It sounds like the part of my model that still hasn’t gotten through to you is my differentiation between appetites and desires or intentions, which is analogous to the difference between sensation and perception or belief. — Pfhorrest

No, I get that bit.

these are not claims about any particulars of human psychology or neurology, these are just different concepts. — Pfhorrest

Yes they are, each of those processes takes place in a brain. Sensation>perception>belief, and appetite> desire>intention are directional, staged processes which have no medium other than neurons through which to act. So if we can find no neural equivalent (or if we find a neural equivalent which, once labelled as such, reveals additional step) then your picture cannot actually be the case. The alternative is to say that you can have a conceptual scheme regardless of the physical reality of it's subject - in which case any conceptual scheme would work. If I disagreed with you and said "no, it goes intention>desire>appetite", how would you argue against that without invoking empirical evidence for what actually happens?

For the sake of perhaps communicating where I think you're going wrong, however, let's take your model as our basis. Beliefs about reality go reality>sensations>perceptions>beliefs. Intentions (ways things ought to be) go reality>internal states>interoception (what you're calling appetites)>desires>intentions.

When we make assumptions about the objective truth of our beliefs about the world, we assume they are objective because we assume we share reality, the bit at the beginning of the chain. It's a reasonable assumption. Get enough people together and errors in the chains of any individual should revert to the mean and so give a good account of that which is shared (reality).

What you're trying to claim is the same thing is not the same thing at all. With your model of intention, each step is not caused by the previous one.

We can model descriptive data points because (and only because) we assume a cause. Our modelling process is exactly to speculate as the the cause of our sensations (and thereby predict the results of our response). Without cause the modelling makes no sense at all.

So with sensations of pain and hunger we might model how they were caused, even our desires we could model how they were caused, but none of this gets us anything prescriptive.

The assumed 'reality' is not...

...merely the whatever-it-is that lies in the direction that our ever-growing accumulation of sensations is headed. — Pfhorrest

It is the cause of our ever-growing accumulation of sensations.

We also have an ever growing accumulation of desires, hedonic sensations etc. We can model the cause of those too. But nowhere in that model would there be anything that we 'ought' to do.

by “appetites” I mean the “sensations” of pain, hunger, etc. These do not directly tell us (or constitute us thinking) that particular states of affairs ought to be the case — Pfhorrest

Appetites do not tell us that particular states of affairs ought to be the case indirectly either. They tell us only about the state of our endocrine system. We interpret that state as an attraction or a repulsion.

Moral blame is about the behaviour of others, so what matters is the point of inter-subjectivity. With both sense data and ineroception data the point of inter-subjectivity is the cause (reality), the assumed cause.

Intention requires inputs from outside of the chain you specify. It's not sufficient for us to have appetites derived from reality. First we must desire some valence of those appetites. An internal model which assumes some target valence to internal sense data may be either learned (such as feeling full after a meal) or hard-wired (such as osmoregulation). The target valence comes from a predictive model about the origin of sense data (ie something goes wrong if that valence is not maintained). What that something is could be biological or cultural.

Then these desires must be weighed with competing ones to produce intentions. The weighing most often takes place in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex - ie it's what we might call a rational process, there's some actual calculation going on. But it also takes input from models of interocepted states - you'll make a different calculation in a different hormonal environment. So intention depends not only on desires (which are already somewhat culturally mediated), but on your varying endocrinologic states.

None of this is to say that beliefs about reality or not also influenced by these systems, but they (unlike intentions) have a short-term checking system to tie them back into the assumed source. If we think we see a tiger (because perhaps we're scared and so our judgement of shadows is skewed toward an explanation for that fear), we will, within seconds, focus on audiovisual input that could confirm such a belief. If, however, we have an intention to make the world some way in order to reduce/increase the valence of some appetite to it's desired level, we cannot check that. We could check if the intention does indeed reduce/increase the valence of the appetite. But we cannot check if the target valence is the 'right' valence (there's nothing to check it against), nor can we check if the weighing of competing targets is 'right' (again, there's nothing to check against. This is because the targets (as opposed to the causes) are not derived directly from an external source.

Essentially (in spite of my extremely long-winded explanation) your error is simply that you say "because we do X with Y we can do it with Z" without any supporting argument. Just because we can make falsificationist-type inferences about causes, does not automatically mean we can do the same with intentions. they are two different processes (as I've just explained). It's like saying that because putting petrol in a car makes it go, it must be that doing so to a horse is also OK because they're both forms of transport.

I have to say that generally I can't make much sense of what you've written, so I've little faith that the following will actually address it, but I'll have a go...

People don't just get to say it is true an outcome ought be achieved just because they exist wanting it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree. Again, I'm not sure where I've said anything that might make you think I wouldn't.

The fact the existence of your desire does not equal that it ought to be achieved. — TheWillowOfDarkness

So if the truthmaker is that it ought to be achieved, I cannot marry that with your response when I said...

That there are things which truthfully ought to be the case is the matter being debated - you here are assuming it. — Isaac

...where you replied...

I have not assumed it. My point is the exact opposite — TheWillowOfDarkness

It seems now that you are saying that there's an objective 'ought', afterall.

You only have reason to prefer your own success if it ought to be over your failure. Otherwise, it makes just as much sense for you to be one who fails and never gets their desires fulfilled, even from your own point of view . — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't need a reason to prefer success over failure. It's literally the meaning of those words in this context. I could not possibly prefer failure because by doing so it would become success, I would have just misused the word 'failure' in that context.

without the ought, failure in this goal makes as much sense as success. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Failure or success in a goal isn't the sort of thing that can make sense. Sentences make sense, actions makes sense (in respect of their objective). Labelling ('failure'/'success') is just a categorisation exercise. It might be wrong or right, but not sensical or nonsensical.

People will, of course, act to achieve success because they want it, but this doesn't ground the action a preferable or the rational option. It's just describing how people exist acting to get what they want. That one has "the might" and uses it does not amount to an action being preferable, either in terms of ethics or the rational. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yeah, I'd generally go along with that. Not seeing what I've said that is contrary to this.

all I mean by “objective” is that it’s not a topic where disagreement doesn’t matter: it’s something where in any disagreement at least one party (and possibly all parties) is at least partly wrong. — Pfhorrest

Yeah, but I just explained how you're missing a step from the first half of that sentence to the idea of potentially all parties being wrong.

With our current models of reality, there's an external source of our sense data about which it is possible for all parties to be wrong. Everyone in the world could assume the source was some way (flat earth), but everyone was wrong (it's actually round).

With a system of 'objective' morality where 'objective' just means that agreement matters, it is not possible for all parties to be wrong. So long as there's agreement, they are right, by fiat. We don't have a model whereby they might all be wrong.

The significance of this difference is that in the former, accord with this external source is the truthmaker - inter subjective agreement is just a proxy for it. We assume that widespread inter subjective agreement about an observation makes it more likely that it is in accordance with the external source.

With morality, in this sense, inter subjective agreement is not a proxy for accordance with some external source of data. Inter subjective agreement is all there is to it. Nothing more.

When the apple is envisioned, the seeds are not included in the vision, and when the seeds are envisioned, the apple is not a part of the vision. The mind does not envision both at the same time. That is why we can conclude no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time. — Don Wade

No, that's not what happens at all. The part of the brain doing the 'envisioning' as you put it does not deal with either the correct application of terms ('apple', 'seed') nor the matter of what is contained within what. These are all carried out by separate cortices and there's no reason at all why they need to produce a single non-contradictory result at any one time.

all I mean by “objective” is that it’s not a topic where disagreement doesn’t matter: it’s something where in any disagreement at least one party (and possibly all parties) is at least partly wrong.

I don’t know what more exactly you take it to mean by that. — Pfhorrest

Simple. an objective fact is one about which it's possible for all parties to be wrong. A decision on which agreement matters is not such a thing - if all parties reach the same conclusion it is right.

If you trying to walk to somewhere for some reason, then there is an objectively right way to do that, — Pfhorrest

Yep.

I see we've simply reached the point where you've previously abandoned the conversation, so that's probably it, but on the off-chance I'll repeat the same objection I raised last time...

accounts for — Pfhorrest

most urgent — Pfhorrest

needs met — Pfhorrest

Are all subjective judgements and so do not produce a conclusion which is any more objective (or inter-subjective, even) than simply asking "which way should we go?".

In a disparate, socially estranged group (of ten such people), you'll get ten different answers as to which way to go. Ask which route satisfies everyone's needs, you'll get ten different answers (based on different ideas about hierarchies of need). Ask which solution best 'accounts for' everyone's instinct or feelings about the solutions, you'll get ten different answers (based on different judgements about whether, and to what extent, a solutions has 'accounted for' the needs concerned).

Ask a socially unified group (joint culture, joint interests, feelings of companionship between them) which 'best accounts for' everyone's needs you'll more likely get a single answer (or close), but then you would have more likely gotten a single answer from the original question in the first place "which way should we go?"

If it matters, then you're treating it like it's an objective or universal matter, where we all need to come to the same conclusion lest at least one of us be wrong (and deserve blame if we act wrongly because of that). — Pfhorrest

This is the bit I don't get. Where's the connection between it mattering and me treating it as objective fact? If I was tied to five other people it would really matter that we agreed on which direction to walk (I might get injured if we don't all agree), but none of us would consider the chosen direction to be objectively 'right', we might as easily have tossed a coin for it.

There's not a necessary logical connection between agreement mattering and the subject of that agreement being treated as an objective fact. There's a step you're missing.

My point is the exact opposite: we don't just have a fact that I should get what I want. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree. I'm not sure what I've written that might make you think otherwise.

My point isn't that the ought must be. It's that if it's true getting my desire is the rational outcome — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm not at all sure what you mean by 'rational outcome' here. I usually take the expression to mean something like the result of a sound logical thought process, but that can't be right here because logic cannot prove it's own premises right.

What is the truthmaker in "if it's true getting my desire is the rational outcome"?

Also, I'm not sure how any of this relates to the argument about assignation of blame being an objective-oriented speech act. In order for such an argument to be plausible, it only need be the case that the speech act is effective at it's objective. That being so, you can almost guarantee that people will use it that way and so it becomes, de facto, what the speech means.

healthy people who would normally remove more of the virus than they contribute — Roger Gregoire

A claim for which you have yet to provide a scrap of evidence. Seriously. @StreetlightX, should this not go the way of the 'men in academia' thread?

We have repeated posting of frankly dangerous claims and a persistent refusal to provide any evidence, or even read evidence to the contrary.

The existence of my desire does not automatically mean it is truthful my desire should be fulfilled. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This just begs the question. That there are things which truthfully ought to be the case is the matter being debated - you here are assuming it.

Existence where you are ostracised is just as logically coherent as one where you are not.

It's only rational for you to stop if there is an ought: that you ought not get ostracised. Then we would actually have a reason to prefer an existence of not being ostracised over being so. Yes, it is rational, but only to a world in which you ought not be ostracised. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Why not a world where you'd rather not be ostracised - why are your own personal objectives being ignored here?

The problem is the statment is not rational unless there something wrong with the action. It's not rational for someone to do what you want, to act to achieve your goals, unless that action and goal ought to happen , even for oneself-- goals are normative in nature, they are an account its true something ought to occur. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Of course it's rational. If everyone in your group thinks your behaviour is despicable then continuing to behave that way is going to get you ostracised and so lose the benefits of group membership. It's therefore entirely rational for you to stop behaving in ways your group disapproves of.

Because the difference between those is binary: can multiple contrary opinions on the same thing be simultaneously warranted, or not? — Pfhorrest

It was the triviality I was questioning - sorry, should have made that more clear. To reformulate - why must it be trivial that we have disagreements of opinion? That I love my wife is just a matter of my opinion, but it is far from trivial.

since you think the different opinions are warranted, you have no motive to blame others for their disagreement — Pfhorrest

I've just explained the motive - it might get them to change their behaviour to one you find preferable. What's not a motive about that?

To put it another way - Assigning moral blame is a speech act (or sometimes a more physical act), and it lets the person know, as well as any other people who might be watching, what your feelings are about their actions such that they might refrain from repeating them. That all seems perf3ctly functional and rational to me. I'm not seeing what about it doesn't make sense.

Of course if you believe strongly in an objective morality of some sort you're not going to agree with that assessment. But that's a very different matter from it not making sense.

you wouldn't just take that like you would take a disagreement in food tastes, right? You would think their assessment of the morality of that situation is incorrect, not just different from yours, no? — Pfhorrest

Why do you see these as the only two options - either 'like trivial preferences' or 'objectively and universally wrong'?

If you did take it that way, then blaming someone for doing something you merely dislike but don't think is actually wrong in a universal, objective way, doesn't seem like it would make any sense. — Pfhorrest

In what way would it not 'make sense'. What is the sense you're expecting it to make? When we say some sentence doesn't 'make sense' we mean it doesn't conform to the arbitrary grammatical rules our language happens to have. When we say an action doesn't 'make sense', we mean something like that it can't be explained in terms of the actor's objectives... I can't see here what you could mean by it not making sense.

The categories in the OP are unilaterally defined terms of engagement. — baker

How would you multilaterally define the terms of engagement, since to do so one would have to first engage?

How, in your neuroscientific view, is the word causing me to do any of this? — NOS4A2

I just explained that. It's not complicated. The sound (or image) stimulates a neuron sufficiently for it to stimulate one to which it is proximate. At the end of that chain is the instruction to your muscles to type. What is it you're not understanding about that?

I’ve also seen a few posts in this thread which seem to be unable to cause a single response, not only from me but from others. Were these pixels, arranged as they were, lacking the causal force? — NOS4A2

Yes. Again, not seeing what's in the least bit difficult to understand here.

Did the “signals” travel down the wrong neurons? — NOS4A2

Yes. You have billions of them, trillions of possible paths just in a single cortex.

So far all you’ve done is written about me in the passive voice and the words in the active one. I think it should be the other way about. — NOS4A2

What you think should be the case is totally immaterial to what actually is the case.

Some things do escape those who study people professionally. — baker

You've given a really good list there of the limits of psychological investigation. I'm largely in agreement. You've prefaced the list rather unfortunately though. These things do not escape those of us who study people professionally. We have no lesser access to them than others.

I have to do you homework for you and remember what you said for you, just shows how lazy of a thinker you are. — Harry Hindu

Where in any of that does is say anything about whether this assumption is "before engaging with anyone"? If you actually read what I write rather than jumping to conclusions about what you think I'm saying we might have had a profitable conversation. As it it you're just arguing against a caricature from your imagination.

The problem is that you believe that compromises can always be reached. — Harry Hindu

Once more then. Where have I made an assumption that this is always possible? I've highlighted the key word for you to make the job easier.

You need to give me an explanation as to what moral "truth" can be true for all in the same way that gravity is true for all. — Harry Hindu

And the last one...where have I spoken about what is true?


I choose my words carefully. If you can't be bothered to read them with equal care don't bother replying at all.

I would argue that our ancestors didn't really have logic or reason as much as we do or even purpose. But those are not a result of living. — Darkneos

Well then do so. Putting "I would argue..." before an assertion doesn't make it an argument. What would your argument be that logic and reason pre-exist living? In what would they reside? What form would they take? What cause or effect would they have, and upon what substance?

All I am really saying is that there is a vast difference between people who are committed to an ideology, a system of ideas which purports to be generally salvational either in this life or the next, and the everyday moral principles which pretty much everybody agrees about. I think there are never good reasons for the former, and every good reason to hold to the common moral principles; the latter are not arguable, and in fact people do not generally argue about them, unless they are idiot philosophers. — Janus

I disagree strongly with this, but I think perhaps the source of our disagreement is about what constitutes a moral principle. I think that when I talk about some moral dilemma, about which non-philosophers definitely do argue - abortion, charity, ethical trade, veganism, social responsibility, children's rights, animal testing, wars (just/unjust), wealth taxes, public health...etc you see those not as differences in moral principles, but differences in how to apply the same principles (something more like fostering some balance between autonomy and social harmony which we all have a general idea of).

I can understand that (though to me it's too far to put it down to one principle - the neurological evidence is strongly against you on that one, there's at least a dozen different types of calculation which need to be accounted for), but notwithstanding...

It's the second part I struggle to get behind. The bit where ideologues are any different. to my mind, they're doing the exact same thing - apply these general principles of morality to the knowledge the (think they) have. Whether that knowledge is of an afterlife, of some God-given rules, of some deep political conspiracy no-one else is aware of... It's this special knowledge which means that the application of these same general principles lead to bizarre behaviours and reprimands.

More importantly than either, though. Is that @Pfhorrest's second and fourth groups represent almost everybody on the planet. People simply do not give much thought to the moral aspects of their behaviour by relating them to deep foundational social (or biological) principles. The overwhelming majority of people behave as they do because other people in their social group are behaving that way. They say what they do because other people in their social group say those things. So the commonality you're seeing is not the result of some deep human trait, it's the result of reversion to the mean. Large societies mix a lot and that mixing creates such a wealth of potential influences that the result tends to be fairly watered down in most cases. You only need to look at some of the bizarre cultural practices and taboos in tribes to see the effects of smaller group sizes. Of course there are biological restrictions - taboos and practices which are actually detrimental to the group cannot thrive and so will die out, plus our biological mechanisms can only come up with a limited range of types.

I'll give you what I hope might be an example. I'm quite a strong advocate of children's rights. Something which you'd say (on the face of it) came under the 'common moral principles' right? But I have a fundamental disagreement with what seems to me a purely ideological belief. I've never reprimanded my children, nor have I ever told them what to do, they did entirely as they pleased (still do, but that's because they're adults now). That, to me, is children's rights. According to the Human Rights Act, however, children can be forced, by their parents or government, to attend school, to dress a certain way, even imprisoned and physically abused.. etc. That children can be treated this way – ways which would often constitute criminal offences if done to adults, seems to me to be an ideological difference, not a ‘common sense morality’ one. Children are given full autonomy in hunter-gatherer societies, then at some point in time it became culturally acceptable to treat them as the ‘property’ of adults, much like women were in marriage. Now, treating them that way is the cultural norm and it is rarely questioned. Whole mythologies build up around it. The point is, I don’t see any more of a ‘common principle’ here that I share with most normal people, than there would be with an ideologue of any other persuasion. I could couch it in terms of people trying to do their best for their children, but that would include religious fundamentalists too (who, arguably are still just trying to do the same, within the world-view they have)
My point is basically that I think the split you’re seeing is not revealing a difference in moral epistemology. It’s just cultural. Things which our culture thinks of as extreme seem ideological, things our culture thinks of as normal seem ‘common sense’.

↪Isaac


How? — NOS4A2

How is obvious - a simple causal chain from the sound of the words hitting your eardrum, their firing through various networks of neurons to the ones which caused you to type your answer. That's the easy and trivial bit.

What's far more interesting is your explanation for the opposite. If the words weren't (could never be) part of the causal chain - along with all other external influences - then whence the signal which caused you to type your response?

I'm only talking about rather boring neuroscience which can be be read about in any textbook, so I don't see much point in me expanding on it here.

You, however, have clearly uncovered nothing short of pure magic, the signals telling your body to type your response spontaneously came from nowhere - it's this new magic I'm sure we all want to hear about. What substance is this magical realm made from? How does it interact with our realm? Does it only affect humans or does it sometime cause rocks to do things spontaneously? How on earth did you arrive at this mystical wisdom (was it an ancient text buried in an Aztec tomb - I do hope so, those are always the best)? Do tell.

Could you use your words to guide me like a marionette to this or that action? — NOS4A2

He already has.

would argue Monty Python is pointless because it’s absurd. Even Sisyphus rolling a boulder is pointless not to mention absurd. Most instances that can be called absurd are also pointless. — Darkneos

They could possibly be, but to be compelling you'd have to give me more than just your ad hoc opinion that they are.

logic tries to do that with ethics when it comes to ought and ought not. — Darkneos

That's why I qualified it with in toto. Given some premise, one might use logic to determine what one ought do "if you want to build a strong wall, you ought to provide it foundations"... but a premise is always required.

Things like logic, reasons, absurdity, purpose... these are all human attitudes toward the world we find ourselves in. We have them as a result of living. To ask if there's a purpose to living is to ask if there's a step in a flight of stairs, purpose doesn't mean anything outside of the context of a living thing.

If it can’t determine if a premise is true then what is it good for? — Darkneos

Deriving true conclusions from true premises.

It derives conclusions from something it can’t prove, that sounds like absurdity to me. — Darkneos

Yes, many have concluded that the meaninglessness of life's premises makes it absurd. But absurd is not pointless. Monty Python is absurd, but certainly not pointless.

You may well have all sorts of feelings in response to the circumstances you find yourself in, but it's simply a category error to think that logic can tell you whether you ought or ought not have them in toto.

Hate speech and bigotry is probably a good place to start questioning the user. — schopenhauer1

Just because vegans feel non-vegans are wrong in their actions/views, and that non- vegans continue with their views/actions does NOT mean non-vegans are absolute enemies that deserve contempt, disrespect, etc. — schopenhauer1

So these are two examples of where you think the line should be drawn, but you don't provide any justification or reason for your choice. Why would (in the view of the person concerned) talking hatefully be deserving of disrespect, but complicity in the torture of sentient beings not so deserving? What is it about these two behaviours which makes the condoning of one worthy of contempt but the condoning of the other merely a good natured disagreement?

Any moral claim argued in good faith on a philosophy forum is meant to be an exchange and healthy debate in the realm of ideas. Both parties should know this. — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by 'good faith' here? It seems as though you're creating a meta-morality around debate. If people can respectfully disagree about something like the suffering of animals or whether abortion is murder, why can we not equally respectfully disagree about methods of discussion?

what pfhorrest is arguing and what you are defending - that Pfhorrest assumes what is right before engaging with anyone. — Harry Hindu

Where does he say anything like that?

What I've been saying is what you assume to be right or wrong can only be the case for yourself and that you have to talk to others to discover what is right or wrong for them. — Harry Hindu

Right.

Moral dilemmas are the result of conflicting goals. They are a dilemma because every individual is considered equal and should have the equal right of achieving their goals. So moral dilemmas are the result of the idea of equality. — Harry Hindu

Yep.

...so what do you call the solution arrived at via working through this conflict, after we've talked to everyone, asked them all what's right for them, devised some compromise which best meets everybody's views...? That solution is the _____ solution. Fill in the blank for me because I'm having trouble filling it with any word that isn't just a synonym for 'right'.

And what would you say to someone determined to have their solution implemented despite it not being the (right) one we'd just painstakingly worked out.

I'm happy to use whatever terminology you want to pick.

We can do this? How? — Banno

Go to 'categories', select your chosen brand of nonsense (Philosophy of Religion, for example), scroll right to the bottom of the list of posts there's an icon of an eye, Tap that and a line will appear through it. Never again will your front page be blighted.

Unfortunately, there's no category for messianic epiphany so we just have to put up with those.

Doing it for a living only makes it more likely you will be predisposed to bias in my experience. — Janus

So you're suggesting that studying something disposes one to biases but a lay approach, what, magically removes bias? So should we no longer listen to the climate scientists, but rather engage with the 'unbiased' assessments of those who just experience the weather themselves as laymen?

Thanks!

You need to get out of your armchair more and engage with actual people.If you do that you will realize that most people have a reasonable moral sense. — Janus

You do realise I literally study people for a living?

I think most people of reasonable disposition have a good sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms. — Janus

I see, so we're back to the delusion that what seems to you to be the case is actually the case. You personally have a sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms, other people have a different sense.

Really...most people grasp theory of mind by the age of three and you're still having trouble with it.

The moral principle of personal autonomy is contingent upon not encroaching upon the personal autonomy of others. — Janus

To what extent? How much is it reasonable to expect others to tolerate by way of restriction to their freedoms such that I might experience freedoms myself?

Note: I've merged a few God threads together into this one. — jamalrob

If they're 'God' Threads can you also put them into the Philosophy of Religion section. The ability to keep (subjectively) crap off the front page is a really nice feature.

The decision to stop is logical as is to stay — Darkneos

Logic is just a method to get from true premises to true conclusions. It can't deliver instructions without premises. Your believing it can is the error you're making. You're waiting for a premise to be derived by logic and it's simply not capable of doing that, it can only derive conclusions.

Yes, there's no moral element involved in determining whether some moral principle is being transgressed by some practice.If we are asking the question we've already acknowledged the importance of the moral principle about which we are inquiring whether it has been infringed upon.

The enquiry is an empirical one. If an infringement is discovered then that is something to be addressed by the law. — Janus

The moral principle itself is in question, not the practice. The moral principle of personal autonomy is in conflict with the moral principle of care for the autonomy of others. If there's no moral element to the balance, then the moral is never transgressed because absolutely any practice whatsoever can claim to be considering both elements, just to differing degrees. One could say that gun-laws in Britain were moral because the personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighed by the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. Likewise one could argue the laws of the US were the more moral because one's personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighs the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. You seem to be saying that so long as the two have been considered, the result is moral. Well that solves no moral dilemmas at all.

You can read dozens of articles and many documentaries that were done prior to Covid-19 warning about what could happen. — ssu

My point exactly. Yet at the same time global monitoring programmes were being shut down, hospitals were being run to capacity, community healthcare facilities were being closed, public health initiatives underfunded, social care driven to near breaking point... all with a known public health threat just waiting to happen.

Who are the criminals, the doctors, scientists, or those ignorant politicians? — magritte

The population in general really. They vote for the politicians. The doctors and scientists were generally the ones telling everyone we need to be more prepared (though not exclusively). Being prepared costs money and effort - a few pence off the tax bill is ultimately a more attractive option - hence we get the politicians who promise that.

Maybe viruses are just too smart for us, they can mutate in a day but it takes the best science much of a year to fight back. — magritte

No it doesn't. This is just the Hollywood myth that's being peddled here. Read the actual scientists I've cited. Proven defences against viruses include - better quality social care, better public health, better urban environments, better primary healthcare facilities, better intensive care facilities, more availability of primary care, early and strict lockdowns, early closure of borders, efficient tracing of contacts, wearing masks, maintaining a social distance, hand washing...and most importantly, having a plan in place which includes these things.

None of that requires us to know the exact molecular signature of the virus concerned. There's only one response which requires that and that's the creation of a vaccine. Creating a vaccine is never, ever, going to be a first line of defence and so is completely irrelevant to the issue of preparedness.

It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought. — Isaac


Such fights are legal matters and can only be settled in the context of the current law. — Janus

???

I said...

individual autonomy and freedom to do whatever does not impinge on the freedom of others — Janus


...is one with which I doubt anyone would disagree, ideologues included, but surely you can see it intrinsically sets up a balance (how much must my actions impinge on the freedom of others in order to outweigh my autonomy?). It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought. — Isaac

...and you're saying there's no moral element to that at all, it's just a matter of whatever the law of the country happens to be?

this stuff happens on any debate in these forums — schopenhauer1

Really? You're saying I could pick any debate and you'd be able to find me an example of responses quote="schopenhauer1;495195"]dripping with hatred[/quote]?

Isaac's contention is that we ONLY do this sort of "dripping with condescension and enmity" schtick when the debate is something as extreme as call to violence and bigotry. — schopenhauer1

Quote me saying that then, don't assign contentions to me based on what you reckon they are. I choose my words carefully.

To quote one of our esteemed mods on the subject I read only yesterday.

It's not only vocabulary that determines level of insult — Baden

The reason I choose an extreme example is exactly the reason you do exactly the same thing in the antinatalism threads - to show that the principle is scalar not binomial. To demonstrate that, at some point, we would all agree that insult was warranted, so we can focus the debate on the location of that point, not the existence of it. Your example shows only the other extreme - that at some point insult is not warranted, the disagreement is indeed trivial and insult is gratuitous.

So that out of the way, the question is - where is that point? At what level of real-world consequence is it justified to show your disrespect for someone's position in order to let them know that your group do not accept such attitudes?

People who want to uphold the constitutional clause of freedom speech have to, if they want to be internally consistent, maintain that words and actions are two different categories. — baker

Things being in two different categories is insufficient to justify any two responses to them. You must show how each category justifies each response.

Some free speech absolutists, for example, believe that words (ideas) can be neither moral or immoral or have anything to do with morality. It's the old sticks and stones. — baker

Indeed, some do (curiously they do so with very impassioned speeches, despite apparently believing that speech has no effect whatsoever). But if that were the case, then all disagreement would be trivial. There'd be no reason at all to resolve it.

Probably because the general consensus is that thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad as actually killing someone, for example. — baker

Obviously. And telling someone to "Fuck off" is not as bad as imprisoning them for life, so that difference seems already covered in our responses, no?

Somehow, for some people, this "not so bad" faded into oblivion, or the above clause got truncated to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad", and further to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not bad". — baker

It wasn't an historical question. I was asking why you believe they should be treated differently, not why other people might have come to.

These prior diseases fell into the category of "nasty flus". — ssu

Russian Flu, 1890, killed a million.
Spanish Flu, 1919, killed 50 million.
Asian Flu, 1957, another million.
Hong Kong Flu, 1968, another million.
HIV/AIDS from 1981, killed about 25 million so far
Swine Flu, 2009-2010, 200,000.
Covid-19, now, 1-2 million (depending on sources).

It's a completely predictable part of living so close together. That we weren't prepared is nothing short of criminal.