It's neither moral nor amoral — Outlander

You would probably agree that malicious genetic engineering (like making someone blind through genetic engineering) is wrong. If that’s the case what is your basis?

I find the idea that there are absolutely no moral considerations when it comes to having children laughable. Most people I’ve talked to on here (and I’m pretty sure you too) would agree that having kids when one cannot provide for them is wrong.

It's a means not an end to a means, one that can result in either outcome. — Outlander

Me pointing a loaded gun at someone and pulling the trigger doesn’t necessarily harm them. My gun could jam after all. But I’m pretty sure we can agree it’s wrong. Imagine if I said “Shooting people is a means not an end to a means, one that can result in many outcomes”

Who knows, maybe if I shoot just right I’ll accidentally remove a tumor or something. So I guess shooting people is fine?

This is obviously ridiculous. Humans are capable of predicting the future and making decisions based on that. We do not need certainties to say that something is wrong (shooting for example, doesn’t harm for certain and yet is wrong). So let’s apply the same standards to procreation. Let's not require perfect knowledge in this one case, and actually look at the harms done by procreating vs not procreating.

But that's my point, friend. You may choose not to participate and create a person who you will raise to not only not do that but do everything in their power to prevent that. Not because they're "forced to" simply because you raised them to view doing so as beneficial and bringing joy to their person. Meanwhile, those who are raised without said belief will continue to do so and thanks to your non-participation will continue this unabated and unrestricted. — Outlander

Humans are not a bunch of inputs that magically will be programmed to be beneficial robot machines. And my main point is that even if you were to be able to program a human in such a fashion (again not how it works), procreating a person in order that the outcome of a beneficial robot machine comes about, would be wrong. That's my point. It's not about the utility of a person in this case of the procreation decision. It is about using them for your means, good intentions or not.

The child will undoubtedly do what the child wants. The assumption that a child raised to receive joy from selflessness is "sacrificed" or otherwise forced to do something against their will is on par with the same idea toward a child raised to feel joy from selfishness, is it not? — Outlander

Same response as above.

Again, people will continue to be born, and without proper guidance, continue to be subject to the scenarios you provided. Until, someone with knowledge and perhaps guts, decides to raise others in opposition to this. — Outlander

Sounds like culling new people to be part of charitable organizations.. weird. I mean, if you are simply saying teach people to give more, fine. But to create new people for that purpose, is the problem.

What future individual? You're an anti-natalist! — Outlander

I mean we are ignoring the individual, bypassing their dignity by creating a being who will be imposed upon and suffer.

See above. People will continue to be born, either with the mission or at least inclination that they should or perhaps could better their fellow man and thus future selves in the process, or not. Regardless, births will continue. So. Do you, as someone who recognizes or at least identifies the current state of society and the world as "in need of improvement" enough to imply it needs to be improved have kids who may be taught to do so, or do others who either don't realize or couldn't care less have kids that just contribute to the degeneracy. The choice is and has always been yours. — Outlander

See above. If you want to start charitable organizations and schools that promote charity, cool. It's more about creating people who will be harmed unnecessarily by way of existing (to be harmed) for this purpose that is the problem here. I look at it as, is this causing unnecessary harm? Is birth for the sake of the person born? No? No? Don't do it.

It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term. — Isaac


I think the standards are arbitrary. Moral objectivists think they're not. Also there is no job called "ethicist" for this reason. — khaled

I don't mean 'job' as in employment. I just mean that you cannot sensibly say that something is the 'job' of a particular type of person(or investigation) when there's no course of action implied. If the rules are arbitrary, then there's no task to be done at all - shut you eyes and point at one, string a randomly selected group of words together... It's just obviously not the case. We do not accept "you must wear a monkey on your head every Thursday" as a moral rule, there are parameters to do with our mutual understanding reflected in our common language - the 'meaning' of the word 'moral'.

It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about". — khaled

I'm not the one saying there's nothing to debate. I'm saying that's the implication of you insistence that the rules are arbitrary (yet naturalistically derived). It would mean that we have no discursive role in their development as a community - something I don't hold to. Once you accept, however, that our biological mechanisms both drive and respond to our interactions with others, those interactions become a vitally important part of the process.

The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim. — Isaac


Agreed. Now, we check the premises and check the reasoning. If we agree with the premises and reasoning then the conclusion must be true. — khaled

What do we 'check the premises' for? What are we checking? Let's say I have the premise that car's need to crank the engine before the pistons will star a self-sustaining cycle. I reason from that premise that we should crank the engine if we want the car to run. Premises we all agree on, sound reasoning. So if I say that it's a moral rule that "we ought to crank the engine", has checking the premises and reasoning helped at all in resolving that claim? No.

There's something about moral claims which sets them apart from other claims. It's not arbitrary - because if it were we'd not be able to trace any kind of connection or draw any meaning at all from someone's use of the term. It's not just whatever anyone speaking claims it to be - then we'd have a private language and communication would be redundant. So there's a matter of fact here (albeit maybe a fuzzy one) as to what are and are not moral premises.

Reducing suffering by removing all life capable of it is not a moral premise because morality (religious hijacking aside) is all about interpersonal behaviour aimed at co-operation. Not causing suffering is surely one feature of this broader objective, but it's not the premise, it's a method - if I cause another to suffer, they may get angry and retaliate, or I might cause them so much harm they're no longer a useful member of the community... and so on.

Basically, what I mean by raising the naturalistic explanation is that we don't just have a series of random desires, and since our language reflects functions in our culture, terms like 'moral' are also not going to have random definitions. So if you can't trace your purported definition somehow back to something 'useful' in our culture, your definition is wrong.

We also have a natural drive to take what we want. Yet we pronounced one drive good and one drive bad. — khaled

I don't think we can describe any drive, including the drive to procreate, as either moral or immoral. How we act, yes. Perhaps even how we think. But one cannot be responsible for one's biology or one's upbringing.

All I’m trying to get at is that the mere fact that we have different, often contradictory drives is not in any way useful when talking about morals. — khaled

On the contrary, I think it is the crux of morality. Were we a solitary species, the question would not arise. Likewise were we of a hive mind. It is the competition between impulses that gives us ambiguity, without which there's nothing to talk about at all.

But that’s not what Isaac and Benkei are trying to do. They are trying to find a contradiction even after accepting the premises, and failing. — khaled

I read Isaac as saying that there's no basis to accept the premise, which is my view too: if there's no naturalistic reason to accept that premise then, in the absence of any other moral authority, the resultant moral rule is arbitrary. There are quite a lot of arbitrary moral rules.

Btw I realise I misread you earlier as expecting such a precise naturalistic justification, my bad. On second reading, I think you might have missed Isaac's point somewhat, which seems more to be an appeal to base moral rules on what morality is, not arbitrarily chosen premises whose falsity requires proof. I am saying more or less the same thing. There are biological drives and responses that act as the angels of our better nature, as well as selfish ones. If we cannot accept the premise on grounds of common experience, nor on grounds of biology, nor by extending existing in-group morality to out-groups, then it's difficult to see how the argument can be well-founded. There are well-founded moral arguments that are based on other evidence, such as animal rights and environmentalism. But antinatalism doesn't have that either.

First off, do you think there are situations where having children is wrong? — khaled

Of course! And situations where it's fine to let someone die, and ones where it is morally compulsory to give to charity. But none of them are generalisable.

I don't think we can describe any drive, including the drive to procreate, as either moral or immoral. How we act, yes. Perhaps even how we think. But one cannot be responsible for one's biology or one's upbringing. — Kenosha Kid

I was oversimplifying. I meant to say that we decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong. But that that statement cannot be concluded from the mere fact that we have a drive to take what we want or from the fact that we have a drive to cooperate. Listing which drives we have doesn't help here.

On the contrary, I think it is the crux of morality. Were we a solitary species, the question would not arise. Likewise were we of a hive mind. It is the competition between impulses that gives us ambiguity, without which there's nothing to talk about at all. — Kenosha Kid

But, again, the mere fact that there ARE different impulses is useless. Which should be favored when? That's an interesting question. But restating that we have different impluses over and over again (like Isaac is doing) is not adding anything to the conversation.

if there's no naturalistic reason to accept that premise then, in the absence of any other moral authority, the resultant moral rule is arbitrary. — Kenosha Kid

First off, there is no such thing as "no natrualistic reason". Unless you consider accepting the antinatalist premises a supernatural act somehow. There is clearly a reason that we accept this or that premise. Stating this fact (over and over) adds nothing to the conversation about which premise we should be accepting.

Secondly, you are implying that the moral rule ought to be accepted based on the existence of a naturalistic reason to accept its premises. Which is textbook naturalistic fallacy. And, as I said, there are naturalistic reasons to accept antinatalist premises (unless, again, you think that the Devil is playing with my mind or something).

There are biological drives and responses that act as the angels of our better nature, as well as selfish ones. — Kenosha Kid

At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses. That is what I am saying. But for some reason you and Isaac keep restating the point that we have different impluses. As if that helps in any way to determine which we should think are good and which bad (again, I'm simplifying)

If we cannot accept the premise on grounds of common experience, nor on grounds of biology, nor by extending existing in-group morality to out-groups — Kenosha Kid

The first would be an argument from popularity. The second would be a naturalistic fallacy. And the final would actually be something akin to what I'm trying to do.

Of course! And situations where it's fine to let someone die, and ones where it is morally compulsory to give to charity. But none of them are generalisable. — Kenosha Kid

Ah come on now. You can do better than that. None of them are generalisable? At all? We just decide arbitrarily on a case-by-case basis depending on how we're feeling? I doubt you really believe that.

For one, I think we can agree that it's fine to let someone die if saving them puts you in similar danger for example. There is some generalization there. I bet you could come up with SOME outline of the scenarios where procreation is unethical, and we can go from there if you want.

But I'd like to point out something important here. Nowhere in my talk with Benkei or Isaac have I pushed antinatalism, because I think that would be a waste of time (and not fun). What they were trying to do is find an inconsistency within the system itself. Failing to do that, they resorted to saying "Well we still have no reason to accept it" which I am perfectly fine with. I was only trying to show that the system is consistent, even if you don't agree with its starting premises. I am only now trying to actually make a compelling argument rather than just a self-consistent one at your request.

If all you and Isaac want to say is "There is no reason to accept the premises of antinatalism" then that's fine by me. However Isaac was trying to say "There is something wrong with antinatalism internally" which is just false. And I would again point out, that unless you're a moral objectivist, "there is no reason to accept the premises of X moral theory" applies to any X. This isn't an AN specific problem which is why I'm confused why it's highlighted so much.

that that statement cannot be concluded from the mere fact that we have a drive to take what we want or from the fact that we have a drive to cooperate. — khaled

Yes it can (to an extent). If we did not have a drive to co-operate, for example, there'd be no material cause for us to "decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong". We don't weigh up the choices randomly. There's an astonishing amount of similarity between cultures on such decisions which stands in need of naturalistic explanation.

Which should be favored when? That's an interesting question. But restating that we have different impluses over and over again (like Isaac is doing) is not adding anything to the conversation. — khaled

You're not reading what @Kenosha Kid is saying. There is, in the very quote you're responding to, a bare-bone version of that explanation. It must be something to do with living co-operatively because if that weren't an issue we'd have no morality at all. As such, any purported 'moral' objective which cannot claim to be working toward such an end is not moral, by definition.

The alternative is to posit that drives such as the desire to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent, arise randomly, without any purpose (in an evolutionary, or biological sense). That's the whole reason I've been bringing up naturalistic explanations for drives. To seek some common ground that they do not simply arise randomly. Given that you seem to agree, what purpose to you suppose a drive to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent might serve?

At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses. — khaled

Then how do you suppose it was done? Randomly? And the massive levels of correlation between disparate cultures are what...just coincidence?

What they were trying to do is find an inconsistency within the system itself. Failing to do that — khaled

No-one's failed to do that. @Benkei's original argument still stands. If you just stick to avoiding harm, you end up with contradictions (such as surgery), so you need to introduce consent, but consent is meaningless for non-existent entities, so we're forced to include benefits in our assessment (again, on pain of inconsistency with emergency surgery). Once benefits are included the antinatalist argument dissolves into completely normal decisions about having children.

All that's happened here is that to avoid having to consider benefits you've doubled down on some idea of avoiding non-consent at all costs, which has lead us here to this discussion showing how such a maxim cannot really count as 'moral' because it is not focussed on living together better, the need for which is the only reason we have morals in the first place.

If we did not have a drive to co-operate, for example, there'd be no material cause for us to "decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong". — Isaac

Correct. We also have a drive to take what we want. So it is not the mere fact THAT we have a drive to do X that makes X moral. Sure, we would need some sort of drive to do something to ever consider it moral or immoral, but simply having such a drive doesn't make the thing moral.

It must be something to do with living co-operatively because if that weren't an issue we'd have no morality at all. As such, any purported 'moral' objective which cannot claim to be working toward such an end is not moral, by definition. — Isaac

All he says is that were we a solitary species, the question of whether or not to steal would not arise. In that I am agreed. However, this does not indicate at all how a communal species (like us) should act.

Given that you seem to agree, what purpose to you suppose a drive to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent might serve? — Isaac

Ensuring a more harmonious community with less conflict. What now? Because it does NOT follow from that that the goal of morality is to establish such a community. Just as seeing an apple fall to the ground does not give apples any sort of teleological purpose of falling to the ground. To think that since moral impulse X arose naturally due to [insert explanation here] therefore we must all believe in moral impulse X is textbook naturalistic fallcy.

I could just as easily ask "What purpose do you suppose a drive to take what we want from others serves?" The answer could be something along the lines of "To ensure the survival of the individual" or "To establish dominance" or whatever. Does that make theft moral? It clearly does not.

At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses.
— khaled

Then how do you suppose it was done? Randomly? And the massive levels of correlation between disparate cultures are what...just coincidence? — Isaac

Definitely not randomly. But that is different from having a justfication. All moral premises are by definition unjustified. Some work better than others at preserving the society. The societies that adopted the ones that work better have survived longer.

However, you cannot conclude from that that: "Therefore the goal of morality is to ensure the survival of the community". It simply doesn't follow.

If you just stick to avoiding harm, you end up with contradictions (such as surgery) — Isaac

Not necessarily. I've presented my system and you summed it up well. Whatever Benkei is attacking is not the system I'm using. If you want to go back to trying to show contradicitons please do so directly, as I see none.

such a maxim cannot really count as 'moral' because it is not focussed on living together better, the need for which is the only reason we have morals in the first place. — Isaac

Morality is not concerned with living together better, but with what is right to do. We often happen to decide that the right thing to do is also the thing that leads to us living together better. This is not necessary nor is it always the case.

Sure, we would need some sort of drive to do something to ever consider it moral or immoral, but simply having such a drive doesn't make the thing moral. — khaled

You're not following the argument. What does then make a thing 'moral'? Our agreement that it fits in some loose category. What causes us to agree on such a loose category? Our shared experiences. Why do we assign normative force to the behaviours in that category? Because we have some drive to do so.

You've yet to provide an alternative explanation for why we call some behaviours moral and why we are inclined to assign normative force to those (and not others).

All he says is that were we a solitary species, the question of whether or not to steal would not arise. In that I am agreed. However, this does not indicate at all how a communal species (like us) should act. — khaled

Should act for what? I thought we'd been through this, there's no 'should' without contingency, we're not moral objectivists. If you want to have a high return, you should invest diversely. If you want to avoid pain, you should use gloves to handle hot pans... If you want society to co-operate effectively you should [insert moral rule]. You could potentially not agree with my contingency for moral rules, but what you're trying to do is do without one entirely whilst still claiming not to be objectivist about morals. This leaves you in the bizarre position of claiming the moral rules have no purpose at all, that we're inclined to add such normative force to them for no reason.

it does NOT follow from that that the goal of morality is to establish such a community. — khaled

Of course it does. You may not agree with the premise, but it absolutely follows from the fact that we evolved moral sentiments to enable a more harmonious community that moral sentiments would be aimed at the maintenance of such a community. That's just how evolution works.

To think that since moral impulse X arose naturally due to [insert explanation here] therefore we must all believe in moral impulse X is textbook naturalistic fallcy. — khaled

No one is claiming that. I (and Kenosha, I think) are claiming that since all impulses which count as 'moral' have some common features, origins and evolutionary heritage which sets them apart as an identifiable group, impulses lacking such features cannot reasonably be called 'moral' (in the absence of evidence to the contrary). It's not "x is natural, therefore you should do x" (naturalistic fallacy). It's ignoring all talk of 'should' as being uninforceable, but saying that "x lacks features a, b and c (which moral impulses share), then x is not moral". The normative force attached to moral impulses is neither here nor there, it's the definition of the word we're talking about.

Definitely not randomly. But that is different from having a justfication. All moral premises are by definition unjustified. Some work better than others at preserving the society. The societies that adopted the ones that work better have survived longer. — khaled

Still not answering the question. For someone who apparently doesn't have a clue why some behaviours are considered moral you sure have some strong opinions as to what is not the reason.

What does then make a thing 'moral'? Our agreement that it fits in some loose category. What causes us to agree on such a loose category? Our shared experiences. Why do we assign normative force to the behaviours in that category? Because we have some drive to do so. — Isaac

Agreed. Though I'd add that the "shared" experiences are not shared by everybody (maybe not even shared by any majority)

This leaves you in the bizarre position of claiming the moral rules have no purpose at all, that we're inclined to add such normative force to them for no reason. — Isaac

It leaves me in the position where moral rules are followed for their own sake. As I have said to you on a bunch of different occasions. Frankly, I find your whole "Let's follow this moral rule purely because it makes better societies" repulsive.

the fact that we evolved moral sentiments to enable a more harmonious community that moral sentiments would be aimed at the maintenance of such a community. That's just how evolution works. — Isaac

I would say that we do not evolve moral sentiments to enable a harmonious community. As in, no one goes out of their way to decide how people should act purely to make for a better community. People propose and use all sorts of crazy moral sentiments. The ones that survive are necessarily the ones that encourage said survival.

However you give these rules undue importance. Simply because they survived does not mean they ought to be adopted. A lot of very questionable ethics have survived for a long time, what makes you think procreation would be different?

"x lacks features a, b and c (which moral impulses share)" — Isaac

What are these features?

And more importantly, why do you make these features definitional instead of circumstantial? That's really the crux of the matter.

Frankly, I find your whole "Let's follow this moral rule purely because it makes better societies" repulsive. — khaled

Where have I said anything like that? I can quote several places I've said the exact opposite. If you're not going to actually follow through the argument there's little point in continuing. We're talking about a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones, and b) what it is about those features that gives them their normative force - the 'if you want...' before the '...then you should...'.

My claim is that it is community co-operation. Efforts to support it are what unite certain normative claims we call 'moral', and the normative force is the maintenance of such co-operation - 'if you want {community co-operation}, then you should [moral rule]'.

Your claim seems to be that there is no 'if you want...' component at all, nor any uniting feature which makes certain normative claims 'moral' ones. Yet you've just ignored my arguments against such a position (private language argument against private definitions, and cultural similarity argument against a lack of contingency).

The rest of your post simply arises from this basic misunderstanding. There is no 'ought' without an 'if' it's impossible for non-objectivist (I'd argue it's impossible anyway, but since neither of us are objectivist I don't have to). So any discussion of what we 'ought' to do must be accompanied by an 'if we want...'. What we're discussing is your 'if we want...'.

So you need to fill in the blank 'if we want to...we ought to avoid risking harm to others without consent'. What is in the blank?

Or...you're arguing that avoiding the risk of harm to others without consent is the contingent part - 'if you want to {avoid risking harm to others without consent}, then you ought to [not have children]'. But here you're faced with the naturalistic argument. We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent?

why do you make these features definitional instead of circumstantial? That's really the crux of the matter. — khaled

Private language argument. We cannot have private meanings for words. Language is a social enterprise.

We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent? — Isaac

Quite. One can look beyond naturalism to culture, but what kind of culture would obliterate itself? Answer: a very, very small, very, very short-lived one.

The first would be an argument from popularity. — khaled

You keep using this argument but it's quite false. All electrons to have the same charge. Defining the idea of 'the electron charge' is not 'an argument from popularity': it is a statement about the category of things called 'electrons'. Likewise deeming something to be a moral consideration or not on the basis of its ubiquity is not about popularity: that ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic.

Likewise deeming something to be a moral consideration or not on the basis of its ubiquity is not about popularity: that ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic. — Kenosha Kid

So unpopular moral theories are no longer moral theories? I'm confused here. What "evolved characterisitc" is antinatalism missing that other moral theories have?

Sure the ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic, but it is your choice to make that characteristic definitional or circumstantial.

a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac

If they are about how you should act.

My claim is that it is community co-operation. Efforts to support it are what unite certain normative claims we call 'moral', and the normative force is the maintenance of such co-operation - 'if you want {community co-operation}, then you should [moral rule]'. — Isaac

So I guess "ethical egoism" is not about morals then? And neither was whatever Kant was doing. I think your claim is ridiculous because many (if not most) things we call "moral theories" do not have the community co-operation as an end goal, and often have cases where they favor other values (freedom, sanctity of life, whatever) over the community.

If you want to define "moral" such that Kant was never talking about ethics feel free to do so but don't expect anyone to use that definition.

Your claim seems to be that there is no 'if you want...' component at all — Isaac

No, my claim is that the "if you want..." component is arbitrary. "If you want community cooperation" works. So does "If you want to respect the freedom of the individual". etc.

So you need to fill in the blank 'if we want to...we ought to avoid risking harm to others without consent'. What is in the blank? — Isaac

Silly quesiton. Here let me ask you another silly question: "If we want to..... we ought to ensure community cooperation". What is in the blank?

See how this is silly? You have to start somewhere. I could just keep taking whatever answer you give there (X) and ask "If you want to.... we ought to X" what is in the blank? Ad infinium. This is why I keep saying the starting point is arbitrary.

Or...you're arguing that avoiding the risk of harm to others without consent is the contingent part - 'if you want to {avoid risking harm to others without consent}, then you ought to [not have children]' — Isaac

This.

But here you're faced with the naturalistic argument. We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent? — Isaac

How is this a natrualistic argument? I didn't say "We should not want to harm others without their consent because it is natural".

If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you. But then there would be no error with antinatalism, just premises you disagree with.

a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac


If they are about how you should act. — khaled

So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? Weird.

So I guess "ethical egoism" is not about morals then? — khaled

A fourth argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory. — SEP - Egoism

And neither was whatever Kant was doing. — khaled

IF you want to explain the origin of Kant's 'goodwill', then do so and we can look at it, but since the issue has dogged scholars since its inception, I doubt you'll be able to give a clear answer. Invoking 'whatever Kant was doing' in an argument is useless unless you know what Kant was doing.

I think your claim is ridiculous because many (if not most) things we call "moral theories" do not have the community co-operation as an end goal, and often have cases where they favor other values (freedom, sanctity of life, whatever) over the community. — khaled

Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). What I'm trying to get from you is your equivalent for your moral framework. Secondly, you still have not resolved the issue of what makes claims 'moral'. As the SEP quote clarifies not all values basing a moral theory are properly countable as 'moral'. It's insufficient to simple say that other moral frameworks have slightly different values and therefore any value equally counts as moral. A multiplicity is not the same as arbitrary.

No, my claim is that the "if you want..." component is arbitrary. "If you want community cooperation" works. So does "If you want to respect the freedom of the individual". etc. — khaled

Again - so "if you want to undo a 10mm nut..." works? You were previously arguing that my concept of what is moral was 'ridiculous' on the grounds of inconsistency with other frameworks we call 'moral'. So if the same inconsistency is not to apply to your position you should be able to point to the moral framework in which undoing a 10mm nut is the main value.

How is this a natrualistic argument? I didn't say "We should not want to harm others without their consent because it is natural".

If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you. — khaled

No. I'm saying the exact opposite. We simply do not have arbitrary desires. If you think we do, the onus is rather on you to explain the mechanism by which you propose they come about because neural representation arising without cause sounds like magic to me.

It's worth having a look at the SEP entry on defining morality.

In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups. — SEP - The Definition of Morality

We're looking for that 'something else', in your framework to justify the claim that it's a 'moral' one.

So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac

If you were to also propose some moral duty to undo 10mm nuts, then yes that would be a moral claim. Otherwise it is instructions.

Secondly, you still have not resolved the issue of what makes claims 'moral'. As the SEP quote clarifies not all values basing a moral theory are properly countable as 'moral'. It's insufficient to simple say that other moral frameworks have slightly different values and therefore any value equally counts as moral. A multiplicity is not the same as arbitrary. — Isaac

In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups. — SEP - The Definition of Morality

Ah so that's where the misunderstanding is. I've been using "moral" in the descriptive sense.

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior — SEP - The Definition of Morality

Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac

My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac

Sure....

If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you.
— khaled

No. I'm saying the exact opposite. We simply do not have arbitrary desires. — Isaac

We keep getting confused here that's my bad. I should have used "No justification". There are clearly reasons (natrualistic explanations) for why we favor this or that moral premise but there are no justifications to favor any. To say those are the same things would be a naturalistic fallacy.

What "evolved characterisitc" is antinatalism missing that other moral theories have? — khaled

That's precisely the point: it would be impossible for a species to evolve a social drive toward antinatalism, therefore it is not part of our social biology. Nor can it be part of our culture since any such culture would be small and short-lived. We can call it an ethic insofar as you can personally subscribe to it, but it has zilch to do with human morality.

So unpopular moral theories are no longer moral theories? — khaled

That has nothing to do with what I said.

Sure the ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic, but it is your choice to make that characteristic definitional or circumstantial. — khaled

Not really. You can be trained to suppress, for instance, altruistic impulses. These are the aforementioned counter-empathetic responses, as e.g. a racist will typically respond to seeing a member of an ethnic minority in torment. You can rely on willpower or fear of reprisal to not act on selfish drives. Characteristics are always definitional though: that's why they're called characteristics.

We can call it an ethic insofar as you can personally subscribe to it, but it has zilch to do with human morality — Kenosha Kid

What’s “human morality” if not codes of conduct you personally subscribe to? All you’ve said here is that it is Impossible to have an antinatalist culture. Ok so what?

Characteristics are always definitional though: that's why they're called characteristics. — Kenosha Kid

The question is why do you make it a characteristic of a moral theory to ensure the survival of the society in which it is used? Why does it need to be possible for a moral theory to be accepted on a societal level for it to be called a moral theory? Because that would disqualify many moral theories.

Just another argument I thought of for antinatalism..

Humans are (generally) creatures that can self-reflect on any given situation in real-time. An example would be that I can know while I am shoveling the sidewalk, that I am indeed shoveling the sidewalk.

Indeed, with the feature of self-reflection comes the ability to also evaluate any given situation in real-time. So as I am shoveling the sidewalk, I can evaluate the situation as not pleasant, neutral, pleasant and anywhere in between.

If it is the case that the person being procreated is one that can evaluate a situation as negative and if there are de facto "facts of living a normal human life" that cannot easily be escaped, or would be violating the communal norms that sustain the individuals in the community by doing so, and can be indeed evaluated at any given time as negative by the person doing them, then forcing someone in a situation where negative evaluations is possible, would be wrong. The keywords are "forcing someone" into possibilities of inescapable negative evaluations.

The implication here is the paternalism feedback loop of forcing someone into situations where one can evaluate the very acts of surviving as negative, and then believing that society must re-educate these individuals into accepting this inescapable circumstance. This is through all sorts of coercive means.

If anyone can provide any further ideas.. this scheme of creating people who can evaluate the very givens of life as negative and then re-educating to "get with the program".. why does this seem immoral, not right, fishy, wrong? I think it has something to do with using individuals, but I'd like other ideas for why this intuitively seems wrong.

What’s “human morality” if not codes of conduct you personally subscribe to? — khaled

It's a lot more than that! Human morality concerns biological and cultural adaptations to allow humans to live together in social groups and allow social groups to co-exist. One can personally believe that you must wear a blue hat on a Tuesday, but it has naff all to do with people or morality. Simply calling it a moral theory doesn't provide insight.

The question is why do you make it a characteristic of a moral theory to ensure the survival of the society in which it is used? That’s what you seem to be doing. — khaled

Moral theories are diverse in that respect. For instance, utilitarianism does not depend on *what* makes us happy. If receiving bananas was the only thing that made us happy, utilitarianism would suggest we should maximize production and distribution of bananas. But it's not. Other theories specifically concern the conflict between selfish and selfless drives. Individualism is an antisocial moral philosophy, socialism a social one. Others, such as egalitarianism, directly describe our base moral nature. I'm not arguing that a moral philosophy has to be fundamentalist and naturalist: I have already said that a purely naturalistic justification for morality would inevitably be ambiguous, untenable and inappropriate. But all of the above deal with that very problem in different ways. Antinatalism does not. It is a fundamentalist moral theory that has nothing to do with what morality is, fundamentally.

Also... Merry Christmas!!!!

Human morality concerns biological and cultural adaptations to allow humans to live together in social groups and allow social groups to co-exist. — Kenosha Kid

But then 90% of moral theories cease to be moral theories, because they have never been tested to prove that they would allow us to co-exist better or at all. I don’t think it’s a fair definition.

I think you’re using morality in the normative sense while I’m using it in the descriptive sense (check the SEP article on the definition of morality)

Individualism is an antisocial moral philosophy — Kenosha Kid

Weird. How do you consider it a moral philosophy? It would not allow social groups to co-exist very well. Unless you’re suggesting it would.

I cannot see what individualism is doing that antinatalism is not.

Merry Christmas!!!! — Kenosha Kid

Merry Christmas to you too! And everyone here.

@khaled What do you think of this one?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/482594

No offence but it doesn't seem new in any way. Seems like your standard argument. "Having kids makes people that could hate life so don't have kids". If you mean this:

If anyone can provide any further ideas.. this scheme of creating people who can evaluate the very givens of life as negative and then re-educating to "get with the program".. why does this seem immoral, not right, fishy, wrong? I think it has something to do with using individuals, but I'd like other ideas for why this intuitively seems wrong. — schopenhauer1

Then I honestly don't care. I don't care about "embedding" moral premises in other moral premises. Why is creating someone who might hate life wrong? Because it just is. OR because it is "using people". OR because it is "disrespecting the freedom of the individual". OR because it is "unwarranted suffering". Or because all of the above. Or because of the first, which is because of the second, which is because of the third.

I can embed the premise (make it a conclusion deriving from another premise) in a large number of other premises but I think doing that is just distraction. The question then becomes "Why is using people wrong?" or "Why is causing unwarranted suffering wrong?" etc. This "embedding" is just a waste of time, it doesn't give any new information or any new answers.

People certainly seem to like it though. The best moral theories have 2-3 "layers" of redundant embedding at least so that when someone asks "Why X?" you answer "Because Y" and then they ask "Why Y?" up to 3 times at whichpoint you can pretend that they're being ridiculous. That is tip number 1 in the "Moral Objectivist's Guidebook to BS". "Embed your moral premises in many layers so that when people keep asking 'why' you can call them children and not actually have to justify anything"

Note: I'm not calling you a moral objectivist or saying you're BSing. It's unrelated.

Then I honestly don't care. I don't care about "embedding" moral premises in other moral premises. Why is creating someone who might hate life wrong? Because it just is. OR because it is "using people". OR because it is "disrespecting the freedom of the individual". OR because it is "unwarranted suffering". Or because all of the above. Or because of the first, which is because of the second, which is because of the third.

I can embed the premise (make it a conclusion deriving from another premise) in a large number of other premises but I think doing that is just distraction. The question then becomes "Why is using people wrong?" or "Why is causing unwarranted suffering wrong?" etc. This "embedding" is just a waste of time, it doesn't give any new information or any new answers.

People certainly seem to like it though. The best moral theories have 2-3 "layers" of redundant embedding at least so that when someone asks "Why X?" you answer "Because Y" and then they ask "Why Y?" up to 3 times at whichpoint you can pretend that they're being ridiculous. That is tip number 1 in the "Moral Objectivist's Guidebook to BS". "Embed your moral premises in many layers so that when people keep asking 'why' you can call them children and not actually have to justify anything" — khaled

I totally agree with your sentiment and really like your explanation of how often finding a moral foundation is simply embedding it in yet another layer that needs another foundation, etc. At some point, you either agree or disagree with the axiom. I have maintained for a long time now that at that point it is more about appealing to a person's emotions on why exactly that premise is so important, not embedding it in another principle that is some sort of air tight case. That will never be the case.

That being said, this doesn't have to be embedded in layers as much as just another primary layer for why it could be bad to procreate. But I guess my real question then is what is it about this principle that seems so noxious to me in particular? It's this weird paternalistic idea that people should like, tolerate, or deal with negative situations in the first place I guess, because it's somehow just "good for them" and if they don't realize this goodness, they need to be re-educated. I guess the difference between that side and my side is that side leads to other people being affected, and my side does not. Of course, that side would shrug and say, "I just don't care" or "experiencing the negative is good" or make it seem like it is inevitable, "it's just the course of life", as if there was no other option. Then you can ask, what is it about experience that needs to take place. I know that is a very deep and somewhat dark question because people think that simply living must be good in and of itself and antinatalism is preventing this, just as antinatalists might say that they are preventing a future person from suffering. There is an odd sort of secular theism in the optimism that living must take place. I don't know.

people think that simply living must be good in and of itself and antinatalism is preventing this — schopenhauer1

That's really been the whole crux of the disagreement with literally everyone here.

For them we should live, and we make morality to live better. For me, we make the morality first, and if "we should live" doesn't come out of it then so be it. Occasionally they try to adopt the second mindset but end up with a really crooked and funny looking morality that makes weird exceptions (causing unwarranted suffering is bad, EXCEPT HERE) and so revert to the former. Some think they're doing the latter when they're actually doing the former. The malicious genetic engineering example is really telling for this.

But then again, is this really unexpected? Antinatalism will never be a major thing, because all it takes is for 2 people of opposite genders to have the first disposition for everyone else's opinion not to matter.

At some point, you either agree or disagree with the axiom. I have maintained for a long time now that at that point it is more about appealing to a person's emotions on why exactly that premise is so important, not embedding it in another principle that is some sort of air tight case. That will never be the case. — schopenhauer1

I don't bother appealing to people's emotions on the internet at all though (anymore). I don't know why you do it or how you can put up with the replies. It's not like I'm going to change their mind in all likelihood and even if I could I probably wouldn't bother.

I think this whole debate is odd. It basically serves no purpose. None of the antinatalists on this site are moral objectivists, and I have yet to run into a moral objectivist from the other side either. We spend all this time arguing over what exactly? As you said:

At some point, you either agree or disagree with the axiom. — schopenhauer1

If the goal is to try to get people to agree to the axiom through emotional appeals, I don't really want a part of that. But then you get threads like these that attempt to show inconsistencies in the system. As usual, they fail, and upon further investigation neither Benkei or Isaac or any of the big participants are willing to push for a moral objectivist view, so it's more like "All the reasons you shouldn't be an antinatalist" rather than "All things wrong with antinatalism". Sometimes they get a bit daring with "All the ways I can define 'morality' so that antinatalism doesn't count because I don't want it to"

A bunch of moral relativists really not liking the other relativist's point of view who pop up with threads like "All things wrong with antinatalism" or "Arguments for antinatalism" where they pretend to be moral objectivists for the first 3 replies then somehow stretch it into 18 pages. A tale as old as time.

That's really been the whole crux of the disagreement with literally everyone here.

For them we should live, and we make morality to live better. For me, we make the morality first, and if "we should live" doesn't come out of it then so be it. — khaled

Yep agreed.

I guess my point with that one too was that in so many ways humans are understanding their pain as they are living it. In a broader philosophical conversation, we are animals that use ideology, ideas, linguistic/cultural based motivations to get stuff done all the time. At any given time we know we can technically be doing something else, even if in the long run it would be a worse alternative in terms of our survival or pain.. but we know we could do something else.

@khaled
Let me explain further...
Because of this extra layer of how we operate and survive, it adds that much more suffering onto the task at hand. We now have to do all sorts of things to try to bypass the suffering and "deal with" the situation. We use things like "ideals", "habits of thought", "self-talk", "discipline" and any number of things. All of this we know as we are doing the very thing at hand. It isn't an instinct, a reflex, a habit learned from operant conditioning really.. it is a dialectical, existential, thing we do as operationally deliberative beings.

So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac


If you were to also propose some moral duty to undo 10mm nuts, then yes that would be a moral claim. Otherwise it is instructions. — khaled

That's not what you're arguing though, you keep loosing the thread of the argument and so it's become very tiresome. Your claim was that features of certain normative claims that make them 'moral' ones are "If they are about how you should act". You've also previously said

moral rules are followed for their own sake — khaled

So your answer that "you should use a 10mm spanner" is only a moral rule "if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is inconsistent with your position that "moral rules are followed for their own sake" as now you're defining a rule as moral that is only followed for the sake of undoing a 10mm nut, not for it's own sake.

Ah so that's where the misunderstanding is. I've been using "moral" in the descriptive sense. — khaled

Where is "avoid all risk of harm without first obtaining consent" a moral objective other than in your mind? It's not a very useful description as it captures one thought of a tiny (possibly even uniquely idiosyncratic) proportion of the population. Descriptive morality isn't about that. Otherwise, again, every single thought counts as a moral one and the term becomes useless.

Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac


My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac


Sure.... — khaled

The former refers to a global definition, the latter refers to what my personal answer is - read carefully.

There are clearly reasons (natrualistic explanations) for why we favor this or that moral premise but there are no justifications to favor any. To say those are the same things would be a naturalistic fallacy. — khaled

Right. So if you agree that there are naturalistic reasons why we prefer this or that moral premise then you are compelled to also agree that moral premises are not arbitrary. If the arise resulting from naturalistic forces, then they are constrained by the probability space created by those causative variables - broadly natural selection and cultural survival. That one should use a 10mm spanner (or indeed that one should undo 10mm nuts) cannot be reasonably shown to fit either.

you keep loosing the thread of the argument and so it's become very tiresome. — Isaac

I was just about to say the same to you.

as now you're defining a rule as moral that is only followed for the sake of undoing a 10mm nut, not for it's own sake. — Isaac

But undoing 10mm nuts can be a moral commandment, though a very stupid one. And in that case it would be getting followed for its own sake. If you believe that undoing 10mm nuts is a moral duty for some reason then it follows from that that using 10mm spanner is a moral duty, as it is the way to undo 10mm nuts.

Descriptive morality isn't about that. — Isaac

That is exactly what it’s about. If you think otherwise then can you tell me exactly what the proportion of the population is that makes something a “descriptive morality”? Does the moral premise have to be shared by 20%? 30? Are all age groups counted?

Otherwise, again, every single thought counts as a moral one and the term becomes useless. — Isaac

“I like pizza” can’t be a moral claim. Even if literally everyone thinks it. Because it’s not about how you should act.

agree that moral premises are not arbitrary — Isaac

I do. For the 100th time. But just because they’re not arbitrary doesn’t mean they’re justified.To say that the mere fact that there is a natrualistic explanation behind why I'm an antinatalist IS justification for antinatalism is textbook natrualistic fallacy. Same with saying that the mere fact that there is a natrualistic explanation behind why you're not an antinatalist IS justification for natalism is textbook naturalistic fallacy. How many times do I have to say this?

That one should use a 10mm spanner (or indeed that one should undo 10mm nuts) cannot be reasonably shown to fit either. — Isaac

It is impossible for anyone to think that you have a moral duty to undo 10mm nuts? I’ve seen people think crazier things on this site.

undoing 10mm nuts can be a moral commandment, though a very stupid one. — khaled

On what basis are you making this claim?