"How this could have been prevented" articles.

https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/12906/how-the-war-on-ukraine-could-have-been-avoidable

https://www.dailynews.com/2022/03/07/tragedy-in-ukraine-could-have-been-avoided/

https://scheerpost.com/2022/02/24/not-one-inch-eastward-how-the-war-in-ukraine-could-have-been-prevented-decades-ago/

https://banyanhill.com/this-could-have-prevented-the-tragedy-in-ukraine/

https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-may-have-been-preventable-n1290831

Sure, but pulling back lift cbecause it's a debacle?

Or pulling back because they achieved their core goals through force? — boethius

They haven't achieved anything of note around Kyiv except losing a quarter of their own force. The capital is almost intact. It seems glaringly obvious that they failed to take Kyiv and are now pulling back. No need to invent bizarre convoluted explanations if there is a perfectly simple and good one at hand, fitting everything we know including what the Russian side itself has said and done.

What exactly are you talking about? Are you saying a promise should be made, but with no intention to actually keep it?
— baker

For the sake of peace, a ceasefire deal affected and used as an opportunity to re-think and pursue strategic objectives further down the road when Russia is weakened by sanctions. — FreeEmotion

No, I'm asking you about what so far appears to be your support of acting in bad faith.

Why the insistence on making a tough stand now

For the sake of the ego.

I am learning new and disturbing things about 'our' world, things that do not inspire confidence in a peaceful future.

Then you're late.

And had they taken Kiev, they'd go on to occupy Poland, and so on, right?

They haven't achieved anything of note around Kyiv. — Olivier5

There's no reason to assume Kremlin ever planned to conquer Kiev a la Mariopul (whether the motivation is high to destroy Azov and symbolism is high and it's in the middle of the land bridge they want).

Of course, if they were allowed to just parade down the streets, they would have done so.

But, there's is no actual reason to assume Kremlin has ever wanted to actually conquer Kiev.

The capital is almost intact. — Olivier5

If they wanted to destroy render the capital "not intact" ... they could have easily done so from afar.

No need to invent bizarre convoluted explanations if there is a perfectly simple and good one at hand, fitting everything we know including what the Russian side itself has said and done. — Olivier5

What convoluted explanation? ... it's a pretty usual military tactic to have some manoeuvres (even most) for the purposes of occupying as much of the opposing force as possible in order to then achieve your core objectives.

Yeah, Russians didn't take Kiev, while they secured a land bridge to Crimea, their core security interest.

Their other stated goals?

No Ukraine in NATO. Check.

"Demilitarise" which the President of Finland asked Putin what that meant, which he explained it was currently ongoing; i.e. degrade Ukrainian military capacity, which blowing up bases and equipment and so on accomplishes. Russia can far easier rebuild what it has lost (and still has plenty in reserve anyways) than Ukraine can. It's also been reported, seems by Ukrainian defence ministry, that basically their entire military industry has been blown up.

"De-nazify" basically means Azov battalion, which is in Mariupol anyways, which they need for their land bridge.

"Liberation of the Dombas," is advancing daily.

These are the stated military goals as stated and explained by both Putin and Russian generals.

These were also the core goals as explained by many Western experts before the war started, what Russia may have mobilized for.

It's not "convoluted" to point out they achieved those core goals ... which manoeuvres elsewhere in the country, in particular pressure on the capital, help achieve by spreading forces and supply lines thin (and making it easier to map and blowup said supply lines).

A some 1300 km front has disadvantages to Russia, but so too Ukraine.

Since Russia can easily resupply and reinforce every part of the front by just going in and out and around within Russia, whereas Ukrainians must resupply from Poland and travel up to a 1000 km at risk of bombardment at each step of the supply line, it could be that this strategy was chosen as it has overwhelming advantage to Russia in accomplishing the core objectives.

Of course, the disadvantage of a 4 front war is there's going to be a lot of mad chaos and Ukrainians can easily penetrate lines and ambush and concentrate forces or small victories here and there, and ATGM's and Manpads definitely make life difficult. However, it's still better to have armor than not have armor, and once Russia achieves it's objectives through relentless shelling instead of armor offensives, then it can just dig in and shoulder launch missiles are of little use against a dug-in front (a waste of resources to fire a ATGM or Manpad at a trench or machine-gun nest ... and without mobility you can't really exploit punching through a line anyways).

Likewise, it's been repeated many, many times that the Russians have tried but failed to kill Zelenskyy.

However, some analysists have pointed out that the Soviets killing the president of Afghanistan was a big mistake when they invaded and one of the contributing factors to a prolonged insurgency.

Hence, maybe the Russians learned from that and it's better to not kill the leader of the country you're invading so that there's possibility of legitimate peace terms. If you kill the recognised legitimate leader, you have have no one to negotiate with that both internal and external actors will largely recognise as legitimate.

the selective hysterics over Russia — StreetlightX

I think there's another element to this, pedestrian but powerful:
The EU resents being dependent for resources, doubly so because they are dirty resources that pollute the environment, and so it projects these negative feelings onto the country from which it imports those resources.

Instead of being resentful and haughty toward Russia, the EU should feel humbled that it needs to import the basics.

there's is no actual reason to assume Kremlin has ever wanted to actually conquer Kiev. — boethius

That is truly an absurd statement.

That is truly an absurd statement. — Olivier5

By conquer I mean through urban warfare.

Of course, if Zelenskyy simply capitulated or then Ukrainian forces just surrendered, that would have been preferred.

Almost no one actually prefers an adversary to fight rather than just give up.

However, considering Russia amassed the troops necessary to achieve their stated core objectives (which did not include conquering Kiev in Urban combat) then maybe they had a plan to win the fight (what they wanted to win in a fight) if Ukraine chose to fight.

As for the encirclement of Kiev.

It could be Russians did not want to cut off all access to Kiev or it could be that they would have liked to but advancing became too costly. However, if they achieve their land bridge, and take the rest of Dombas, and destroy Azov in Mariupol, and blowup all the Ukrainian critical logistical network and military infrastructure (by forcing resupply on 4 fronts), then encircling Kiev may have been deemed unnecessary.

In other words, if there is no objective to take Kiev in Urban combat, then encircling Kiev entirely is not really necessary if the general purpose is to just tie-up lots of troops to defend Kiev and force a lot of supplies to go to Kiev.

Likewise, Ukraine will fight fiercely to prevent total encirclement of the capital, so if it's not a core objective then it makes sense a stalemate does arise, as the whole purpose of a pin-down operation is to lower overall losses of your forces.

Again, I would agree that the Russian military would have encircled all of Kiev if they were simply allowed, but there's no reason to assume it was a core objective.

Now, you may say the very low list of objective announced at the start of the war, and essentially hasn't changed, is that the Kremlin were hedging their bets and intended to get more but failed.

Maybe true ... but the very fact someone hedges their bets is that they know ahead of time they may not get everything they want.

The EU resents being dependent for resources, doubly so because they are dirty resources that pollute the environment, and so it projects these negative feelings onto the country from which it imports those resources. — baker

As much as I would like to believe this I would not frame things in these terms. For one, it assumes the EU gives a damn about trading with tyrants. As if it has never willingly accepted blood money without question. Second, never account in terms of feelings what can be accounted for in terms of power. And this is very much about power.

That's quite a stretch and not relevant here. Taking these two territories "only', would have been much less deadlier than a full scale war.

I agree that this goes beyond a mere flag, but the cause is security concerns mixed with nationalism.

There are people just like us in Urkaine - parents with families, wage-earners, people just trying to get along, make a living, live their lives, whose homes are destroyed, loved ones killed, families separated, cities in ruins. And for what? Let's not forget that. — Wayfarer

While living in a democratic country under the rule of law where your neighbor can destroy your home -- and laugh -- and get away with it, is just so much better ...

> So the Russian legitimate security concerns triggered by the West that led to this war ultimately consisted in whose flag is decorating the Ukrainian parliament building. Is this consistent with your claim that a legitimate security interest is an “interest some party might have about their security which actually relates to their security (as opposed to a connection made only for political rhetoric)”? It doesn’t seem to me so because a decorative component of a Parliament building has literally nothing to do with national security — neomac
Did you miss the parenthesised part or do you need me to explain it?

Yes, I need you to explain how Russia’s legitimate security concerns is at the same time actually related to Russian security and to a flag on top of the parliament building in Ukraine based on your “parenthesised part”.


> IT was the bit where you said…
I 100% agree with you — neomac
...just after I'd been talking about fighting over nothing but national identity. Is it that you misunderstood what I was saying

You not only misunderstood what I said but also missed to fully quote me, as I explicitly asked. So here is the full quotation: “I 100% agree with you, if the independence war Ukraine is fighting against Russian military oppression, can be reasonably rendered as a fight over an ornament of a Parliament building. ”
My agreement was conditional. And the antecedent of the conditional doesn’t hold to me, indeed I find it preposterous. I also explained it a few lines later that “For me it’s matter of Ukrainian national security vs Russian oppressive expansionism”, so the issue has nothing to do with a flag as piece of colored fabric decorating a building, unless you take it in some metaphorical sense (the flag as symbolic equivalent to national identity and independence). But also in this case, the problem is that the metaphor, while intelligible, is analytically useless in that e.g. it doesn’t distinguish foreign oppression from fighting against foreign oppression, which I consider relevant for moral assessments and responsibility attributions to geopolitical agents.


> My point is that it must be perfectly possible to negotiate even in situations where your counter party is going to lie because diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works. All that's necessary is for each side to think they have the better deal by ending hostilities than by continuing them. That can be achieved through lies, bribery, honesty, threats, concessions...it doesn't matter. That's what statecraft is.

I find your claim questionable for the following reasons:

• if “it must be perfectly possible to negotiate even in situations where your counter party is going to lie because diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works” expresses a logic claim then it can not be grounded on empirical claims (like “diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works”). Besides it is probably inconsistent: if diplomats lie all the time (which already sounds as an exaggeration) they lie also when they claim to have found an agreement at the end of their negotiation sessions, so no negotiation agreements would be reliable and the practice itself would be pointless. If “it must be perfectly possible to negotiate even in situations where your counter party is going to lie because diplomats lie all the time and yet negotiation works” is an empirical inductive generalisation and “diplomats lie all the time” just a gross exaggeration, it can be statistically true, and yet lead to fallible predictions in the given circumstances: indeed there are negotiations that fail because one of the party perceives the other as too unreliable (see also the current negotiations between Russia and Ukraine). And I doubt that such statistics are relevant for the parties directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations. But probably the specific case studies of Western/Russian past negotiation strategies may be very useful in the negotiation process maybe more than in predicting its outcome.
• “All that's necessary is for each side to think they have the better deal by ending hostilities than by continuing them” sounds true because that’s how negotiations are supposed to work, but it’s also empty of interesting moral/strategic implications. What is morally/strategically interesting is precisely to understand how geopolitical agents come to think “they have the better deal by ending hostilities than by continuing them”, especially on the issue at hand, the war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed geopolitical actors need to do their calculations as reliably as possible based on what they strategically and morally value, and than get reliable assurance that the agreement will be honored as they expect to be by the other parties, especially if there is such a level of mistrust between parties.

> I assumed you were following the thread. I haven't time to have the same conversation separately with every interlocutor I'm afraid. If you also haven't time to keep up with the whole thread then then we're stuck. Why don't we compromise and you tell me which experts are saying that the US is blameless and why you find their arguments persuasive. That's something you've not yet done so you wouldn't be repeating yourself.

I’m not relying on any specific expert’s views, and more importantly I already provided to you some of the main arguments I find persuasive. I must add that I didn’t claim that the US is blameless (whatever it’s supposed to mean), I just gave you my reasons to question your accusations against the West: “recklessly endangering millions of people by knowingly provoking a ruthless tyrant without any meaningful protection for those he might attack is immoral”. Putin’s ambitions are intelligible from a geopolitical point of view as well as western containment strategy against such ambitions. Yet from a moral point of view about the issue at hand I would take into account the distinction between oppressor & oppressed, the nature of the oppression (also wrt its triggers), the nature of the decision process and the value proximity: 1. Ukraine is the oppressed and not Russia, and the West is helping the oppressed not the oppressor 2. Ukraine & the West adopted a more “stick & carrot” containment strategy while Russia opted for an invade and wreck aggressive strategy 3. Whatever action is taken by the West is not coming from the decisions of a single dictatorial leader but of a bunch of democratic leaders with problematic coordination, we can not say the same of Putin 4. Ukraine seems more open to share our views on standard of life and freedoms than Russia.

I can suggest you another compromise: there is no need “to have the same conversation separately with every interlocutor”, it’s enough to give me links to your posts where you mention and/or argue the views of the experts you rely on.


> It’s odd how, when I raise a specific issue about negotiation (Ukraine have lied too, so can't fairly expect Russia to be an honest negotiation partner), you switch to "hypothetical" mode to make your arguments, but when I make hypothetical arguments you won't accept them without specifics…

And what is the specific issue about negotiation you are talking about? Can you exactly quote yourself? Maybe I simply missed it. BTW I already put into account that Ukraine may have lied and be perceived as an untrustworthy party in the negotiation by the Russians: “For example, the Ukrainians can reasonably suspect that a call for negotiation from the Russians is to allow Russians to re-supply their war machine and continue the war. And the Russians can reasonably suspect the same of the Ukrainians. And one of them may be right. So my question is, in this hypothetical situation, are there any alternative moral principles that could tell us how the hypothetical party in “good faith” should proceed, when the other doesn’t seem to be?”
My hypothetical mode of thinking is focused on what we can apply to the case at hand. If you do the same in a way that is understandable to me, I don’t mind if you do it.



> The alternative strategy to arming Ukraine and fighting to the last man is negotiations. Ones involving not only Ukraine and Russia, but America (or NATO) and Europe (EU, or representatives) since the situation involves them too. Russia's existing demands are de facto the case anyway, so they would be a perfectly good starting concession for negotiations.

So you are for pushing Ukraine to concede to Russia all they have demanded (no NATO membership, acknowledgement of Crimean annexation, independence of a couple of Donbas provinces) in exchange to stopping the war. I fail to see how this is a third strategy as you have claimed (“It’s clearly possible to devise strategies which oppose them both”): in what sense is this strategy opposing Russian expansionism?
Anyways, there are many unavoidable reasons why such concessions are geopolitically very problematic for Ukraine, EU and the US, especially Putin’s territorial demands. Crimea is a hub of utmost strategic importance in the Black sea for commercial, energetic and military reasons, while the Donbass region is vital for industrial and energetic reasons. So this concession would not only empower Putin to further his expansionist ambitions (e.g. against other European countries), but it will threaten the EU economic security (due to the energetic and alimentary dependency on Ukraine and Russia as Putin’s blackmailing is proving). Not to mention that it will prove the weakness of the West to the world, from its enemies (starting from Russia and China) to its allies (the eastern and central European states).
So such concessions are not only the opposite of containment strategy. But likely a major breaking point for the entire World Order as we know it. In other words, the West and Ukraine have plenty of strategic reasons to keep fighting Russian oppression as long as they can and as best as they can.


> The 'legitimate security concerns' I believe I've already mentioned. Closer alliances with NATO could allow US or EU military installations in Ukraine. Such installations give Ukraine an advantage in any future negotiations (their meaningful threat level is higher), they act as levers to push Ukraine into further economic union with the EU (harming Russian efforts), and they make Ukraine the stronger opposition in any territorial dispute (such as Crimea) which may hamper further military strength in other areas (as it's a crucial port), finally, actors within Ukraine (such as anti-Russian paramilitaries) are given more strength by being able to shelter under the wing of the stronger Ukraine. It's not rocket science, it's exactly the same concerns NATO have.

Even if the concerns are exactly the same, which I questioned because NATO in this case didn’t expand through forceful annexations of other sovereign nation’s territory and this is a crucial point which you should address before anything else when you talk about Russian security concerns, then we should support NATO against Russian expansionism also for moral reasons in addition to the strategic ones. It’s a shame that the West didn’t handle better this situation and there are probably big mistakes done by the West, and now that the West is in such predicament the West can’t simply step back.


> I thought we'd just done talking about the insignificance of flags?

Only in the sense that I totally disagree with you. So if you take it as a premise of your reasoning, all your reasoning looks as bad as the premise. If not worse.


> China want influence in Taiwan. Their method might be to put their flag over the parliament. The US want influence in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen... Their method is to fight a war to install a US-friendly government under such crippling loan terms that they've little choice to accept US influence. The methods are immaterial here. Both cause massive destruction and loss of innocent life. Both lead their instigators to positions of power.

Well from an abstract geopolitical point of view you can call it influence, but from a more concrete and personal point of view there is a big difference in how this influence is deployed: e.g. Isis might want to put their flag in our decapitated head, while the US might want to put their flag on the sandwich we are eating. Do you see the difference? Because if you don’t, I do and I value it.


> Likewise, Russia could claim that about Syria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the Donbas regions.

Talking about this war, the Donbas region wrt Ukraine doesn’t enjoy the same international status as Taiwan wrt China. But even if we ignore this aspect, still geopolitics is not all what counts to me.
Russia can try to influence whoever they want the way they see fit to their geopolitical goals, yet I will react differently depending on moral implications and personal preferences.


> If there are, say, ten reasons Russia invaded Ukraine, all ten are collectively responsible. It doesn't change that to say "he would have attacked anyway with only five”.

I find this line of reasoning analytically too poor and misleading to support such claim about the West: “recklessly endangering millions of people by knowingly provoking a ruthless tyrant without any meaningful protection for those he might attack is immoral”. I explained that to some extent here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/675364 immediately after your quotation “> No one argued he needed it. A vase doesn't need me to knock it over in order to smash, any number of things might cause that. This doesn't excuse me if I did, in fact, knock it over.”

As much as I would like to believe this I would not frame things in these terms. For one, it assumes the EU gives a damn about trading with tyrants. — StreetlightX

No, I'm saying that they potray them as tyrants.
If, say, tomorrow in France, an enormous store of natural gas would be discovered and France would export it to other countries in great amounts, those other countries would begin to resent France, start painting it as a tyrant. Even though previously, they considered France to be a wonderful, democratic country. Being dependent on someone can have a negative effect on one's morale if left unchecked.

Second, never account in terms of feelings what can be accounted for in terms of power. And this is very much about power.

I'm talking about the lack of decency on the part of the EU, the way it takes for granted natural resources, and doesn't show proper gratitude and respect toward those who give them those natural resources.

Depending for one's basic resources on someone else should fill one with trepidation, not hubris.

The full speech, made in 2005, is in English on the Kremlin website: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931 — jamalrob

I can't access it.

Should be clear enough that Russia has the military resources and location to do whatever here. They've already leveled a number of Ukrainian areas, including civilian/residential. In that respect, they're on the offense, invading, shelling, strategizing, sending people fleeing, doing whatever, certainly not particularly worried about Ukraine (or anyone) invading Russia.

The Russian forces can retreat, resupply, regroup, add troops/weapons, re-attack (including bomb from afar), change objectives, more or less as they see fit, and keep doing that (indefinitely). We've already seen some of that.
The Ukrainians can't, it's their homes, in this respect they're on the defense, a target that's stuck whether on the move or not, despite external aid. Their efforts would have to be quite effective to deter the Kremlin, let alone Putin's vision.

Hence Russia has the upper hand kind of perpetually, unless something changes. Putin doesn't really have to go to meetings or comply with much, plus they have an impressive amount of nuclear ☢ weaponry to boast (and intimidate) with.
I suppose their worries per se are sanctions, economy, and losing face, ...?

So I guess where I disagree with your analysis, is that I do believe that Putin is solely responsible. He is, after all, a dictator. He's dictated this conflict, written the script, which has not turned out at all as planned. — Wayfarer

Putin, the superhero. You're making the same mistake as those who blame WWII solely on Hitler.

It's simply not possible for one single person to orchestrate such a thing.

It can be psychologically appeasing to blame large, complex events on one person, but it's just not realistic.

I suppose their worries per se are sanctions, economy, and losing face, ...? — jorndoe

Yeah, losing face is probably the biggest problem now. They can't go home humiliated, or to state it another way, they will not.

Hence the tension of this war.

Seems Ukraine may have retaliated inside Russian territory, which will likely lead to further escalation.

What a mess.

Of course, if Zelenskyy simply capitulated or then Ukrainian forces just surrendered, that would have been preferred. — boethius

Exactly, and that plan failed disastrously. And then they couldn't even start to bombard Kyiv because they were repelled.

Exactly, and that plan failed disastrously. — Olivier5

That's not a plan, it's just a priori wish of pretty much any engagement.

Ukrainians would have preferred the Russians to just immediately capitulate as soon as they encountered brave resistance ... yet you're not saying Ukraines plan went disastrously because.

Preferring your opponent to just give up is not really a "plan", it's certainly not a warfare plan.

Now, had the Russians didn't amass the troops needed to accomplish the goals they stated, then, ok, they had delusional wishful thinking and sent in some random troops without a plan under the assumption Ukraine would just capitulate without a fight. But that's not the scenario.

Indeed, the only reason that Russia has "a lot" of losses to discuss ... is because they committed a lot of forces to the fight and kept fighting.

I can't access it. — baker

Yeah I don't know what's up with their website. It's been intermittently inaccessible for the last few days. I just kept trying and eventually got in.

Yeah I don't know what's up with their website. — jamalrob

Web is also fragmenting, I can't access rt.com ... even though it's apparently not legally banned here, but I'm still not allowed to see it.

Of course, internet was already seriously fragmented with the great firewall technology, and seems that approach will be exported to a lot of the world now.

I think he really did at one time expect and desire that Russia go down the route of liberal democracy in the style of Western Europe. The difference in his explicit position on these issues between then and now is striking, and important to understand. — jamalrob

I think the difference is in how different people understand "democracy".

For some people, esp. Westerners, "democracy" is simply about coming into a position of power by being elected into it, as opposed to inheriting or usurping it. And that's it. And once in position of power, it's all about power, and your opponents must have "the maturity to accept their loss".

Such a Western notion of "democarcy" is one where the quality of a proposed solution to a problem is irrelevant, but where the only thing that matters is what those in power want to do (even when they enact technologically, logistically suboptimal solutions to problems).

There was a discussion of this a while ago here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/607969

The more "Eastern" notion of ruling has to do with the quality of solutions to problems and there is an implicit belief that ordinary people do not know, are not qualified to know what the optimal solution to a problem would be. Hence their votes shouldn't be taken too seriously.

From that other thread:

Where is the "emotional maturity" of doing politics primarily or even solely on the level of whose will prevails??
— baker

It requires enough faith in people that you can allow them to discover their own way.

Every generation faces challenges to that faith. People who want to destroy that faith abound. You're an example of a person who's never had that faith.

It's not for everyone. That's for sure. — frank

Ie. democracy as, for all practical intents and purposes, an act of relying on an oracle.

Or maybe this Littell fuck is sincere - it really is just better for the West when Russians are swamped in poverty. — StreetlightX

The Western ego feeds on the misery of others.

That's not a plan, it's just a priori wish of pretty much any engagement. — boethius

Everything indicates it was the plan. You do not need to defend the strategic blunders of the Kremlin.

Everything indicates it was the plan. You do not need to defend the strategic blunders if the Kremlin. — Olivier5

How'd they close the land bridge to Crimea within a few days and encircle Mariupol (the whole of their primary ideological opponent) ... without a plan?

If the plan was just to just assume total capitulation of Ukrainian forces faced with confused conscripts wandering around, and unexpected resistance created an unmitigated disaster ... how did the Russians accomplish anything?

Now, not to say Russian's plan was "the best" or the costs-benefit is positive, but they clearly had a plan in the event Ukraine made serious resistance.

If, in the first days and weeks of the war, when we were told Ukrainian resistance was a total surprise to the Russians and they're all confused, and morale terrible, and they're falling apart, it then happened; ok, that would be one thing. But the predicted disaster due to low morale and no plan etc. simply hasn't happened.

So it echoes @Isaac's comment about the idea the US goal and activity in the pursuit of that goal to collapse the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Soviet Unions collapse.

If Russia had no plan and it's a total disaster, how has anything been accomplished at all?

And it's not convoluted to point out the goals people explicitly state ahead of time, point out to those goals being achieved, and then fit the steps taken to achieve those goals into some coherent plan.

It's much more convoluted to say people had goals, but not what they state (which sure, people can be lying, but that's a more convoluted theory ... especially ...), and no plan but they somehow achieved their stated goals as some sort of consolation prize offered or taken in an improvised way.

And, likewise for the sanctions.

The idea the Kremlin has been taken completely by surprise by the sanctions and economy is in free fall, would make sense if the Kremlin took no steps to protect itself from sanctions.

If you want to argue someone is completely surprised by a risk occurring, it sort of goes with that argument pointing out they took no preparatory action.

It's like it starts to rain, and I take out my umbrella, and you accuse me of not having a plan in case it rains because I'd prefer it to be sunny.

The issue is not: being surprised vs. not being surprised at the sanctions, it's being surprised by the extent of them, which is a different issue.

So there are no other roads to take? It's either the authoritarian regime imprisoning or poisoning critics of the state, propaganda to the point of total denying reality... or a consumerist hellhole? — Christoffer

How did you arrive at this dichotomy???

Because that is the dichotomy you are presenting here.

No, that's the one you're seeing.

If giving the population the individual freedom to choose their own path in life, to give them security in freedom of speech, to have real democratic elections (a democracy with low corruption is still the best system in existence, and if you don't agree then provide an example of a functioning alternative system), is the same as a consumerist hellhole, you might need to elaborate how you reach that conclusion.

The majority of the population of any country are plebeians. If they are given the reigns, the society will sink further and further.

(By the way, this was the idea behind the US institution of the Electoral College: to make sure that some idiot wouldn't obtain a position of power simply because the majority of the people voted for him.)

Just because western culture has a lot of problems that a lot of modern philosophy is examining and dissecting, that doesn't mean Russia is better. It's not, it's an authoritarian state with state violence against anyone who doesn't follow the rule of the "king".

Like I said:

The total genius of Western democracies is that they outsourced government oppression to individual people. So that it isn't the government which oppresses people, it's Tom oppressing Dick and Harry. The government's hands are clean, but the people walk on eggshells and fear for their jobs and lives. At the same time, they are becoming more and more alike, the differences between them are superficial at best, one big mass of mindless drones. And what does it help if some politician can hold his elected position of power only for 4, 8 or, 10 years, or so, if the next one differs from him only by name?

The greatest trick that the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist. — baker

Maybe first get Russia to a place where people don't get poisoned, imprisoned, and don't have an authoritarian leader who plays around with his rich friends while a large part of Russia lives on almost nothing. If that means more western standards, so be it. If not western standards, then feel free to present a system of state that frees Russia while keeping western standards of living out of there.

Frees them from what? Frees them to do what?

It's tiresome to hear people complain about a solution when there's no alternative solution presented that is better. If you want real-world solutions you might need to be a bit more pragmatic. Idealism is good for changing a system that is already somewhat functioning, pragmatism is needed when a system is fundamentally broken.

I'm saying that the situation in Russia is actually not that different from the situation in the West.
That the "freedoms" and "advantages" of Western societies are artificially trumped up, presented as more valuable and more relevant than they actually are.

There is no country in this world where one could "speak up against the government" without this having some negative consequences for one. If not imposed by the government, then imposed informally, by one's employer, one's customers, one's friends, and relatives. One can simply never speak badly about those in power without this backfiring in some way.

Police fire tear gas as anti-Covid restrictions ‘Freedom Convoy’ enters Paris

And so on. We can also look up how many times the police in Western countries have used real bullets against protesters, not just rubber bullets (which can sometimes be as dangerous as real ones), water cannons, tear gas, mass arrests. (Oh, and if the West is so wonderful, then why on earth are people protesting at all?!)

Secondly, if you think that having twenty kinds of potato chips to chose from is somehow indicative of wellbeing and prosperity, then you have let capitalism lull you into a moral turpitude.