Comments

  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    are you saying that you would not accept any of these historical justifications for anti-natalism as a proper moral argument, or are you focusing exclusively on the the ones in this thread?Joshs

    I couldn't possibly say that, I've not read most of those. No doubt some fail on that count, maybe others don't. I can only argue against positions which I've read. It can't possibly be the case that simply by declaring something to be a moral theory it thereby is one. It must be possible to be in error in this regard - as I repeatedly mention, the private language argument already makes this case.

    The point still stands, and @schopenhauer1's move of kicking the can down the road to 'right' and 'wrong' does nothing to change it. 'Moral', 'Right', 'Wrong'...these are all terms in a common language. In order for them to function they cannot have private meanings. As such the question of what is 'moral', what is 'right', what is 'wrong', must have an answer (at any given time) and that answer must be in the public use of these terms.

    The alternative is that language is somehow delivered to us by some supernatural force (what is 'right' has been defined, not by our use of the term but by some outside force compelling us to use the word a certain way), or that there's no relationship at all between all the things we use 'right' for and they are each just individually labelled thus by fiat at the time.

    The former is ridiculous. The latter is at least plausible, but I think it's a trivial matter to point to commonalities between the things we call 'right' which suggests more than a case-by-case christening.

    What is evident is that individuals are not placed to simply declare what is 'right' or 'moral' from their own private opinion on the matter. 'Right' and 'moral' are both words in the English language - their meaning is a public matter.

    It follows then that any discussion about what is 'right' or 'wrong' is a discussion about language use. Which things are understood by using those terms.

    What I'm arguing here cannot possibly cover all of anti-natalism (there are other good arguments against other aspects). I'm arguing here against the specific claim that "do not risk harm to another when you cannot obtain their consent no matter what the consequences" is a 'moral' or 'right' objective in the normal use of those terms. I can't think of a single other maxim we count as 'moral' or 'right' which adds '...no matter what the consequences', and it's trivial to find many maxims and duties which break that rule but are nonetheless considered 'moral' or 'right' so it seems a very poor candidate for inclusion in the use of those terms.

    That's the only reason why I've invoked any sort of naturalism (which shouldn't be taken in isolation - I've also invoked culture and religion). It's because such naturalism (together with the other influences I mentioned) gives a very good model for what sorts of things are meant by those terms. we've not just randomly grouped some behaviours together and labelled them all 'good', 'right' or 'moral', those groupings very much appear to have common threads - threads resulting mainly from psychology, culture, and religion, with a very strong emphasis on psychology.
  • Freedom and Duty
    I do not know what normative force (NF) is, but maybe we don't need to go that way. I will assume there is such a thing, and that it is somehow, someway, more compelling than mere collective agreement. So, would you allow that arithmetic has NF? the idea being that if NF, then relativism is ruled out.tim wood

    My bad. By normative force I simply mean something like persuasive power with regards to action - ie the the difference between saying to someone "you ought not do x" and "you ought not do x because...". the degree to which the 'because...' is persuasive is the normative force of the statement.

    And let's block here any form of nihilism. He or she can deny up is up or down is down, represent that up is down, or say that 2+2=5. But the nihilist annihilates truth, and in this truth is presupposed. Our job then, as best we can, to identify it, and to satisfy ourselves that what we think is true, actually is; and then to see if in virtue of being true it possesses NF.tim wood

    I think you make a false dichotomy between nihilism and rationally derived truth, There are other values than rationally derived truth which might give normative force to a statement. for example "If you don't do X no-one will like you" has normative force because (generally) we want to be liked. Us generally wanting to be liked is an empirical observation and anyone denying it would have quite a job of persuasion, so there's little risk of nihilism, but nor is there a rational argument there as to why we 'ought' to want to be liked - we just do. That's why, when I said about your argument having normative force I offered two courses - the rational argument, or the appeal to some value we're likely to hold commonly.

    No doubt feeling can add verisimilitude, but is itself an imitation of NF. What is left? I find reason. Do you find anything different? And reason must be before experience, because experience cannot create reasontim wood

    I'm not sure where you're getting this line of argument from, it seems to have no basis that we might share (or are you simply trying to establish that basis?). In the latter case then I'm afraid we do not have common ground from which to argue because I disagree with your axiom here. I believe 'reason' is simply a habit of thinking which has proven useful. The 'proven useful' part is experience. We think in such algorithms as show that 2+2=4 simply because such methods yield useful results, not because such thinking methods are somehow hard-wired into the universe (though they may be somewhat hard-wired into us).

    "We hold these truths to be self-evident." We had better, or we hold no truths to be evident at all.tim wood

    Agreed. But it is absolutely evident that we do not all hold the same truths to be self-evident. That there is a need to hold something as self evident to avoid nihilism cannot be held up as an argument in support of any specific such something. Support for some particular something (truth held as self-evident) might come from psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion...but it cannot come from rational argument because rational argument must always take a premise and show a conclusion. If the conclusion is "X should be taken as self-evident" what would the premise there be?

    We can sample it, but for immersion you have to go there.tim wood

    It's hard to tell if you're claiming these as empirical observations or rational conclusions. If the latter, the question is the same for each - what is the premise from which you derive these as conclusions? As the former they fail spectacularly in terms of support.

    1) Mankind alone is free - we have no reason to believe this. We feel like we're free, but then we also find ourselves making decisions we later which we'd given more thought to, anden masse we seem to make some incredibly self-defeating choices. The jury is very much still out as to how 'free' we are.

    2) Mankind alone can make moral choices - The jury is not even really still out on this one. Majority opinion is that at least great apes have morality that is biologically indistinguishable from our own. I can provide citations if you're interested.

    3) Reason alone is the original source of moral choices - Again, not even up for debate really. FMRI scan show moral decisions being made involving areas of the brain at times completely separate from those involved in rational decisions. We unequivocally do not make moral decisions solely by rational thought. again, if you require citations I can provide them

    4) Morality is the ability to discern and distinguish the right, and to choose accordingly - Yes, I think that's a good working definition.

    5) Humanity, in self and community, has value (or it has no value) - Yep, no argument there either.

    6) Life in itself has value (or it has no value) - Again, agreed.

    7) The right is in accordance with a reverence for life and humanity - It certainly seems to be, but consider acts of bravery in war, these may well involve killing an 'enemy'. I think reverence for life and humanity is part of it, but it's complicated in times of conflict.

    8) In order to act morally, one must be free to act - Not so sure on this one. There does seem to be some necessity to have free choice (if we're forced to do a 'good' thing, that is rarely seen as virtuous), but I'd be sceptical that a definition requires us to know the 'true' extent of someone's freedom. Were that the case we'd never be able to properly use the word. It must be sufficient that there's a general appearance of freedom (ie no-one's putting a gun to your head). I see no reason why that need extend to the absence of psychological drives to act. Such drives are, after all, just as much part of 'us' as our rational thoughts.

    9) Duty is the obligation to act in accordance with morality - Seems like another good working definition.


    10) Realization of purpose under morality is the highest aim of mankind - Empirically difficult to see how this is true. as a rational conclusion it requires a jump from identifying that which is moral to identifying an absence of other equally pressing objectives - something you've not yet done.


    The helmetless rider in traffic harms no one, until he is subject to the routine accident that every experienced rider assumes, knows, will happen sooner or later. But for the helmetless rider, the accident that may have just scraped some denim and maybe some skin, that he should bounce up and walk away from, is instead death, whether a living death or a dead death. At the least is a devastated family. And nearby is a rehabilitation hospital that takes on brain-injury cases, and that care is so long and expensive only the state and federal government can afford it, i.e., me for sure and maybe you!

    The helmetless spirit inhabits every level where there is ignorance or stupidity. And in a crowding world, mere personal moral failure becomes offense in fact.
    tim wood

    Right - so this ^ is all what I mean by post hoc rationalisation. Nothing you've said here is false, but it is 'selected' to achieve an end (helmetless riding is bad, helmeted riding is not). Where, in your assessment of potential harms is the particulate pollution that even helmeted riding produces - arguably more damaging than the occasional motorcycle accident? Where the risk to other road users simply by virtue of unnecessary travel - all motorised vehicles are dangerous, the leading cause of death in many places? Where the harm caused simply by buying the bike - unfair working practices, modern slavery derived components...? I could go on.

    The point is simply that regardless of our conclusions about the flaws or otherwise in your moral framework, it is without a doubt that it's application is post hoc - you already know what sorts of things you'd' like to turn out to be 'right' and which you'd like to turn out to be 'wrong'. They're generally the things which seem good to you. I can guarantee you that if a moral algorithm ever produced the result that you should murder your wife you simply wouldn't do it, you'd presume you'd made a mistake somewhere. Why? Because you already know it's wrong. It's not like maths. I have no feeling about the 'right' answer to a complicated sum, but I already know which answers to complicated moral dilemmas feel wrong.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    I’m assuming your formulation of moral consensus based on natural
    grounds wouldn’t be accepted by someone like Rorty because he would consider the notion of the natural
    to be itself ungrounded in anything but contingent pragmatic use.
    Joshs

    In that he'd be against the essentialism, I think yes, but I'm not that familiar with Rorty.

    The point I was making though was not so much about grounding answers to moral questions in naturalism (I think most such attempts are post hoc to that which has already been decided by deeper psychological processes). It was more that the word itself has a public meaning which has arisen partly from our biology, but also from shared culture, religion etc. What I object to here is the idea that one can come up with any objective whatsoever and claim it to be a 'moral' one. It's simply a misuse of the word. It's no different to if I were to consistently use the word 'angry' to describe my satisfied sigh at my first sip of evening whiskey. It's not that I'm 'redefining' anger, I've just misused the word. That's not the right word to describe such behaviour.

    'Moral' is just not the right word to describe a desire to remove all suffering even at the expense of there being no one to benefit from having done so.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Reduction of harm seems a good place to start, as I think both parties agree that in some respect, this makes sense. It is more about the context and circumstances and thresholds of how much that difference start taking place.schopenhauer1

    No, not at all. Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. That's the whole point. Moral rules have some broad set of unifying properties (as per the SEP article I cited). Reduction of harm without anyone to benefit from that reduction meets none of the publicly held criteria, not religious, not social, not biological... none of them. It's just a wierd arbitrary objective held by a small number of people for various non-moral reasons.
  • Freedom and Duty
    I can't make out the point of your post. As to "normative force,"tim wood

    You say

    I think the logic of the thing compels agreement.tim wood

    Your argument is essentially. ..

    -By Kant's definition of freedom, riding without a helmet is not freedom.

    -We all think freedom is a good thing.

    -We should therefore not ride motorbikes without helmets.

    But you equivocate on the meaning of freedom between the first and second point. If riding a motorbike without a helmet is not freedom as Kant defines it then the only thing that follows from that is that we should not ride motorbikes without helmets if we value freedom as Kant defines it.

    Since it is nowhere shown why we should do so, nor empirically demonsrated that such a value is likely to be one we all hold, the conclusion has no normative force.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    As to...

    it's literally just you trying to say that antinatalism is not a moral theory.khaled

    This is the entry I've already cited from the SEP, my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics.

    Any definition of “morality” in the descriptive sense will need to specify which of the codes put forward by a society or group count as moral. Even in small homogeneous societies that have no written language, distinctions are sometimes made between morality, etiquette, law, and religion. And in larger and more complex societies these distinctions are often sharply marked. So “morality” cannot be taken to refer to every code of conduct put forward by a society.

    In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.

    As we’ve just seen, not all codes that are put forward by societies or groups are moral codes in the descriptive sense of morality, and not all codes that would be accepted by all moral agents are moral codes in the normative sense of morality. So any definition of morality—in either sense—will require further criteria.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Let us take the question: Ought I to wear black shoelaces or brown shoelaces to the market? I would say this is 100% not a moral consideration. However an elder of the Latter Day Church of Black Shoelaces might strongly differ with me on this.Kenosha Kid

    Yeah, that's pretty much how I see it. The only way we can even make sense of what the elder means when he uses the word 'moral' is that we know roughly what he's trying to get at (in this case, something like "God wants you to...". We might disagree on the grounds that God doesn't want us to, or on the grounds that such a criteria makes no sense because of a lack of referent.

    What would make no sense is if a non-elder just said "you ought to wear black shoelaces to the market" is a moral claim, but "you ought to use a double bow to tie them" is not a moral claim and can offer nothing by way of properties pertaining to either which might distinguish them.

    I think that my definition of a moral premise perfectly fall within that range. At least one other guy here thinks so:khaled

    So far your definition seems to be literally any instruction not contingent on a prior objective. I've not come across that definition anywhere.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    I've given you my defintion already. You then ask me "where I got it from". I don't know how to answer that question. Where did you get yours from?khaled

    As I said, look into the private language argument. 'Your meaning' and 'My meaning' don't make any sense. There's no private meanings to words, only public ones.
  • Freedom and Duty
    Now we know something is the case: either you're wrong or Kant's wrong. And for Kant to be wrong, it must be on his terms.tim wood

    No. You can't equivocate like that. You said...

    Where it is legal, many motorcycle riders do not wear helmets. (As a long-experienced rider I am well aware of the charms of helmetless travel, and recognize that there are limited situations when it is relatively safe - traffic not one of those situations - my bona fides and biases up front.)

    But what is wrong with it? Simply the heightened risk of being killed or catastrophically injured in an otherwise minor accident of the sort motorcycles are subject to, at a cost the victim cannot himself bear. That is, he, usually a he, hurts everyone, and some greatly. There can be no such freedom to either cause or unreasonably risk such harm.

    And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement.
    tim wood

    That is a statement about courses of action, not definitions. What we 'call' such a course of action is not relevant to the normative force you want to impart to it.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    You make it sound like there is some set definition of the word.khaled

    What? You're seriously arguing there's no definition of the word? How on earth do we communicate using it then?

    Are you familiar with the Private Language Argument. I mentioned it a while back but you didn't respond. I don't want to teach you to suck eggs, but If you've not come across it before, I'd seriously recommend reading about it. It will save you falling into the hole you're digging yourself with this line of argument.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    That it can be a moral commandment? Because it is talking about what you should do, and is done for its own sake.khaled

    Yes, that one. Where are you getting this definition from?
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    undoing 10mm nuts can be a moral commandment, though a very stupid one.khaled

    On what basis are you making this claim?
  • Freedom and Duty
    freedom is not at all freedom from duty.Echarmion

    I can't make sense of this proposition, you seem to have used 'freedom' in two different ways and whilst I understand the latter, I'm unclear on the former. in "freedom from duty" I understand freedom to mean 'the absence of constraint caused by...' (in this case duty). But it would make no sense to have this meaning in the former use, since no constraint is given. So what is the use of 'freedom in it's first instance that you're trying to define by it's second use?
  • Freedom and Duty


    A more lovely example could not be presented of deciding in advance what one is going to consider right and wrong and then constructing some pseudo-logical monstrosity to justify it post hoc. Well done. I presume that was your objective...
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac


    If you were to also propose some moral duty to undo 10mm nuts, then yes that would be a moral claim. Otherwise it is instructions.
    khaled

    That's not what you're arguing though, you keep loosing the thread of the argument and so it's become very tiresome. Your claim was that features of certain normative claims that make them 'moral' ones are "If they are about how you should act". You've also previously said

    moral rules are followed for their own sakekhaled

    So your answer that "you should use a 10mm spanner" is only a moral rule "if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is inconsistent with your position that "moral rules are followed for their own sake" as now you're defining a rule as moral that is only followed for the sake of undoing a 10mm nut, not for it's own sake.

    Ah so that's where the misunderstanding is. I've been using "moral" in the descriptive sense.khaled

    Where is "avoid all risk of harm without first obtaining consent" a moral objective other than in your mind? It's not a very useful description as it captures one thought of a tiny (possibly even uniquely idiosyncratic) proportion of the population. Descriptive morality isn't about that. Otherwise, again, every single thought counts as a moral one and the term becomes useless.

    Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac


    My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac


    Sure....
    khaled

    The former refers to a global definition, the latter refers to what my personal answer is - read carefully.

    There are clearly reasons (natrualistic explanations) for why we favor this or that moral premise but there are no justifications to favor any. To say those are the same things would be a naturalistic fallacy.khaled

    Right. So if you agree that there are naturalistic reasons why we prefer this or that moral premise then you are compelled to also agree that moral premises are not arbitrary. If the arise resulting from naturalistic forces, then they are constrained by the probability space created by those causative variables - broadly natural selection and cultural survival. That one should use a 10mm spanner (or indeed that one should undo 10mm nuts) cannot be reasonably shown to fit either.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism


    It's worth having a look at the SEP entry on defining morality.

    In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.SEP - The Definition of Morality

    We're looking for that 'something else', in your framework to justify the claim that it's a 'moral' one.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac


    If they are about how you should act.
    khaled

    So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? Weird.

    So I guess "ethical egoism" is not about morals then?khaled

    A fourth argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory.SEP - Egoism

    And neither was whatever Kant was doing.khaled

    IF you want to explain the origin of Kant's 'goodwill', then do so and we can look at it, but since the issue has dogged scholars since its inception, I doubt you'll be able to give a clear answer. Invoking 'whatever Kant was doing' in an argument is useless unless you know what Kant was doing.

    I think your claim is ridiculous because many (if not most) things we call "moral theories" do not have the community co-operation as an end goal, and often have cases where they favor other values (freedom, sanctity of life, whatever) over the community.khaled

    Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). What I'm trying to get from you is your equivalent for your moral framework. Secondly, you still have not resolved the issue of what makes claims 'moral'. As the SEP quote clarifies not all values basing a moral theory are properly countable as 'moral'. It's insufficient to simple say that other moral frameworks have slightly different values and therefore any value equally counts as moral. A multiplicity is not the same as arbitrary.

    No, my claim is that the "if you want..." component is arbitrary. "If you want community cooperation" works. So does "If you want to respect the freedom of the individual". etc.khaled

    Again - so "if you want to undo a 10mm nut..." works? You were previously arguing that my concept of what is moral was 'ridiculous' on the grounds of inconsistency with other frameworks we call 'moral'. So if the same inconsistency is not to apply to your position you should be able to point to the moral framework in which undoing a 10mm nut is the main value.

    How is this a natrualistic argument? I didn't say "We should not want to harm others without their consent because it is natural".

    If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you.
    khaled

    No. I'm saying the exact opposite. We simply do not have arbitrary desires. If you think we do, the onus is rather on you to explain the mechanism by which you propose they come about because neural representation arising without cause sounds like magic to me.
  • Coronavirus
    here is Professor Sir David Speigelhalter himself saying the EXACT OPPOSITE of what you are saying. You can make country comparisons, of course you have to understand how rough those comparison are, which I DO understand. Please listen the following interview to the end.ssu

    I'm not arguing that no-one thinks inter-country comparisons are useful, so I'm not sure what this interview is supposed to teach me. You were the one arguing that issues around variable recording methods were 'tinfoil hat-wearing' conspiracy theory. I'm just trying to inject a little nuance into this. It's more complicated than that.

    Where did you give the contrary evidence? I and you have not discussed or if you have given it earlier, so could you give a link to what you are referring to. It's an informative way would give links or simply to give the exact reason why and what is wrong.ssu

    From the UK government's own website

    concerns [were] raised by academics from the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine about the original measure, which counted anyone who had ever tested positive as a COVID-associated death.

    the numbers of deaths in people who have tested positive have become substantially greater than the numbers of deaths subsequently registered as COVID-19 deaths by the ONS, which is why we are now changing our approach to reporting deaths — PHE

    I've not gotten the stuff you refer to, that governments can make statistics just what they want.ssu

    Where did I say anything like that?

    In my view Spiegelhalter isn't refuting or contradicting the pandemic.ssu

    Of course he wasn't, he's a respected professor, why would you even think he would be refuting the pandemic?
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Frankly, I find your whole "Let's follow this moral rule purely because it makes better societies" repulsive.khaled

    Where have I said anything like that? I can quote several places I've said the exact opposite. If you're not going to actually follow through the argument there's little point in continuing. We're talking about a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones, and b) what it is about those features that gives them their normative force - the 'if you want...' before the '...then you should...'.

    My claim is that it is community co-operation. Efforts to support it are what unite certain normative claims we call 'moral', and the normative force is the maintenance of such co-operation - 'if you want {community co-operation}, then you should [moral rule]'.

    Your claim seems to be that there is no 'if you want...' component at all, nor any uniting feature which makes certain normative claims 'moral' ones. Yet you've just ignored my arguments against such a position (private language argument against private definitions, and cultural similarity argument against a lack of contingency).

    The rest of your post simply arises from this basic misunderstanding. There is no 'ought' without an 'if' it's impossible for non-objectivist (I'd argue it's impossible anyway, but since neither of us are objectivist I don't have to). So any discussion of what we 'ought' to do must be accompanied by an 'if we want...'. What we're discussing is your 'if we want...'.

    So you need to fill in the blank 'if we want to...we ought to avoid risking harm to others without consent'. What is in the blank?

    Or...you're arguing that avoiding the risk of harm to others without consent is the contingent part - 'if you want to {avoid risking harm to others without consent}, then you ought to [not have children]'. But here you're faced with the naturalistic argument. We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent?

    why do you make these features definitional instead of circumstantial? That's really the crux of the matter.khaled

    Private language argument. We cannot have private meanings for words. Language is a social enterprise.
  • Coronavirus
    if the US would share similar percentages as Canada, it would have now only 125 000 deaths, not 330 000. Hence the simple fact is that policies taken DO MATTER.ssu

    Yep.

    Meanwhile half a million die from preventable heart disease, but not a penny of additional investment in health initiatives or legislation around food and working conditions.

    Another half million from preventable cancers. No additional investment in research, no action on known carcinogens in the environment, no action on community healthcare.

    Another 150,000 or so preventable respiratory diseases. No action on air pollution, no action on outdoor activities, no action on allergens. No additional research investment.

    3 million children across the world die from poverty...every year. No increase in foreign aid, no action on fair trade, no action on modern slavery.

    The question is not whether policy matters. The question is why take every measure conceivable to avoid these particular deaths when no one gave a shit about all the other preventable deaths last year.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Sure, we would need some sort of drive to do something to ever consider it moral or immoral, but simply having such a drive doesn't make the thing moral.khaled

    You're not following the argument. What does then make a thing 'moral'? Our agreement that it fits in some loose category. What causes us to agree on such a loose category? Our shared experiences. Why do we assign normative force to the behaviours in that category? Because we have some drive to do so.

    You've yet to provide an alternative explanation for why we call some behaviours moral and why we are inclined to assign normative force to those (and not others).

    All he says is that were we a solitary species, the question of whether or not to steal would not arise. In that I am agreed. However, this does not indicate at all how a communal species (like us) should act.khaled

    Should act for what? I thought we'd been through this, there's no 'should' without contingency, we're not moral objectivists. If you want to have a high return, you should invest diversely. If you want to avoid pain, you should use gloves to handle hot pans... If you want society to co-operate effectively you should [insert moral rule]. You could potentially not agree with my contingency for moral rules, but what you're trying to do is do without one entirely whilst still claiming not to be objectivist about morals. This leaves you in the bizarre position of claiming the moral rules have no purpose at all, that we're inclined to add such normative force to them for no reason.

    it does NOT follow from that that the goal of morality is to establish such a community.khaled

    Of course it does. You may not agree with the premise, but it absolutely follows from the fact that we evolved moral sentiments to enable a more harmonious community that moral sentiments would be aimed at the maintenance of such a community. That's just how evolution works.

    To think that since moral impulse X arose naturally due to [insert explanation here] therefore we must all believe in moral impulse X is textbook naturalistic fallcy.khaled

    No one is claiming that. I (and Kenosha, I think) are claiming that since all impulses which count as 'moral' have some common features, origins and evolutionary heritage which sets them apart as an identifiable group, impulses lacking such features cannot reasonably be called 'moral' (in the absence of evidence to the contrary). It's not "x is natural, therefore you should do x" (naturalistic fallacy). It's ignoring all talk of 'should' as being uninforceable, but saying that "x lacks features a, b and c (which moral impulses share), then x is not moral". The normative force attached to moral impulses is neither here nor there, it's the definition of the word we're talking about.

    Definitely not randomly. But that is different from having a justfication. All moral premises are by definition unjustified. Some work better than others at preserving the society. The societies that adopted the ones that work better have survived longer.khaled

    Still not answering the question. For someone who apparently doesn't have a clue why some behaviours are considered moral you sure have some strong opinions as to what is not the reason.
  • Incel movement and hedonism
    I can't understand why half the world is still crying, man, when the other half of the world is still crying too, man, and they can't get it together, man. — Janis Joplin
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    that that statement cannot be concluded from the mere fact that we have a drive to take what we want or from the fact that we have a drive to cooperate.khaled

    Yes it can (to an extent). If we did not have a drive to co-operate, for example, there'd be no material cause for us to "decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong". We don't weigh up the choices randomly. There's an astonishing amount of similarity between cultures on such decisions which stands in need of naturalistic explanation.

    Which should be favored when? That's an interesting question. But restating that we have different impluses over and over again (like Isaac is doing) is not adding anything to the conversation.khaled

    You're not reading what @Kenosha Kid is saying. There is, in the very quote you're responding to, a bare-bone version of that explanation. It must be something to do with living co-operatively because if that weren't an issue we'd have no morality at all. As such, any purported 'moral' objective which cannot claim to be working toward such an end is not moral, by definition.

    The alternative is to posit that drives such as the desire to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent, arise randomly, without any purpose (in an evolutionary, or biological sense). That's the whole reason I've been bringing up naturalistic explanations for drives. To seek some common ground that they do not simply arise randomly. Given that you seem to agree, what purpose to you suppose a drive to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent might serve?

    At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses.khaled

    Then how do you suppose it was done? Randomly? And the massive levels of correlation between disparate cultures are what...just coincidence?

    What they were trying to do is find an inconsistency within the system itself. Failing to do thatkhaled

    No-one's failed to do that. @Benkei's original argument still stands. If you just stick to avoiding harm, you end up with contradictions (such as surgery), so you need to introduce consent, but consent is meaningless for non-existent entities, so we're forced to include benefits in our assessment (again, on pain of inconsistency with emergency surgery). Once benefits are included the antinatalist argument dissolves into completely normal decisions about having children.

    All that's happened here is that to avoid having to consider benefits you've doubled down on some idea of avoiding non-consent at all costs, which has lead us here to this discussion showing how such a maxim cannot really count as 'moral' because it is not focussed on living together better, the need for which is the only reason we have morals in the first place.
  • Coronavirus
    Which seems counterintuitive. As a parent, I sacrifice for my children's future, I do not sacrifice my children for my future, nor my parent's future. I am baffled why the governments seem to function in direct opposition to this concept. I do not not of one grand parent that would sacrifice their grandkids' future for the chance to live another year.Book273

    Yeah, but policy mostly affects other people's children, especially for the wealthy.
  • Coronavirus
    Thanks for that. Looks pretty bad and a bit predictable.Benkei

    No problem. Yeah, things look bad either way. We seem to have no good options. What I find difficult to swallow is why, given these hard choices, our governments consistently choose to mitigate the unknown using methods of unknown efficacy at the expense of the known harms of doing so. Personally I'd mitigate the known harms and hope for the best with an unknown, if I was forced into such a choice. We know how much people rely on primary care, aid, and community healthcare, so let's at least keep those going, shut down the rest and hope for the best. But then I don't have to get re-elected.

    I think a big part of the problem is social media. There's been significant studies indicating the effect on polarization of views. Because flag-waiving trumptards want to downplay the virus and keep the economy going, the only option for the 'other side' is to say the virus is worse than anything else in the world and all responses are entirely justified. Trying to tread any public line between is like trying to roll a marble on a knife edge, sooner or later it's going to roll irretrievably down one side or the other.

    Vested interests lobby hard, as usual, but what's changed is the escalating effect social media has on the narrative they put out there.
  • Coronavirus
    Yeah, there aren't statisticians in the World who would notice the differences in the reporting fatalitiesssu

    You mean like Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter from Cambridge University who called comparing countries' performances a "completely fatuous exercise"? But of course, I forget everyone who disagrees with you is simply a conspiracy theorist. It's shocking how high up the echelons of academia these conspiracy theorists can get - this one even has a knighthood.

    hundreds of thousands of deaths can be simply reported just how the powers that be want them to be reported as so.ssu

    Yes, that is exactly the case. The method of recording and counting death is set by either the government or the government agencies in the respective countries. It is exactly true that deaths can be reported how the powers that be want them reported. I've literally just cited the British government saying exactly that - for fuck's sake. It's like you're immune to any contrary evidence. The British government determined how a covid death should be counted, a professional epidemiologist raised concerns that this was doing exactly what is being claimed (inflating the numbers of covid deaths) and they responded by changing the way they counted covid deaths.

    As if those doctors don't care what they write down as the cause of deathssu

    Caring is not necessarily correlated with any particular method of recording is it?

    those who gather these statistics cannot be relied upon.ssu

    Again, I've just cited cases in which they have made substantial mistakes. It's a complex situation. This Disneyfication of it into a nice childish narrative is positively dangerous.

    Has any research been done on that anywhere?Benkei

    I cited earlier a couple of reports on the impact of lockdowns on TB which gave estimated numbers of deaths. I can't find a free version, so I'll quote

    Even temporary disruptions can cause long-term increases in TB incidence and mortality. If lockdown-related disruptions cause a temporary 50% reduction in TB transmission, we estimated that a 3-month suspension of TB services, followed by 10 months to restore to normal, would cause, over the next 5 years, an additional 1⋅19 million TB cases (Crl 1⋅06–1⋅33) and 361,000 TB deaths (CrI 333–394 thousand) in India, 24,700 (16,100–44,700) TB cases and 12,500 deaths (8.8–17.8 thousand) in Kenya, and 4,350 (826–6,540) cases and 1,340 deaths (815–1,980) in Ukraine. The principal driver of these adverse impacts is the accumulation of undetected TB during a lockdown. — The potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tuberculosis epidemic a modelling analysis - The LancetIsaac

    There's also some work done on behalf of the WHO on deaths from the loss of normal vaccination programmes due to lockdown and supply disruption, no figures yet, but speculation that it could be in the tens of thousands. Here's the briefing note - https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/geneva-palais-briefing-note-impact-covid-19-mitigation-measures-vaccine-supply-and

    Polio vaccinations have been postponed in many countries - http://polioeradication.org/news-post/call-to-action-to-support-covid-19-response/

    There's no collective numbers that I know of on the impact of lessened access to primary healthcare, but there was a good study done at Leeds on Heart attacks which showed a worrying decrease in emergency care access for heart attacks, putting the figures in the low thousands of potential deaths. If this were extrapolated out to cancers, other heart conditions, etc the figures would be alarming. The WHO have done some research on the extent of disruption, but not the numbers yet -https://www.who.int/news/item/01-06-2020-covid-19-significantly-impacts-health-services-for-noncommunicable-diseases. - These diseases kill 41 million annually

    This is a most worrying study from the Lancet on infant mortality - https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30229-1/fulltext estimating an additional 253 500 child deaths and 12 200 maternal deaths from disruption to healthcare and food access. This is just infant mortality here.

    None of this even touches yet on development aid budgets. Oxfam is closing its operations in 18 countries due to Covid restrictions. The World Food Programme estimates number of children in food poverty will double - https://www.wfp.org/news/covid-19-will-double-number-people-facing-food-crises-unless-swift-action-taken

    What really worries me though is the impact on the next generation - https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32929399/ . As ever, children seem to be treated like lesser citizens whose lives can be interfered with with impunity in service to the older generations.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term. — Isaac


    I think the standards are arbitrary. Moral objectivists think they're not. Also there is no job called "ethicist" for this reason.
    khaled

    I don't mean 'job' as in employment. I just mean that you cannot sensibly say that something is the 'job' of a particular type of person(or investigation) when there's no course of action implied. If the rules are arbitrary, then there's no task to be done at all - shut you eyes and point at one, string a randomly selected group of words together... It's just obviously not the case. We do not accept "you must wear a monkey on your head every Thursday" as a moral rule, there are parameters to do with our mutual understanding reflected in our common language - the 'meaning' of the word 'moral'.

    It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about".khaled

    I'm not the one saying there's nothing to debate. I'm saying that's the implication of you insistence that the rules are arbitrary (yet naturalistically derived). It would mean that we have no discursive role in their development as a community - something I don't hold to. Once you accept, however, that our biological mechanisms both drive and respond to our interactions with others, those interactions become a vitally important part of the process.

    The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim. — Isaac


    Agreed. Now, we check the premises and check the reasoning. If we agree with the premises and reasoning then the conclusion must be true.
    khaled

    What do we 'check the premises' for? What are we checking? Let's say I have the premise that car's need to crank the engine before the pistons will star a self-sustaining cycle. I reason from that premise that we should crank the engine if we want the car to run. Premises we all agree on, sound reasoning. So if I say that it's a moral rule that "we ought to crank the engine", has checking the premises and reasoning helped at all in resolving that claim? No.

    There's something about moral claims which sets them apart from other claims. It's not arbitrary - because if it were we'd not be able to trace any kind of connection or draw any meaning at all from someone's use of the term. It's not just whatever anyone speaking claims it to be - then we'd have a private language and communication would be redundant. So there's a matter of fact here (albeit maybe a fuzzy one) as to what are and are not moral premises.

    Reducing suffering by removing all life capable of it is not a moral premise because morality (religious hijacking aside) is all about interpersonal behaviour aimed at co-operation. Not causing suffering is surely one feature of this broader objective, but it's not the premise, it's a method - if I cause another to suffer, they may get angry and retaliate, or I might cause them so much harm they're no longer a useful member of the community... and so on.

    Basically, what I mean by raising the naturalistic explanation is that we don't just have a series of random desires, and since our language reflects functions in our culture, terms like 'moral' are also not going to have random definitions. So if you can't trace your purported definition somehow back to something 'useful' in our culture, your definition is wrong.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge — Isaac


    Arbitrary standards, again.
    khaled

    It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term.

    In the same way, figuring out why you favor this or that moral premise while I favor a different one does not say anything about the premises themselves, or which is better (if there is such a thing), or which is consistent. That is the job of ethics. That is what we are debating.khaled

    What I'm saying is the judgement of which is better must also have a naturalistic explanation, or be non-physical in origin. If the former, then there is no 'better' in objective terms, nothing to debate.

    clearly we have had hundreds of uses of the word "moral" in context of antinatalism. So I'm not sure where your objection that the conclusion is "not moral" but is "just a plan" comes from. It could only come from arbitrarily deciding that one use of the word is "illegitimate" even though we have had threads going into hundreds of posts using it in the context of antinatalism.

    We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning. — Isaac


    And as we said, the word has some room for error. And I think "having children is immoral" falls squarely within legitimate bounds of its use. You also think this, or you wouldn't have understood what was being said. It would have sounded like "having children is 134". But it doesn't.
    khaled

    This is not at all true. If I said elephants are a type of cat you'd know exactly what I was talking about, but I'd still be wrong - elephants are not a type of cat. The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim.
  • Coronavirus
    'm quite confident that if the cause of any particular autoimmune disease was the presence of one type of molecule, that cause would have been found by now.Metaphysician Undercover

    That's better. I wondered what had happened to the old MU with all this "I'm sure the experts know best" malarkey. This is much more like it - startlingly egotistical pronouncements of certainty on topics you clearly have absolutely no training or understanding of...the world's back to normal again.
  • Coronavirus
    Millions of doses were purchased by the federal government prior to the FDA approval. Should this be concerning?creativesoul

    Yeah, I'm worried.

    Research in the Journal of General Internal Medicine, found the lobbying expenditures ($248.4 million) and new lobbyist registrations (357) of the health sector represented nearly a fourth of all lobbying activity, across all industries, in the first quarter of 2020.

    Health sector lobbying spending increased more than 10% in Q1 of 2020 while non-health sector increased only 1%. Meanwhile, the number of new lobbyists registered in the health sector increased a staggering 140% while non-health sector registrations increased only 63%.

    Overall, the top 30 healthcare organizations (16 of which were pharmaceutical organizations) spent almost $100 million on lobbying in Q1 of 2020, which represented a 55% increase in lobbying spending over Q4 of 2019.

    from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11606-020-06085-6

    Most worrying, to me, is the conclusion of one of the study authors [my bold] "The return on investment on a dollar of lobbying appears much higher than a dollar of R&D"

    Same seems to be the case in Europe where European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) lobbied against a tool designed to facilitate equitable access and pricing for pandemic treatments in Europe and former EFPIA Director Richard Bergström is one of seven members on the EU team negotiating these vaccine deals with pharmaceutical corporations.
  • Coronavirus
    Citations can always be cherry picked from diverse sources to support just about anythingmagritte

    Well then you should have no trouble cherry-picking some experts who claim that the effectiveness of the vaccine at reducing transmission and symptom severity have already been established in vitro.

    None of us here are expert virologists, so the interest is in reading such opposing views, not in pointing out their theoretical existence.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    What do we do when those clash? The answer to THAT is not natrualistic. You can explain the instincts and evolution behind both incentives but that doesn't tell you which one we should favor in which circumstance. That's the job of ethics.khaled

    Again, you haven't explained a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge, and b) if there's not a naturalistic explanation (predictive model) to be had regarding which we will choose, then what does the choosing? If, on the other hand, the choosing is done by some natural mechanism, then there exists a naturalistic account of the choice.

    the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping. — Isaac


    What do you mean here? Just sounds like word salad to me.
    khaled

    Just that words are not defined by individuals alone, nor by some rational process. They are defined in the use they are put to in a community. We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning.
  • Coronavirus
    Isn't that the reason for long term studies? I mean, isn't it the case that the reason we'll probably never know(this time around) is because we've neglected public safety protocols that have been in place for decades because we already know that such measures are necessary to insure we're doing everything we can to provide the safest possible treatment(s)?creativesoul

    Sort of, but normal safety protocols for new drugs aren't designed to pick up on those kind of long term potential consequences either, it's just too hard. You're right that the longer term the trial is run for the more potential reactions it will pick up, but the differences in trial monitoring periods are small. Longer-term effects are picked up (if at all) at phase 4 when the vaccine is already in use.

    This is why a proper risk assessment, including investigation of alternatives is so important, as opposed to the two people spending just three weeks checking a chemical to be injected into half the world.https://www.statnews.com/2020/12/17/did-the-fda-understaff-its-review-of-the-pfizer-biontech-vaccine/

    Insanity.
  • Coronavirus
    Effectiveness is established in the labs in thousands of test tubes by mass laboratory techniques. Before they ever take a vaccine outside the lab effectiveness is already solidly established.magritte

    Well then you should have no trouble citing the published results demonstrating this effectiveness.

    Viruses do not attack individuals or communities or the poor.magritte

    Long-standing systemic health and social inequities have put many people from racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk of getting sick and dying from COVID-19. — CDC

    Here is an overview. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7221360/

    Again, if this is so obviously false you should have no trouble citing counter-arguments.

    Viruses attack the entire extent of the human genome anywhere and everywhere even in the most remote regions of Earth, sooner or later.magritte

    No. For example people with S-reactive CD4 T cells show significant immunity without having been previously exposed to the virus. https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.17.20061440v1

    This is a highly technical subject, seriously, if you can't even be bothered to provide citations there's not much point in commenting. No one's interested in what you 'reckon' might be the case.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. — Isaac


    Arbitrary in the sense that there is no reason you should favor it over another one.
    khaled

    There is a naturalistic explanation for why we have the starting premises we do. However that does not invalidate using alternative premises.khaled

    You're missing the point. We have those imperetives. That's what we just established. The's not some 'other' you that gets to decide what the 'natural' you wants. There's just your wants. Some of which are 'moral' according to the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping.

    At no point is there some external judge.
  • Coronavirus
    On the subject of MMR vaccines, which are credited with saving millions of lives a year, the WHO reports

    Vaccinations have been disrupted for several reasons. Some parents are no longer taking children to clinics because of movement restrictions imposed to slow the spread of the coronavirus or because they are scared about the risk of exposure to the virus. Health workers who provide vaccinations have also been diverted to help with the response to the pandemic. A lack of protective equipment means clinicians are reducing the number of people they treat.

    Lockdowns and cutbacks in commercial flights have also led to delayed the delivery of some vaccines, leading Gavi to devote funding to ship vaccines around the world.

    Monumental recklessness.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means? — Isaac


    By sharing the same arbitrary starting point.
    khaled

    Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. Unless there was some global coordinated government ruling on what counted as 'moral', that I missed. If we generally share the same starting point (and we're ruling out divine intervention) then that fact stands in need of explanation. If that explanation is natural, then there exists a naturalistic basis for that shared understanding.
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    On what grounds do we decide? — Isaac


    Arbitrary ones. I think.
    khaled

    Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means?
  • All things wrong with antinatalism
    But not everything we are inclined toward doing is moral. That's the naturalistic fallacy. We are inclined to steal. We are also inclined to help the poor. One is moral one is not. Deciding which is ethics.khaled

    On what grounds do we decide?
  • Coronavirus
    How can science shorten field trial periods from multiple years to less than a year, and remain confident that any significant, possibly deadly, side effects from a treatment have shown themselves?

    If there are side effects that do not show immediately, but rather take years, and a very broad sampling size, to show themselves, then it is literally impossible to know about them over a much shorter duration with smaller less diverse sample sizes...
    creativesoul

    Yeah, this is certainly a concern. Having said that, a phase III trial is a phase III trial, if it's come about two years earlier, it's not necessarily a less powerful trial as a consequence. I think the greater concern is that no amount of money can buy expertise (that requires training). We can sequester people from other projects, but those projects were not trivial themselves and don't necessarily have less of an impact, so expert scrutiny will either be lacking here, or we will have drawn such scrutiny away from other live-saving projects. What we can't do is suddenly 'buy' another few hundred expert pharmacologists.

    As to the potential long-term effects, we'll probably never know. Beyond a few years, the compounding factors mount up in any cohort making isolation of subtle effect difficult, if not impossible. With a small enough cohort it might be possible, but the more people involved in the first wave of take-up, the more confounding factors become likely to materialise in that group from possibly external sources.

    The point is that we fully expect vaccines to have side effects at a low prevalence. Most governments have a Vaccine Adverse Reaction compensation system (I know the UK and most of Europe does). With MMR, for example anaphylaxis occurs at a rate of about 10 per million, seizures about 1 per 1,150 doses, thrombocytopenia at about 1 in 30,000, up to a 1 in 100 risk of Aseptic Meningitis (depending on the strain of the mumps component used), febrile seizures at about 8.5 per 10,000...

    ...and those are just the acute short-term effects.

    The point is the benefits outweigh the risk, not that there is no risk. Vaccination against something like measles remains one of the most cost effective ways of saving lives, but the idea that it has no negatives to weigh this against is a fairy-tale for people who can't handle complexity.

    What's wrong here (corona virus) is that without a strong indication that a vaccine will reduce the severity of the disease in vulnerable patients then hospital admissions will probably increase - just at a time when our healthcare services are at breaking point. The vast majority of the side effects I just listed require at least some healthcare intervention, mostly hospital admission. Imagine if the whole country were given the vaccine and it had those rates of adverse reaction (which are really good rates). Tens of thousands of additional hospital admissions.