably, yeah. Simple narratives have a strong appeal when pushed for mental bandwidth, and moral questions are so ubiquitous. For my twopenneth I also think there's a laziness in the art of persuasion too, it leads to an excessive attraction toward powerful answers (I've often referred to it as looking for a bigger stick with which to beat one's opposition). "God said so" is a pretty big stick, but "Logic says so" is favoured by many.

There are reports of Sarin gas being dropped from drones over Mariapol last night(11/04/22). — Punshhh

As far as I can tell those reports come from tweets by the Azov battalion.

https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1513603720646467589?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

Do you have any reliable sources?

At least he has had no troubles of doing that partly for 8 years. So why take some more?

There's no reason why he now would have to stop. Do notice the logic behind terrorizing people to move away from their homes. Will he stop because of sanctions??? Lol. — ssu

This is a common tactic. Ignore disagreement over premises and then act with faux shock at the apparent disagreement in conclusion. It's about as subtle as a brick.

If Putin held ,say, Crimea against the will of the population purely by terrorising them, then you'd be surprised anyone would question his ability to do it some more.

But since that premise is disputed, your surprise over the disputed conclusion is absurd.

It's perfectly reasonable to conclude that Putin could not (and would not even attempt) to hold the whole of Ukraine because its perfectly reasonable to believe he's yet to demonstrate such an ability. You might well not believe that, but your disagreement doesn't make alternative views ridiculous.

Also fighting over money can be moral of course, — neomac

So what factor (or factors) governs the difference?

You just keep claiming that “the rich oppress the poor far more consistently than one nation oppresses another” without providing evidences and while being contradicted by the evidences: Ukrainian families got exterminated by Russian soldiers, no Ukrainian ruling class member has exterminated those families. — neomac

Are you suggesting that the policies of the ruling classes have resulted in no deaths?

You could claim that one is morally more justified in fighting X over Y, because X is more oppressive, but that doesn’t equate to claiming that one has no moral reason to fight Y. — neomac

Yes. Which would probably be why I didn't make such a claim.

And what is the relation between Russian rich people being in a luxury yachts, while Russian children starve do death in their rubbish, with the fact that Russian soldiers are exterminating Ukrainian families and children? — neomac

Very little. Which is probably why I didn't restrict my assessment to the Russian ruling elite, nor the Russian poor.

if Zelensky’s moral stand and choices are to be assessed over a de facto situation or actual terms on the table (as you claim), then I don’t see why your moral stand and choices about this war can’t be assessed based on the actual clash between 2 de facto dominant powers, as you frame this war. — neomac

Because our choices aren't limited to a de facto 2 clash between dominant powers. Which is probably why I have never suggested they are.

I talked about math because you talked about multi-causal theory and multi causal theories would allow to evaluate the exact or statistical relevance of a cause in a given output. — neomac

How?

No single dimension is a priori sufficient for a moral assessment. — neomac

So you keep saying, yet you seem quite clear on what dimensions are not to be considered. Perhaps a quick run down of these multiple dimensions would help?

If you want to object to me for good, tell me if you would morally support Isis over America and why. — neomac

I already did, right at the beginning of the paragraph you're supposedly critiquing.

if you contrast Zelensky’s government with a Putin puppet, blaming the first while assuming more acceptable the second. — neomac

Again, how on earth do you get from the notion that a puppet government wouldn't be so bad as to be worth thousands of lives to "I think we ought to depose Zelensky". It's just an insane leap of inference.

> It's absolutely absurd to suggest that every time I raise a criticism about a government decision, I'm calling for them to be deposed.

Where else did I do that? Can you fully quote me? — neomac

I just did.

Poor people bring to life children that they are incapable of taking care of, don’t they have some responsibility for the death/sickness/starvation/misery of their children? — neomac

Yes. I presume that would be why they try with every ounce of their soul to feed and protect those children.

Palestinians bring to life children that they are incapable of fully protecting against the oppression of Israelis, don’t they have some responsibility for the death/sickness/starvation/misery of their children exposed to the Israelis’ oppression? — neomac

Yes. Again probably why they try so desperately hard to protect them.

So shouldn’t they stop having children? — neomac

That's one solution, yes. Not the only solution, clearly.

Ukrainians do not want to be eradicated from their lands nor they want their children to grow up under a Russian dictator capable of committing another Ukrainian genocide like the Holodomor, so they act accordingly. — neomac

The former is true, the latter is a strategic judgement. I'm not speaking to a Ukrainian so I can't interrogate their reasoning. I'm speaking to a non-Ukrainian, form the comfort of their non-bombed home and asking why they are supporting continued fighting so fervently.

BTW, for the third time, wouldn’t this line of reasoning of yours simply support whatever the status quo is (ruling class oppressing working class is a de facto situation right?), since no power (especially authoritarian) can be radically challenged without risking one’s (and often beloved ones’) material well-being and life? — neomac

Then for the third time, no, the outcome continued war is compared to matters.

if you were familiar with propositional logic, you would understand that my argument corresponds to the valid form:
p1. if p or q implies r
p2. p and q
c. r
So it totally follows. — neomac

What? You've not labelled p, q or r so I can't possibly use this.

> What I expect them to do is to offer concessions and make demands in the same way any party to a negotiation would.

What concessions and what demands do you expect them to do wrt Putin’s? — neomac

Concessions might be things like - independence for Donbas and Crimea, keeping Ukraine out of NATO (or keeping US weapons out of Ukraine), independent monitoring of far-right groups in Ukraine, consultation on economic ties with Europe which might impinge heavily of Russian trade interests.

Demands might be things like - an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces from Ukraine, submission to war crimes investigations, adherence to the full independence of Donbas (and possibly Crimea, if they can win that)

It's not difficult to think of options, I'm sure there's more.

I don’t need to assume that the US leaders are acting out of moral intentions. All I claimed is that there are moral reasons to support Ukraine. — neomac

But I support Ukraine. So does everyone writing here. We disagree about how. Are you claiming there are moral reasons to back particular strategies?

Whenever I talk about strategy you switch to intention, when I talk about intention you say it's about 'moral reasons' when I talk about morality you defer back to tactics again. You don't seriously think that looks anything other than completely disingenuous do you?

It’s enough to re-read what I wrote because I’ve already addressed this many times already: geopolitical entities per se have no moral agency — neomac

Fine. Replace all my uses of US, NATO and Europe with the names of their current leaders and influences and then answer the questions.

If making concessions and avoiding sanctions will consolidate Putin’s power as well as not making concessions and adopting sanctions, I think it’s indifferent which option is chosen. — neomac

Not what I asked.

My point was simply that I’m well aware that there are risks when taking position on such matters. Yet I don’t think that we can take risk-free decisions on such matters, nor we can simply suspend our judgment or action just because we can’t make enough risk-free decisions, if pressed by the events. — neomac

Again, not even addressing the question I actually asked.

cruel and unfair treatment of people, especially by not giving them the same freedom, rights, etc. is morally defensible when it’s for punishing immoral people. — neomac

So you think punishing immoral people is unfair?

If one wants to explain why a negotiation fails, then either demands/grievances/expectations/complaints/wishes/concessions/requests/desires/[fill up as you please] are not perceived as acceptable and/or they are not addressed with enough assurance. And an alternative to 2 parties' strategies in terms of demands/grievances/expectations/complaints/wishes/concessions/requests/desires/[fill up as you please], can not possibly coincide with one of 2 parties' strategy. — neomac

There cannot always be an alternative, otherwise negotiations never end. At some point in time the agreement has to coincide with both parties' strategy.

> So If I think their standard of living will be considerably worse, then It's a reasonable position to take that involving the US is not worth the benefit.

You can take side in accordance to your beliefs. So do I. Now what? — neomac

Well, you could start by refraining from referring to my beliefs as 'preposterous', if you accept that they're just beliefs.

> So why do you trust those who tell you that continuing to fight is better for the Ukrainian people? Why do you trust those who tell you that life under the terms of a US/European loan system will be better than one under Russian puppet government?

Never made such claims. — neomac

Good. So are they?

If the outcomes of strategic decisions are beyond your expertise, then why do you choose to trust the experts and leaders supporting your current position and not those supporting the alternatives?

I already answered: “So for what strategy is concerned I tend to defer more to the feedback of experts and leaders, and then double-check based on what I find logic or consistent with other sources and background knowledge” — neomac

That's not an answer. All we can ever do on a site like this is enquire about people's reasons for holding the views they hold. The entire enterprise if pointless otherwise. If you're going to answer "because of some reasons", then we might as well give up here. I'm asking about what those reasons are, I assumed you had some.

What matters to me is what Ukrainians and Western leaders consider the “worst option” in geopolitically significant terms — neomac

Why? Why not, for example, what the various military and foreign policy experts consider the “worst option” in geopolitically significant terms? Or what the various political commentators consider the “worst option” in geopolitically significant terms? Why put your faith in the Ukrainian leadership and the Western powers' leadership?

If...

Russia already has the groundwork to enable these problems, — Christoffer

...and...

the US doesn't — Christoffer

...then how come...

We see the behaviors of corruption and radical movements of people under Trump. — Christoffer

..., when the lack the necessary 'groundwork' for those behaviours to emerge. And furthermore, if it's true that...

if people "don't care about politics", they could wake up in a world similar to places like Russia. — Christoffer

...then the 'groundwork' you spoke of with regards to Russia appears to be completely irrelevant as you're suggesting that the US could end up like Russia despite having none of those factors.

I'm talking about how Russia's political groundwork for authoritarianism can happen in other nations — Christoffer

No. You haven't once mentioned Russia's 'political groundwork' occurring in other nations. The factors you've provided for the US's descent into 'Russian-ness' are "the behaviours of corruption and radical movements of people under Trump" (which you admit occurred despite the US not having any of Russia's political groundwork yet) and that "people "don't care about politics"". You've given no other factors related to any of Russia's political groundwork.

How? Websites, newspapers and social media spreading 'misinformation' have been increasingly banned since Covid times. — Isaac


Yes, they spread misinformation in a time of crisis. The problem is the uneducated with a megaphone spreading misinformation that hurts other people. How many people died during this pandemic due to misinformation telling them not to get vaccinated? — Christoffer

Naysayers have been ridiculed, de-platformed, sacked — Isaac


That's not what I've seen. The ones that have been ridiculed, de-platformed or sacked have all taken part in spreading dangerous misinformation or acted with such disregard for safety, like nurses not caring for protocols when people risk dying around them.

Protests have been met with militarised police under emergency powers. — Isaac


The large gatherings who didn't have permission during a time when large gatherings need to be avoided? People who don't understand how a pandemic works, who don't understand that large gatherings could create super-spreading events which result in people outside of this gathering getting killed by the consequence of such a super-spreading event, don't know what the fuck they're talking about. To be blind to how pandemics work is to ignore facts. — Christoffer

I didn't ask about the reasons for the response, I asked about what more you wanted people to have done. You seemed to think the response to 'misinformation' was dangerously lacklustre. I was pointing out that it was a more robust response than any we've seen since McCarthyism. You said you wanted it to be...

At least on par with the vocal minority advocating for extreme nationalism, racism, antivaccine, conspiracy theories etc — Christoffer

It is. Websites have been banned, social media is being filtered, searched engines have buried Russian output on the war, there's a generally hostile environment for anyone not toeing the general anti-Russian line... I'm asking you what more you expect the 'moral majority' to do.

Seems you are using "biological urge" in much the way I might use "desire". — Banno

Possibly. I was trying to give a charitable understanding of the ethical naturalist position (despite not really being a fan). Personally, I've never found a truly satisfactory term for what they're trying to get at. 'Biological urge' doesn't really do it either (as if there were non-biological urges - what would they even be?). I think - to give a fully wordy definition - what they're trying to get at are urges which seem to occur to us without the influence of others - ie ones which are unaffected by culture. That's the motivation behind Karen Wynn's work, it's why she studies babies.

I think, despite the lack of an easy term, it is an important distinction (well it's important in Psychology - it may turn out to be irrelevant in Philosophy, we'll find out!) It's demonstrating that there are (possibly) some pre-wired beliefs (in psychological terms - tendencies to act as if...) and that would obviously have all sorts of interesting consequences. Morality, in some respects, is the hardest, but most interesting of these. Alison Gopnik is carrying out similar studies on beliefs about Physics. My wife's work, incidentally, is in a similar vein on certainty (lying, trusting sources, etc). I don't really know what implications these studies have on the various related philosophies, that's what I'm interested to explore, but it seems to me that we can't, in our philosophical investigation of morality, simply ignore Wynn's findings, they surely must have some meaning? I'm just not sure what. I'm pretty clear, however, that its' not the sort of simple one-rule ethical naturalism espoused so often, other studies rule that out.

Perhaps a more interesting question is the meta-question. What is it about "morality is..." type statements which so appeal to people? We hear dozens of them, all wanting it to be one single simple metric. Why? What's the benefit, or attraction, of it being so simple when it's abundantly clear that morality is anything but simple?

How do you measure well-being? — Isaac

There are specific metrics like
1.our biological drives to survive( belong to a group,), to flourish(ensure safety) and to procreate.
1.our biological urges Address our biological need, Seek non destructive pleasure and avoid pain/suffering
3.Behavior fueled by our mirror neurons that enable sympathy and empathy
those are some of the most essential. — Nickolasgaspar

Those are not metrics. I'm asking you how you measure whether someone (or society's) well-being has been harmed. That measurement is required for the objectivity of your proposed scheme.

wellbeing can work as a tentative foundation — Tom Storm

I think that morality has more than one aspect and we often conflate them. My personal relations with others do not generally get modulated by any consideration of the greatest increase in well-being. I act toward others in a manner I think is virtuous (or at least I strive to). It's about the kind of person I am, not the outcome.

The problem, however, is that governments (and other institutions) are not persons and so have no virtue in and of themselves. Individual government officials can be virtuous, but government policy cannot. So I see a need there for foreseeable consequences to be considered and in that case, perhaps a loose idea of 'well-being' might make a good foundation on which to base one's arguments.

We still face the problem of underdetermination though. Most people already know the power of 'well-being' as a metric for consequentialist arguments, so most will already formulate their arguments using it. As such, the main problem of deciding between them remains undented by such an attack.

Societies have all kind of rules that t put limits on human behavior, especial to those who don't have the brain to deal with more mature decisions (kids) and those who can become a victim of addiction. — Nickolasgaspar

In what storyline do you think I'm someone who doesn't know that? I presume none (you may imagine a young child has joined, but a simple check of my vocabulary should eliminate that possibility). So simply telling me stuff I clearly already know doesn't constitute an argument. You have to relate it to the point being disputed, which, in this case, is your definition of 'well-being'.

How do you measure well-being? That seems key to the disagreement. You keep dismissing things (pleasure, desires...) but you've not replaced those with anything. If well-being is your key metric it needs a clear definition, no?

if they are a minority, then the educated, morally balanced, and larger portion of the world should be more vocal against them, — Christoffer

How? Websites, newspapers and social media spreading 'misinformation' have been increasingly banned since Covid times. Naysayers have been ridiculed, de-platformed, sacked and in some cases threatened with violence. Protests have been met with militarised police under emergency powers.

Could you explain just how much more vocal you expect the 'moral majority' to be? Summary execution perhaps?

The young in Russia do not mix well with what Russia has always been and people just ignored everything. The old people were either too scared to say anything, even when the iron curtain lifted, or they were hardcore Stalinists who just wanted a new daddy to take care of them, so they blindly followed the next masculine power who looked the part. All while the young who grew up in families with decent economical stability had access to the internet and knowledge about the world, thought that they lived in a nation that was just like any other stable democratic nation, with the same freedoms and rights. But it's this ignorance of what is going on underneath, the blind eye to political events unfolding that creates the groundwork for what is happening now. — Christoffer

And yet...

we can see it in places like the US as well — Christoffer

The US has had none of the factors you describe from Russia yet you say it is experiencing the same (or similar) problems.

Doesn't that at least imply that the factors leading to such a situation are more probably something common to both nations rather than the less parsimonious conclusion that two completely different sets of circumstances have coincidentally resulted in very similar outcomes?

The French president is accused of showing solidarity with Ukraine without doing anything concrete. — Olivier5

Fancy showing solidarity with Ukraine without doing anything concrete! It's a good job none of the contributors here would be so shallow as to spend post after post signalling their deep concern for Ukrainians, whinging about Russia (who are neither listening, nor care about your opinion) whilst doing fuck all to actually help.

...or were you helpfully offering us a single term to describe your contributions?

For clarity... I take a linguistic view. That which is 'moral' is that for which we use the word 'moral' and are understood. So if I say "punching old ladies is moral" I've not made a factual error, I've simply misunderstood the meaning of the word 'moral' it's not used to describe the sort of thing punching old ladies is.

there may remain mind-to-world statements that are about others that are not moral. It's just that moral statements are at least mind-to-world statements involving others. I see what I said before could be misinterpreted. — Banno

Absolutely, so we're left (are we not) with at least one factor that might be common to all moral statements that is neither their direction of fit, nor their subject matter ('how we interact with others'). Those are perhaps necessary, but not sufficient to qualify a statement as being a member of the set {moral statements}.

Even though I don't personally hold to the idea, I think that 'being a particular kind of biological urge' cannot be ruled out as a candidate for that additional factor.

It would, as you say, have to be a particular kind of biological urge, as just any old biological urge might not be sufficient (although together with those other two criteria...?). If, in theory, we could identify some sub-class of biological urge which satisfied a one-to-one relationship with all moral statements, then we would, theoretically, have shown that the full criteria for being in the class {moral statements} was 1) being of a mind to world direction of fit, 2) being about how we act toward others, and 3) being of a certain sub-class of biological urges.

Personally, however, I don't think we'll find such a sub-class. reason being, as I said, that moral decision making seems to involve a dozen or more completely unrelated 'biological urges' ranging from disgust through in-group identity, social norms, empathy, and plain old Machiavellian tit-for-tat reciprocity.

Hence, I think that last criteria for membership of the set {moral statements} is of a family resemblance kind. No one criteria, but any one of a wide set.

even it they are "predictions"what is the issue? — Nickolasgaspar

The issue is as I've described it, one of underdetermination.

Again Pleasure is not a metric for well being on its own. As I pointed out to you forbidding small children to swim alone in deep water, or playing with matches or doing drugs might limit their pleasure but NOT their well being....since well being except of being "well" also has the condition of "being" (being/staying alive).
So limiting the sugar intake of children only affects instant pleasure, not their well being. — Nickolasgaspar

Sugar intake is not fatal, so excess does not limit 'being'. You're in danger of using the vagueness of 'well-being' to make it fit whatever act you've predetermined to be moral. To avoid this, give a clear definition of what you mean by 'well-being'.

A criminal is consider an enemy of society and this is why he is isolated from it. They are people who undermined the well being of others and society's as a whole. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not in need of an explanation for criminal punishment, I'm pointing out that it harms the well-being of some in the short-term to benefit the well-being of many in the long term.

The objective principle will allow objective evaluations independent of how different random cases are. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, no. Again, that's what underdetermination describes (did you read the link?). The 'evaluations' will always support more than one course of action in any moral dilemma (in your system) because the data on well-being will always underdetermine the theory (what course of action is most 'moral').

-I will try, once again to bring some facts in this conversation of abstracts by listing two acts that are objectively immoral.
1. a society that allows kid raping
2. a society that allows owning other people as property
Can we agree that ending up as a slave or being rapped during our childhood years are both immoral under any context?
Can we agree that a society allowing such acts will reduce the well being of its members.
Can you identify any other metric that would be affected and that could be used as a principle in our evaluations on what is moral or immoral? — Nickolasgaspar

To the first question, yes. We can agree, but that's just because you and I already think that way. Others disagree and we cannot persuade them objectively, by using your 'metrics'.

We might say "keeping slaves harms the well-being of the slaves and so is immoral". Someone else might say "keeping slaves does cause that harm, but it is outweighed by the greater benefit to society's well-being brought about by the increased economic growth, so the slaves ought to put up with their bonds for the greater good". Both arguments use the same metric - the well-being of society - just over different timescales. We might say "but look at societies with slavery, they perform no better than societies without, that disproves your theory" and they could reply "wait another twenty years, the benefits take time to accrue".

If, on the other hand, you say that no-one's well-being should be harmed at all for the greater good, nor for any hyperbolic discounting, then you have yourself a definition of well-being that can only be assessed on the last day of one's life - did it indeed turn out that going through all that exercise was worth the temporary drop in well-being, or did I, in fact, just get run over by a bus on the way home from the gym?

All moral dilemmas involve some sacrifice in well-being either at the individual level, or the short-term. If they didn't they wouldn't be dilemmas, they'd just be thing we want to do anyway. So it's always a weighing exercise, which means that there's always an argument as to how much weight to give each part. You don't, therefore, resolve those decisions by telling people what it is they're weighing (well-being, harm, pleasure...whatever), because the real dilemma is how much weight to give to individuals vs others, to long-term vs short-term, to nation vs world... etc. Competing interests.

Now I think this is enough to mark moral discussion as different to mere preference, and contrast it with statements of fact. Moral discourse is about our relations with others. — Banno

Is it though? Can we not think of mind-to-world statements about our relations with others that are still not moral statements? Perhaps "we ought to speak loudly enough to be heard". Not a mere preference (I'm clearly saying others ought do this too), but not a moral statement, I don't think, merely a pragmatic one?

Maybe you have a broader definition of 'moral' than I do?

As I said, I'm personally inclined toward the idea that 'moral' statements have only a sort of family resemblance in common, that there's no one factor relating them all, but rather some collection of factors any group of which might be sufficient.

Incidentally (to those who would cite neuroscience @Nickolasgaspar), the neuroscience clearly back me up here. Far from there being some 'morality' brain region, there are, in fact, several regions involved in moral decision making and all of them overlap with other aspects of thought (such as disgust, in-out group determination, empathy...) such that we can say with some certainty that more than one method is employed.

It offers evaluations based on contemporary knowledge on the implications specific acts have on well being. — Nickolasgaspar

Those evaluations are clearly predictions. "the effect on well-being of X will be", not "the effect on well-being of X was"

-You will need to provide an example on that where the well being of people changes dramatically during time. — Nickolasgaspar

I already have. Children and sweets. Well-being definitely drops just after being denied sweets, raises again on enjoying a healthy weight and full set of teeth in later life. A more extreme example is in every form of criminal punishment - the well-being of the person concerned drops during the punishment, but supposedly rises again as they enjoy being a member of a society in which their particular crime is thereby discouraged. On a larger scale, foreign aid for infrastructure investment benefits no-one in the short-term, but reduces the well-being of the country it's coming from (less welfare, education and health spending). In the long-term, however, the idea is that it helps those in greater need. Some may argue that whilst, yes, it helps those people in the long-term, it harms them in the even longer term because they become reliant on aid...

-The principle is the tool by which we choose our "theory". The principle stays unchanged. — Nickolasgaspar

No. That's not what underderemination describes.

Take any act you accept as objectively moral or immoral and check whether it shares the same characteristic with any other act that you can thing (promotes or reduces the well being of members) — Nickolasgaspar

That's what I'm saying. All such acts do in one timescale and do not in others. It cannot be determined. they all cause harm in the short term to individuals with the intention of reducing harm in the long term to society, but since the term is not fixed it cannot ever be demonstrated that they do, in fact, achieve this end.

Can you imagine other metrics that are affected by moral or immoral acts and can be used as an objective principle for new evaluations? — Nickolasgaspar

It's not about the metrics, it's about what we do with the uncertainty over their application. even if I were determined to cause no harm, such determination would not be sufficient as I would not have any way of knowing which behaviours avoided harm over any given timescale.

The naturalistic fallacy remains: that babies act in a certain way does not imply that you ought also act in a certain way. — Banno

To be fair, the article never made such a claim, but notwithstanding, I don't see how it follows.

The declaration that one ought to do X is a declaration, not only about a fit of desire to world, but of membership of a particular set of such fits. I'd like the world to be such that Whisky were free, that doesn't mean it morally ought to be that way, yes.

So there's a sub-set of such 'mind to world' fits which are 'moral'. In other words, there exists a set of behaviours {behaviours we ought to do} one of whose membership criteria are they act to bring about a world in our minds to the actual world, but clearly not the sole membership criteria (otherwise my Whisky desire would be a member and it clearly isn't).

So the leaves the question of what that second (or more) membership criteria is/are.

People have (here) suggested that it is that sub-category of aims/fits which reduce harm. I take issue with that because of the problem of underdetermination over time, almost anything can be made to fit by claiming it reduces harm in the long term.

I don't think there's anything fundamental to rule out the possibility that this second membership criteria is 'those aims which we are biologically programmed to have as such aims'.

You might say "Ah, but what if there's a thing we ought to do that is not biological in origin, that disproves the theory". True, but you'd have to a) show that there is such a thing, and b) show that you're not wrong about its membership of that set. It's (b) that causes the most problem for your argument. See, if I were to say "we ought to punch an old lady every day" you'd tell me, in no uncertain terms, that I was wrong, I'd made a mistake, that in spite of my feeling the world ought to be that way, I'm mistaken about the inclusion of that particular desire in the set of desire which are 'moral'. So for every counter-example you give of a desire which is not biological in origin, it's possible that you too are mistaken about its inclusion in the set of such desires which are 'moral'.

Ultimately, 'moral' is just a word we use to apply to a loose affiliation of behaviours, and personally I very much doubt there more that links all those behaviour than there is which links all the things we use the word 'game' for. Nothing more than a 'family resemblance'. But regardless of my own personal theory, I don't see we have the theoretical foundation as yet to rule out the possibility that the factor which, in fact, links all those behaviours we use the word for, is actually their having a specific biological origin.

First of all lets assume that future societies do manage to find out that a currently "immoral" practice X does promote the well being of individual members and society's as a whole in the near or far future. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not talking about finding out in future, I'm talking about a disagreement in predictions. If your metric is the harm to well-being an action might cause then you're always predicting the future since you're always talking about consequences. You say "hitting that person is bad because it will cause then harm, not "hitting that person is bad because it has caused them harm".

I'm pointing out that one could then say "yes, but it will cause them an even greater well-being further on"

It's not about updating our evidence. Lets assume we have a fixed amount of evidence for the time-being. We'd still be able to use that fixed amount of evidence to prove both arguments (the short term harm or the long term benefit). What I'm describing, in a roundabout way, is really just an example of the general problem of underdetermination applied to your 'moral science' - the same body of evidence can used to support multiple theories.

no immoral behavior against a specific population or members of a society can be justified as moral just because other larger populations (in future or contemporary) are benefited by it. — Nickolasgaspar

Possibly. But that begs the question. You're already describing the behaviour in question as immoral and we're talking about determining whether a behaviour is immoral or not. If what you mean to say is "no harmful behaviour against a specific population or members of a society can be justified as moral just because other larger populations (in future or contemporary) are benefited by it." Then clearly that's wrong (or you disagree with much of what's considered moral), because such behaviours are considered moral all the time, such as imprisonment of criminals, for example.

Don't let the door hit your ass on your way out. — Olivier5

...he said, trying a more absurdist ploy — John Hegley

The Nazis were definitely wrong. Im not so sure "We" are right. The world is not so black and white. — Merkwurdichliebe


Sometimes it is. — RogueAI

So the first task is to determine which cases are black and white and which aren't.

Is that decision black and white?

Your disingenuousness isn't the interesting matter here. If that's all you're prepared to offer at the moment I'll wait for another opportunity where you might be more candid.

You mistook me for someone who cares what you talk about very much. I don't. — Olivier5

How's that in the least bit relevant to...

What are your reasons for thinking we ought not discuss the role of the US, Europe and NATO? — Isaac

...?

You presumably have an opinion on whether one ought to discuss the role of the US, Europe and NATO? You presumably have reasons for that opinion. I'm asking what they are. What I choose to do doesn't enter into it.

the real discussion is like this:

We say: "the Russians are terrible for doing X...

You say: "yes but the US also does X..."

Or: "The US does Y which is worse..."

Not vice versa... — Olivier5

Yes, obviously. But no-one is complaining about that. The part of the conversation I'm asking about is why you then say

"yes but Russia also does X..."

or: "Russia does Y which is worse..."

...and proceed to disparage the comment, infer (or often just directly say) that we're Putin apologists, that we're on Russia's side, that we're condoning their actions...etc

The reasoning for the first half I've already given...

We do have both a say and a duty to hold our own governments to account. So doing so is not only useful but necessary. — Isaac

...and...

We have no say whatsoever over Russian policy so whinging about it is nothing but empty virtue signalling. — Isaac

So I've explained why, when you say about Russia's crimes I'm inclined to say "what about America?". I'm now asking you in return why, when I talk about American culpability, you're so inclined to say "Yes, but what about Russia?"

If anyone is interested, there are other versions on the web which might be accessible there in Timbuktu. — T Clark

The relevant chapter of the Handbook of moral development is also available online here

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/f/1145/files/2017/10/Wynn-Bloom-Moral-Handbook-Chapter-2013-14pwpor.pdf

If I kill a murderer right before he manages to kill my wife....I did harm a person but can we say I did an immoral act. No, because an act that is in favor of the well being of our society and its members is moral by definition. — Nickolasgaspar

Right. So for any moral choice, one might say (using your 'metrics'). "Look, see how much harm action X is doing, it's surely immoral".

But someone else might say, using the exact same metrics, " Ah, you just wait another 20 years, you'll find that society as a whole has benefitted from allowing/encouraging action X more than enough to make up for the temporary harm it did"

Then someone else might say, using the exact same metrics, " Ah, you just wait another 200 years, you'll find that society as a whole has been harmed by allowing/encouraging action X more than that temporary benefit the first 20 years allowed us"

...and so on.

Rendering your 'metrics' utterly useless as means by which we can make morality objective.

There is a categorical difference here. Those countries fighting in the Ukraine war, vs those not fighting. Two different categories. — Olivier5

You were referring to responsibility...

This makes a big difference in terms of involvement and hence responsibility. — Olivier5

...you could at least follow your own argument.
How does who's actually fighting create a categorical difference. Again, Putin is not actually fighting. He's ordering, encouraging orchestrating the fighting, but not actually doing it. The US are playing a similar role (with the exception of ordering).

Notwithstanding any of that, you've not explained why the question of who is actually fighting has any bearing on the question of whom we ought discuss.

You can mention whatever. — Olivier5

I'm not asking for your permission, I'm interrogating your reasons. What are your reasons for thinking we ought not discuss the role of the US, Europe and NATO?

All my favorite philosophers are dead. Their accounts of the source of morality are more satisfying to me than those put forth by living writers. I would think Wayfarer could make a similar argument. — Joshs

An argument for preference, yes. The claim I took issue with was about the difficulties of not using religious doctrine.

That would be a bit like me claiming it was generally difficult to see how society could live without Talisker because it's my favourite whiskey. I would find it hard, but I've no difficulty understanding how society at large wouldn't.

There's thousands of cultists, gurus, prophets and Messiahs right now. You (or @Wayfarer) may not personally like what any of them have to say, but that doesn't make it hard to see how morality from divine revelation could work without religious doctrine. On the contrary, it's easy to see how, we just need to ask one of thousands of cultists, gurus, prophets and Messiahs we have with us right now what's morally right and what's immoral.

I don't know the circumstances well enough. Perhaps something more simple. Denying a child sweets. Clearly causes measurable harm in the short term (crying, loss of pleasure), but the aim is greater good in the long term (health, and perhaps learning forbearance).

NATO have no troops fighting in Ukraine, the Russians do. This makes a big difference in terms of involvement and hence responsibility. — Olivier5

Indeed. I don't see anyone denying a difference in scale. You are attempting something much more categorical than that.

Why does the difference in the scale of responsibility mean we can discuss one party ad infinitum but should never mention the other?

Try be serious. — Olivier5

You first. You excluded talk of the US, Europe and NATO because this is about Ukraine. Why are they excluded but not Putin?

You'd argue that despite not being in Ukraine, Putin is responsible for the events there and integral to how any solution might work.

That's exactly the same argument by which discussion about the US, Europe and NATO is included.

Most important part surely is with the Ukrainians and Putin's armed forces. — ssu

Why?

my government is assisting Ukraine, sending them weapons. And with the words of our Prime minister, believing that Ukraine will win. And soon joining NATO. — ssu

So waive a flag.

We are here to talk about Ukraine — Olivier5

Then why do you keep going on about Putin? He's not even in Ukraine.

timescale is not relevant. — Nickolasgaspar

If some course of action causes harm in the short term but greater good in the long term is is moral or not?

humans don't possess an innate ability to discern the good, at least not without training in philosophy, which is concerned with discerning the good, and the curriculum of philosophy is in learning that skill. — Wayfarer

I included that (plus divine revelation) when I said...

Enlightened, divinely inspired, directly in touch with god...if you like, yeah. But still people. — Isaac

...

The point is there are more people alive now than have ever been. So if some small portion of humanity are open to enlightenment or divine revelation, then what those people are saying about morality right now is a better guide than what a far smaller group said about it in the past.

In other words, why are you privileging ancient people's access to god (which they then wrote down) over modern people's access to god.

Specific metrics in behavior(altruism, truthfulness, respectful etc) is how we know that well being is reinforced among members of a society.
So if specific behavior undermines well being or the prospect of it then we can objectively make a judgment for its immoral nature. — Nickolasgaspar

Over what timescale?

I think that in a thread about the war in Ukraine you should dare to talk about what is happening in Ukraine. — ssu

I am talking about what's happening in Ukraine. The US, Europe and NATO are instrumental parts of what's happening in Ukraine. Not only that, but they're the parts toward which we bear some responsibility. That makes them not only part of what's happening, but the most important part.

If that is somehow futile virtue signalling for you, I guess it's you who needs therapy here. — ssu

Announcing who is morally wrong and ignoring your own culpability and responsibility is literally virtue signalling. Its the definition of the term.

Other than NATO enlargement being this reason for Russia to attack Ukraine (and for many, the absolutely only important reason) or that the US gave support to Ukrainian protesters in 2014, what is the issue why a thread about Ukraine and the war in Ukraine has to be about the US? — ssu

Add to that the US warmongering to enhance arms sales and reconstruction loans, and the US deliberately spreading misinformation to those ends then - nothing more.

Is that not enough? They've been instrumental in causing the war, perpetuating the war, and lying about the war...and you're seriously attempting some faux surprise about what they're doing in a thread about the war?

If Russia does terrible things in Ukraine and this is a thread about Ukraine, what is wrong with then discussing this? — ssu

As I said, it's futile virtue signalling which draws attention away from the malpractice of those powers which we both can and ought hold to account. We're not your therapists, if you're upset about the bad things that are happening, talk to a professional. If you're proud of what your government are doing, buy a flag.

So your critical about your governments. Fine. But just what has it have to do with Ukraine? Focus should be on what is going to happen in Ukraine. — ssu

It is. As I said, the US and Europe are key players in Ukraine. Cause, motivation, solution. They are deeply entwined in all three.

And that seems a very hard thing to discern sans a religious doctrine. — Wayfarer

How so? Religious doctrine is written by people, no? Enlightened, divinely inspired, directly in touch with god...if you like, yeah. But still people.

So religious doctrine with regard to morality is to act as a past record of what people had found out about it.

Now. Why do we need a past record of what people had found out about it? Why not a current one? There are more people alive now than have ever been, so more people now should be directly in touch with god than have ever been.

Keeping a past record seems little more than archiving. If we want to know what's moral according to divine rule we'd be statistically better off consulting the current crop of religious cults than the written record of the previous crop.

We do have both a say and a duty to hold our own governments to account. So doing so is not only useful but necessary. — Isaac

Yes. And notice that both me and Christoffer have talked about what our governments are doing about the situation. — ssu

I've read you both being broadly supportive of it, particularly the moves in the direction of NATO. So all the more odd then that you seem so opposed to us criticising our governments without you having to constantly undermine the power of that complaint by pointing out how some other government has done the same, or worse.