I need you to explain how Russia’s legitimate security concerns is at the same time actually related to Russian security and to a flag on top of the parliament building in Ukraine based on your “parenthesised part”. — neomac
The part in parentheses was "even if sometimes only figuratively", Ie not necessarily referring to an actual flag. The flag represents control by the government of that country. Control over some aspect of Ukraine's government (either by having them sign a binding agreement, or by installing a friendly 'puppet' governor in some region) would reduce their risk from foreign influence.
You not only misunderstood what I said but also missed to fully quote me, as I explicitly asked. So here is the full quotation: “I 100% agree with you, if the independence war Ukraine is fighting against Russian military oppression, can be reasonably rendered as a fight over an ornament of a Parliament building. ”
My agreement was conditional. — neomac
Well then your agreement is nonsensical. I don't know what more to say. Either fighting over national identity is wrong or it isn't. It doesn't become wrong or right based on the interpretation of some specific historical event. If your agreement that "fighting over a flag is always wrong" is dependant on how the Ukraine war is interpreted, then how did you decide before Russia invaded Ukraine?
“For me it’s matter of Ukrainian national security vs Russian oppressive expansionism”, so the issue has nothing to do with a flag as piece of colored fabric decorating a building — neomac
Right. So you'd have to forward some argument to that effect. It's no good just saying 'for me' at the beginning and expecting that to act as an excuse not to supply any reasoning at all. Why do you see it as a matter of Ukrainian national security vs Russian oppressive expansionism. Why not, for example, a matter of American expansionism vs Russian expansionism? To quote from the article
@StreetlightX posted earlier...
This definition, which requires an inter-imperialist war to be one where both sides are seeking to conquer each other’s territory, doesn’t even fit the Second World War. British and French imperialism weren’t interested in seizing German territory, but in hanging onto their already overstretched empires. And Hitler wasn’t particularly interested in these. It was eastern Europe and the Soviet Union he was after. — Alex Callinicos
...expansionism isn't always about territory.
if “it must be perfectly possible to negotiate even in situations where your counter party is going to lie because diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works” expresses a logic claim — neomac
It doesn't.
if diplomats lie all the time (which already sounds as an exaggeration) they lie also when they claim to have found an agreement at the end of their negotiation sessions, so no negotiation agreements would be reliable and the practice itself would be pointless. — neomac
Not at all. Diplomats are not the arbiters of whether a negotiation has worked. If a process stops the war, everyone can see that it has worked, we don't rely on diplomats to tell us this.
If “it must be perfectly possible to negotiate even in situations where your counter party is going to lie because diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works” is an empirical inductive generalisation and “diplomats lie all the time” just a gross exaggeration, it can be statistically true, and yet lead to fallible predictions in the given circumstances — neomac
Of course. But I'm not the one claiming that it will not work. I'm only claiming that it might. I only need to demonstrate that it is possible in order to substantiate that claim. Those who argue that Ukraine shouldn't negotiate because Putin lies, have the much harder task of demonstrating that such a process
never works, otherwise it'd still be advisable to try.
What is morally/strategically interesting is precisely to understand how geopolitical agents come to think “they have the better deal by ending hostilities than by continuing them — neomac
That matter is undeniably secondary to actually partaking in negotiations. The parties involved must actually be negotiating in order for it to even be a question.
I’m not relying on any specific expert’s views, and more importantly I already provided to you some of the main arguments I find persuasive. — neomac
That wasn't the point against which I argued. I don't have a problem with the fact that there are arguments exculpating America which are persuasive. I was arguing against...
the claim that the West recklessly and knowingly provoked Putin into waging war against Ukraine at the expense of million of innocent civilians doesn’t seem to me supported by a more objective understanding of the historical and strategic interactions between Ukraine, Russia and the West with its related moral implications. — neomac
...that you find some arguments persuasive is irrelevant to this claim. Your claim is that arguments of America's culpability are
not supported by an objective analysis of the facts. I asked how you justify that claim when so many experts, after having made an objective analysis of the facts, reach a different conclusion.
1. Ukraine is the oppressed and not Russia, and the West is helping the oppressed not the oppressor — neomac
The west is delivering weapons to the oppressed. Whether that's 'helping' them depends entirely on your analysis of their options.
2. Ukraine & the West adopted a more “stick & carrot” containment strategy while Russia opted for an invade and wreck aggressive strategy — neomac
So? How many people have the 'stick' immiserated. That's the metric we're interested in, not the method.
3. Whatever action is taken by the West is not coming from the decisions of a single dictatorial leader but of a bunch of democratic leaders with problematic coordination, we can not say the same of Putin — neomac
I don't see what difference this makes if those decisions all tended in much the same direction.
4. Ukraine seems more open to share our views on standard of life and freedoms than Russia. — neomac
What am I supposed to do with that? What evidence to you have? As I've posted many times (to no effect whatsoever), every single metric that humanity has seen fit to produce shows Ukraine and Russia at much the same level in every measure of human well-being. So what makes you think they're 'more like us' than Russia?
it’s enough to give me links to your posts where you mention and/or argue the views of the experts you rely on. — neomac
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/671136, for example.
So you are for pushing Ukraine to concede to Russia all they have demanded (no NATO membership, acknowledgement of Crimean annexation, independence of a couple of Donbas provinces) in exchange to stopping the war. I fail to see how this is a third strategy as you have claimed (“It’s clearly possible to devise strategies which oppose them both”): in what sense is this strategy opposing Russian expansionism? — neomac
1. This gives Russia no more than is de facto the case already, so it doesn't give an inch on Russian expansionism, it just admits that we've failed to contain it peacefully as we should have. Russia already run Crimea, Donbas already has independent parliaments and make independent decisions, NATO have already pretty much ruled out membership for Ukraine, as have Ukraine.
2. I care very little about Russian expansionism when compared to the lives of thousands of innocent Ukrainians. If you want to throw them in front of the tanks to prevent it, that's on you, but I'm not going to support that.
Crimea is a hub of utmost strategic importance in the Black sea for commercial, energetic and military reasons, while the Donbass region is vital for industrial and energetic reasons. So this concession would not only empower Putin to further his expansionist ambitions (e.g. against other European countries), but it will threaten the EU economic security (due to the energetic and alimentary dependency on Ukraine and Russia as Putin’s blackmailing is proving). Not to mention that it will prove the weakness of the West to the world, from its enemies (starting from Russia and China) to its allies (the eastern and central European states).
So such concessions are not only the opposite of containment strategy. But likely a major breaking point for the entire World Order as we know it. In other words, the West and Ukraine have plenty of strategic reasons to keep fighting Russian oppression as long as they can and as best as they can. — neomac
A perfect summary of the West's interests in this war, well done.
Now explain how it's morally acceptable for us to throw Ukrainian civilians in front of Russian tanks to help us achieve these goals.
Even if the concerns are exactly the same, which I questioned because NATO in this case didn’t expand through forceful annexations of other sovereign nation’s territory and this is a crucial point which you should address before anything else when you talk about Russian security concerns, then we should support NATO against Russian expansionism also for moral reasons in addition to the strategic ones — neomac
What 'moral reasons'? (I've addressed the significance of tactics already. There's no inherent moral preference for one tactic over another if both cause the same level of misery)
from a more concrete and personal point of view there is a big difference in how this influence is deployed: e.g. Isis might want to put their flag in our decapitated head, while the US might want to put their flag on the sandwich we are eating. Do you see the difference? Because if you don’t, I do and I value it. — neomac
We're talking about the US and Russia here, not Isis. The US 'method' is causing more deaths in Yemen right now than are being caused in Ukraine by the Russian 'method'. And Yemen isn't even the US's only theatre of war as Ukraine is Russia's.
geopolitics is not all what counts to me.
Russia can try to influence whoever they want the way they see fit to their geopolitical goals, yet I will react differently depending on moral implications and personal preferences. — neomac
Care to expand on these clandestine 'personal preferences'?
I find this line of reasoning analytically too poor and misleading to support such claim about the West: “recklessly endangering millions of people by knowingly provoking a ruthless tyrant without any meaningful protection for those he might attack is immoral”. I explained that to some extent here — neomac
Right. That just goes back to your disagreement that Russia had any reason at all to see NATO's actions as a threat (ie arguing that NATO weren't even shaking the table at all). The problem is, an overwhelming quantity of foreign policy and strategic experts disagree with you and you've not provided a single reason why anyone would take your view over theirs.