The point was that something's seeming to you to be the case is not contradictory to that thing's seeming to someone else not to be. And yet the bulk of disagreement seems to be on that very issue. — Isaac

Sure, as is to be expected in an informal place like this.

The point was that something's seeming to you to be the case is not contradictory to that thing's seeming to someone else not to be. And yet the bulk of disagreement seems to be on that very issue. — Isaac

So? I don't understand where you're getting with this.

I don't understand where you're getting with this. — baker

I was countering your view that "most of the conversations at forums like this are about people, ie. the people directly involved and the way some particular idea is relevant or irrelevant to them." Were that the case disagreement over the status of X would be irrelevant since one would have no reason to think its relevance to oneself might need to be corroborated by relevance to another.

People do not simply passionately declare that X us relevant to them. They passionately declare that X seems to them to be the case in such a way as to imply that such a property renders X necessary, in some way.

This is the conceit we adopt when we imagine the 'polite debate', respecting the views of either side.

Either it doesn't matter at all what your interlocutors think (in which case, by extension, it doesn't matter to them what you think) - rendering the exercise trivial at best. Or, it does matter what they think (it affects society in some way) - in which case their thinking it has a moral dimension with all the potential judgement and ostracism associated with that.

I was countering your view that "most of the conversations at forums like this are about people, ie. the people directly involved and the way some particular idea is relevant or irrelevant to them." Were that the case disagreement over the status of X would be irrelevant since one would have no reason to think its relevance to oneself might need to be corroborated by relevance to another. — Isaac

Not at all. See below.

People do not simply passionately declare that X us relevant to them. They passionately declare that X seems to them to be the case in such a way as to imply that such a property renders X necessary, in some way.

This is the conceit we adopt when we imagine the 'polite debate', respecting the views of either side.

Sometimes, this is the case and people are in fact acting in such conceit.

But other times, what you're seeing is simply amateur philosophizing. It's quite messy. It's when people don't know yet how to properly formulate a syllogism, when they don't know much about informal fallacies, and so on. So they express their thoughts and their concerns in a pre-philosophical way. Hence all the "it seems to me" mixed with all those expressions of certainty.


A person could rightfully be accused of the conceit you mention if they also demonstrate that they are able to think and write philosophically, but that in some instances, they characteristically refuse to.

It's when people don't know yet how to properly formulate a syllogism, when they don't know much about informal fallacies, and so on. So they express their thoughts and their concerns in a pre-philosophical way. Hence all the "it seems to me" mixed with all those expressions of certainty.


A person could rightfully be accused of the conceit you mention if they also demonstrate that they are able to think and write philosophically, but that in some instances, they characteristically refuse to. — baker

I can't make out what you're trying to say here. My point was that philosophical agreements are either trivial or they have moral connotations (with all that's incumbent). I can't quite see how the issue of skill at analysing arguments plays in.

My point was that philosophical agreements are either trivial or they have moral connotations (with all that's incumbent). — Isaac

Sure. So where seems to be the problem?

So where seems to be the problem? — baker

Obviously lost in the labyrinthine discussion we seem to be having.

@Pfhorrest posts an OP which identifies groups of dissenters (from one's own view of what's right), people generally chime in criticising the idea that any group might be treated as 'wrong', or having 'bad' ideas. I'm arguing that opposing ideas are either trivial (disagreement doesn't matter), or non-trivial, in which case there's a moral dimension to holding any given view. When people act outside of our moral code we usually express some opposition. It seems odd to me that there would be such an resistance to doing so with the holding of ideas which have a moral consequence.

Another way of putting it might be that ideas are either meaningless or they affect the world. If the former, then what's the point in resolving disagreement? If the latter then it's no less morally relevant to hold an idea that it is to act.

We dismiss, ostracise, even fight with people whose behaviour is in opposition to our moral codes. Why do ideas get treated differently?

So if someone were to come on and politely, patiently explain why Jews were the inferior race and need to be exterminated for the benefit of the master race, and I told them to "fuck off", I'd be the one in the wrong there? We should, rather, have a long in-depth and polite conversation exploring our difference of opinion about the extermination of an entire race.

Should I interfere at the building of the gas chambers? Or is it too soon whilst the debate is still to be settled? — Isaac

Way to use the fallacy of Appeal to Extremes to try to contradict a simple plea for more agreeable conversations on debate platforms...

It's more like this example:
He believes that the mind is computational. She believes that mind is connectionist. He comes in the debate dripping with hatred for her position, calling her argument the "worst thing I've ever seen".. intersperse with ACTUAL content.. more ad personum attacks.. the End.

And you can interchange that with ethical debates, political, debates. It doesn't matter. To use the extreme violence and bigotry to make your point, just shows how much you are trying to avoid the actual topic at hand which is that people do debate in a style of total enmity. It has nothing to do with "Only when the topic is about extreme violence and bigotry". A strawman. If anything, the way the media pits people against each other, Trumpism, etc. should warn us against this sort of enmity debate style. Not EVERYTHING is an offense of the utmost worst degree. To keep treating people you disagree with like this is to perpetuate being a troll.

Another way of putting it might be that ideas are either meaningless or they affect the world. If the former, then what's the point in resolving disagreement? If the latter then it's no less morally relevant to hold an idea that it is to act.

We dismiss, ostracise, even fight with people whose behaviour is in opposition to our moral codes. Why do ideas get treated differently? — Isaac

The constitutional clause of freedom speech drives a wedge between words and actions, as if the two would be in different categories.

People who want to uphold the constitutional clause of freedom speech have to, if they want to be internally consistent, maintain that words and actions are two different categories.

Some free speech absolutists, for example, believe that words (ideas) can be neither moral or immoral or have anything to do with morality. It's the old sticks and stones.

Why do ideas get treated differently?

Probably because the general consensus is that thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad as actually killing someone, for example.

Somehow, for some people, this "not so bad" faded into oblivion, or the above clause got truncated to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad", and further to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not bad".

He believes that the mind is computational. She believes that mind is connectionist. He comes in the debate dripping with hatred for her position, calling her argument the "worst thing I've ever seen".. intersperse with ACTUAL content.. more ad personum attacks.. the End. — schopenhauer1

Hold on. I've yet to see this! People who discuss models of the mind and use terms like "computational" and "connectionist" actually use phrases like "worst thing I've ever seen" and who knows what name calling??

I thought that at that level, even the ad homs would be more classy ...

Hold on. I've yet to see this! People who discuss models of the mind and use terms like "computational" and "connectionist" actually use phrases like "worst thing I've ever seen" and who knows what name calling??

I thought that at that level, even the ad homs would be more classy ... — baker

Notice I said this...

It's more like — schopenhauer1

Indicating I'm just trying to give a type of an example. Do you want me to start pulling what people do on this forum as exemplars? Isaac's contention is that we ONLY do this sort of "dripping with condescension and enmity" schtick when the debate is something as extreme as call to violence and bigotry. I'm trying to convey that debates get this dirty in cases that are nowhere near something like that.

I'm just trying to give a type of an example. — schopenhauer1

So a

fallacy of Appeal to Extremes — schopenhauer1

then?

then? — Isaac

No this stuff happens on any debate in these forums. A lot of the time it's the "style" of the poster. They like poisoning the well.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poisoning_the_well

It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought. — Isaac

Such fights are legal matters and can only be settled in the context of the current law. That has nothing to do with what I am addressing. If the laws are not fair then they should be changed. If they are not served properly it is because of corruption. It's an imperfect world to be sure.

The distinction you're making between "common sense" and "ideologies" sounds like a distinction between "facts" and "beliefs". — Pfhorrest

No it's a distinction based upon the difference between ethical principles founded on common sense and decency that should be practiced and insisted upon by all thinking people at the local level, and ideologies based upon totalizing visions of the human situation and speculative systems proposing what should be done about it on the largest of scales.

The point is that when it comes to the everyday ethical principles I'm saying should be practiced and insisted upon by all thinking people, there is nothing to argue about. You don't see arguments about whether rape, theft, exploitation, murder, and so on are acceptable or unacceptable.

The arguments are over whether such ethical infractions have actually been committed in particular cases or whether certain social practices involve them. These are matters for debate and for the law, but they are debates concerning particulars, not debates about general principles. The general principles are always already agreed upon. It's about what's actually being done to cheat the principles that basically everyone agrees upon, or at least pays lip service to; that's what most needs to be addressed.

But are others here for those same purposes? — baker

At least one of those for most people, I would expect. They either think they have something to teach other people, or they have something they hope to learn from others. Possibly and ideally both.

Do you believe there are people here who come here to be taught by you? — baker

Not me in particular, but there are plenty of OPs asking questions, and those people obviously hope to learn the answers to them from someone or another, and I’d like to help in that way whenever I can.

The topic of this thread is not specifically about this forum though, BTW. I was thinking more of political conversations with non-philosophers out there in the wild.

It's about what's actually being done to cheat the principles that basically everyone agrees upon, or at least pays lip service to; that's what most needs to be addressed. — Janus

Consider a group of people who believe that all Jews are conspiring together to commit white genocide and that it would therefore not be murder but righteous self-defense to gas them all to death. They superficially agree with the rest of us about all the important common sense principles — they’re trying to stop many wrongful killings, murders, of innocent people, by committing some killings themselves sure, but righteous killings against would-be murderers. They just disagree with us about the little details about the facts of this particular situation: whether there really is such a Jewish plot, etc.

Does that make such Nazi ideology “not an ideology”? Because if so, it looks like there are no ideologies, because everyone thinks their moral outlook is grounded in generally agreeable moral principles (“common sense”) that others just don’t see the implications of on the facts of the current world, or else disagree about those facts.

Consider a group of people who believe that all Jews are conspiring together to commit white genocide and that it would therefore not be murder but righteous self-defense to gas them all to death. — Pfhorrest

And what solid evidence do they have for their belief in your thought experiment. None, I'll warrant, and for me that's the very essence of ideology; strong, even fanatical, beliefs without any actual evidence to support them.

And what solid evidence do they have for their belief in your thought experiment. None, I'll warrant, and for me that's the very essence of ideology; strong, even fanatical, beliefs without any actual evidence to support them. — Janus

I don’t think there is any good evidence to support such beliefs, which is why I don’t believe those things, but no doubt they would point you at things they think are good evidence.

OK, sure but for me there is good evidence or there is not. And ideology begins with believing without good evidence. Of course not all believing without good evidence is ideology; for example I could believe my wife is having an affair without good evidence, but that would not be an example of ideology. So not all believing without good evidence is ideology, but all ideology is believing without good evidence.

Do you think those we disagree with realize that their evidence is bad?

Do you deny all possibility that despite your best efforts, at least some of your evidence could be bad?

People who want to uphold the constitutional clause of freedom speech have to, if they want to be internally consistent, maintain that words and actions are two different categories. — baker

Things being in two different categories is insufficient to justify any two responses to them. You must show how each category justifies each response.

Some free speech absolutists, for example, believe that words (ideas) can be neither moral or immoral or have anything to do with morality. It's the old sticks and stones. — baker

Indeed, some do (curiously they do so with very impassioned speeches, despite apparently believing that speech has no effect whatsoever). But if that were the case, then all disagreement would be trivial. There'd be no reason at all to resolve it.

Probably because the general consensus is that thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad as actually killing someone, for example. — baker

Obviously. And telling someone to "Fuck off" is not as bad as imprisoning them for life, so that difference seems already covered in our responses, no?

Somehow, for some people, this "not so bad" faded into oblivion, or the above clause got truncated to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not so bad", and further to "thinking or speaking about killing someone is not bad". — baker

It wasn't an historical question. I was asking why you believe they should be treated differently, not why other people might have come to.

this stuff happens on any debate in these forums — schopenhauer1

Really? You're saying I could pick any debate and you'd be able to find me an example of responses quote="schopenhauer1;495195"]dripping with hatred[/quote]?

Isaac's contention is that we ONLY do this sort of "dripping with condescension and enmity" schtick when the debate is something as extreme as call to violence and bigotry. — schopenhauer1

Quote me saying that then, don't assign contentions to me based on what you reckon they are. I choose my words carefully.

To quote one of our esteemed mods on the subject I read only yesterday.

It's not only vocabulary that determines level of insult — Baden

The reason I choose an extreme example is exactly the reason you do exactly the same thing in the antinatalism threads - to show that the principle is scalar not binomial. To demonstrate that, at some point, we would all agree that insult was warranted, so we can focus the debate on the location of that point, not the existence of it. Your example shows only the other extreme - that at some point insult is not warranted, the disagreement is indeed trivial and insult is gratuitous.

So that out of the way, the question is - where is that point? At what level of real-world consequence is it justified to show your disrespect for someone's position in order to let them know that your group do not accept such attitudes?

It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought. — Isaac


Such fights are legal matters and can only be settled in the context of the current law. — Janus

???

I said...

individual autonomy and freedom to do whatever does not impinge on the freedom of others — Janus


...is one with which I doubt anyone would disagree, ideologues included, but surely you can see it intrinsically sets up a balance (how much must my actions impinge on the freedom of others in order to outweigh my autonomy?). It is that balance over which most such disagreements are fought. — Isaac

...and you're saying there's no moral element to that at all, it's just a matter of whatever the law of the country happens to be?

...and you're saying there's no moral element to that at all, it's just a matter of whatever the law of the country happens to be? — Isaac

Yes, there's no moral element involved in determining whether some moral principle is being transgressed by some practice.If we are asking the question we've already acknowledged the importance of the moral principle about which we are inquiring whether it has been infringed upon.

The enquiry is an empirical one. If an infringement is discovered then that is something to be addressed by the law. Or if the law won't address it then it is up to those who care enough about the transgression in question to protest.

Do you think those we disagree with realize that their evidence is bad?

Do you deny all possibility that despite your best efforts, at least some of your evidence could be bad? — Pfhorrest

If they learn to think critically they will. I do my very best never to believe anything for which I don't have what is arguably sufficient evidence.

That said I don't put personal faith into the category of believing without sufficient evidence. I think (intersubjectiely) sufficient evidence is only required for beliefs that I think others should share, and I don't think anyone is justified in thinking that when it comes to religious faith.

Yes, there's no moral element involved in determining whether some moral principle is being transgressed by some practice.If we are asking the question we've already acknowledged the importance of the moral principle about which we are inquiring whether it has been infringed upon.

The enquiry is an empirical one. If an infringement is discovered then that is something to be addressed by the law. — Janus

The moral principle itself is in question, not the practice. The moral principle of personal autonomy is in conflict with the moral principle of care for the autonomy of others. If there's no moral element to the balance, then the moral is never transgressed because absolutely any practice whatsoever can claim to be considering both elements, just to differing degrees. One could say that gun-laws in Britain were moral because the personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighed by the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. Likewise one could argue the laws of the US were the more moral because one's personal autonomy to carry weapons is outweighs the autonomy of others to walk un-threatened through the streets. You seem to be saying that so long as the two have been considered, the result is moral. Well that solves no moral dilemmas at all.

If they learn to think critically they will. — Janus

Do you think they realize they’re not thinking critically?

Do you think they realize they’re not thinking critically? — Pfhorrest

No, not if they are not thinking critically.

The moral principle of personal autonomy is in conflict with the moral principle of care for the autonomy of others. — Isaac

Not at all. The moral principle of personal autonomy is contingent upon not encroaching upon the personal autonomy of others.

The moral principle of personal autonomy is contingent upon not encroaching upon the personal autonomy of others. — Janus

To what extent? How much is it reasonable to expect others to tolerate by way of restriction to their freedoms such that I might experience freedoms myself?

To what extent? How much is it reasonable to expect others to tolerate by way of restriction to their freedoms such that I might experience freedoms myself? — Isaac

I think most people of reasonable disposition have a good sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms.

Some cases may be nuanced to be sure, but someone will soon tell you if they feel encroached upon. Why would you feel you need to disrespect others' personal spaces?

I think most people of reasonable disposition have a good sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms. — Janus

I see, so we're back to the delusion that what seems to you to be the case is actually the case. You personally have a sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms, other people have a different sense.

Really...most people grasp theory of mind by the age of three and you're still having trouble with it.

You need to get out of your armchair more and engage with actual people.If you do that you will realize that most people have a reasonable moral sense.

Anyway how is your claim that most people grasp "theory of mind" by age of three any different than my claim that most people have a reasonable moral sense?

Your claim is based on your own experience, isn't it?