That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.
— Mww

Seems to me like that would only be true if the universe were finite towards the past, which doesn’t seem tautologically true — Amalac

Evidence that the universe is finitely existent in the past is provided by the mathematically logical necessity of singularities. If singularities are real phenomena, then the existence of the universe follows the same logical criteria as is followed by the world. Thing is, experience informs us of the phenomenal reality of the world, but cannot inform us of the phenomenal reality of the universe or of singularities. Can’t use the criteria for what it is possible to know, in determinations for what is not.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time
— Mww

Doesn't seem that explicit to me, how does that follow? (1. The world exists, 2.???, 3. Therefore, the world has an origin in time) — Amalac

That’s fine; it doesn’t have to be explicit to you. I said with respect to Kant reflected in Popper, in which there is no 2.???. That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.

As a matter of dialectical interest, though, how does the statement not follow, from your point of view?

isn't that as fallacious as arguing that the series of negative integers cannot be infinite because otherwise it could never reach -3? — Amalac

Negative integers have a necessary originating condition, so arriving at -3 is not impossible. The totality of the series of integers is infinite, but a particular member of the series is given by the mere assembly of count from whatever arbitrary origin. Now, the infinite divisibility of an aggregate quantity, represented by numbers, on the other hand, would make arriving at -3 impossible.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time, therefore the time of the world cannot be an infinite series, even if time itself, is, irrespective of phenomena. And while space is infinitely divisible, the world is already a whole conceptual aggregate in itself which immediately defines the limits of its own finitely divisible space. The tacit understanding here is, if divided too far, in order to conform to the infinite divisibility of space in general, but regarding only that space the world inhabits, the world is no longer conceptually identical to its original, hence the incurrence of a “transcendental illusion”.....the very thing the antinomies make apparent.
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my point is that the argument he used to prove that the universe cannot be infinite to the past doesn't appear valid. — Amalac

Interesting. Where do he prove that, exactly? I don’t know of it, and couldn’t find a reference in the texts for it. As far as I understand the antinomy, he describes the confines of it, to certain determinations, of which there is the world, and there is nature...not Nature, nor reality in general, just the constituency of whatever is being considered at the moment....but only makes reference to the universe as a object in the refutation of its viability in any argument with respect to the world.

In fact, I don’t think he attempted to prove the universe cannot be infinite to the past, for to do so is to exchange a phenomenal object of sensibility, which is solely determined by the pure intuitions of space and time thus a possible experience, for an intellectual object of understanding, which cannot be so determined at all thus can never be an experience. If anything, he proved the universe cannot be argued to be infinite to the past, or infinite in any relation to time or space, under the same conditions from which the world is so argued.

But...maybe I missed something, so I’d welcome a little help.

Ok. Thanks.

I did not manage to specify the field..... — Manuel

You did specify the field, in your response to . But all that does is presuppose that to which the field belongs, but says nothing about what that entails.

I don't know how else to formulate the topic. — Manuel

The historical precedent for formulation of anything, always begins by proving the possibility of it. If successful, its possibility is always followed by proving its necessity.

Exacting criteria, to be sure, but hey.......you brought it up, so the onus is on you.

Good luck!!!

We ‘see’ with our occipital lobes. — I like sushi

Yeah......and?

I don’t care what the occipital lobe is doing. When I close my eyes I know why I can’t see.

I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake — Manuel

Nahhhh. You “took up arms in a sea of troubles” so up to you to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”.

Still, it would seem you had your dialectical legs kicked out from under you from the very beginning, for not establishing the legitimacy of the domain, prior to inquiring about the possibility of legitimate questions arising from it. And because of that, as soon as laptops and sundry post hoc ergo propter hoc foolishness writ large in language philosophy entered the field, the war was lost.

You were heading in the right direction. Or at least heading in the same direction I already went.

All well and good. Now insert time in there somehow.

Good catch. I like them both, but favor Kant.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize (we cannot name).
— Mww

Hehe... this claims we can only name things that we can both conceptualize and perceive at the same time and at the same respect — god must be atheist

So a claim for what cannot be named is at the same time claim for what can? Nope, ain’t buyin’ it.

The first is quite obviously true insofar as that which is neither perceivable nor conceivable cannot be known to exist as far as we’re concerned, while the latter is quite obviously false insofar as we can certainly name things conceived long before that thing is ever perceived, if it ever is.

Connective consistency is important; logical consistency is paramount.

So the senses pass physical information that can be used as input, presumably for mental content, which the dictionary (sigh) terms “perception”. As well, apparently, perception can comprise mental content without the passing of physical information, insofar as at least one kind of perception doesn’t use the senses. Where does the mental content come from that isn’t passed by physical information? I suppose thinking can provide mental content, but still, what kind of content can it be, if not physical information from sensory inputs?

Perception as mental content comprised of physical information passed by the senses, and perception as mental content comprised of something other than physical information not passed by the senses. Seems like there should be a difference, so how does the mind tell the difference, and how does the mind treat one differently than the other, if there is one?

I understand all that. I’m not begrudging your definitions.

Still, granting that the senses aren’t used in your system of mental content, what part do they play?

Thinking of time perception as mental content...... — Mark Nyquist

Thinking as mental content...ok;
Thinking of time as mental content....ok;
Thinking of time perception as mental content....not ok.

Because thinking of time as mental content is already granted, the only way thinking of time perception as mental content can be consistently affirmed, is to treat perception as a function of the mind. If perception is a function of the mind.....what are the senses for?

Oh. Psychological matter.

That lets me out.

Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

Agreed. Can’t have an answer consistent with a very specific question, without a proper ground being given for it. Always best to separate the sophists from the dialecticians.

Time is how we perceive entropy. — I like sushi

True enough, but we don't care that time is how we perceive, when we wish to know how time is perceived.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize, we don’t have a name. No one can beat that horse beyond its expiration date, or, as in my case, no proper yankeevirgobabyboomer can analyze that such that the logical inconsistency of what you did say, becomes glaringly obvious. (Grin)

Ok. Thanks.

emotions provide an aesthetic 'intuition' about a decision and its potential outcome based on reason. How do these aesthetic judgements arise or change in one's mind? — Shawn

By the creation of an object of desire or inclination, from practical reason, by which the subjective condition explains itself to itself. I may have feelings about something, not necessarily because of what it is, but merely from how I am inclined to think of it, or, for some affect I wish it to impart to me.

It should be noted that emotions, while prevalent, are not necessary for humans. We know there are things for which we have no feelings at all, things for which no judgement is made with respect to that thing’s affect.

I think, technically, we don’t know how aesthetic judgements arise, but only speculate on the conditions under which they become possible. It is plain they are merely subjective, because it is plain one subject may have very different feelings than another, given exactly the same circumstance. And anything purely subjective, is pretty much impossible to quantify across the board.

We don't need to perceive it directly. We can compute it, and we do — god must be atheist

No, technically, we do not; we compute duration or succession, and represent such computations with everything from clocks to scratches on a wall. Flowers bloom under conditions right for them, but it is only with respect to humans, that flowers bloom in the spring. Spring, of course, a human conception, having absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with flowers themselves. Just as the first directly visible light from the sun on Earth itself has nothing to do with “morning”.
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for what we don't perceive, and for what we can't conceptualize, we don't have a name. — god must be atheist

Not “and for”. “Or for”. Your language makes explicit we must perceive all we name, which is obviously not the case. It follows that iff there is no perception of time as such, and yet time is nonetheless a name for something, it only names a conception, which can be argued to be the case without contradiction. Whereas time as a perception, is full of them, one for each and every instance of treating time as an object. Misplaced concreteness writ large? I mean....if time is perceivable, shouldn’t we be able to smell it?

What we don’t understand and for what we can’t conceptualize, we don’t have a name....is perhaps a better description of the human condition. Now, if time is something merely understood, we have reason to name it, but we have no occasion for, and are relieved of the absurdity of, smelling it.
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Human language is the extension of models of reality — god must be atheist

Absolutely. Human models described by human language derived from human experience.
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the very title of the thread is "How do we perceive time?" — god must be atheist

Yep, and I understand you mean that to ask that question presupposes the truth of it, in that we actually do perceive time, and the query simple asks about the means by which such perception occurs. That being the case, I must admit I don’t know how we perceive time.

does not need guidance. — Fooloso4

I see I misspoke: you said mechanistic but I wrote deterministic. Sorry....not paying proper attention.

Anyway, agreed, mechanical systems need no guidance. What ground is there or attributing extension to systems, when Descartes in Principles only attributes extension to “corporeal substance”?

I’m aware of but not well-versed in Descartes’ science, having more interest in his metaphysics. I shall have to take your word for it, that he regards the world as deterministic, so jettisons final causes. But if he claims that mind, body and god all are not responsible for guidance in the course of things, does he then claim Nature itself, is? I mean....what’s left? That, or the course of things isn’t guided at all, I guess. Excluded middle kinda thing.
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at once consistent with it and contrary to it. — Fooloso4

Yeah...if you’re gonna upset the applecart, ya gotta be ready to appease the owner.

I hope it makes a little sense to avoid the dichotomy of either treating emotions as "rational" or "irrational"? — Shawn

It can make sense to avoid the dichotomy, insofar as rational/irrational implies logical judgements based on reason, whereas emotions imply aesthetic judgements based on feelings alone. It follows that emotions need not be treated as rational/irrational, thus avoiding the dichotomy.

Humans, after all, reason to a logical judgement, but reason from an aesthetic judgement. On the one hand, we have to understand things about an object before we know what the object is, but on the other hand, we very well may already have feelings about something before we know what it is about it, that causes those feelings.

Expressions of emotion may be rational/irrational. But emotions themselves, as purely subjective conditions, are not.

why does he want to distinguish them? — Fooloso4

In modern parlance.....the quest for the unconditioned? The irreducible. The absolute certainty. From which the possibility of knowledge itself is given.

Recognition of the validity of thinking outside the Bible.

Humans wonder naturally, nature of the intellectual beast. It is nevertheless a fine line between wonderment and confusion.

How a term is meant to be understood is by definition a definition. — Fooloso4

Objection noted, and agreeable in principle. A definition is the complete representation of the conception, which always arises spontaneously from the understanding alone. How I define a term is represented by how it is understood by me.

Problem is, of course, there is no promise of necessary congruency between a plurality of understandings, from which follows the possible disparity between definitions, i.e., complete representation, of the same conception. I rather think how a term is meant to be understood, is the explanation of it, integral with its propositional employment.

Minor point, far deeper into the weeds than necessary.
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we do not gain knowledge by analysis of definitions. — Fooloso4

Correct; knowledge is far more complicated than that.
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Can the mind/body distinction be made if sensory awareness is a matter of thought? — Fooloso4

How about......awareness of, e.g., pain, is an indubitable certainty, a product of mind, even if its cause is not, it being a product of body. Difference between aware of, and aware-ness of. I suppose there’s all kinds of ways to distinguish one from another, right?

Is it the same to define a term, as it is to declare how it is meant to be understood? Descartes tells us what he means by the use of a term, e.g., P.P 1,9, on “thought”, insofar as when he is thinking all these listed mental occurrences are predicates of it, but he didn’t really define it, per se, as did Kant with his “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”.

As well, in P.P. 1,10, he warns against over-complicating “items of knowledge”. Then it is the case that “logical definitions for very simple and self-evident matters” should be unnecessary, because these should be taken as the very principles upon which the treatise is grounded.

Still, I would agree P.P. may very well be a response to critics, in which he is clarifying his intended use of terms, or, “items of knowledge”, rather than setting definitions of them.

What did you have in mind with “exactly what some are doing here”?

Neither gods nor commodores shall cause me to fire on such abundant perspicuity.

Be all that as it may, it remains that it is humans doing the work, therefore it is impossible to get beyond the metaphysical/empirical dichotomy with respect to the core question, which is my sole raison d’etre in attendance.

I have been thinking that it is the core question which goes beyond the dichotomies of metaphysics vs empiricism — Jack Cummins

How can it go beyond that dichotomy, when the proposition that asks about it obtains its meaning from them? Given that understanding itself is metaphysical, and reality itself is empirical, it follows that bypassing either results in reality that is not understood, or, that which is understood is not reality. In effect, nullifying the core question.

On the other hand, if there is understanding of reality, in whichever form that obtains, then the response to the core question must contain both the elements of the dichotomy, thus the question, effectively, hasn’t transcended either of them.

Just sayin’......

I don't think you guys are still talking about how we perceive time. — god must be atheist

I’ll cop to that. I reject that we perceive time in the first place, so don’t bother with talking about how we do it.

That, and I reject that missiles nest. How absurd!!!!

Would changing the words to [neurons, (mental content)] be more understandable? — Mark Nyquist

Not in my case; I understand mental content as instantiated non-physical. And neurons are just neurons in any case.

It's just normally we wouldn't note the neurons being present, but to do rigorous philosophy, we should. — Mark Nyquist

True, we don’t normally consider neurons in rigorous philosophy; that’s the purview and professional domain of empirical scientists. There’s a reason for that, I think, insofar as humans do not...and perhaps do not even possess the ability...to think in terms of the very natural laws by which the brain operates. And if that’s the case, how does the explanatory gap ever close, between the physical operation of the brain and the appearance of us as apparent manifestations of the non-physical operation of the brain?

our mental process does have full input/output capabilities and this model accounts for those capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

That was never in doubt; the problem is in translation of one input type to a completely different output type. The type of input as energy, that translates to a type of output as motion, is quite comprehensible, but the type of input as energy that translates to a type of output as “fascination”, “anxiety”, “freedom”.......well, that just doesn’t work so well, does it.

Fun stuff.....

The statement in question...... — Fooloso4

I like the “Principles of Philosophy” exposition more. Simpler, with a follow up for what he means by “think”.

Could you explain how his outcome would have been different if he had? — frank

No, not with any legitimacy. I can philosophize all day long over it, but that would never be any more than making inferences based on my understandings, which are most likely not even be close to his. He had a different mindset and different authorities to answer to than I, after all.

Is the complaint that he hasn't executed a proper ontological proof? — frank

I don’t think Descartes meant to infer his own existence, with the predicate “...therefore I am”.

I don’t think Descartes needed an ontological proof for anything, insofar as his sole intent was to prove a distinction between mind and body. The method for proving a distinction does not need an ontological proof for its elements, as much as it needs validation of an absolute necessity of one of them. All he had to do was show how the doubting one set of conditions for a thing, was impossible for doubting some other set of conditions for some other thing. It follows that if doubt of that other thing is impossible, that other thing must be absolutely necessary. He then has no need to prove the existence of it, having already proven its necessity. So it is, that because “I think” is undoubtably, “I am” is given necessarily.

Another way to look at it is, logical consistency reduces the “I” that thinks, to be the very same “I” that is thinking. “I” think, therefore “I” am. As such, “I” isn’t proven to exist, only that it is simply proven, by its thinking.

I think Descartes’ mistake was not to eliminate the extension of “I am” to phenomenal existence. So in effect, I guess you could say he failed to provide an ontological proof for the impossibility of mind as such. And he failed at that, because, as aforementioned, he didn’t consider, or at least didn’t use, the categories, as did Kant, it being reasonable to assume he knew about them, at least in Aristotle-ian form.

As an aside, there is also a standing Kantian metaphysical argument, unknown and/or not recognized as valid by Descartes, that existence cannot be a predicate in a logical proposition. So, if “I think” is true, “I am” is given immediately because of it. I mean....how could it be that “I think” but “I am not”.

Subtleties indeed. As in Tonini, I’ll wager.

to found an absolute grounding in subjectivity for science , logic and math, not an empirical one. This is in the best tradition of continental philosophy: dig deep down beneath the assumptions of math and science to those truths that are indubitably true for all, everywhere, at all times. (...) That for me is the difference between psychology and philosophy. The former is a conventionalized, conservative derivative of the latter. — Joshs

Well said.

Why would Descartes need "Everything, which thinks, exists" to be true in order to infer his own existence from the fact that he's thinking? — frank

Ahhhhh....the subtleties of philosophical investigations.

What do you think “infer his own existence” to mean?

With respect to Kant at least, there’s no philosophical laughing, but there is a basic refutation.....

“...The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings necessarily. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained—because....”

....and I say basic because it occurs in a mere footnote to B422, and I say refutation, as shown by the “ -because...”, insofar it is only so in accordance with Kant’s philosophy, which employs a conceptual scheme Descartes didn’t, re: the categories.

On the other hand, Kant congratulates Descartes for not making the same absurd claims with his idealism in general, as Berkeley made with his, so.....it’s a wash. Praise on one hand, criticism on the other.

In general, if you think your brain has mental content, you need a philosophy that accounts for this and it needs to recognize content has both input and output capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

Yep. Sounds about right.

Or you could walk around with one of those new-dangled machines strapped to your head, with a platoon of geeky lab-coated pencil-pushers in tow, taking turns telling you what’s reallyreallyreally going on between your ears.

(See? Right there! Apple tastes good = 2.5uv in zone 5 of area 2 of region 3; 14 phosphate ions over 10nm cleft!!! TaaaaDaaaaaa!!!!)