Thanks for the thoughtful reply. Glad to see you using the notion of direction of fit. And yes, there is more to fitting word to desire than just moral claims, and preferences are not necessarily moral.

I don't agree that 'those aims which we are biologically programmed to have as such aims' is up to the task. More could be said, but to give a counterexample, we are presumably biologically programmed to drink, but drinking is not a moral act.The counterexample is not a moral case that is not biological programmed, but a biological program that is not moral. Being biologically programmed is not enough to mark something as moral rather then a preference.

I think the additional aspect that makes a statement moral is, at least in part, that were as a preference sets out what you want and hence applies to you, moral statements are taken as applying to others as well as to you. It's as if you were to claim that everyone ought drink whiskey. Preferences apply to you; moral statements apply generally, or at least to those in the same given situation. They apply to others as well as to oneself.

Now I think this is enough to mark moral discussion as different to mere preference, and contrast it with statements of fact. Moral discourse is about our relations with others.

I wonder, where did you get that idea from? — Banno

The fact–value distinction is derived from the is–ought problem in moral philosophy as characterized by David Hume. This is the fundamental epistemological distinction described between:

1. 'Statements of fact' ('positive' or 'descriptive statements'), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method.
2. 'Statements of value' ('normative' or 'prescriptive statements'), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology.

So I'm saying that the former are primarily quantitative in nature, and hence capable of objective validation. The latter are primarily qualitative in nature and so are not subject to objective validation, although this doesn't imply that they're 'merely subjective', either. It is the orthodox interpretation of the import of the is/ought problem.

So I'm saying that the former are primarily quantitative in nature, and hence capable of objective validation. The latter are primarily qualitative in nature. — Wayfarer

Interesting. No, I disagree. quantitative/qualitative differences are distinct from descriptive/normative differences, as the examples I gave show. I do not think values are primarily qualitative.

Your examples are not conclusive. Regarding whether 'clouds are fluffy' or not, it is a factual matter. If in such cases the terms can't be defined clearly enough to be decided objectively, then it's ambiguous. Regarding how many apples should be in the basket, that is predicated on whether your calculation is correct, or whether you were possessed of the relevant data when you declared there ought to be five apples. You're not saying there ought to be five apples because it would be ideal, but that according to your calculations there should be five, which will either be correct or not. So you're not using 'should' in the normative sense in that context.

None of which makes your case.

Now I think this is enough to mark moral discussion as different to mere preference, and contrast it with statements of fact. Moral discourse is about our relations with others. — Banno

Is it though? Can we not think of mind-to-world statements about our relations with others that are still not moral statements? Perhaps "we ought to speak loudly enough to be heard". Not a mere preference (I'm clearly saying others ought do this too), but not a moral statement, I don't think, merely a pragmatic one?

Maybe you have a broader definition of 'moral' than I do?

As I said, I'm personally inclined toward the idea that 'moral' statements have only a sort of family resemblance in common, that there's no one factor relating them all, but rather some collection of factors any group of which might be sufficient.

Incidentally (to those who would cite neuroscience @Nickolasgaspar), the neuroscience clearly back me up here. Far from there being some 'morality' brain region, there are, in fact, several regions involved in moral decision making and all of them overlap with other aspects of thought (such as disgust, in-out group determination, empathy...) such that we can say with some certainty that more than one method is employed.

Those evaluations are clearly predictions. "the effect on well-being of X will be", not "the effect on well-being of X was" — Isaac

even it they are "predictions"what is the issue? The accepted principles and our extended list of examples remove the risk.

Well-being definitely drops just after being denied sweets, raises again on enjoying a healthy weight and full set of teeth in later life. — Isaac

Again Pleasure is not a metric for well being on its own. As I pointed out to you forbidding small children to swim alone in deep water, or playing with matches or doing drugs might limit their pleasure but NOT their well being....since well being except of being "well" also has the condition of "being" (being/staying alive).
So limiting the sugar intake of children only affects instant pleasure, not their well being.

A more extreme example is in every form of criminal punishment - the well-being of the person concerned drops during the punishment, but supposedly rises again as they enjoy being a member of a society in which their particular crime is thereby discouraged — Isaac

A criminal is consider an enemy of society and this is why he is isolated from it. They are people who undermined the well being of others and society's as a whole.

There are correction systems in Northern Europe where the well being of convicts is taken in to account . The main priority of their system is for the individual to be able to returning back to his society without suffering. So the correction period is much different from conventional solutions that aim to make those people value well being by depriving it from them.

No. That's not what underderemination describes. — Isaac

Again you are confusing a steady principle with fluctuating facts of different cases. The objective principle will allow objective evaluations independent of how different random cases are.

That's what I'm saying. All such acts do in one timescale and do not in others. It cannot be determined. they all cause harm in the short term to individuals with the intention of reducing harm in the long term to society, but since the term is not fixed it cannot ever be demonstrated that they do, in fact, achieve this end. — Isaac

-I will try, once again to bring some facts in this conversation of abstracts by listing two acts that are objectively immoral.
1. a society that allows kid raping
2. a society that allows owning other people as property
Can we agree that ending up as a slave or being rapped during our childhood years are both immoral under any context?
Can we agree that a society allowing such acts will reduce the well being of its members.
Can you identify any other metric that would be affected and that could be used as a principle in our evaluations on what is moral or immoral?

It's not about the metrics, it's about what we do with the uncertainty over their application. even if I were determined to cause no harm, such determination would not be sufficient as I would not have any way of knowing which behaviours avoided harm over any given timescale. — Isaac

-I feel like we are talking about two different things and the problem is that none of the interlocutors in this thread is willing to test the principle by checking whether well being is a common denominator in all our moral judgements.!

Here is a set of questions for you.

Do you care about your well being, are you ok with acts by others that affect it?
Do you know many people that do not care about their well being, are they ok with acts that reduce it?
How can you call acts that endanger your well being ?

Can we not think of mind-to-world statements about our relations with others that are still not moral statements? Perhaps "we ought to speak loudly enough to be heard". Not a mere preference — Isaac

Oh, let me be clear, I do not think that mind-to-world statements mark moral statements. Moral statements are a sub-class of mind-to-world statements, alongside preferences and a wide range of other such devices. John Searle hives a detailed analysis; that moral statements differ from mere preferences (your whiskey example) in being about other people, but yes, there may remain mind-to-world statements that are about others that are not moral. It's just that moral statements areat least mind-to-world statements involving others. I see what I said before could be misinterpreted.

I'll leave the brain science to you, but it would very much surprise me if there had been found some "moral region" in the brain. Morality is too much a part of our actions and our relations and our language for it to have been so localised.

So giving a command has the direction of fit mind-to-world, involves others, but would not ordinarily be considered a moral act.

Do you care about your well being, are you ok with acts by others that affect it? — Nickolasgaspar

These are the Sam Harris type questions, whenever he talks about Wellbeing as the basis for secular morality. I generally accept these sorts of arguments.

How can you call acts that endanger your well being ? — Nickolasgaspar

Not sure what this question means. Do you mean, 'What can you call...?'

Can morality be absolute? — PhilosophyRunner

Sure, in two ways: internally and externally...

If rape is wrong because we have agreed it is wrong, it is good when we change our mind. — Hanover

But rape is something that moral language has made an obvious example of "not good". So no, the language doesn't have to allow disagreement on the issue. Anyone changing their mind to the extent of wanting to call such a behaviour "good" will not be credited with having contributed to the system of usage. They are deemed simply not to speak the language. They don't know the meaning of "good".

This doesn't mean that a system exhibiting such internal absolutism can't allow internal relativism as well. It will rely on at least one buffer zone between obviously good and obviously wrong, which creates disputed borders, representing differing or changing minds, or differing contexts. (Lying surely lies on such a border.) But this may well serve to keep obviously good absolutely apart from obviously wrong. As explained here.

If you mean, rape is good when we change our system, or moral language... well, could we, just like that?

If you mean, rape is good when we or some alien culture develops or evolves a totally different moral language... well, maybe, but only until the different cultures meet. External absolutism happens because language systems are unbridled in their ambition. They presume to refer universally. So when they discover each other they have to merge, and contradictions have to be ironed out. Statements previously shown true are now shown false. Things that were acceptable in the 80's are now seen to have been wrong. (I guess the song has examples? lol. But obviously history has plenty of serious ones.)

To be honest I am not familiar with Sam Harri's philosophy on morality or better I have listened to a talk of his many years ago but I don't recall his opinions.
And yes...that should be a "what"...lol

None of which makes your case. — Banno

I have no need to make a case for something which is laid out in any textbook in plain English.

Can morality be absolute? — PhilosophyRunner
-The correct answer for the initial question is No since moral declarations ignore different situation and cases.

-"Sure, in two ways: internally and externally... — bongo fury

"
-that claim carries no epistemic value without defining the aspect the spatial designations you use.

If rape is wrong because we have agreed it is wrong, it is good when we change our mind. — Hanover

But rape is something that moral language has made an obvious example of "not good". So no, the language doesn't have to allow disagreement on the issue — bongo fury

-The correct question should be "is sex immoral" and the answer is "it depends"....proving once again that moral evaluations of specific acts can not be absolute. Now if one asks Is sex without consent immoral (rape) then the answer is yes for that specific situation.

I don't think it is. Have you a reference?

wow I am getting old. I just remember reading a really think book "the moral landscape" by Sam Harris many years ago!

even it they are "predictions"what is the issue? — Nickolasgaspar

The issue is as I've described it, one of underdetermination.

Again Pleasure is not a metric for well being on its own. As I pointed out to you forbidding small children to swim alone in deep water, or playing with matches or doing drugs might limit their pleasure but NOT their well being....since well being except of being "well" also has the condition of "being" (being/staying alive).
So limiting the sugar intake of children only affects instant pleasure, not their well being. — Nickolasgaspar

Sugar intake is not fatal, so excess does not limit 'being'. You're in danger of using the vagueness of 'well-being' to make it fit whatever act you've predetermined to be moral. To avoid this, give a clear definition of what you mean by 'well-being'.

A criminal is consider an enemy of society and this is why he is isolated from it. They are people who undermined the well being of others and society's as a whole. — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not in need of an explanation for criminal punishment, I'm pointing out that it harms the well-being of some in the short-term to benefit the well-being of many in the long term.

The objective principle will allow objective evaluations independent of how different random cases are. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, no. Again, that's what underdetermination describes (did you read the link?). The 'evaluations' will always support more than one course of action in any moral dilemma (in your system) because the data on well-being will always underdetermine the theory (what course of action is most 'moral').

-I will try, once again to bring some facts in this conversation of abstracts by listing two acts that are objectively immoral.
1. a society that allows kid raping
2. a society that allows owning other people as property
Can we agree that ending up as a slave or being rapped during our childhood years are both immoral under any context?
Can we agree that a society allowing such acts will reduce the well being of its members.
Can you identify any other metric that would be affected and that could be used as a principle in our evaluations on what is moral or immoral? — Nickolasgaspar

To the first question, yes. We can agree, but that's just because you and I already think that way. Others disagree and we cannot persuade them objectively, by using your 'metrics'.

We might say "keeping slaves harms the well-being of the slaves and so is immoral". Someone else might say "keeping slaves does cause that harm, but it is outweighed by the greater benefit to society's well-being brought about by the increased economic growth, so the slaves ought to put up with their bonds for the greater good". Both arguments use the same metric - the well-being of society - just over different timescales. We might say "but look at societies with slavery, they perform no better than societies without, that disproves your theory" and they could reply "wait another twenty years, the benefits take time to accrue".

If, on the other hand, you say that no-one's well-being should be harmed at all for the greater good, nor for any hyperbolic discounting, then you have yourself a definition of well-being that can only be assessed on the last day of one's life - did it indeed turn out that going through all that exercise was worth the temporary drop in well-being, or did I, in fact, just get run over by a bus on the way home from the gym?

All moral dilemmas involve some sacrifice in well-being either at the individual level, or the short-term. If they didn't they wouldn't be dilemmas, they'd just be thing we want to do anyway. So it's always a weighing exercise, which means that there's always an argument as to how much weight to give each part. You don't, therefore, resolve those decisions by telling people what it is they're weighing (well-being, harm, pleasure...whatever), because the real dilemma is how much weight to give to individuals vs others, to long-term vs short-term, to nation vs world... etc. Competing interests.

there may remain mind-to-world statements that are about others that are not moral. It's just that moral statements are at least mind-to-world statements involving others. I see what I said before could be misinterpreted. — Banno

Absolutely, so we're left (are we not) with at least one factor that might be common to all moral statements that is neither their direction of fit, nor their subject matter ('how we interact with others'). Those are perhaps necessary, but not sufficient to qualify a statement as being a member of the set {moral statements}.

Even though I don't personally hold to the idea, I think that 'being a particular kind of biological urge' cannot be ruled out as a candidate for that additional factor.

It would, as you say, have to be a particular kind of biological urge, as just any old biological urge might not be sufficient (although together with those other two criteria...?). If, in theory, we could identify some sub-class of biological urge which satisfied a one-to-one relationship with all moral statements, then we would, theoretically, have shown that the full criteria for being in the class {moral statements} was 1) being of a mind to world direction of fit, 2) being about how we act toward others, and 3) being of a certain sub-class of biological urges.

Personally, however, I don't think we'll find such a sub-class. reason being, as I said, that moral decision making seems to involve a dozen or more completely unrelated 'biological urges' ranging from disgust through in-group identity, social norms, empathy, and plain old Machiavellian tit-for-tat reciprocity.

Hence, I think that last criteria for membership of the set {moral statements} is of a family resemblance kind. No one criteria, but any one of a wide set.

For clarity... I take a linguistic view. That which is 'moral' is that for which we use the word 'moral' and are understood. So if I say "punching old ladies is moral" I've not made a factual error, I've simply misunderstood the meaning of the word 'moral' it's not used to describe the sort of thing punching old ladies is.

without defining the aspect the spatial designations you use. — Nickolasgaspar

The dot dot dot meant "please read on for clarification".

Now if one asks Is sex without consent immoral (rape) then the answer is yes for that specific situation. — Nickolasgaspar

Well yes, that was my starting point.

because we are talking about a "job" called reason and wisdom.? — Nickolasgaspar

Still...it makes no sense to have more people than absolutely necessary to accomplish a given task.

The history of the world is but the biography of great men (sic). — Thomas Carlyle (Great Man (sic) Theory)

I can't wrap my head around the so-called is/ought problem. An ought is meaningless unless there's an is that it's designed to correct, oui?

An ought requires two conditions:

1. A set of values which serves as the standard for comparison.

2. An is i.e. the current state of affairs.

first of all reasoning and arriving to wise claims is not a job. Its a property that is essential for all societies since it affects politics public opinion etc.

-" The history of the world is but the biography of great men (sic)."
What does that say for those great men, when our history is a mesh?

You're free to disagree, but don't do it just so you can. I, for one, am sold on Thomas Carlyle's idea about how only a few thousand or so men & women have been responsible for humanity's successes and failures.

unfortunately I have to agree with you on that...lol =p
The fact is that majority of humans are not responsible for this think called human history.

unfortunately — Nickolasgaspar

:lol:

The issue is as I've described it, one of underdetermination. — Isaac

-And I've already explained why that is irrelevant to a system based on a core principle that enables objective evaluations on any given evidence.

Sugar intake is not fatal, so excess does not limit 'being'. — Isaac

Obviously moderate sugar intake is not a problem but since we are in a middle of an obesity epidemic (for decades) any intake adds to the problem. In addition to that the mechanism of sugar in the brain resembles that of opioids.
Societies have all kind of rules that t put limits on human behavior, especial to those who don't have the brain to deal with more mature decisions (kids) and those who can become a victim of addiction.


Do you really equate rules that train people to avoid easy ways to reward their brains with morality and well being????
So according to your opinion, because guys who live in the city center enjoy speeding we shouldn't remove all the rules that govern those streets?
Seeking pleasure in life can have negative effects on our well being.

I'm not in need of an explanation for criminal punishment, I'm pointing out that it harms the well-being of some in the short-term to benefit the well-being of many in the long term. — Isaac

Sure but that doesn't have an impact on well being as a principle for morality within a society. Criminals owe to society or a society needs to keep them away. Depending on the individual, either we can either train him to respect the well being of others or if that is impossible we need to keep him away for good. In both cases his actions turned society against him and his well being is located outside of his society.

Well, no. Again, that's what underdetermination describes (did you read the link?). The 'evaluations' will always support more than one course of action in any moral dilemma (in your system) because the data on well-being will always underdetermine the theory (what course of action is most 'moral'). — Isaac

-Again no, underdetermination addresses evidence ,not moral evaluations based on an objective principles. There is a reason why our morality has being evolving for thousands of years....because we constantly have being dealing with new evidence (and old minds). The issue is more with outdated minds and biases than completely new evidence. I.e. there aren't any evidence that could render the act of owning other people as property moral. We are done with that.

Do I think that it is a recipe with a guaranteed 100% success and no room for improvement!? OF course not but the good news is that we have an objective foundation to work with even if new evidence might delay our decisions. Underdetermination is not an unmovable obstacle in interpreting evidence and you shouldn't present it as such.

To the first question, yes. We can agree, but that's just because you and I already think that way. — Isaac

What do you mean "just because you and we already think that way. Do you think that you would like as a kid(would increase your well being) to live in a society where raping you was thought to be a moral act? Our thoughts are IRRELEVANT. ITs our biology and reality that decide what is moral and what is not( I explained that to Tom). Does it mean that there are ideas that affect our thoughts and moral judgments? Sure but that is the whole reason why I advocate an objective System.
A society that justifies kid rapping doesn't act in favor of its member's well being. Violated individuals will have to deal with psychopathy in the future....and you know what that means for that society.

-"Others disagree and we cannot persuade them objectively, by using your 'metrics'."
-no no no, others might disagree but that doesn't make our evaluation subjective
Don't present it as if it does. Those individuals do not use objective criteria and principles.

We might say "keeping slaves harms the well-being of the slaves and so is immoral". Someone else might say "keeping slaves does cause that harm, but it is outweighed by the greater benefit to society's well-being brought about by the increased economic growth, so the slaves ought to put up with their bonds for the greater good". — Isaac

-Do you think it subjective moral evaluation if your society allows you one day to become a slave?

You see most of you make a huge error in your moral evaluations. You talk about the act as if your are not part of the scenario.
You need to place yourself in the middle of this scenario and you should evaluate how an act feels when it affects YOUR well being.
I think this is the most important point I can stress in our conversation.

If, on the other hand, you say that no-one's well-being should be harmed at all for the greater good, — Isaac

-This notion of "greater good" is your artifact. I don't use it since, as I said before it sound like a political excuse used to undermine the well being of the society and all its members.
The metric is Well being.

All moral dilemmas involve some sacrifice in well-being either at the individual level, or the short-term. — Isaac

Are you including the suppressed sexual appetite of a child molester? You do understand that our well being must not to suppress other people's well being. You need to realize that from the moment a an individual affects the well being of others and their society, there is no DILEMMAS no matter how suppressed they feel.
This is why I constantly mention all the members and their society as a whole.

Societies have all kind of rules that t put limits on human behavior, especial to those who don't have the brain to deal with more mature decisions (kids) and those who can become a victim of addiction. — Nickolasgaspar

In what storyline do you think I'm someone who doesn't know that? I presume none (you may imagine a young child has joined, but a simple check of my vocabulary should eliminate that possibility). So simply telling me stuff I clearly already know doesn't constitute an argument. You have to relate it to the point being disputed, which, in this case, is your definition of 'well-being'.

How do you measure well-being? That seems key to the disagreement. You keep dismissing things (pleasure, desires...) but you've not replaced those with anything. If well-being is your key metric it needs a clear definition, no?

To the first question, yes. We can agree, but that's just because you and I already think that way. Others disagree and we cannot persuade them objectively, by using your 'metrics'.

We might say "keeping slaves harms the well-being of the slaves and so is immoral". Someone else might say "keeping slaves does cause that harm, but it is outweighed by the greater benefit to society's well-being brought about by the increased economic growth, so the slaves ought to put up with their bonds for the greater good". Both arguments use the same metric - the well-being of society - just over different timescales. We might say "but look at societies with slavery, they perform no better than societies without, that disproves your theory" and they could reply "wait another twenty years, the benefits take time to accrue". — Isaac

I think you have summarised nicely the shortfalls in the wellbeing argument. I have generally taken the view that for secular morality, wellbeing can work as a tentative foundation - subject to ongoing clarifications and refinements - which for me is an improvement on debating the putative will of gods which humans can't agree on. It's definitely flawed or incomplete, but I'm not aware of anything better for now.