The combined effect on academics I think is it's either useless, error borne from lazy thinking and lack of education in their field, or not related to their research at all. — fdrake

Indeed. Although a (thankfully) small number of researchers I've known have expressed a similar opinion of their statisticians, so researcher's judgement on the value of other fields is fickle to say the least, and not always to be trusted.

So please make up your mind what your position is. — Artemis

I'm not seeing the disparity you're drawing between those positions. One says that whether something is a fact or an opinion is a matter of the degree of intersubjectivity of its veracity measurements, the other states that physics is not at the 'opinion' end of this scale.

This is all to counter the idea that you could call philosophy an opinion but not physics. As you suggested above. — Artemis

I see, so this is hinging on what we mean by 'just opinion'? I mentioned my interpretation of that phrase in my earlier posts, but my writing is not always that clear I'm afraid. Given my belief in model dependent realism, there is no sense in which something is fact, as opposed to opinion, other than in degree. So for me (and I think colloquially many others) the degree of intersubjectivity determines the place on the fact-opinion scale.

Physics deals (mostly) with highly intersubjective data, the behaviour of matter and forces predicted by its theories are agreed upon by all observers, hence we're more likely to declare its results to be facts. Philosophy makes propositions which are not verifiable by reference to intersubjective observation. It appeals to intuition, elegance, adherence to rules of thought... Most are not widely agreed on and so we tend to declare the propositions 'opinion' rather than 'fact'.

My main point, contrary to what you'd written, is that one need not know the modalities of a field to know that it contains what they'd justifiably call 'opinion'. They only need know the methodology.

Interesting post but I'm afraid I'm at a loss to understand how it relates to anything I'm saying. I'm talking about the distinction between knowing the modalities of a subject and knowing it's scope - content vs methodology, if you like. You seem to be talking about certainty and the problems of scientism. I can't see the link between the two, perhaps you could join the dots for me.

By way of some reply, I agree that the search for certainty is misguided. I do, in fact, believe (silly or not) that logic is just a method of thinking, not a truth of the universe, and as such is very much open to question and improvement, as are all models in physics. It's just, as I say, I'm not sure how any of this relates to what we've been discussing.

I think this is largely true. I'm not an art historian so I only have my lay knowledge to go on, but I struggle to think of any art older than 50 years or so that wasn't supposed to either look nice, have some religious/spiritual significance, or inspire people to be 'better'. In fact, it seems quite a strict split with visual and musical arts being aesthetic or religious and stories being inspiring. This trend towards mistaking art for journalism seems to be quite recent and I don't think it's a good direction for the reasons you give.

The trouble is with the Brecht quote that @Bitter Crank gave earlier. I think it's unavoidable that art is both of those things. It can't help but be a mirror to society because artists are both from, and sell to, society. It also acts to shape society as art strongly influences how we feel and act.

So what's created is a positive feedback loop. These systems tend to magnify the effects of small errors. So, to give an example, if an artist reflects inner city life as being brutal and gang-dominated, those growing up with such art will be more likely to act as if it is and so make it more so. The next artist reflects it as such, and the next generation make it so...

This is fine if artists are (as I think many intuitively used to be) careful to err on the side of 'betterment'. That way, any effect of their work is most likely to be positive.

Nowadays what seems to sell best is gritty, violent or bland 'realism'. Which does not so easily avoid the problems of positive feedback.

I see no merit in dragging the poor girl up in front of audiences for this debate either. It is a bald-faced attempt to distract from actual, scientifically based, debate. — jambaugh

She's not getting involved in the scientific debate. She's involved in the political debate. She's making political demands and those opposed to her are doing so also. Only a handful of flat-earther's and paid for shills are still trying to debate the science.

Way to miss the point. — Artemis

The 'point' was you saying that people could not coherently hold a position that philosophy was really hard and yet simultaneously dismiss it as 'all opinions' - that philosopher's ideas are not based on a body of knowledge.

That is exactly the situation I described in my analogy - not knowing the full modalities of the content of a subject, but knowing what sort of proposition that subject contains.

I know that the rules of chess contain a series of made-up proscriptions, that none of them reflect the actual physical constraints on the movement of the pieces. I know this without having to actually know what the rules of chess are.

I know that the study of physics deals with the derivation and testing of theories corresponding to experiments on physical matter and forces. I can know this without knowing what any of those theories actually are, nor understanding a word of them. IF someone asks me if physics is 'just opinion' I can justifiable answer that it is not, on the basis of this meta data without needing to understand any of the actual data.

Likewise, if someone were of the opinion that subjects which have no intersubjective consensus do not have a body of knowledge, they could justifiably put philosophy into that category simply using the knowledge that philosophers do not use intersubjectivitiy to test their theories. They do not need to know what those theories actually are, not understand any of their internal complexity to justify this conclusion because it is not based on the content of the theories, it's based on the methodology by which they're derived and tested.

Wouldn’t it be more effective to shift the focus and pressure from taxation to better wages. If people had better wages and more disposable income they would spend it on what directly benefits them with no middle man. — Brett

Firstly, that only benefits services which are purchasable. In making money individuals and companies make use of public resources which need to be replenished/maintained at public expense - the health and availability of a pool of potential employees, the environment (air water soil etc.), existing infrastructure, security (police, army)...and so on. Maintaining these in good order costs money but is not generally something private individuals do without collective payments of some sort.

Secondly, there's a massive proportion of the population - children, elderly, unemployed and homemakers who are not the direct beneficiaries of wages. Ensuring their welfare by raising wages puts them at the mercy of individual wage-earners (not all of whom have their best interests at heart), whereas attending to their welfare by taxation at least encourages fairer treatment by an entity over whom they have some control.

Having said that, wealth tax is an utterly stupid idea, and you're right about it being about revenge. If we didn't want these super rich individuals we shouldn't have paid them billions of pounds for their stupid products should we? If you don't like how rich Bezos is, don't buy from Amazon, if you don't like the fact that footballers get paid a million pounds per game, don't watch the game, if you don't like the fact that some Hollywood actor gets paid an obscene amount, don't watch his films. It's ridiculous to be instrumental in making these people so rich and then support schemes designed to get all that money back again. As was said earlier...

As with Walmart, there can actually be a very high ethical cost to achieve such low prices... — VagabondSpectre

...you'd have to be an idiot not to know that, at yet everyone still lines up to pick up the 'bargains'.

The short answer is wealth inequality within and without the United States. It gives him incredible power that he can either abuse or waste. — VagabondSpectre

People can either buy from Amazon or not. It's not in the least bit hard to not buy stuff from Amazon and if everyone stopped doing so, the Bezos empire would collapse.

There are many, many inequalities which are the result of huge institutional problems not readily attacked by the common man, but the Amazon fortune is not one of them. It's built entirely on the lazy selfishness of the average citizen, that's what gives him his power, nothing else.

Let’s say you and I team up to affect democracy and the rule of law. Since we have de facto control over both, how would you and I go about doing that? — NOS4A2

Well, depending on our intent, we may have any easy or a hard time of it, but if we faced difficulties they would be mostly the result of the lack of support from other private citizens, not the obstruction of the current government.

No.

What is your opinion about the deeper meaning in the poem 'the jabberwocky'?

Don't know, I've never read it.

What is your opinion about the contribution the jabberwocky has made to astrophysics?

I'm almost certain it's made no contribution at all. I've never read it, but I do know that it's a poem, not a theory of astrophysics.


Data - the meaning, metre, syncopation of the poem.
Meta data - the fact that it is a poem.


It takes expertise in poetry to know the data, it does not take such expertise to know the meta data.

They cannot both maintain that they cannot have an informed opinion and think they have an informed opinion. — Artemis

Yes they can. One is an opinion about the modalities of the rule set and the other is an opinion about the meta data. Two different areas of knowledge/opinion.

I’m only saying the private citizen has no control or power over the structures. In order to affect those structures they must vote people into those positions. I’m not saying they cannot vote people into those positions. — NOS4A2

Right... So that constitutes control and power over the structures doesn't it. That they can vote people into positions of control, based on their intentions to exercise such control, constitutes de facto control.

That’s clearly not true because it is not easy for any one private citizen to get someone elected or to get elected himself. — NOS4A2

What barriers are in the way then? Voting in an election couldn't be easier really. Standing for election is slightly harder but still no more so than the average business career.

Only the state has the power to usurp ideals like democracy and the rule of law because they are in direct control of, and in power over, the structures of democracy and the rule of law. The private citizen has no such power. — NOS4A2

The private citizen elects the state in almost full knowledge of their intentions. How is that not power to affect such structures?

In which case they cannot have an opinion thereof. — Artemis

Indeed. But that doesn't prevent them from having an informed and valid opinion about the origin or scope of those rules, that's the point.

I am not well versed enough to have anything but the most superficial understanding of the full modalities of the rules of chess. I am nonetheless quite sure, and justifiably so, that the rules of chess are entirely someone's opinion.

I’m mostly speaking about the positions and structures and not necessarily the various people who occupy them. Anyone who occupies those positions are bestowed a power not available to those who don’t. — NOS4A2

Your original cclaim was...

Private citizens, rich and poor, would not purchase power or advantage if there wasn’t first someone selling it. — NOS4A2

... This is clearly not true because if private citizens wanted to make such a purchase, they would simply elect someone (or themselves stand for office) such as to make such an opportunity available.

Likewise if private citizens did not want such opportunities to be available they would simply stand as or elect someone who would remove them.

That such opportunities are available is therefore entirely in the bestowal of private citizens.

I was talking about people who want to simultaneously maintain that philosophy is both too hard/heady for them (therefore inaccessible) but also just a matter of opinion (therefore infinitely accessible). Clearly these positions cannot be maintained simultaneously. — Artemis

Yes, that is the exact point I'm disputing. It is possible to create a set of rules, the inclusion of each member of that set being nothing but opinion, whose full modalities are nonetheless too complex for a person of only moderate intelligence to grasp.

In English we differentiate between those who hold official power conferred by the state—judges, bureaucrats, police etc.—and those who don’t by using those phrases. — NOS4A2

The categorical distinction is beside the point. I'm not denying the it is possible to classify people on the basis of their job, but your categories are not mutually exclusive. The point is that those who are in positions of power are drawn from, and maintained in those position by, private citizens, so saying that power structures are not made by private citizens simply because they cease to be labelled as such when they are thus enabled is tautologous.

One becomes a public official when he is in a position of official authority conferred by a state. A private citizen has no such power. — NOS4A2

Are you suggesting private citizens are barred from being public officials?

it isn’t the private citizen who usurps democracy or the rule of law, it is whomever legislates and enforces it. — NOS4A2

The legislature and enforcement bodies are constituted of private citizens and in most modern cases the rule makers are elected by private citizens in at least partial knowledge of exactly what they intend to do, so I'm not sure (apart from historically) what point you're making.

Well no good means you're up to no good. It's not beneficent. People are intellectually annoyed. — Qwex

I'll be sure to bear that in mind.

Well, I'll just have to take your word for it. I've recently been entreated to trust experts in the field, perhaps this would be a good place to start. I shall henceforth earnestly attempt to do good things by the black standard.

At any given moment, there is beneficent qualia concerning the sensory data.

Philosophy forum --> Philosophy is a good idea to post. Post good joke. Don't post.

What do you call that? — Qwex

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about.

Not a definition I'm aware of. Perhaps you could enlighten me.

Morality is a widely accepted theory that is against you. — Qwex

'Morality' is a theory? In what form?

Yes. Just with more knowledge and at a different level. The difference between chess world championships and amateur chess at home. — Artemis

No. Because a right move in chess is agreed upon by every single chess player in the world. There is no equivalent agreed upon 'right move' in ethics.

Since philosophers don't just do that, this is a dead end. — Artemis

So, are you suggesting that, for example, epistemology has a pre-existing set of criteria determining what constitutes the field? That it's not defined by its practitioners?

Ideally, they would not debate but share their respective insights whilst acknowledging the expertise of the other. — Artemis

This just begs the question. You're presupposing that the neuroscientist is deficient in some knowledge or skill which the philosopher of consciousness can supply. Many do not consider that to be the case. I'm asking you to present the argument that it is, not just presume it.

Of course it would be. People debate over matters of knowledge all the time. — Artemis

Knowledge as justified true belief. People debate over what might become knowledge were it to turn out to be true, or about the acceptability of justification. Absolutely no scientist I've ever encountered has argued with another about some matter they consider to be absolutely settled knowledge (ie true), they argue about theories, speculations which may, in time, end up sufficiently agreed upon to be classed as knowledge.

That's just pretty inaccurate. — Artemis

OK, well then simply provide me with an example proposition from philosophy which is agreed upon across the fields.

That would be an amphiboly....so obviously. That example doesn't therefore pertain to the discussion. — Artemis

The amphiboly is the point. Simply declaring a subject matter does not confer a field of expertise, its just a name. Actual competition of theories determines fields.

The fact that philosophers disagree on any given subject doesn't mean a layperson can claim to have equal say in the matter. — Artemis

I'm not talking about philosophers disagreeing. I'm talking about philosophers making theoretical claims in areas where there are competing claims by psychologists, physicists, neuroscientists, linguists, historians, anthropologists etc... In a field, say consciousness, where both a philosopher and a neuroscientist make a claim, who judges who has strayed into whose territory? It clearly can't be either expert (they have competing claims).

I don't know enough to actually participate in the debate or to try and convince a scientist of my view. Most non-philosophers do not show the same humility toward philosophy. — Artemis

It depends very much on the topic at hand. The reason why you could not participate in the quantum physics debate is, as you say, that you "do not know enough". But in the matter under debate, there is no 'knowledge' otherwise it would not be up for debate would it? So what we're referring to by not 'knowing' enough is the already agreed on body of knowledge on which both parties base their competing theories.

In philosophy, there is no such agreed upon body of knowledge in the widest sense. Only within specialised fields might you have a similar situation to the physicists, where a considerable body of axioms are agreed by both parties, but these are rarely the debates in which lay people become involved.

Yes, but certainly you would defer to their expertise on all matters chess, or at least recognize that they probably know better than you about the best way to move the rook.

I'm talking about laypersons who specifically won't defer or acknowledge the expertise of the...,yknow, experts on philosophical matters. — Artemis

Yes, but if one of these hypothetical chess experts claims that his expertise on bishops extends to, say, real bishops, we aren't obliged to simply take his word for it. It is not an expert in chess who determines the extension of propositions about chess, it it experts in other fields making more satisfactory claims about the contested area.

The trouble with Philosophy in this context is that experts in other fields compete over almost all areas.

You're thinking too simplistically in terms of buying influence with direct payments. This is only a tiny fraction of the mean by which money can buy influence.

Tax breaks for the wealthy, for example, are rarely just 'bought'. They're part of a package in right-wing governments which also includes populist legislation. Control of what constitutes popular opinion is disproportionately held by the wealthy.

they want on the one hand to maintain that "oh, all that philosophy stuff is too hard and heady for me!" but then also don't want to think that professional philosophers know anything more than they do or could have more nuanced/educated/researched ideas about all sorts of things — Artemis

This is not a dissonating position to hold. Advanced chess is too hard and heady for many, but those expert at it do not "know" anything more about "all sorts of things". They've simply invented a game, the full impliations of which are quite complex and so understanding them is 'hard and heady'. They still know nothing more about anything outside of chess. A computer can be programmed to understand chess, I wouldn't ask it any advice on other matters.

Why do they remain unquestioned? Again, either out of sheer ignorance and class unconsciousness, or out this divinity-encumbant entitlement as part of the very definition. — Grre

What would "questioning" constitute? I think there's plenty of "questioning" going on, open any newspapers, even the right wing rags, and you'll not read anyone claiming that the rich and powerful deserve all the influence they get, you'd have to go to some Randian sociopath to get that kind of argument.

So why, despite all this "questioning", this rhetoric, do the rich and powerful retain the influence they have? Basically, they didn't get that influence coincidentally, they got it by manipulating social dynamics to make it desirable to allow them that influence. People are broadly driven by adopting the requisite behaviour and attitude of the social group to which they wish to belong. The distance that globalised (or even national) media creates between the desired social group and its members, allows companies and individuals to present whatever attitudes and behaviours best suit their needs as if they were already in place in that social group. Thus would be members adopt those attitudes and behaviours in order to secure membership.

A respectful and moderate tone is desirable as it's the most likely to foster serious and productive discussion. — ssu

An oft repeated mantra with startlingly little by way of empirical support.

So, anyone may transform the land, in whole or in part. They are then within their rights to resort to force to defend their property. — Virgo Avalytikh

People transform the land simply by taking part in the ecosystem. Your logic here would give indigenous tribes the rights to all the land outside of Europe. Mind you, there's those Homo floresiensis that the Indonesian Homo sapiens might have stolen from...

Your property rights strategy is going to get complicated quite quickly, but I'm all in favour of returning land rights back to the indigenous population, so that would be a good start, yes?

My point is there is structure that I think is more than merely random heterogeneity of properties over a space. Rather you have patterned heterogeneity, and those patterns are dictated, ultimately, by the structure of the space and the relations between the underlying physical properties. — aporiap

I don't doubt there are limits (to doubt that would lead to idealism), but I doubt we could ever describe those limits, we can only refer to them tangentially by pointing to ineffective models and speculating that transgressing one of those limits may be the cause of its failure.

Essentially, it's the problem of pessimistic meta-induction. We cannot reasonably induce that our theories model reality with some one-to-one relationship because absolutely all the evidence we have from previous models is that our models do not do that. If we were to speculate that our current models reflect reality in some unique way (by which I mean not merely one of a number of equally viable options), then we'd be faced with an explanatory gap as to why these particular theories have such a relationship when clearly every single past (rejected) theory did not. The evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the conclusion that our current crop of models will go the same way in time.

It would be so depressing to think all of our 'advancement' in empiricism led us to left field when the ball was going right. I mean that would just be shattering for me lol. It's what drives my science interest. — aporiap

Indeed, but philosophically more interesting maybe... That might be some compensation.

Well it's interesting because probability distributions differ, thinking of electron orbital shapes, of interferometer experiments where there’s a non 50/50 likelihood for the particle to land at either detector and so on. What sets those is a complete mystery to me. — aporiap

That's interesting. Do we have, as part of the model, the factors affecting the distribution, or is that part of the mystery?

With a little generosity, Isaac and others are just frustrated that they arent having higher quality conversations and they want the ability to police their own threads. — frank

That's really all it is. It seems to have got blown up into a debate about the qualities of academics in social sciences and philosophy and I don't quite know how.



I have some sympathy for what you're saying, with a few caveats, but I don't want to get into that. All my suggestion ever amounted to was a means of policing a slightly higher standard of discussion using the need to have read and engaged with a text as a filtering mechanism.

I'm not implying that philosophy without a text is pointless, it represents the vast majority of my comments here. I've just become weary of the type of predictable, hubristic omniscience, or failure to grasp the issues that seems (to me) to drown out some otherwise really interesting potential discussions. I thought I had an idea of a way I (and anyone else feeling that way) could just filter that out from time to time and focus on something. Academic texts were just a tool to help with that. Not an arbitrary tool (hence my argument as to why I think anyone taking the matter seriously shouldn't have any trouble sticking to the restriction), but just a tool nonetheless.

I think that's very well said. What I was trying (but I think ultimately failing) to come up with was a way of separating out a category of discussion where posts which don't fit that mould would be be removed (to some other category).

There seems to be a reluctance to be too heavy handed in moderating posts for quality, tone etc. forum-wide, and I'm just going to accept that the moderation team have good reasons for that related to their vision of what this place should be. So I think, if there is a way, it would have to be by category and it would have to be moderated by the people involved (politely reminding the offending poster that this is not the right category for that type of post). I suppose, post hoc, I'm wanting to see what interest there would be in such an approach because without a significant portion of the community willing to police it, such a category would never work.

Firstly, I don't see what's elitist about wanting to have a section where matters are taken a bit more seriously. We have already split off 'the lounge' in recognition of the fact that some conversations are less serious than others. Ideally, we'd just judge the more serious conversations on their merits, but, that being too subjective, anchoring the discussion to an academic paper which participants will be expected to have read is a more objective way of separating these types of discussion out. I'm not trying to denigrate other types of conversation. I'm just saying that, for me, it would be nice to have a conversation that was more heavily moderated in favour of the more serious approach.

Secondly, I think you're confusing the notion that "philosophy should be able to be exercised by anyone and everyone" with the posts I was being derogatory toward. Philosophy, if taken seriously, is quite hard, it's not, in my opinion, just 'reckoning some stuff'. This means that a) you'd be crazy not to read at least a summary of what people before you have already thought on the matter, b) it's very unlikely that you'll be so confidently right about any of it as to make the kind of 'you're wrong' single line pronouncements I'm referring to, and c) anything you do think is likely to need to stand on the shoulders of others as explaining the whole thing from first principles would require a book, not a 150 word post.

Given the above, I find it very unlikely that serious philosophy could be done in few short posts without reference to previous work. That's not to say that a jolly good chat can't be had that doesn't do that, but that there is a categorical difference there.

isn't this a "banal one-liner" in the exact sense you were lamenting Isaac? — Pantagruel

Yes, probably. I'm not lamenting the entire existence of banal one-liners, I'm just explaining how some of them in certain contexts seem out of place in the sorts of discussions we might reasonably want to encourage.

That's the problem with the approach that many here have to philosophy, they are not looking for the truth, rather they are looking for material to support what they already believe. So when articles of philosophy approach the truth, and it is not what these people already believe, they tend to turn away. — Metaphysician Undercover

The truth is massively overrated.