I do not know...is more than an opinion. — Frank Apisa

While this is certainly correct, the OP asked about nothing more than the absence of opinion.

The additional cognition is necessary. Otherwise, the soul remains merely a conception, which is an analytic judgement, without regard to its reality, which is a synthetic judgement.

An opinion on the existence of the soul is entirely predicated on the cognition of a synthetic judgement. No judgement, no opinion.

I would agree. Granting the conception of soul doesn’t require an opinion concerning the possibility of its existence. That would be a separate, additional, cognition.

In this Kantian pure reason sense, no. — tim wood

Reason may not construct reality per se, but it can be said reason constructs our sense of reality, or, constructs reality for us.

“...(...) all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize a priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified character....”

Good read indeed. Tough as it may be.

While I accept most of this, I find myself wondering what would be accomplished by “....superimposing rational concepts upon existence...” given “...the notion that existence is irrational.”

What logical aspect would arise from superimposing rational concepts on an irrational notion?

Even granting “....it is obvious that subjectivity comes into contact with it (“it” being the so-called irrational notion of existence)...”, there still seems to be some indication a theory incorporating this tenet relegates subjectivity itself to irrational grounds. I don’t think a worthy epistemological theory can afford to do that.

Within the context of continental Enlightenment epistemological philosophy, imagination is a faculty in use both a priori and a posteriori. In the latter, imagination synthesizes appearances to phenomena, and passes to understanding representations of real objects as a mental images, which become our experiences. In the former, imagination spontaneously creates its own intuitions, and synthesizes these to form a representation which it then passes to understanding, not as a mental image but as schema, to which belongs the content of our pure conceptions, re: geometric figures, numbers, colors.
(CPR, B178......loosely....it’s pretty forbidding down here in the weeds)

Given an experience of blue, it is not a problem to imagine a shade not belonging to experience, re: Hume’s missing shade in E.C.H.U., Sec 2. Schema exist only in thought, which makes explicit that if there is experience of a blue, which is technically an intuition of an object with the property of blue inhering in it, as understanding thinks as belonging to it, we can easily imagine a blue of more or less degree, even in that very same object.

Depending on which doctrine one accepts, color either belongs to an object which we then perceive, or color resides in us merely as a pure conception, like extension, size, causality, which we apply to objects as part of our cognitive process.

Anyway.....I know. It doesn’t help when the answer to a question just raises more of them.

Ahhh, yes.....the infamous and oft-misrepresented Copernican Revolution, I’m guessing. THAT kinda messed up for everybody.

Thanks.

objective and subjective do not form an antithetical pair. — StreetlightX

So subjective and objective are not a pair. — StreetlightX

And also because fuck Kant. — StreetlightX

Do you say the last because you think him guilty of the first two? None of his epistemological tenets are being used by name on this thread, so......just wondering.

We still got unpacked boxes from cross-country move three years ago.

Tip of the pointy hat, and.....thanks....and......see ya later.

Just want to note that there is most certainly a conception called "Pure Reason". Much if not most of Western Philosophy holds to it. — creativesoul

My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'. — creativesoul

I've shown how the framework you're using is inherently flawed. — creativesoul

It's getting way too ridiculous — creativesoul

In closing, I’ll give you two of four. Humans reason, and the fullest use of reason is logic. Th only way you can refute the notion of pure reason, the kind common to most of western philosophy, metaphysics and science itself, is to call it something else, and then stab at it recklessly until you’ve convinced someone you’ve accomplished something. I must say, I don’t know what a notion of pure reason would even be, that wasn’t itself pure reason.

Now I must grant that your thought/belief theory may be valid. Just because I don’t understand it speaks either to my lack of ability or your lack of sufficient explanation. No matter which, you haven’t shown me the flaws in my framework, and because you’re talking to me, as far as I’m concerned, you haven’t refuted anything having to do with some notion relevant to most western philosophy.

Have a nice day.

I do kind of like his formulation of truths as being the beliefs that the community of inquirers will come to hold at the very end of inquiry, — Janus

Yeah, we see this form of truth in jury-based judicial systems.
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he also held that absolute or objective truth is unknowable. — Janus

I’m not sure any respectable philosophy advocates knowledge of anything absolutely. The closest the Masters dare to say is that of which the contradiction is impossible is as near absolute as they care to venture, re: the thinking subject, logical laws of thought....stuff like that. I guess this could be called objective truth, if one grants everybody thinks, and has his own “I”. Certainly not an empirical objective truth, however.

Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is currently in the throes of seemingly irreducible indeterminism, which would be a negative absolute, insofar as there seems to be things we can never know, at least with respect to current understandings, re: Planck scale observations, the size and/or volume of the Universe. But Peirce, et.al., wasn’t aware of any of that empirical science, at least at first, so that probably doesn’t count.

Disclaimer: I’m not familiar enough with pragmatism to talk too much about it.

Be well. — creativesoul

You too.

Kant called hypothetical imperatives “counsels of prudence”, whereas the categorical, or moral, imperative is a “command of reason”, both grounded in maxims. Peirce knew both The Metaphysics of Morals, from which came the imperatives and maxims, and CPR, from which came the term “pragmatic anthropology”. There is no record of him saying as much, but apparently he took each of those ideas and constructed the beginnings of a new philosophy out of them, with the pragmatic maxim as a tenet.

“....Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object....”

Just a footnote...rhetorically speaking....thought you might be interested. If you didn’t already know. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, first put to print in 1878 is taken directly from the form developed as the hypothetical imperative by......you know who.

Nobody knows how what appears to be mind comes from what the brain does.
— Mww

Do you know what everyone knows? — creativesoul

I don’t have to know what everybody knows to know there is at least one thing nobody knows. As bad as when I said, “It doesn’t have to be any more complicated than that”, and I get back, “if it’s that simple....”.

(Sigh)
———————-

Are your thought/belief about Empiricus' the same as Empiricus'? — creativesoul

I don’t think about Empiricus. I think about what Empiricus thought, and as our thinking systems are identical, whatever he thought I could think just as well. In no other way can humans understand each other.
———————

Show me the black swan. — creativesoul

Assuming you’re not joking, it’s not my burden to show you a black swan, but it wouldn’t be difficult to show you that which falsifies the notion of universal moral belief. You would have to prove a universal moral belief is possible without considering a particular example of what one would be, in order to circumvent the induction principle.

I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be...
— Mww

Thought/belief about unacceptable/acceptable behavior that grounds all morality. — creativesoul

I reject the notion that behavior grounds morality. Behavior may be said to ground ethics, which in turn may be said to be representative of subjective moral dispositions. But even if this idea of ethics is itself rejected, it still leaves open the claim that morals are subjective determinations, from which certain actions are chosen and which may or may not obtain as a physical behavior.

If you mean thought/belief grounds morality, I would say you’re closer to the basic idea. I’m more inclined to say morality is something we have, not something we do. It seems much more parsimonious to grant humans certain inherent abilities, perhaps your thought/belief or something like it, sufficient to inform us of how we must behave, and still be in accordance with the kind of person we have already determined ourselves to be.

Nevertheless, if you’re saying thought/belief about acceptable behavior is a possible universal moral belief, that doesn’t say anything. If it be granted every rational human is a moral agent, and we grant practical reason as thought/belief, than universal moral belief is given. Better said as universal moral believing, maybe, because every moral agent thinks about his moral beliefs. But that says nothing about that which is contained in the beliefs, what would be an actual universal moral belief, which is what I asked you about.

We named it. — creativesoul

that which existed in it's entirety — creativesoul

WHAT did we name? WHAT existed?

You’re always saying we do this stuff, but never say what we’re doing it to. I suppose we name that which exists in its entirety as thought/belief, and the method for that naming is thinking about though/belief. That still leaves me wondering how the thinking in thinking about though/belief comes about, if we need it in order to explain what already exists. You’re using what you’re trying to explain the use of.

The intrinsic circularity of pure reason has been known for centuries. It is inescapable when reductionism is taken too far, which leads inevitably to illusions and manufactured contradictions. But it’s your theory; you’re more than welcome to expound it until the common understandings finally see the light.

Are you denying knowledge of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief? — creativesoul

Yes. Nobody knows how what appears to be mind comes from what the brain does.
—————————

Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief? — creativesoul

Yes. I’ve said before, to me they are the same thing. Or, I see no good reason to think they are not the same thing, and I get no help from you as means for granting the distinction.
—————————

It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case.
— Mww

What are you talking about? — creativesoul

He who says it first usually says it best:
“....When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite....”
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)

I’m both surprised and disappointed you failed to connect your point-of-view invariant universal moral belief to my counter-argument against it. You must have failed to connect because you asked what I was talking about, instead of showing what I was talking about is wrong, or at least does not apply.

You think? Oh. I’m happy for you.

Thanks.

Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant. — creativesoul

OK. Good place to start. To stipulate point of view invariant relegates experience to irrelevance because of the concept of invariant cancels it, but allows room for pure reason because of a point of view requires it. To stipulate the principle of universality implies that which every otherwise rational agency has naturally incorporated in his mental being. If we allow these the name of innate ideas or notions, we are naming something common to all humanity.

It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case. I can think there are some that should reside, that ought to reside, but I cannot have the knowledge that they do reside. If it is impossible to know a thing, and any supposition about it is the sole remainder, then it follows necessarily that any qualification as to its relative good is merely another supposition.

No supposition in and of itself can be proven to be the case. If all that exists with respect to point of view invariant universal moral beliefs is innate ideas, and the exposition of innate ideas are given from pure reason because experience is irrelevant here, and pure reason is itself a point of view with great variance amongst moral agencies, then we have contradicted the major premise.

There may be point of view invariant innate ideas of a universal moral beliefs, but we won’t ever indubitable conclude what they are. Even the relative worth of them is not point of view invariant, and I don’t see how we can say any of them should be without infringing on the the right of pure reason to testify for its respective owners.

I think it safe to say universally we are each moral agents, but the kind of moral agent we each are, is strictly a function of our own point of view. Still, we can without contradiction think a moral belief better or worse than some other moral belief, but only to ourselves, simply from the ones we each hold, but that serves no other universality than the “as if” of deontological doctrine.

Nevertheless, I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be, and how its relative benefit can be manifest.

even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use. — creativesoul

Yeah, that seems to be all the rage these days, from Pinker, Fodor, Crane, even Dennett, fercryinoutloud....with this LOT theory. Language is far and away one of the more spectacular aspects of the human condition, and is certainly indispensable for general communication. But I don’t communicate with myself, and even granting something like modern versions of cognitive architecture, the theories leave much to be desired, and when push comes to shove, I find them no more satisfactory than good ol’ Enlightenment epistemological speculation. No one knows for sure how this stuff happens, but it does happen, so we are free to speculate as much as we want, within the confines of logical possibility.

If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language;
Nine times out of ten, there just isn’t time for common language use;
As a young human with limited experience, being informed of “2” does use common language, but he hasn’t come to terms with anything. He will use “2” by rote in expressions or operations that include it, but without any concept of quantity;
Specific task-oriented cognition uses imaging, not common language;
If I do use common language when I think to myself, maybe it is only because such would be absolutely necessary iff I were to then tell you about it. Maybe it’s merely a sub-conscious anticipation that I use common language in thinking *BECAUSE* it may be henceforth so communicated. Maybe, because I need language for you to understand me, I need language to understand myself;
What is happening in a deaf person’s head, who has no access to common language *use*. He is still a rational human, so it is logical to suppose he thinks as a rational human, which implies common language use is not necessary for *his* coming to terms with anything;
Given the human brain has innate capability for logical inference....somehow.....naturally.....and is equally representational....ditto....it stands to reason that common language use is merely what we say we’re doing when the underlying mechanics is at work. We’re not conscious of our basic cognitive faculties, so we insert what we know into the logical form of our mechanisms. But that doesn’t explain the how of knowing, which leaves room for speculative epistemological theory.

So, yes, coming to terms involves common language use, but that coming to terms doesn’t describe what exists a priori that needs coming to terms with.

Well, you know what they say........mockery is the fool’s critique.

So let's make a start. — Isaac

Nahhhh, let’s not. I don’t know how to write in English.

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself? — creativesoul

No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)

Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play.

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best? — creativesoul

Which what? Law? Little bit experience, little bit heredity, little bit personality, whatever the moral agent thinks best for him. Subjective moral relativism; the moral consequences can be taught, the moral choices available to make can be taught. The actual choices made cannot be taught, for they are made in the moment.

Thinking is merely a representation of brain mechanics, in the form of a subject, that which is thinking. All thought is of something; all thought has an object of thought. When the subject thinks of itself, it is the one and only possible case where subject and object are logically the same thing.

No matter the method, no matter how you wish to expound it, there is only one subject that thinks, thus if the subject thinks about an object which is himself, he is still just thinking. Anything else borders precariously close to Cartesian theater.

counts as being moral by virtue of having it — creativesoul

Freedom. The idea of freedom as primitive causality.

Coming to terms with them involves common language use — creativesoul

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules.

“...But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any object of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical-to explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost....”

It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. — creativesoul

This is catastrophically wrong. To make a mistake purposefully is an instance of immorality, of disrespect for a moral law in the form of negligence of duty proper. Knowing the good thing to do and reasoning oneself to not doing it, is a purposeful mistake, readily apparent to any moral agent with what is conveniently and conventionally regarded as “a guilty conscience”, which is a knowledge and no ways a mere feeling.

In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.

In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.

Need be no more complicated than that.

Rationalization comes easy to some. — creativesoul

Yes, quite, and the ground of the intrinsic circularity of pure reason. And why the idea of law is incorporated into the moral condition, insofar as respect for law becomes the regulatory agency for such rationalization. Not to dispose of unwarranted rationalization, but to recognize it and attempt to circumvent it, by which a moral worthiness is established.

conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour. — creativesoul

Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know.

Why almost?
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That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" — creativesoul

As...the promising and the making of a promise? May I say I think I handled that well enough.

the ‘good’ of a promise is contingent upon integrity as always morally good, — Possibility

Good thought, and would be justified, if it could be shown that integrity is itself irreducible. It’s the difference between what a man has as opposed to what a man is, and whether what a man has is sufficient to fully describe his moral disposition.

Me....carrying on.

Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement; being good, or its complement, not good, is a moral judgement. The former is legislated by reason with empirical predicates, the concepts of which are from experience; the latter is legislated by reason with pure practical predicates, the concepts of which are from understanding, better known to Everydayman as conscience.

Being mistaken doesn’t fit into the deontological schema. It is common to think that which is predicated on law is thereby susceptible to having those laws “broken”, hence arises the idea of mistake. While that is all true, such is not the true implication of law in moral philosophy, it being more the natural inclination of rational agents to respect the intrinsic properties of any law. Because humans generally respect law, it follows that if moral laws were shown to be possible, it is reasonable to suppose humans would respect them as well. Hence the ground of deontological moral philosophy.

He still had to split-think.

Who’s the Philebus here, and who’s the Socrates?

I don’t hold with the concept of “moral in kind”. One is moral or he is not, and either only with respect to himself.

I said

Not all promise making is good. — creativesoul

is an instance of moral relativism. I should have said subjective moral relativism, because the good of a promise is always internal.

Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper.

I wasn’t asked that, so no, that wasn’t what I was saying.

An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure.

No. I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.

The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view.