That’s ok. If you understand why you agree with then you’ll be closer to understanding me.

Here it is derived from 'ouisia' which is nearer in meaning to 'being' or 'bearer of attributes'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and Para 54 of Principles is prefaced with just that qualification, re: ”...each substance has one principle attribute...”, which is the same as saying each is the bearer of one principle attribute.

This is a very small part of what constitutes holding someone accountable. It applies in all sorts of situations where there may be no specific rules - in employment, in personal relationships, in business relationships, basically in every aspect of human interaction. — T Clark

If it is such a small part, how then does it concern all those things you listed?

The subject matter has to do with accountability, which is to say, in this case, the way in which people account for the activities of others. The subject wished to be held in abeyance, has to do with the account one person takes for himself.

The difference is in the kinds of judgement related to the two different accounts. The one I speak about, and the one with which the topic concerns itself, is judicial judgement alone, whereas the judgement concerned with the will of the individual in relation to himself, is aesthetic. The two cannot mix, and still maintain the differences in accounts, for the interests of the individual determine the judgement under which he is to subsume himself.

The article stipulates, “...Mind-brain dualism is the view that brain and mind are derived from entirely different kinds of things—physical stuff and mind-stuff....”, and that, “...for dualism to be true, all of science would have to be false...”

If it be granted the initial predication for mind/body dualism arises in Descartes,1641, and that there is further elucidation of it in 1647, and included in that latter a distinction in substances for each, then it should be noted that such elucidation of “substance”.....

“...As for corporeal substance and mind (i.e. created thinking substance), they can be understood in terms of a single common principle, all we can mean by ‘substance’ is ‘a thing that exists in such a way that it doesn’t depend on anything else for its existence....”
(Principles of Philosophy, 1. 52., 1647)

“....We can easily come to know that we are in the presence of a substance by one of its attributes. The nature of corporeal substance is extension in length, breadth and depth; and any other property a body has presupposes extension as merely a special case of it. The nature of thinking substance is thought; and anything else that is true of a mind is merely a special case of that, a way of thinking....”
(Ibid) 53

“....Thus we can easily have two vivid and clear notions or ideas, one of created thinking substance and the other of corporeal substance, provided we are careful to distinguish all the attributes of thought from the attributes of extension. (...) We must confine our idea to what we clearly perceive, not cramming into it any invented features beyond the ones that really belong there....”
(Ibid) 54

....does nothing whatsoever to justify that the validity of physical science is destroyed by it.

All that says nothing of other subsequent renditions of the stated dualism, but it’s always best to start from the beginning.

In a generally civilized society, the members of it are already held accountable, by means of the tenets of an agreed upon administrative code. Such code, and the voluntary adherence to it, is predicated on the mutual desire to live under some set of conditions as a community, and has nothing to do with an individualized personal will.

The question as to whether or not the individual ought to conform to the code willingly, is irrelevant, when the only interest he has in it, relates to the mere desire for its benefits. There is no need to will himself to comply, when a want suffices for the same end.

Public accountability can be given without any consideration of will. Or....will has nothing whatsoever to do with public accountability.

I dispute your ability to speak for the Everydayman since you are on this forum. — fdrake

Yeah, busted, for sure. Pretty presumptuous of me to declare a demographic doesn’t care about something, then appoint myself to represent them on exactly what they don’t care about.

Hey.....

The three I’s.....interesting, informative and intelligent. This discussion over the last few days.

In the back of the room, taking notes, sits Everydayman, nodding in affirmation once in awhile, but shaking in negation generally, for he knows beyond doubt that his head just doesn't work that way.
He’s actually chuckling to himself, because to him Mother Nature has pulled a fast one on those who wish that the belief that the door is open ever was a belief, and that merely a product of ionic activation potentials forced as sufficient justification for it. I mean...he invented “mind” to cover all that stuff, and it doesn’t bother him that technically, he cannot include such a thing in his list of thing-like possessions. Maybe why he’s here in the first pace, but also why he sits back here and keeps his mouth shut.

But don’t get me wrong; I’m a lot smarter....I’ve studied many centuries worth of philosophy, I’ll have you up there on the podium know.....than these other guys back here, and I know the brain does all those things, from which arises that which is present to all of us. I’m just here keeping him company, because I sympathize with him in his perceived loss of individuality which must follow from the strict determinism of natural law under which the brain necessarily functions, combined with some sort of social contract, which I’m sure you'll forgive him for treating as pure horseshit.

So....as self-appointed spokesman for Everydayman, just let me advise you that he ain’t buyin’ it, for he has never once in his life ever realized anything of which the grounds of the discussion promises. And while I personally agree with the foundational premises of the discussion, I am in agreement with him that it doesn’t, and never will, make the slightest impact on humanity in general, who just plain doesn’t think in terms of ion potentials and energized neural networks, and therefore couldn’t possibly care less about them.

Furthermore....he says.....it makes not the least difference what the public determines as intentionality of language predication, for he is first and foremost perfectly capable of disregarding the entirety of it, and, somewhat to his own detriment perhaps, the more redneck....obstinate....he is, the more apt he is to do it. In effect, he is saying, and even Intellectuals must admit the truth of it, that no matter what the test equipment probes and dye traces say, and.....sorry, Isaac, what theoretical psychology wants....he can immediately deny it, simply because he can think otherwise in refusing to be lumped with the crowd.

Yeah, ol’ Mother, She did indeed pull a fast one. On the one hand, possible empirical proofs of a thing, on the other, perfect deniability for that very same thing. Technology gives pictures of synaptic clefts, but not one human ever has formulated his mentality in terms of them.

That’s it, from the back of the room. Or....Token Rebuttal from the Vulgar Majority!!!!!

This exercise is merely another edition of the first antinomy of pure reason, the inverse of which is just as logically sound, in which is found we shouldn’t even be here to consider how us not being here would be impossible.

Might be fun to think about, but there’s no profit in it.

By sheer accident.

I’ll see your 2 cents, and raise you a nickel.

Where the self falls in all this is what phenomenology is about. My 2 cents — Gregory

While this seems to be the case, it means that somewhere buried in the depths of the phenomenology literature, must be some sort of proof that the self is a phenomenon. Hence, the debate amongst later German idealists and neo-Kantians, all in the name of justifying the evolution of transcendental philosophy from its Enlightenment origins, in which the self cannot be a phenomenon.

Interesting read. So...thanks for the link.

It seems as though you have misinterpreted what I said. — Janus

No, I was just responding to the queries, not the statements.

How do I know that processes of inductive and abductive reasoning (creative hypothesizing) are sound? — Janus

....to which my response was directed.

The question was as to how we "see" that. — Janus

That’s a different question altogether, which I gather refers to....

I see reason as relying on felt sense. — Janus

.....for which I can make no comment, because I don’t think of reason as relying on anything at all. It’s something we do, so I guess we could say reason relies on us.

On the other hand, if the questions are combined, we might arrive at, how do I see my reasoning is sound if I rely on a felt sense of reason? Well.....now we’re off to the rodeo.

That the human animal is imbued with a felt sense is given, otherwise morality itself is impossible. Ok, so what exactly is a felt sense? Just the words suggest a felt sense indicates a condition relating something to the kind of feeling, or the degree of a kind of feeling, a subject gets because of that something.

But humans are equally imbued with the capacity to reason, from which reasoning is derived.

So if humans are imbued with two separate and distinction qualities, or attributes, or capabilities, it is probably the case that there shouldn’t be an interconnectivity between them. Otherwise....why two? And why the two so different from each other?

Metaphysics understands this, by making reason the arbiter of the relations of our thinking in conjunction with a methodology (reasoning), and making feelings the arbiter of the rightness of those relations in conjunction with a personality (feelings).

But the rightness of relations is not the rightness of the ability that makes them possible. The true or false of reasoning does not reflect on the true or false of reason. A fast car going slowly, or a slow car going as fast as it can, is still only a car.

It turns out, feelings do not impinge on reason the ability, but restrict themselves to the objects derived from the method employed by that ability. We can have feelings about things we think (reasoning), but do not have feelings about reason (the innate faculty for creating relations).

If all that be granted, which from a metaphysical perspective it should, then the question, “how can I see the soundness of my reasoning if reason is a felt sense”, is a question that has no meaning, because the subject and the predicate do not belong together.

If all that’s just a heapin’ load of bullshit, then.......never mind. It’s all I got.

Thanks for the add-on. I was wondering what I was supposed to do with the original.

Thinking of a dreamscape is a way to imagine time as a construct, because dream time literally is constructed. The things that populate a dreamworld don't really have the origins implied by their presence. — frank

I can see how it might seem that way. The content of dreams is of a different time than the content of the experiences from which the dream content arises. But it’s the same for plain ol’ conscious memory recall, too, so, not sure we’ve gained much. As to origins, I think we’re stuck with a common origin for every manifestation of human cognition, whether conscious thought, memory recall, or dream state content.
————-

Cause and effect fails, but only from a perspective beyond the world. — frank

Does this relate back to dream worlds as being beyond the world? So c&e doesn’t hold power there? True enough, I suppose, but then, dreams are just imagination without arbitration from reason, meaning that not only is there no proofs of the possibilities contained therein, but there isn’t any need of them. There’s no need to subject dreams to logical principles, so it doesn’t matter if c&e holds or not. I’m sure we’ve both known folks who would claim they’ve whooped Bobby Fisher. Or copied Albert’s beam-riding.
————-

If you depend heavily on cause and effect and implied origins, you're bound to an in-world perspective. You can't mix that up with an out-world one. — frank

Absolutely. I mean....what would an out-world be? How would it manifest? How would we even know if we were in it? If we were in it, it wouldn't be an out-world. The nature of the human intellect: for any possible conception, it’s complement is given immediately from it. The implied origin of a possible out-world is given necessarily from the fact of the in-world.

Can I getta A-MEN!!! brutha?

Yeah? And......?

It is difficult to disentangle aspects of the brain and sensory awareness. — Jack Cummins

Yes, but we’re disentangling parts, not aspects. Brain and eye can be aspects of something common to both without being parts of each other.

As a yankeevirgobabyboomer.....you know, everything in its proper place.

Do you actually believe this? — frank

Ehhh.....I don’t have much use for the concept of time. I can get all I want from the usefulness of it with a clock. I can defend his theory, but it is just that, a theory. Everybody’s got one.

What’s your take on it?

It was only after a few eye problems that I became aware that the retina is actually part of the brain. — Jack Cummins

Then why isn’t the eye problem you have, a brain problem? What part of the brain got fixed when the eye did?

I don’t think we worry so much about the soundness of logic, as we do for its proofs. The only proofs for logic lay in experience, whether or not the soundness of conclusions conflict or conform to observations. And I don’t think we need to worry about how the logic feels, other than we just might not like what it tells us. I guess, as well, we might not like the premises we are forced to start with in order to get a conclusion that proves the soundness.

I agree deductive reasoning alone can't tell us anything beyond its form, but we are allowed to substitute particulars into that form, subject that form to experience, to test it.

When it comes down to it, we can’t expect more from the system than it’s capable of delivering.

What is time according to Kant? Obviously we perceive it, but what's up with our apriori knowledge of it? — frank

Time is nothing but the condition by which things are successive to, or coexistence with, each other. We don’t perceive time; we perceive things in relation to it. Two things can never at once occupy the same space, but two things can at once occupy the same time. One thing can never be in two spaces, but one thing can be in two times. And that’s all there can ever be for us to know about.....no things, one thing, or more than one thing.

Our a priori knowledge of time arises because we invented it. It is a purely human intellectual conception, used only to make the natural world understandable by means of the system that invented and uses it. Same with mathematics and formal propositional logic.
————-

We didn't understand S that differently, in the end. He does something like you said, but rather than some elan vital you implied, the force behind everything, he merely makes will a substitute for the unknowable, such that Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself is removed. Problem is, he spends the first part of the book telling us what will is for us, and the second part telling us how it applies to the world, but makes no proof that the human will we know is the same as that which grounds everything. So we are still left with a thing we don’t know, except by a name that we do.

He removed will from time, in the world, but will in humans absolutely requires time. So how he decided to use human will as the way to understand the world as will, is far too long a reach for me.

It is now, but was it always?
— Mww

If we're in a dream right now, that question is dubious. What's your answer? — frank

If we’re dreaming we wouldn’t be in a public domain, so we can say the question isn’t dubious, right? At least for that reason anyway.

My answer is no, naming isn’t always in the public domain. After the first naming, yes, if repeated or recorded as such. Before it, no. Unknown natural thing, first discovered, then named, at the discretion of the discoverer. Usually.

Think man-made objects that don’t exist in Nature until constructed or invented. As it is for that, so it is for everything.

Pass? Fail?

And when you name the rose, this naming is anchored in a public domain. — frank

It is now, but was it always?

I wonder what it could even mean to understand the mind, though. — Janus

Best I can figure.....The conception of it means we can eliminate infinite regress. Gotta start somewhere, right? I don’t personally attribute anything to mind not already accounted for by reason. In that respect, I don’t need a felt sense of mind, and by the same token, a mere felt sense of reason can’t account for its usefulness.

The concept of reason does get me out of the infinite regress problem, so....bonus points for that.

Call ‘em both “transcendental objects” and leave it at that?

what you're saying is that perception, as you understand it, is the end-to-end of the nervous system from stimulation of nerves through to awareness. — Kenosha Kid

No, actually it isn’t.

My fault. Guess I didn’t make myself clear.

No worries. It was fun anyway.

If that’s what you got out of it, far be from me to say otherwise.

Naming a function in a process doesn't suggest there's nothing else in that process. — Kenosha Kid

No, it doesn’t. But it can suggest too much included in the process.

I have, and used it as reference. It has its good parts.

There is only one perceiver that is somehow magically multiplexed. — frank

As each human is a replica of any other, in a general sense, why not?

I think Arthur just wants to say all of us cognize, judge, and experience, the same way.

So you end up close to Schopenhauer's take on perception. — frank

Pretty close, if you’re going from this, in WWR, 1.3., 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, 1909:

“...We shall consider these abstract ideas by themselves later, but, in the first place, we shall speak exclusively of the ideas of perception. These comprehend the whole visible world, or the sum total of experience, with the conditions of its possibility....”

Gotta be careful of the world as idea, though.

That which employs a method to understand, cannot itself be subjected to that same method.

Map/territory dilemma.

It can only be given as an irreducible and necessary condition, then subsequently shown that the method it uses is both possible, and non-contradictory.

A strange conception not in itself possible to understand, and stands as an irreducible given necessity, in humans at least, is reason.

The issue is what the word 'perception' means, and it means the organisation of sensory information by the brain, and therefore is brain function. — Kenosha Kid

I agree organization of all sensory information is the function of the brain. From both an empiricist’s and a rationalist’s point of view. Certain flavors of idealists, on the other hand, while granting the authority of science with respect to natural law, are justified in forwarding logically predicated theoretical systems, until, if ever, our empirical knowledge supports the scientific dominion over them. That being said........

Sensation is the downstream side of sensory apparatus, that which the apparatus reports.

Sensation without a cause is an unconditioned natural event, which violates the principle of cause and effect, and is logically impossible on certain initial grounds.

To sustain the principle of cause and effect, there must be that which is antecedent to sensation, as the cause of it.

Each of the plurality of modes of sensation, as singular, dedicated effects, are internal to the body, all causes of sensations as objects in general, are external to the body, the apparatus being merely the natural physiology sufficient to mediate one with the other.

There are distinct modes of sensation, but that in itself does not require correspondingly distinct modes of cause, insofar as it is possible a single cause can affect separate modes of sensation, and that even simultaneously.

“Perception” is that conception which represents the appearance of an physical object, such that the sensory apparatus is caused to evoke a sensation as effect. As simple cause and effect, there is no organization, no cognition, being a strictly passive one-to-one transition of empirical information.
“Appearance” herein not to be confused with “looks like”.

Perception as brain function alone disregards the absolute necessity for causality of sensations, and at the same time, disregards the spatial distinction between the external cause and its internal effect.

“.....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses....”
(Master and Commander of Outdated Theories, 1787)

Qualia aside, it turns out in the end, that it isn’t philosophy that “has a problem tolerating useful words associated with outdated theories”. It is science, or at least psychology, that hijacks a perfectly reasonable, established philosophical conception, and the domain of its employment, turning it into something it was never intended to represent.
—————

In humans, reason is a major contributor to that organising ability — Wayfarer

Sad commentary indeed, that in 13 pages, that word hasn’t once made an appearance. The only saving grace must be that reason is tacitly understood as given, which even if true, still leaves the mistakes being made under its name.

“They have forgotten the faces of their fathers”.

Btw I enjoyed this very much. — Kenosha Kid

Cool. I had fun with it. Just because we take our philosophy seriously doesn't mean we need to take ourselves as much.

I'd tell the boss that I had been slapped and how hard. — Kenosha Kid

Just what I’d hoped. Would you agree the empirical occurrence, and the quality of it, as reported, belongs properly to the concept of sensation? Do you think the conclusions follow from the proof? The intent of the exercise is in the question at the end, which was meant to pave the way for relieving the concept of perception from any internal predication, pursuant to the relative validity of the answers.

.....information flows from nerves to brains. We're in disagreement that this alone constitutes perception. — Kenosha Kid

I don’t think you said it was, and I know I would never claim it was. So we are not in disagreement with this. That perception is a brain function, is the major premise of our disagreement, you in the affirmative, me in the negative.

Perception is the organisation of these messages, not the messages themselves. — Kenosha Kid

Which forces the “empirical occurrence and the quality of it”....the message.....to remain internal, as you’ve maintained all along, and I understand it as such.
————

In taking exception to your rendering, it is not incumbent on me to supply an alternative
— Mww

If your counterargument is that there is a different authoritative definition, you ought to be able to cite it. — Kenosha Kid

True enough, but I’m not counter arguing in favor of a difference, but in arguing in refutation of a stated claim.

Given that the criteria for the possibility of a conception is its definition, and, say, I delivered an authoritative definition for “perception”, you are then entitled to ask me to cite the criteria that supports it. OK, fine, but we’ve already got one: perception is a function of the brain. If I advance a successful refutation of that definition, which is my wont because I’m denying its validity, by showing how the criteria do not support it, beginning with the gedankenexperiment, then I don’t need a different definition. And in the case at hand, should I offer one, I might be susceptible to accusations of committing an informal etymological fallacy. A fancy-assed way of saying what was once acceptable now isn’t.

Not to mention.....and conspicuous in its absence.....nobody’s asked me for one.
———-

If I was _certain_ that a given perception was caused by a particular object, then I'd be saying that such an object is necessary. — Kenosha Kid

Of course, but certainty is a knowledge condition, so this statement is correct from that perspective. But the thought experiment attempts to show that the cause of sensation is entirely unknown. or, more accurately, knowledge of the object is not given, is impossible to derive, from the mere sensation of it, just as you yourself made explicit in your “hard slap”.

Regarding the proposition, then, all you’re justified in saying is, if you are certain a sensation is caused by an object, the object is necessary, and its existence is therefore given, and nothing else whatsoever.

There is no knowledge of the object, and there is no organization of any kind at this level of the system, therefore there is no inclusion of brain function.

If perception is a brain function, and there is no brain function at this level, there is no perception at this level. Or, perception was never a brain function in the first place, which grants the possibility that perception is something else entirely.

Refutation success!!!! YEA!!!! (Does the Happy Dance, feet just a-blur. Look it ‘im go, sawdust ‘n’ peanut shells ‘n shot glasses flyin’ all over the place.)

if perception is a brain function, then it has lost its established meaning,
— Mww

(...) Can you cite the established meaning? — Kenosha Kid

That would be whatever says perception means a thing of its own and not a brain function. In taking exception to your rendering, it is not incumbent on me to supply an alternative, but to argue as to how yours doesn’t work. Socratic dialectics, donchaknow.

Case in point, in your entry to ......

None of this is to say I am dubious about the existence of any object that purportedly causes my perception of it. — Kenosha Kid

.....is found no disconnect between saying perception over brain function, insofar as external objects in general actually are sufficient causality both perception and brain function, which implies interchangeability without contradiction. However, in the next.....

Nonetheless, I am proceeding only in extremely high confidence in the hypothesis that my experience of the red flower is caused by an external object with certain properties that cause that experience. — Kenosha Kid

....is found the necessary causality not given in the first, re: certain properties. As these certain properties as assumed to belong to the object, they are not given from brain function, but they are nonetheless perceived as residing in, or appended to, the object as the means of its distinction from objects in general.

This is called direct realism, or epistemological monism.
————

Subsequently, in this...

nothing of the external world is, for instance, in my brain. — Kenosha Kid

....is found that those conditions sustaining epistemological monism are apparently false, insofar as herein it is said there is nothing of those given properties of that object found in the brain. Now we see that it is the case that the loss of, or the non-existence of, the monistic properties of the object in the brain, says absolutely nothing whatsoever about the loss of, or non-existence of, those very same properties given from the perception of them.

The logical deduction from all that is twofold:

The theorem:
Properties never did belong to the object, therefore the loss of them is irrelevant, and, perception of objects is distinct from the brain function with respect to them.

The proof:
Imagine yourself a dendrite, just under the skin. A very young dendrite, perhaps an infant dendrite. At least inexperienced. You know what your job is, but haven’t yet had a chance to impress the boss. You know, His Esteemed Grayness sitting all lofty up there, surrounded by bone and long flowing locks. Suddenly, this protrusion of unknown origin (nod to Eric Bloom, aka, Blue Oyster Cult) slaps you right in the dentrical face. YEA!!! You finally....AT LAST....get to send a message. You’ve trained for this since mamma met papa, but you’re cool....you do your job.

First......What do you tell the boss?
Second......do you, as dendrite, really expect the boss to send a return message saying.....thanks, but I already knew all about it.
Third....if the second becomes the case, wouldn’t you wonder, in your dendrite manner.....WTF am I doing here then????
(Then you get all depressed and pathologically stupid and shoot yourself with an overdose of calcium ions, bursting yourself, taking your cell body with you. Your neighbor dendrites look at each other and wonder as well.....he’s got a point. What are we doing here anyway, if the boss already knows what we send him.)

The intent here is to ask....what is NOT sent upstream?

Are you saying that if I personally don't know the collective noun for something, I'm saying that something is a non-entity? — Kenosha Kid

Not exactly. I’m saying that if perception is a brain function, then it has lost its established meaning, hence become a non-entity with respect to it.
———-

I'm open to whatever you've got. — Kenosha Kid

History. Not gonna help me much, is it.

Well the senses themselves don't cogitate. So there's no puzzle by itself here. — Manuel

Believe it or not, I was about to butt in to yours and Janus’ dialogue with, “the senses don’t think and cognition doesn’t sense”, but I figured he’d think I was picking on him....again. So I deleted myself.
————-

Why not just have cognition alone? — Manuel

We always have cognition, but sometimes we have cognition alone, meaning without perceptions. Any mathematics done in your head, without transferring it to speech or paper or whatever, is cognition alone. Something else that seems to have bit the modernization dust....a priori knowledge. Can’t see it, can’t smell it, can’t measure it, get rid of it.
————-

why is that what we sense differs so much from the phenomena that causes the sensing. — Manuel

Maybe it’s as simple as hardware vs software.

.

Sorry. What?

HA!!!

No.

Wait. Are you serious? I can’t tell.

Different senses have different kinds of receptors, so what name covers them all, if not perception?
— Mww

Sensation? That doesn't seem right either. I don't think I know the word for it, but I'm pretty certain perception isn't it. — Kenosha Kid

It is so odd, that the precursor to the human cognitive system, the mere transformation of one kind of energy into another, in a measly five modes of operation, in a near one-to-one correspondence, fully observable and reproducible......finds itself relegated to a non-entity. The exact opposite of what natural science is meant to do, but theoretical psychology grants because it just doesn’t know any better.

There’s no explanatory gap in sensibility, yet it finds itself forcefully conjoined to that which has one. What sense does that make to anybody?

Anybody????

Ref:
Perception is a brain function.
— Kenosha Kid

I understand all that, but isn’t what I want to know. Isn’t what I’m asking.

I wouldn't call actual excitement of nerves in the skin perception, — Kenosha Kid

Like Michael Corleone, “just when I think I’m out, they pull me back in!!!!”

Different senses have different kinds of receptors, so what name covers them all, if not perception?

If perception organizes, what does the brain do?
— Mww

It's the brain that's doing it. Perception is a brain function. — Kenosha Kid

Oh.

Ya know.....I’m in agreement pretty much down the line, these last few pages, with minor adjustments maybe. But this.....too far out for me.

It escapes me completely, how sensory receptor stimuli perception in my skin, can be construed as a brain function in my head. Related, of course; similar, maybe, both respect natural law. Identical? Ehhhh.....beyond my comprehension.

Causality for perception is very far removed from causality for brain function.

Maybe I better understand your “collapsing”, insofar as combining perception with brain function, the need for language to make the difference between them intelligible, is eliminated. And while psychologically convenient, it is empirically disasterous.

With that, I’m out.