Knowledge of global warming had been around for decades before the world in general became interested. — frank

True enough; the observed changes in Nature became known as global warming, when the information contained by those changes became understood. Some are interested, but, e.g., The Great Pacific Garbage Patch, says, not enough.

I hesitate to agree the world in general is interested. Or, perhaps, interested enough to do anything significant about it. Some merely blame the cyclic nature of Nature herself, some say they can’t see it from their house, so neglect their due diligence.

Still, it is the case, that while a bucketful of ants won’t effect a scale, a dump truck full of them certainly will, all things considered.
———————

what is the mindset that pays attention to science? — frank

Hmmmm....good question. The mind that pays attention to science, is the mind that judges a validity in it? I mean, the microwave oven benefits me immensely, but it was a completely accidental discovery, hardly scientific, which suggests mere benefit can’t be the sole arbiter for paying attention to science. Maybe its products, but the discipline in itself.

How does the physical matter of neurons instantiate the non-physical content of future perception?

Sounds an awful lot like epiphenomenalism, doesn’t it? Also sounds an awful lot like a re-write of the “hard problem of consciousness”.

Interesting subject, nonetheless. Doesn’t have any good answers, but still interesting to think about, up to a point anyway.

All -isms are concerned only with the affirmation or negation of the essential root conception, right?
— Mww

Yes, but as Daemon points out below, the exception might be pluralism. — Janus

Maybe, but I would treat pluralism as a singular conception in itself. Pluralism is still different than the myriad of separate -isms contained in it. If pluralism was a pot, it matters not to it, that there is something, or there is nothing, in it.

I honestly don't understand what the difficulty is here. — James Riley

A hint, maybe: misplaced concreteness. The treatment of general conceptions, in this case, information, as an actual thing. Information, in and of itself, can never help anyone decide anything at all, but only that which the information is about, may. Information without the human cognition of its object, is empty.

People like to say....well, the information was always out there, just waiting or us to find it. Which is just the lazy over-simplification of why everything possible to know, isn’t.

These three questions do not interest me anywhere near as much as...... — Tom Storm

Same here. To “untie philosophical knots in our understanding” starts at home.

Is it the case that all isms are essentially nothing-but-isms? — Janus

I’m pretty much ok with that. All -isms are concerned only with the affirmation or negation of the essential root conception, right?

There seems to be a common will to fundamentalism, to foundationalism — Janus

The intrinsic human need for certainty on the one hand, and the lazy folks’ intrinsic wish to have decisions ready-made for them on the other. Hence.....everything from the Logical Laws of Thought to the Planck Constant to expiration dates on consumables. And of course, the Ten Commandments and variations thereof.

Yeah, well......as long as it’s only “ought to be”......

Science doesn’t correct itself. Scientists correct themselves and science follows.

What is the problem with seemings in Kant? — Manuel

The problem of seemings is in people generally, not Kant specifically. For Kantian idealism to deal with seemings, or, which for all intents and purposes is the same thing, feelings, takes a different approach than epistemology. That’s all I’m saying.

Cool. Thanks.

Having nothing better to do can be entertaining, at the very least. — Manuel

HA!!! True dat, amigo.

Yeah...the bane of idealism, even Kant’s: seemings. Can’t empirically prove ‘em, can’t rationally get rid of ‘em. Nature of the beast.

Just because we can’t prove doesn’t mean we can’t trust, and then have to doubt. Both radical skepticism and metaphysical reductionism have logical boundaries, after all.

that path of reductionism just leads to ever smaller relations of units of stuff. — Manuel

Smaller units of stuff implies empirical reductionism, right? For that reason, I stipulated metaphysical reductionism, which pertains to ever smaller units of conception. Prime example......A = A. The logical laws. In Aristotle and Kant, among others perhaps, there are also the categories. Gotta start somewhere and the irreducible offers the least possibility for contradiction.

It doesn't seem like a very coherent idea to doubt the given in such a manner that it is eventually denied. — Manuel

Absolutely. Pretty silly, ain’t it?

Galen looks too much like Art Garfunkel. Makes me think he’s going to sing. He also rejects free will, so there’s two strikes. Good quote, though. Quite apropos.

Well, ya know.....as with any theory, it all depends on one’s initial position. Used to be, pre-Enlightenment, either top-down, in that the external holds sway, or bottom-up, in that the internal holds sway, and one’s personal philosophy was taken from which was favored.

The Kantian paradigm shift occurred when the two were, not so much combined, as taken as equally necessary in their own right, which served to, for all practical purposes, dismiss both Hume-ian top-down empiricism (all are things in themselves) and Berkeley-ian bottom-up subjectivism (none are things in themselves).

The missing ground for the possibility of that equality, was the theoretical/logical proof for the validity of pure a priori cognitions, as the only means for humans to bridge the gap between what is known, and what is merely thought, for both are inarguably resident in the human rational system.
————-

what I believe to be true based on things I've read and thought about myself — Manuel

All well and good; it is the way of the common understanding, which is just about everybody. Metaphysical reductionism asks, nonetheless.....if a thing is true why merely believe it, and, if a mere belief, on what ground can it be true, this first brought to light, of course, by the Socratic dialogues and dialectical arguments in general. Usually partaken by those with nothing better to do. (Grin)

(Insert thanks, appreciate it thingy here)

denies that we can possess cognition of things as they are in themselves, i.e. things as they are independently of how we experience them through our cognitive faculties."

Yes, he is! — counterpunch

So that’s your notion of what constitutes subjectivism, such that Kant is a proponent of it? Are we then to say any rational being is a subjectivist? Apparently, then, any being in possession of cognitive faculties is subjectivist? Much to broad a brush, to apply a lumpy paint, methinks.

This is actually what he said, as opposed to what somebody else said he said:

“....It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of empirical idealism **, which, while admitting the reality of space, denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it, and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion. (...)

Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form of that intuition which we call external, and, without objects in space, no empirical representation could be given us, we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper self, as it exists in itself—not the transcendental subject—but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us, unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy—although both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws....”
(** re: Berkeley and his dogmatic subjectivism)

Will a subjectivist, as you mean it, grant “the objects of external intuition (....) are real”? And that we “ought to regard extended bodies...as real”?

Correct me if I’m wrong, but if subjectivism absolutely requires a phenomenal subject, and such phenomenal subject “cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing”, then what is it that makes Kant a subjectivist?

If you must attribute to Kant some -ist that he does not himself endorse, perhaps “cognitive representationalist” might better suit the need.

Why would we assume a limit for human experience? — frank

Because we are forced to admit the impossible. In the human cognitive system, for every conception, the negation of it is given immediately. It follows that because some experiences are possible, there are necessarily some experiences that are impossible. Given a speculative theory in which the possibility of experience of objects is predicated on space and time, that which is not so predicated, or not known to be so predicated in accordance with that same theory, will be impossible as an experience.

“....It is a matter of indifference, whether I say, "I may in the progress of experience discover stars, at a hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now visible," or, "Stars at this distance may be met in space, although no one has, or ever will discover them."....”

That there is no limit to human thought a priori is not to be aligned with the limit for experience, which is itself never merely a priori, but only conditioned by it.
————-

Do you know much about the IIT theory of consciousness? — frank

No, can’t say I do. From my well-worn armchair, consciousness doesn’t warrant a theory of its own, it being already a constituent of pure reason, which has an established theory. I’d be interested in having a nutshell thrown my way, if you’re so inclined.

Kant is subjectivist. — counterpunch

No, he is not, at least insofar as he undermines the objective. He undermines pure reason’s, and thereby the transcendental subject’s, proclivity for over-estimating the objective. He doesn’t limit the objective, he only exposes the human limit for understanding it.

In reality, we see the world as it really is. — counterpunch

Correct, but we don’t care about what we see, as much we wish to be certain about our knowledge of what we see. It makes no difference to us what’s out there, we care only about how it relates to us.

So the idea is that we're sort of projecting an environment for the things we encounter. — frank

Exactly, and of which there are but two members of such “environment”......space and time.

The Kantian “an sich” of the full “ding an sich“, is that which is not ever encountered by us. “In itself” makes explicit “not us”, and it is quite obvious we can say nothing of that of which we are necessarily excluded.
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It's that we don't apparently learn that, for instance, physical objects have spacial and temporal extension. — frank

Correct. We cannot say whether or not space and time are properties of objects. But of course, the common metaphysical rejoinder is, that they are. To which Kant argues, if such is the case, in order for us to experience anything whatsoever, we are forced to grant “....two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real...”, an absurdity.
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The argument for the thing-in-itself is about apriori knowledge. — frank

No, it isn’t. It is about the limit of human experience, or, which is the same thing, a posteriori knowledge. The purpose of the first critique is to expose the natural excesses of pure reason, and to set the proper boundaries for it, in accordance with a particular speculative theory.
————-

Kant is a prime example of philosophy confirming the position of the Church - that science is suspect of heresy; — counterpunch

This is catastrophically false. Or, in the interest of proper dialectic, I have no familiarity with anything Kantian that sustains such an assertion, and would certainly appreciate citations in support of it. While it is the case Kant belonged to a religious civil society, and his benefactor was indeed a religious individual, Kant himself had no such overt inclinations, at least as witnessed in his metaphysics and most certainly not in his moral philosophy.

The church may well have thought science to be suspect of heresy; Kant, on the other hand, was a Newtonian first, and an era-specific theoretical “natural philosopher” in his own right, second, re: nebula theory, plate tectonics, refutation of absolute space and time, so can hardly be said to confirm science as heretical.

Sapere aude.

Are you in agreement with Putnam and Husserl, re: the representational human cognitive system, or are you using them just as some informational response to the OP?

Oh fercrissakes!!! For any private moral consideration whatsoever, if the state of it is supposed, the conditions for the state of it is necessarily presupposed, and propositions with respect to those conditions, are irrelevant. Only syllogistic propositions or mathematical formulae have truth value; moral inclinations are neither, hence do not.

“Is it true you ought not to kill that guy?”
“Hmmm...lemme think. I ought not to kill that guy, so you want to know if it’s true I ought not to kill that guy? What kinda stupid question is that, anyway? I ought not, but it might be not true I ought not? If it’s not true I ought not, how in the HELL did I come up with ought not in the first place? And if that fool did dirty to my daughter, even if I ought not kill him, I might just do it anyway. So it turns out that dumbass question is moot no matter the consequence of the inclination behind it; I ought not kill the guy whether I let him go with a stern talking-to, or put him in the ground.

....Yeah, and besides all that, considering the contrary, if it is the case that I ought to kill that guy, then it must be the case that I ought possibly to kill any guy, from which follows possibly I ought to kill every guy, which makes me wonder....how lucky are you to be here asking me stupid questions?

....Maybe I was wrong in coming up with ought not.”

(Sigh)
————

But as far as I'm aware that we ought not kill isn't a recognisable physical state — Michael

Correct. Hence, the contingency of a mere “ought, rather than the universality intrinsic to empirical conditions.

......myself as well as to you. — Banno

Ever one but not the other? Ever one before the other? What if “we” do not analyze, but it is only each “I” that does? Therein, perhaps, lay the transcendental subject, which in turn facilitates the subjective condition itself.

What is gained by describing it as subjective? — Banno

Describing is tacit acknowledgement of limitation to specific time and membership. Whether a gain or not, depends on discourse.

"Thoughts" is the name we give to our inner experience when we have to put it into words to communicate with another person. — T Clark

My sentiments as well. Has there ever been an occassion, in the everyday course of your private rational machinations generally, you ever said to and for yourself alone, “I think.....”?

I’m guessing.....never.

After spending some time with it, I cannot find any value at all, and find it instead confused. — tim wood

Yeah.....about that: all from THN 3.1.1, 1739......

“....It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments, by which I have prov’d, that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection....”

.....and four paragraphs later.....

“....It has been observ’d, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion....”

.....from which we see how easy it must have been, to be “awakened from my dogmatic slumbers”.

So there must be something about never producing any action, that is different from affording us the means for producing an action. Either way, reason cannot be both inert, and at the same time, influential.

We were no longer simply a creature, but a creature who could ask ‘what am I?’, and ‘what is this world I find myself in?’ — Wayfarer

How else to answer his own questions, then to have the conditions for it already resident within himself?

It’s because we became independent arbiters of what is good. — Wayfarer

Yes, but that is not the same as becoming independent arbiters of what good is.

We are no longer merely creatures, we did become independent arbiters, but those evolutionary predicates don’t invalidate the notion of a moral sense as a pre-eminent condition of the human creature.

My two pfennigs....

I think therefore I am not physical? — Rxspence

That I am not physical, is true, but it isn’t true because I think.
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"I" is a perceived being.
It is not a logically deduced or proved by reason being. — Corvus

To be perceived implies the use of the senses. “I” am never available to any sensibility, even my own. “I” am a perceived being is therefore false. And impossible besides.

The only possible means for “I” at all, is by logical deduction. In humans, all logical deduction is only possible by reason. But “I” am not a being at all, so whether or not a being logically deduced or a being proved by reason, is moot.
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Beware reification.

Well....good luck, and have fun with it. Get to the bottom of whatever it was that smacked right into your face.

My English is apparently outdated. — god must be atheist

Nahhh.....I took it as you intended.

being able to read through the opening post and following what it says. — god must be atheist

Oh, I wouldn’t admit to following, as much as I’d admit to reading. I’m pretty sure its author will agree.

B is "A then C" or "not A" — Samppa Hannikainen

“A then C” implies change, but “not-A” carries no implication of change. “‘B’ is ‘A then C’” doesn’t seem to hold the same truth value as “‘B’ is ‘not-A’”, insofar as the former’s is contingent on the instances in the change from A through to C, whereas the truth value of ‘B’ as ‘not-A’ is given without contingency, hence can be called given necessarily, which is one of the Aristotelian Three Laws of Logic.

‘A then C’ cannot be ‘not-A’ immediately, because ‘not-A’ must first be A, a contradiction. By the same token, ‘B’ cannot be ‘A then C’ because B must first be A, an impossibility.

I gather the “A then C” is an exposition of the transformation of implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge, from your opening thesis? If so, how does A, as the existential condition of B, transform into C? It looks like ‘A then C’ is the existential condition of B, which refutes your major premise, re:

A is an existential condition of B — Samppa Hannikainen

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The "existential condition" is "A". I will go ahead and call this "existence". — Samppa Hannikainen

Fine, but now, by simple substitution, you have “existence is the existential condition of B”. Like...in order for there to be B, B must exist. A tautology if there ever was one, I must say.

Harkens me back to the old adage...old meaning Enlightenment-era German idealism...existence cannot be a predicate. Having an existential condition for B presupposes B, otherwise there is nothing to condition, so qualifying B with ‘existence” doesn't add anything to B it didn’t already have.
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And it is BOTH "defined and undefined" in a very precise way that is described in the forming of the condition B as "Content" of condition A. — Samppa Hannikainen

If A is always true, and A is the condition for B, then isn’t B exactly as true as A permits? And if that is the case, isn’t B then defined by A?
————

I’m wondering....does this enterprise of yours resolve from your research into the analytic/synthetic propositional dichotomy? If not, meaning all this is just off the top of your head without that specific research, I might direct you to it, if only in order for you to see the familiarities between it and yours.
————

One last thing:

The truth value of "E" ("not A") will always be false, no matter from what viewpoint it is evaluated. The truth value of D however is by definition "variable". — Samppa Hannikainen

Where in the HELL did D come from??? If E is ‘not-A’, is D ‘not-B’?

I’ve become lost in the letters.

The human cognitive system is inherently complementary, so your intrinsic/extrinsic condition is a valid representation. Nevertheless, I think that from the fact the explicit arises because the implicit is given, it does not follow necessarily that such arising is experienced as consciousness.

I would have been happier if you’d called the original an absolutely necessary condition, rather than a kind of knowledge. All knowledge is reducible, so in effect, you’ve left yourself open to falsification by allowing the basic premise grounding your entire treatise to be too weak. In other words, a proper critique of the constituency of “knowledge” may not even permit it to create consciousness, so your major premise is shot to hell.

I don’t see how to avoid the same difficulty carried by the claim “...implicit knowledge" transforming into "explicit knowledge". That transformation is experienced as "consciousness"....”, which implies consciousness is an experience. All kinds of conflicts with that, I’m afraid.
——————

no system can describe itself through the language of itself. — Samppa Hannikainen

Except you, as a human system, just did exactly that. As do each and every single one of us, iff so engaged.

Anyway....well-thought, overall. Good job.

However, intuitively, we can say that Tom is more justified than Sam. — Curious Layman

By what right can we say that?

To the hull of whose thought a lot of barnacles have attached themselves. — tim wood

....only to slow the ship, or veer it from its plotted course.

Kant didn’t treat of phenomena beyond undetermined representation, because he didn’t have to. Those following, in so treating, whether philosophical progress or mere professional opportunism......ehhhh, for each student to decide for himself.

I understand you yourself have used the Pinkard reference as an indirect source for the quoted passage, so the Prussian Academy pagination system won’t apply. If it did, in B152 you’d find, as Pinkard himself should have, the last line of the quote to read “...without the aid....”.

It matters as far as textual accuracy is concerned, but doesn’t effect your comment all that much.

If rejecting isms requires a suffix — Tom Storm

My point is that it doesn’t. The common rejoinder is, well, hell, dude, if you reject fanaticism, you’re automatically an advocate of anti-fanaticism. To which I say......horsefeathers.

Any conception can be rejected merely by re-thinking the conditions for it.

While re-thinking is the exchange of conceptual validity, which is an entailed judgement alone, re-thinking is not necessarily conceptual substitution, which is a separated cognition incorporating its own conditions.
(Re: I can easily think some concept does not belong to its cognition, without ever thinking which concept does so belong.)

Therefore, rejecting an -ism, which at the same time explicates rejection of the concept appended to it, does not necessarily require another —ism and its appended conception be substituted for it.

It follows that the statement, “rejection of -isms is itself an -ism, and hence contradictory”, is false.

All inquiries are subsumed under metaphysics, for the excruciatingly simple reason that it is humans doing the work. The sciences may describe the conditions under which there are questions to ask, but it is metaphysics alone which determines what form the questions are given.

So, yeah, there are meaningful differences, easy to dismiss but impossible to ignore.

The “stop baiting” warning should carry over here.

Would it set a record, that the same group of children are responsible for the closing of two separate threads, at practically the same time, and for the same reason?

(Sigh)

But you prove/"prove" it intuitively, the question of is some a priori judgment true or false, is judged by intuition. — Antinatalist

Close enough. We’re saying about the same thing.

I made a mistake, nonetheless, in that judgements don’t have truth values, as such. They stand, a posteriori, as the correctness of the relation between an object we sense and the object as it becomes known. Or, in the case of mere thought a priori, they stand as the validity of the relation of conceptions to each other.

Best to bear in mind the perspectives involved. When there are two distinct and separate cognitive systems in play, they are required to conform to each other in order to facilitate the possibility of productive communication. When either system operates on its own, for its own purpose, to its own end, there is no communication, the system is confined to itself internally. The difference is language, necessary for the communication between multiple systems, not even present in each singular system in its internal operations. So when it is said a judgement is true, what it meant is that the proposition composed and presented externally to represent the internal judgement in one system, conforms to the internal judgement in the other, from which his composed proposition would have been congruent, had he been the speaker rather than the listener. In effect, it is the proposition that holds truth value, and then only because a judgement has been made on the validity of the relations in the proposition given by one system, to the relations in the internal judgement of the other system, with respect to it.

Are we having fun yet?

I was thinking that perhaps reasoning about a priori judgments is itself intuitive. — Antinatalist

In that case, all we’re doing is exchanging the general form of the judgement, with particular matter that can be used to verify or falsify it. We are still reasoning about an intuition and not reasoning about an a priori judgement, the validity of it being a consequence. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line, the judgement, requires us to reason to the physical construction of the representations contained in the concepts of point and straight and line, such that the judgement is shown to be true.

So you think all a priori judgments are reasonable and discursive, but there is no intuition at any level. — Antinatalist

No intuitions, at any level? Yes, there are, at the empirical level. The sensible level, of real things, represented in us as phenomena. There is no knowledge of real things of experience without representations by intuition, just as there is no knowledge of abstract things of thought without representations as concepts.

You might see the problem here. Nothing given from concepts alone can tell us about the world of objects and nothing from intuition alone can tell us about abstract things, like beauty, justice, moral obligation, even though experience is rife with examples of them.
———-

if you radically doubt everything, you doubt also science etc.
And I don´t think such a doubt is a rational way to view life. — Antinatalist

Agreed. Radical skepticism prohibits knowledge.

My hard statement is that all knowledge is based on intuition.
— Antinatalist
....which rejects a priori judgements.
— Mww

Perhaps so, but what is the relation between a priori judgments and knowledge? Just asking (what you think). — Antinatalist

What I think:

All empirical judgements are intuitive, hence contingent; all a priori judgements are discursive, hence necessary. Knowledge from intuitive judgements is experience; knowledge from discursive judgements is reason.
———-

......without any intervening arbitration.
— Mww
I agree. If you mean, that he didn´t found any new logical truths. — Antinatalist

Yep, that’s what I mean.
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It is mystery what this "I" is. — Antinatalist

Not for the hard sciences, for the most part finding no empirical reason to acknowledge the validity of it. Brain states, recyclable neurotransmitters, variable ion potentials and all that jazz, doncha know. And not for speculative epistemology, which grants that the “I” represents the unity of the manifold constituency of consciousness. But then, metaphysics is a mystery in itself, so....there is that.

My hard statement is that all knowledge is based on intuition. — Antinatalist

....which rejects a priori judgements.

If we assume classic logic in general to be true "I think, therefore I am" is analytically true. — Antinatalist

...which is necessarily an a priori judgement.
——————-

I don´t think that there´s any serious arguments against Descartes, I certainly think that he proved logically his existence for himself. — Antinatalist

People do think of it that way. But here, in the sections following the section in which ”Cogito... is posited, is found “the first and most certain...”, which is congruent with your “analytically true”. So Descartes himself didn’t logically prove anything, per se; he merely espoused something as impossible for him to not know immediately, without any intervening arbitration.

“....I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of trying to explain things that were already very simple and self-evident, by producing logical definitions that make things worse! When I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is ‘the first and most certain thing to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way’, I wasn’t meaning to deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and know that it’s impossible for something to think while it doesn’t exist, and the like....”
(Principles of Philosophy, I.10., 1644, in Cottingham, Cambridge, 1985)

Even so, the serious argument....assuming there is one..... revolves around exactly what existence, and thereby what kind of existence, Descartes was so sure of. All he said about “....I am”, is “...we can’t suppose that we, who are having such thoughts, are nothing....” (ibid, Sec 7). He is saying what I am not, but doesn’t say what I am, only that I am.

My interpretations only, of course.