I am focusing on our non-scientific a posteriori everyday experience of the "nature" of empirical objects. — charles ferraro

If this were the case, then..…

We simply have to posit the possible existence of empirical rules of sensory organization embedded in the sense data which spontaneously guide our brains' synthesizing activities. — charles ferraro

…..that would follow.

But it isn’t, so it doesn’t. Our experience is of representations of empirical objects, from which follows the rules cannot be embedded in the sense data, which are not representations, but only mere appearances.

Rules imply a logical form. If the faculty of sensibility from which sense data is obtained has no logical predication, then rules, principles or a priori legislation of any kind, cannot reside therein.
————-

Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? — charles ferraro

He goes to a relatively minor extent to expose the error in doing exactly that, the “clearly”, “convincingly” and “precisely” being judgements as subjective as the reader’s willingness to accede to the tenets of the work as a whole.

The nature of a given empirical object from which its matter alone is given a posteriori, is nothing more than an undeterminable change in our sensory condition, or, which is the same thing, the manner in which the senses are affected by the presentation of that object to them. That by which the matter is arranged, and by which the object is determinable, cannot be contained in the sensation, but must reside a priori in intuition. From which follows it isn’t the nature of the given empirical object, but the nature of the representation of that object, that is our experience. In short, it is we that say what that nature is, in accordance with the kind of intelligence incorporated in our nature.

Nevertheless, you’re kinda right, in that his implementation of imagination in both the faculties of sensibility and cognition, for which he admits (A76/B103) as having no clear, convincing, precise exposition, leaves one to either grant the necessity of it logically, or…..you know, like……question the very ground of the theory itself.

Same as it ever was…..

I understand you guys are talking about Plato, but I wanted to inject this in the interest of conformity with the textual record.

This is Kant's starting point (….) the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

Priority of what’s in the mind…..yes; that the priority of what’s in the mind is phenomena……no.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories.

Ideas, remaining with Kant, have priority in the mind regarding that which is not as yet, or may never be, phenomena.

Unless I misunderstood, in which case…..never mind.

…..really unique argument….. — charles ferraro

Yeah, considering the starting premises. Just as in any argument, change the initial premises, or the relation of words to conceptions, and any unique argument falls apart.

The problem for some of his successors was his affirmation of real things, but denial of matter, or as he calls it, “unthinking substance”, as the ground of real things. Note the concession to Descartes, re: thinking substance.

Anyway, ol’ George had some good stuff to say, setting the stage for later and rather more involved idealisms.

Berkeley's detailed analysis showed that SUBSTANCE and NOTHING have the same meaning. — charles ferraro

Wouldn’t that be a necessary precondition for the claim that all knowledge is of ideas imprinted on the senses? So saying, he has no need to prove substance as the substratum that supports time, but only the permanence of the real of ideas, in time.

From there he goes to minds as the perceivers of those ideas, and it’s off to the rodeo…..

….the origin of the categories would be transcendental….. — Janus

Remember Kant for the dualist he admitted to being. As such, empirically, we first sense then cognize then experience an object, but after that, rationally, we can still cognize that object without it having met with sensibility. We conventionally say we draw such objects from memory, whereas technically we cognize from the content of consciousness by means of “…the unity of apperception…” represented by “I think”. But never mind all that.

We sense objects from which experience follows, but we can also think an object, which alone affords no experience, yet later sense it and from that, experience follows. The question here is then….how is it that some object of sense, and the very same object of thought, contain enough of the same representations such that the judgement made on the one, which is always a posteriori, doesn’t conflict with the judgement made on the other, which is sometimes purely a priori, and from which the cognitions of identical representations is sustained, and the knowledge of that object stands in the one case or obtains on the other. In other words, what is it that conditions both the sensing of objects and the thinking of them, such that the contradiction of one by the other is either eliminated, or, demonstrated and then corrected, in accordance with rules. As it must be, otherwise the very notion of knowledge itself on the one hand, and possible knowledge on the other, becomes suspect, which, under certain circumstances, is altogether and utterly absurd. So it now becomes a matter of not so much what makes this or that possible, but rather, what is it that prohibits this and that from contradicting each other. The answer to that must be that there is that which conditions the human intellectual system in its entirety.

It isn’t really so much how do these contain the same conceptual representations, because they are put together…..synthesized…..under their respective happenstance by the same faculty, re: understanding. So what is it about understanding, by which representation of sensed objects in precise conformity to objects of mere thought, receives its consistency? Or, put another way….what are the rules? It is a fact objects can be conceived no one has ever experienced; they’re called inventions. But how does the one who didn’t invent understand the invented object as sufficiently proximate to the inventor himself? No other way than iff all humans have the same basic conceptual capacities, abide by the same cognitive rules. But having them isn’t enough; how did we get them, or even, what are they?

Well, we just don’t know, do we. We know the ends, insofar as there is cross-species agreement on some considerations, but haven’t a clue to the means in the same empirical manifestation as the end agreement. That which we don’t empirically know, which underlies what we do, which can only happen iff there is that which underpins the entire system, has been called transcendental. The transcendental has that which follows from it, re: all a priori representations and their respective offspring, and by which general speculation is logically validated, but it is fruitless to seek what comes before, insofar as continuous regressive speculation has no validation at all. With respect to the average smuck on the street….folks like me…..there is nothing gained with respect to knowledge of things, by asking about what comes before the transcendental ideality of space. And there is nothing gained from the necessary truth of the principle of cause/effect by asking about the time before relations.
—————

I don't see that it follows that the origin is transcendental in the sense of its coming from a transcendent "realm". — Janus

As you can see, it doesn’t follow. The origin of the transcendental is buried somewhere in a particular kind of intellect. The transcendent “realm” just represents what lies outside that intellect. So, e.g., transcendent principles, just means those that only work on things of transcendent origin, which we wouldn’t know anything about, so are useless to us.

Perhaps you see the evolution from Renaissance philosophy, in which the principles corresponding to our thought do originate in the transcendent realm of deities and such, graduating to the Enlightenment precept of limiting fundamental understanding to the subject himself rather than being force-fed by gods or the community, but still leaves the origin of the grounding conditions quite unknown, even if the place of them is credited as entirely internal to the subject. So the transcendent, which isn’t the origin, became the transcendental, which is. If the gods get dumped, gotta fill the void with something, right? And no one could use the term transcendent for that which resides internally in the subject, for then he would be considerable as are gods, which just might have been frown upon by organized religion, and all this philosophical evolution was happening during still-religious times, Galileo’s predicament still fresh in the minds of academia.

It might just be that Kant coined the term transcendental in order to grant the Church its notion of transcendent supremacy and thereby its raison d’etre in the exposition for it, but at the same time, he absolutely required the very same notion, a sort of unconditioned be-all-end-all explanatory device, albeit on a rather lesser scale, with respect to the critique of reason. He stipulates we can think anything we wish, which is decidedly god-like, so we need the conditions which permit it, but at the same time, we are not gods therefore cannot think whatever we wish and then expect to get what we want out of it. To think whatever we wish allows access to the transcendent realm; the limitations of transcendental reason remove the expectations, which makes such transcendent thought a waste of time, and THAT, is the critique in a nutshell.

Everybody wins: the Church gets to retain its version of absolute supremacy, Everydayman gets to see how he can let it go.

Anyway…..food for metaphysical indigestion.

Can we think of any other sets or extra members of the four sets, or can we argue that some do not belong? — Janus

Sure it can be done, but then it isn’t the same philosophy. According to Kant, his is the definitive list, even moreso than Aristotle’s, but there are a veritable plethora of conceptions subsumed under them, which he calls schema, the majors for each category detailed in the text. I think the minors continue being filled in, as science goes on, which he says we are welcome to do on our own. For instance, under quantity is numbers, under numbers is fractions, etc., but nowadays, under numbers is also Hawking’s imaginary time, probability distributions….ooooo, and my all-time favorite…..Schrodinger’s negative entropy. And with all that, makes one wonder why folks still quibble over whether 1 + 1 = 2. (Gasp)

Biggest issue I suppose, is the fact he doesn’t show how the pure conceptions come about, other than to posit that they reside transcendentally….make of that as you will….. in understanding, to serve as rules for the reduction of the diversity of representations in intuition to that which ties them all together under a conception.
————-

But are we not natural beings, with a natural capacity to reflect on experience and arrive at generalized ideas about the nature of that experience and the judgements we make about it? — Janus

Absolutely we are. And there are as many ways to reflect and generalize as there are theories as to how we do it. While the categories are necessary for one theory, they may not be for another. Whether fact or fiction, Kant’s theory is nothing if not the most drudgingly complete of all. I mean….wannabe theories abound, but none have 800 pages of technical support. Hell, he even wrote a CPR for Dummies!!! Gave it a title no dummy would understand, and upon seeing it wouldn’t read the essay anyway, but still…..

If you reduce a sensory input to a decontextualized quale, that perhaps might be a "bare perception". — Pantagruel

I think a decontexualized quale as an intuition. I could get away with calling that a bare perception, as long as I didn’t cross-examine myself too much.

Your visual perceptual system essentially performs inferences….. — Pantagruel

An inference is a logical construct, and I deny to my eyes, ears, nose, skin or tongue the capacity of syllogistic propositions.

I fear there will be a pervasive conceptual inconsistency if we continue here. We’ll be the Hatfield and McCoys of philosophical discourse, so to speak. So, carry on, and have fun with it.

…..the judgement infiltrates perception…. — Pantagruel

If perception is the affect of a real physical object on the sensory apparatus, and judgement infiltrates perception, then does it follow that judgement changes how we are affected by objects? If such is the case, then, e.g., the sound made by an object would be changed by a judgement. It doesn’t make sense that the sound an apple makes hitting the floor because it fell out of your hand, will be different than the sound an apple makes hitting the floor because a judgement is that it tastes bad.

Perception is entirely independent of understanding, even though, as you say, they are necessarily related by their job descriptions.

I think we are only able to perceive chaos against a background of order. — Pantagruel

I think we are only able to perceive objects. Order/chaos is a relative quality thought to belong to an object, but not as a property for the determination of what it is. To merely perceive an object affords no judgement as to its qualitative state.

We understand chaos against the background of its complement, but that is a logical conclusion given a certain set of conditions as premises. And while I agree there is an inherent relationship, it remains that perception doesn’t do logic any more than understanding does perception.

Just like anything, it all depends on one’s interpretation of the words being used.

Perception arises out of order, order (qua change) requires causality. — Pantagruel

I think perception arises merely from the presence of something to the sensory apparatus. It’s like it just waits around, not doing much of anything until something comes along that presents itself. Perception doesn’t care about order.

Or…..benefit of the doubt….why would perception care about order? How would it know of it? Is ordered perception different than chaotic perception?

But I don’t want to go off on a tangent here. We’re talking about awareness of time.

Not in the sense of fundamental awareness, I should think. Change presupposes causality, but causality doesn’t rise to immediate awareness, as does, say, motion.

You see that, then you might ask what caused that. If you ask what does this cause, then you don’t have fundamental awareness.

I would submit the irreducible awareness, that by which every single human ever, is affected, is change.

No big deal; just throwing it out there.

Perhaps the concept of time only makes sense in the context of awareness. — Pantagruel

I’d agree with that. But then, in order to justify the concept itself, one has to ask…..what is the irreducible awareness which limits the context, such that without it, the concept wouldn’t even occur.

Cool. Bear in mind the examples were superficial. Taking it down closer to the bone, you know just as well you don’t like Brussels sprouts as you know two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Two different kinds of knowing, two different ways of knowing.

we have constructed little conceptual 'prisons' for ourselves — Tom Storm

I’d call it limitations. One hardly subjects himself to inescapable imprisonment, but one can willingly acknowledge his limitations.

In one respect I’d agree, though. Not to do with conceptual explanation, but with logical necessity are we imprisoned, insofar as we in ourselves cannot escape its legislative authority.
————

You and I are both human beings, with the same intellectual abilities in general, given the same natural operation of a brain we each possess as a physical organ. Yet you detest, e.g., Brussels sprouts but I find them delicious. You think you heard a firecracker but I know that sound as from a .38 stub-nose, probably pre-1954. That sensation is explicitly identical for both of us, yet we treat it differently. Natural law, by which both our brains work, should not allow such dissimilar treatments.

Cognitive neuroscience of course, has much to say about this, relying on massive brain complexity which it can demonstrate as sufficient reason for means, but cannot prove as necessarily the case as ends. Which, ironically enough, is precisely the limitations imposed on metaphysical speculation.

Would you agree that thinking space and time as the "pure forms of intuition" and discovering the categories of judgement do both entail reflection on experience? — Janus

Sure. Thinking about the doing, and setting the doing to theory, is one thing.The actual doing, in and of itself, as an intrinsic modus operandi, is quite another.

Nature is the boss, no doubt, and our experience is governed by it, which has never been contested. We still wish to understand what it is to experience, what may be the conditions by which it is possible for us, which puts us in somewhat of a jam, insofar as we ourselves determine those conditions, but whatever we come up with cannot be in contradiction with Nature.

Are there pure intuitions? Probably not, but experience informs us that objects have a relation to each other and to us. Are there pure conceptions of the understanding? Probably not, but experience informs us of quantities, of causes, of intensities, and so on. Or, does understanding inform experience of the specifics of all those because our intelligence is naturally disposed to recognize the universal form of each of them? It can only be one or the other and however we seek to explain all that makes no difference, as long as Nature remains uncontested.

“…..The understanding gives to experience, according to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible….”

There probably aren’t any of the metaphysical conceptions. No such thing as reason, judgement, knowledge and whatnot. They’re inventions, meant to explain in the absence of truth, but never intended to prove in the absence of fact. I’m sure you must see the problem, that historically takes so much care in exposing, in that it is we that propose to Nature the rules by which it operates, but in doing so, we should have prohibited ourselves from the capacity for proposing, re: the absolute determinism of natural law with respect to the brain, should not allow the indeterminate possibility of subjective inference.

We’re left with doing the best we can, in not making more of a shitstorm of things than we already have.

an example of pure a priori knowledge and explain how it could be gained in the absence of any prior experience? — Janus

Mathematics. And because not only are its conceptions created by us, but so too are the objects subsumed under the conceptions. Not the rote instruction in mathematics you got since you learned to keep the pointy end of the pencil down, but rather, the principles legislating mathematical operations, which to know you must think.

I may have interpreted Kant in ways which make sense to me….. — Janus

What else could you do? Same as everyone, right?

Yes, I know. But ’s argument is just as valid in its own right. The major difference being, the one, yours, relates to and supports transcendental philosophy, the other, not so much.

You’re both right. There is a priori knowledge derived from extant experience, but in Kant, the stipulation is made that when he talks of a priori knowledge, he means absent any and all experience. The first is “impure”, the second, “pure”, and the second is the meaning throughout. This stipulation is on the first pages of the entire treatise, indicating its importance.

“….. Knowledge à priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge à priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is, through experience....”

The synthetic/analytic dichotomy, however, relates to judgement alone, insofar as these distinguish only the relative content of conceptions in a proposition to each other, which is a function of understanding. We can say we have knowledge based on synthetic a priori cognitions, but that is not to say we have synthetic a priori knowledge. Case in point, that every change universally and necessarily presupposes a cause, is a synthetic proposition understood purely a priori, but change is itself an empirical conception entirely dependent on intuitions, which makes explicit any knowledge derived from it, is empirical.

And if that doesn’t work for you, check out his simple arithmetic brainstorm.

Hope that helps, at least a little….

Things in space and time, however, are only given insofar as they are perceptions — RussellA

Good onya for the reference. Exactly the one I would have used.

Not so good in calling out red and left as things given to us in perception. What sensation do you get from left? What does up feel like? Why does a thing look red to you but the very same thing look some crappy shade of pink to me?

perception allows for an awareness of what specifically distinguishes an object from others. — RussellA

Perception allows for awareness, is just another way of saying perception is that by which awareness is possible, but says nothing whatsoever of what that awareness entails. We would never be physically aware of things if we didn’t have a sensation of them through perception.

You’ve admitted the sensation of an itch doesn’t give you the cause of it. An itch is the perception which serves as awareness of an object. But you can’t distinguish from the sensation what the object is, only that there is one.

And finally, the one thing that specifically distinguishes one thing from another, is the one thing that doesn’t belong to either, and is not perceived in our awareness of the sensation the thing gives us.
————

Anything with the slightest hint of anthropology or psychology isn’t proper metaphysics.

So in answer to my question, regarding Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition. The source can only be the momentary physical state of the brain…. — RussellA

Oh. Well alrighty then. Which state would that be, that relates to the representation of space, and to no other representation in the least? From which neural pathway would that originate? There are 3.6b neural connectors per mm3 in the human brain, any one considerable as being itself a state of the brain.

So what we have heah….in best Strother Martin imitation….is a tautological truth: everything a human does mentally reduces to a brain state, which, of course, tells us not a damn thing regarding what we really want to know.

And brain states aren’t Innatism; they’re cognitive neuroscience. Or quantum biology maybe. Sure as hell ain’t proper metaphysics.
—————

For Kant, our non-empirical intuition of time and space doesn't come from observation, doesn't come from any perception of the world, but comes from pure cognition in our minds. — RussellA

Yes, as I said. Pure cognition in our minds, is understanding.

It comes down to the meaning of perception. — RussellA

As it should. Since it is Kant’s notion of space and time being discussed, we would use Kant’s notion of perception. Which is……?

It is true that I may perceive an itch on my hand, but the itch does not represent what caused it. — RussellA

Just as the itch requires more than its sensation for the determination of its cause, so too must an object’s relation to you, that it is left or right, that it is above or below, that it is this or that, require more than its mere perception.
————

From the Wikipedia article on Innatism, — RussellA

C’mon, man. If Innatism, indicating a dedicated doctrine in itself….it is an -ism, is it not???…. was so much a part of historic philosophy, why is not the term nor the doctrine as such, found in it? That there are innate ideas or notions or subjective conditions in the human intellect goes as far back as rational discourse, but as a topic in its own right, it is modern psychology. Those that followed, deemed historic philosophers to be intimating Innatism, even if they themselves never described it as an -ism.

“…. It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of preformation system of pure reason—a middle way between the two—to wit, that the categories are neither innate and first à priori principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence….”

I, speaking only for myself, would never be so presumptuous as to suppose…..well, this is what he said, but this is what he really meant.
—————

As regards Kant's non-empirical intuition, if such intuition is non-empirical, then where is the source of such intuition if not innate ? — RussellA

Understanding. Plain and simple. It’s all in the text. Not in wiki. Space and time are irrefutably merely representations, all representations are products of either sensibility as phenomena, or thought as conceptions. Both sensibility and cognition insofar as they are active processes of the human intellect, are not themselves innate, thus it follows that neither are their respective products. That humans can sense and can think may indeed be innate, but the process by which these are done, which implies a system, is not that by which they are possible, which is given from a certain kind of existence alone.

Following the yellow brick road gets you to the conclusion there is no such thing as a non-empirical intuition; such is pure a priori, which only denotes the mode of the cognition for its place in the system, and not its function.
———-

Your claims are not groundless, I must admit…..

“…. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name of space….”

….in which it does seem as if the subjective condition is itself innate. But don’t confuse a subjective condition from which departure is possible hence is contingent, re: the means by which we are affected by objects given a different theoretical system, for a necessary one from which no departure is possible, re: the logical predicates of one particular system. Which just says….if this then that necessarily, but your this may be different than mine.

……both Hume and Kant have an acceptance of what would be called today, Innatism. — RussellA

What would be called today, perhaps, insofar as Innatism, being a rather more psychological formalism, had no standing in Enlightenment metaphysics. Nevertheless….

“….. Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined à priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in general…”

…...gives the impression of a form of standing henceforth classified as Innatism. On the other hand, one must be cautioned against obtaining Innatism as a formal capacity of the subject in general, from the formal capacity of the subject’s being affected by objects. I think Kant would attribute pure reason and pure practical morality as innate formal capacities in subjects as such, leaving the formal capacity of being affected by objects, to sensibility.

Kant's transcendental time flows uniformly everywhere for every person. — charles ferraro

“…. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)….”
(A143/B183)

The determinations of the changeable is the same everywhere for every person. Time is not that.

All Einstein did was show the determinations of the changeable is the same for everyone iff they are each in the same everywhere as the change being determined.

I am crossing a busy road and see a truck moving straight towards me. I perceive the truck and I perceive the truck moving through space and time. — RussellA

I clearly perceive objects, space and time in my mind. — RussellA

Yes, sure seems that way, donnit? Conventionally speaking, its what Everydayman accepts as the facts. If you’re ok with it….so be it.

Me, I reject that my mind perceives, preferring to leave such occupation to my senses, as Nature intended.

The space and time we perceive we must also experience — RussellA

Correct, insofar as experience requires perception, and space/time is not an experience, just means neither is space nor time a perception.

The space and time that exists independently of us we can neither perceive nor experience. — RussellA

That which exists independently of us is that which can be an affect on our senses and is thereby a possible representation in us as phenomenon. Space or time, because they are not perceptions, are not affects on our senses, therefore are not possible as a phenomenon, therefore are not that which is known as an existence independent of us.

It seems that Kant is arguing that the space and time we perceive is not the space and time that exists independently of us. — RussellA

Kant says we don’t perceive space or time, space and time do not exist independently of us insofar as they do not exist at all, so your interpretation is not what he’s arguing. To argue an objective validity is not to promote an existence.

Where the difficulty in understanding occurs generally, is the mediate conclusion derived in the transcendental thesis, that an objective validity without an empirical reality accompanying it, is the same as being an ideal. Further exacerbated by the method by which the former is necessary yet the latter is not even remotely possible, with respect to knowledge a posteriori, which seems contradictory. Which reduces to understanding exactly how, in Kant, the origin of space and time as ideal conceptions is accomplished, irrespective of their employment regarding the possibility of experience itself, and thereby granted as metaphysically legitimate conditions.

Kantian space and time are not experiences.

Understood.

I’m listening.

the importance of an "ontological commitment" validating that a belief is genuinely held. — Pantagruel

Sure. To hold a belief presupposes the something to which it relates. There must be something that serves as the object of the belief, hence the necessary ontological commitment. Nevertheless, to hold a belief says nothing about the means of its origin.

I agree belief is constitutive of consciousness. But then, in humans, everything rational is constitutive of consciousness, so in that respect, there is nothing particularly significant in merely holding some belief or another.

Nahhh…I’m not getting into the belief/knowledge mudhole. I favor what you said about intuition, that’s the important part.

….knowledge (…) contains the framework of its own validation. Intuition doesn’t. — Pantagruel

I’ll disagree with that. Insofar as intuition is a faculty, it must contain its own framework from which it obtains its validity. Knowledge, by the same token, is not a faculty, hence does not contain a framework at all. Knowledge is an end; the means are elsewhere.

We’re saying the same thing for all practical purposes, in language two centuries apart.

Except for the trust part; that I can’t reconcile with disparities in language. My problem, not yours.

So intuition is what bridges the gap between the cognitions made possible within discursive thought, and the reality that is being cognized. — Pantagruel

YEA!!! Best rendition of the nature of intuition yet, I think.

In essence, it is about making estimates that are based on information that is extracted from an idealized model of your perceptions. — Pantagruel

BOO!!! Extracted from a model? To build a model requires information, so, what….information is put in to build it, then extracted from it? Why not extract information from perception and build an idealized model from that?

Actually, this is probably what you meant to say. There is an idealized model of the information received from perception, it even has its own name; intuition constructs the model but does not use it, hence, the notion of being a bridge.

…..allowing yourself to trust that faculty…. — Pantagruel

Might I suggest the trust is misplaced?

Ok. Thanks.

It is a fine ideal, that requires one to be honest with oneself about ones' motivations, but modern reporting is inclined to be motivated most of all by fear of appearing biased — unenlightened

Agreed. Fear of appearing biased is almost worse that actually being so. Peer pressure, job security and the like overriding intrinsic personality.

Or that there is some irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated? — hypericin

Under the assumption of any form of report by an individual subject, cognitive prejudice is an irreducible level of bias which cannot be eliminated. But its conflicts can be recognized and subsequently guarded against.

As I listen to music I "know" implicitly the many contexts that are there — Astrophel

I think I know what it is to know. — Astrophel

Why is it, and what does it mean, that know is given two significations here? What do the scare quotes in the one but missing from the other, indicate?

The cow has been grazing for years, say, and it looks up a sees what memory informs her to be 'good eating over there" but not conceptualized, obviously. She moves over there. To me, this bears the mark of reason's conditional proposition. — Astrophel

For me, it is self-contradictory. Reason’s conditional proposition just is conceptualized. If there is no conceptualization, there is no mark of reason, in humans. To speak of any other cognizance or possible cognizance, is anthropomorphic and thereby “….exhibition of pitiful sophisms quite beneath the dignity of philosophy…”
————

In the world, what authorizes logic, so to speak, is some kind of a posteriori presence…. — Astrophel

In the world, what validates logic is some kind of a posteriori presence.

metaphysics needs to be conceived as an essential part of our existence — Astrophel

Metaphysics needs to be understood as an essential part of our kind of intelligence. Existence is necessarily presupposed, but metaphysics has no part in it.

….this presence itself stands beyond classification. I hold that presence is metaphysics… — Astrophel

Self-contradictory. Presence beyond classification is contradicted by being classified as metaphysics.

It is wrong to think of rationality in terms of the abstract "authoritative" logic it produces — Astrophel

Backwards: logic produces rationality, under the auspices of a particular speculative metaphysical theory, insofar as the human cognitive system is itself a self-sustaining tripartite logical system, manifesting as rational or irrational thought, pursuant to the proper or improper use of its authoritative grounding principles.

If it is the case rationality produces abstract authoritative logic, and it is wrong to think in terms of it, what is there left to think of rationality in terms of?

Logic is actually "of a piece" with affectivity, and the open ended nature of this is not the impossibility and foolishness of reason grasping beyond its means, but a desire that seeks consummation. — Astrophel

I personally have no use for the conception of “affectivity” with respect to a priori methodological predicates, and even less use for the notion that the open-endedness of logic, is a desire. The subject is that which desires. If logic desires, can it also want? Can it need? Can logic possess an interest? Logic is merely a cognitive method in itself, and to associate an aesthetic condition to it merely weakens its place as ground of the system to which it belongs.
————

The idea here was that when reason is set upon something to "understand" it, it tends to produce something of its own abstract utility, a conclusion qua conclusion, which is simply a logical function. — Astrophel

Reason is not set upon something to understand, even if it does produce a conclusion qua conclusion, which is certainly a logical function. Hence the notion that the human cognitive system, in and of itself, is inherently logical.

The conclusion qua conclusion reason sets itself upon, resides in the relation of the abstract utility of understanding in its synthesis of conceptions, to the series of such synthetic conjunctions in judgement, such that the one does not conflict with the other, or, to show that they do. In this way alone, is it therefore possible to learn about a thing only once a posteriori rather than upon each occassion of is perception, or to think by means of the construction of conceptions not influenced by phenomena, re: mathematical objects and fundamental grounding principles.
————-

Do I have that right? — Janus

As far as what you said, yes. Or close enough. But what you said doesn’t properly address the unity of apperception, which was itself misrepresented in what you were responding to. The transcendental unity of apperception is a principle and nothing more, by means of which human understanding as an independent faculty, is even theoretically possible.

“….. The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception…..”

In addition, that the understanding has the capacity to think objects on its own accord yet without being conditioned by the categories, which are noumena, understanding does not think the synthetical unity of apperception as an object so unconditioned, hence there is nothing whatsoever noumenal about it.

As an aside, transcendental the conception, reduces ultimately to the possibility of a priori cognitions. That which is transcendental, then, is that from which anything purely a priori follows, or is derivable. Transcendental this or transcendental that merely indicates a logical function of understanding in conceptions, and reason in subsuming conceptions under principles.

The why of this, is found in the necessity for accounting for how it is possible to come up with stuff never to be found in Nature originated by Nature. It is an irrefutable observation this is done by humans generally, and always has been, but no account for it had even been given from the perspective of the very same intelligence that is actually doing it. Attributing to the supersensible (pre-Enlightenment theologians) or denying completely (Renaissance/Enlightenment empiricists) the validity of pure a priori cognitions the ground and origin of which resides in the cognitive power of the thinking subject himself, met its demise in 1781. At long last. But not that we’re any the better off for it.

I agree, it is inherently and irreducibly a personal condition. — Judaka

YEA!! That means I interpreted the title correctly. Or at least, sympathetically. Morality is personal.

Objective moralists will indeed disagree with me, as you say. But an objective moralist is an ill-disguised behaviorist, which means he begins by barking up the wrong tree.

Anyway, problem solved, and…..thanks.