You can’t even understand that dietary laws and circumcision are both mere religious observances and not the internal “sins” Jesus preached against. — Joe Mello

They are part of the Law. Plain and simple. There is no distinction between "mere religious observance" and other parts of the Law. What textual evidence do you have that Jesus makes such a distinction? When he says:

Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them.

(Matthew 5:17)

he does not mean fulfill the Law by abolishing it.

The internalization of the Law for Jesus, in distinction from Paul, was not an alternative to or nullification of observance of the written Law, it was a necessary part of its fulfillment.

And every Internet troll plagiarizing what he has read and who is not really educated or experienced in the subject matter cannot appreciate someone who is. — Joe Mello

Nonsense. I pointed to the text of Matthew, which you have refused to address. I have also been at this a long time. Long before the internet. I have been at this long enough to know that anyone who is "really educated" does not rely on sweeping condemnation of biblical scholarship, philosophy, and science based on nothing more than the fact that he possesses the truth.

I wasn’t giving you my opinion or making assumptions. — Joe Mello

That is exactly what you are doing, but you are blinded by your unwarranted belief in the correctness of your opinions that you mistake them for the truth.

I haven’t looked up the texts ... — Joe Mello

That much is evident. If you did you would see that Paul is talking about more than circumcision. Dietary laws were a point of contention between Paul and Peter. This can be found in the texts you delude yourself in thinking you don't have to look at because you assume you know exactly what is there.

I’m a former seminarian and Franciscan Friar. — Joe Mello

By no means does this confer expertise on you. In fact, it is in your case a detriment. Without challenges from contrary scholarly opinion you only hear what what confirms what you already believe. Reading the same texts over and over again is a pointless exercise as long as you are convinced you will find only what already supports your beliefs and nothing else.

As long as there has been Christianity there has been contrary opinions. The Franciscans are no exception.

Every book written about Jesus in today’s world is horrible hermeneutics — Joe Mello

Of course everyone who disagrees with you is wrong. If they weren't they would not disagree with you. Either you were not paying attention or your degree in philosophy was nothing more than indoctrination. A trained philosopher may be convinced she is right, but does not dismiss other claims out of hand. Conspicuously absent from your posts is reasoned argument.

Whichever side he chose he did seem convinced at the time that he was on the side of truth and that it was his unquestionable mission to promote it.

But I don't think he thought of himself as deliberately creating something, but rather, as with the prophets, testifying to what he believed was revealed to him. Which is not to deny he created something, but only that is not how he saw it.

My own view is far more impious. I don't think his conversion was either a natural result of his own search for meaning or supernatural intervention. It was neither a rational and deliberate synthesis nor a miracle of divine origin. His rhetorical powers of argument clearly show, however, that he was not devoid of reason.

It MUST be traced back to Jesus himself. — schopenhauer1

But:

It is wise to also understand that the Gospels were written AFTER Paul's influence was already taking hold. — schopenhauer1

Paul stands between us and whatever Jesus might have said. But not only Paul. We should be cautious in assuming that what human beings hear and understand and repeat is what was said and meant.

If Paul is JUST giving HIS interpretation, then things start collapsing. — schopenhauer1

It may be that if Paul had not given his interpretation Christianity might never have survived. It is Paul's promise of grace and easy salvation for all that many latched onto.

Disputes about the Law, which Saul zealously pursued in both speech and action, were all but rendered moot by Paul. The end was at hand and those who believed in Christ would be saved.

Paul did not contradict Jesus’ teaching, and it’s poor hermeneutics to suggest he did. — Joe Mello

It is one thing to give your opinion, quite another to declare other readings that attend more closely to the text and do not bring assumptions to the text in order to fit a particular outcome"poor hermeneutics".

If, as you claim, Jesus was internalizing the Law, then that internalization would include this:

For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished.

(Matthew 5:18)

The internalized Law cannot be other than an internalization of the smallest letter and least stroke of the Law. The internalization of the Law cannot be an internalization of only a part of the Law you separate out as "religious observance". Purity laws were not a matter of religious observance.

The problem of interpreting the Law was a divisive topic at that time. Jesus and Paul were born into and participated in these disputes.

Paul himself attests to his disagreement with Peter. Peter, who actually knew Jesus and could talk to him and ask him questions. To suggest that Peter's objection to Paul was a matter of "poor hermeneutics" is the height of arrogance.

His thinking is developing as he writes. — Sam26

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs.
In PI he says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."

(217)

This was in regard to following rules.

What this means is simply that we can dig no further to uncover some underlying principle or foundation or stable unshakable ground

The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.

(OC 166)

Hinges are not timeless or immutable. It is not that they stand free of doubt, but that we need to look at all that hangs on and revolves around them. We cannot call one into doubt without calling a great deal more into doubt. Hinges have their place within a system.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept.

@Joe Mello

How do you reconcile Jesus' strict adherence to the letter of the Law with Paul's telling the Gentiles that this was not necessary? When in Matthew Jesus is reported to have said:

Therefore anyone who sets aside one of the least of these commands and teaches others accordingly will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.

(Matthew 5:19)

He was not making any such distinction.

Once again, which is it? Why are you so afraid of stating where you stand? And why are you so intent on burying this and other threads? Are you that intolerant of views that do not match your own views which you keep hidden?

The "facts" according to the text, Einstein! — Apollodorus

The point raised by @Olivier5 was not about the religious claims found in the NT, but rather, the fact that Jesus the man was of his time and place.

Now either it is a fact that Jesus was a man or he was not. You cite the NT in support of the claim that he was not man but God, that the NT states the facts in unambiguous terms. Either the facts according to the NT are the facts or not.

Which is it?

Like your hero Euthyphro you hurry off claiming to have other things to do. At least he had the courage to state and stand by his convictions.

. It was YOU who affirmed (1): — Apollodorus

That is the conclusion that follows from your appeal to the NT and the Son of God, not my opinion!

I never affirmed absolutely nothing ... I was arguing (2) ... — Apollodorus

and yet you claimed:

... the text is very clear and states the facts in unambiguous terms — Apollodorus

You claim that what you quote are the facts and use this to argue against the claim that Jesus the man of his time and place, an individual.

Are you now reluctant to affirm what you claim are facts?

I was arguing (2) i.e., influence, solely on ... — Apollodorus

So, you do not affirm (1) or (2). That leaves (3):

(3). Jesus never existed, in which case the question of his connection with Platonism does not arise, and all discussion of the subject is rendered superfluous. — Apollodorus

Creatures of the shadows abhor the light.

In any case, it’s good to see that Foolo has opted for possibility (1) — Apollodorus

I can't tell if you are being serious or attempting to be clever.

If you affirm (1) then why all the effort to argue influence? If you affirm (2) then why the smokescreen of (1)?

To my knowledge, most scholars who have studied the subject matter agree that there are three basic theoretical possibilities: — Apollodorus

This just shows how woefully limited your knowledge is. Are you unaware of the differences in the versions of Christianity between the Johannine literature and Paul's writings? Or the differences between Paul and Jesus' disciples?

The conclusions of the council at Nicaea were made by men who were by no means unanimous in their decisions. If the NT is authoritative, then Arius' arguments should have prevailed. Even if one accepts that Jesus was in some sense divine, (this is not a unitary term), that a group of self-appointed human beings gets to decide what this means, whether Jesus was god or man, man who became god, one and the same being as God or not, is, to say the least, problematic.

Jesus had the external appearance of a human, but in reality he was the Son of God manifested by the power of the Holy Spirit. — Apollodorus

So Jesus was NOT influenced by Hellenistic thought, the Son of God don't need no human influence!

You have confirmed the following:

There are some here, perhaps most, who prefer historiography to a mythologized history designed to support certain assumptions that have more to do with Christian dogma and Neo-Platonism than historical evidence. As with the Christian apologists, history is distorted or ignored and rational argument buried under misdirection and misrepresentation in favor of some version of transcendental truths they imagine they know something about. — Fooloso4

I think we lost the ball — Alkis Piskas

You have to keep your eye on the ball. I was trying to put the problem of interpreting Wittgenstein in the larger context of the problem of interpretation of philosophy. If we are to understand a philosopher we cannot simply look at standard dictionary definitions. We have to look at how they use terms.

You said:

The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

This is not what Wittgenstein means by 'fact'. Once you see how he uses the term it is no longer ambiguous. But Wittgenstein's use, although it does not fit the dictionary definition you provide, is not [edit; unusual]. What is known or proved to be true is what is the case. How could it not be?

So it's an attempt to arianize Jesus. To un-Jew him. — Olivier5

It is telling that he attempts to make a connection, what he calls "an unquestionable connection", between Platonism and Christianity via divine knowledge, then denies he has any interest in wanting to demonstrate that connection, but refuses to address a central feature of Judaism, revelation. As if Jesus was a Platonist rather than a Jew.

the God of the Hebrew Bible is "not good" or "not God"??? — Apollodorus

I form the light, and create darkness:
I make peace, and create evil:
I the Lord do all these things.

(Isaiah 45:7)

Evil is a translation of the Hebrew 'rah' - bad, adversity.

Plato in the Republic explicitly denies that the Good is the source of evil.

That's supposed to be my fault???

I didn't write the Hebrew Bible, did I??? — Apollodorus

Another brilliant argument. Right up there with your earlier response to me:

But even though Apollodorus will never acknowledge the weakness and vacuity of his arguments, others can and do see them for they are. — Fooloso4

I do realize that Ehrman and his followers will never acknowledge the weakness and vacuity of their arguments, but the rest of us can and do see them for what they are. — Apollodorus

Your argumentative prowess are wanting when they mimic the old schoolyard response: I know you are but what am I.

You still have not responded to my questions. An all too common practice of yours.

Right, and you fail to make the distinction between Plato and Platonism. Where did Plato say the Good is God?

But rather than rehash that, what about the rest of what I said? Is your silence an indication that it is accurate?

Some time back you made the extremely tenuous and convoluted argument that Jesus was not a rabbi because he is the Son of God.

Is this god who begat a son the god of Plato? If the good is god then this god is not the god of the Hebrew Bible.

Actually, it is your questionable and overly simplistic interpretation of Plato. Anyone interested can search other threads here. I have no interest in rehashing it.

Even if one were to grant that Plato said this and he meant what you think he did, what are we to make of your silence on the other points I raised?

What would change, or what's the implication if Jesus had read Plato? — Olivier5

See his earlier post:

What is unquestionable is that the concept of divine knowledge as an enlightening force is central to Christianity as it is in Platonism where the Good, the Source of Knowledge and Truth, is compared to the Sun who illumines the world (cf. "I am the Light of the world", etc.) — Apollodorus

What he leaves out here is what he says elsewhere, that the Good is God. As he sees it, the revelation of divine knowledge goes through Plato to Plotinus to Jesus. Conspicuously absent is the revelations of the Jewish prophets.

But it is far from usual — Alkis Piskas

How so? You say:

Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

How could that be if a fact is not what is the case? For something to be the case we do not have to know that it is the case. We cannot, or more to the point, should not make factual claims about things we do not know, but the facts are what is the case whether we know them or not. We attempt to determine the facts of the matter.

one should not have to study the work of a philosopher to understand what he means by a term! I can't make my point more clear than that. — Alkis Piskas

You made your point clearly, but if we are to understand a philosopher we must not make demands on them but rather understand what demands they makes on us. I think it important to write simply and clearly, but the great philosophers throughout history have been singular in their unwillingness to follow my advice.

Another informative, well-written post. There are some here, perhaps most, who prefer historiography to a mythologized history designed to support certain assumptions that have more to do with Christian dogma and Neo-Platonism than historical evidence. As with the Christian apologists, history is distorted or ignored and rational argument buried under misdirection and misrepresentation in favor of some version of transcendental truths they imagine they know something about.

But even though Apollodorus will never acknowledge the weakness and vacuity of his arguments, others can and do see them for they are.

If they do, it means they are themselves "idiosyncratic" or even not so stable mentally. — Alkis Piskas

I do not find Wittgenstein's use of 'fact' unusual. My comments here are in regard to hermeneutics and the history of philosophy. We tend to be more receptive to those who seem to share our views. A shared terminology leads to the assumption of a shared understanding. It is a rhetorical device. It has been used to avoid censorship.

A classic example is Descartes's "I think therefore I am", which has been, and still is, discussed a lot. In such cases, one has to find out why, the context in which, the philosopher said what he said. And usually, this can be easily found and explained. It's rearily a question of language. — Alkis Piskas

Descartes is a good example! He was keenly aware of what happened to Galileo and his work. He had to give the appearance of writing in support of the Church. When Descartes doubts everything this must include the teachings of the Church, but that is not something he could safely say. When he points to himself and reason as certain he points away from the authority of the Church.

Earlier than this is the example of Plato and Socrates. Although reason is a primary concern of the philosopher it is not the only concern. Plato found a way to write so as to avoid the fate of Socrates.

He was never "dark" for me. He was very clear and his views can still stand today; they are timeless. He was/is "dark" only to people who couldn't/cannot understand the meaning of what he said. His language, however, was very clear and exact! — Alkis Piskas

Given that there is wide ranging disagreement among competent scholars, I take a more modest view. Perhaps what you take to be clear and exact is only an appearance that hides the obscurity of his words.

But a thread on Wittgenstein is not the place to pursue these other matters.

I undestand that one needs to learn a new language, different from the language most philosophers --and people, in general-- — Alkis Piskas

Many of the philosophers have some terms idiosyncratically. Why they do is an interesting question.

The "world of facts" is an ambiguous expression. Actually, a fact is something that is known or proved to be true. — Alkis Piskas

Wittgenstein is unambiguous as to what he means by a fact.

2 What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs.

A state of affairs is not dependent on anyone knowing or proving it to be true. This is not say that this is the correct or only meaning of a fact, but if we are to understand him we need to begin with the way he uses terms, otherwise we argue for or against things he did not say or mean.

when we say "my world", we mean my reality, everything that is in it — Alkis Piskas

That may be what you mean but not what he means.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the
world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye.

And the Metaphysical Principle that I discovered long ago (and that has never been refuted by any scientific discovery, or even known by any scientist) that is the foundation under the "necessity" for the existence of an omnipotent power in the creation and evolution of our Universe is this:

No combination of lesser things can create a greater thing without something greater than the greater thing added to the lesser things. — Joe Mello

Except there is no evidence to support such an a priori necessity. Contrary to what he aimed to demonstrate, Newton's physics work without the hand of God. Evolution is a down up rather than top down order.

That looks like a somewhat Kantian move... — Srap Tasmaner

He used 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense of the conditions for the possibility of experience, but not according to the categories of the understanding.

The thing is, the logical structure LW finds in the world is clearly deduced (not to say "projected") from the logical structure of language. — Srap Tasmaner

He assumed that there are simples, but I don't know if this was deduced from language. It might have been that he accepted a picture of the world based on irreducible building blocks. Of course such a picture can be applied to language, but Democritus' atoms, for example, were not derived from language.

On one side of the limit is what can be said, on the other is what can be shown, or seen, or experienced.

Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)

— T 6.421

They are not in the world. They are not facts. This does not mean he denies their importance or significance for our lives, only that they are not part of the logical structure of the world. It is only what is within the world of facts that can be addressed by language.

One needs to learn the rule first, — Luke

What is the rule? How does one learn to count by being told that 1+1=2? What happens if they forget the rule? If they memorize the rule do they then need to be told that 1+1=1=3 and 2+1=3 and 1+2=3, for every combination of numbers?

What if a child does not accept the rule? Can it be demonstrated?

and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything — Luke

It helps to learn the names of the numbers, but it is not necessary. A child can first learn that there are this many apples on the table, holding up the right number of fingers. We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong.

The multiplication table is a rule, but one does not need to memorize or consult the table in order to multiply. One need not remember the rule: 12x12=144 to figure it out.

But this may be getting us too far off track,

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything. — Luke

Right, it is an abstraction, but we can determine whether it is true or false by counting. The rule is derived from counting.

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement. — Luke

There may be a point where I am no longer arguing about the correctness of your understanding of Wittgenstein and arguing against his understanding of arithmetic. This much seems to agree with what I said:

Put two apples on a bare table, see that no one comes near them and nothing shakes the table; now put another two apples on the table; now count the apples that are there. You have made an experiment; the result of the counting is probably 4. (We should present the result like this: when, in such-and-such circumstances, one puts first 2 apples and then another 2 on a table, mostly none disappear and none get added.) And analogous experiments can be carried out, with the same result, with all kinds of solid bodies.---This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down three beans and then another three beans and then count what is there. If the result at one time were 5, at another 7 (say because, as we should now say, one sometimes got added, and one sometimes vanished of itself), then the first thing we said would be that beans were no good for teaching sums. But if the same thing happened with sticks, fingers, lines and most other things, that would be the end of all sums.

(Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics)

The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4.

Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.

But is he going against his own admonition to just look? Does his theory of mathematics as well as modern number theory get in the way of what we actually do and say? For the ancient Greeks a number was not an abstraction but tells us how many of something. Saying how many is an empirical statement that is either true or false.

The two are equivalent. In both cases the persons in question die, oui? — Agent Smith

There is a lot more going on here. The serpent tells Eve:

“You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”

There is some truth to what the serpent says. God had neglected to tell Adam that their eyes would be opened. But the serpent is deceptive. As a consequence of eating they will die.

However, God told Adam:

"... for in the day that you eat of it you shall die.”

(2:17)

They did not die in that day. Yet because of what they did in that day they would eventually die, after what by our standards was an impossibly long life.

Like the tower of Babel story shows, God doesn't want us anywhere near Him and that includes paradise. — Agent Smith

There is a thematic connection, but this is not what the story shows.

And the Lord said, “Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is only the beginning of what they will do; and nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them.

(Genesis 11:6)

The ability to do whatever they propose to do is to collectively have the power of a very powerful god. Although man knows and can do good he also knows and can do evil [added: doing evil is often what is chosen]. Once again, God saves man from himself.

How do you know we're not born evil? — Agent Smith

My concern here is what the story-teller does and does not claim.

It is a paradox consider as an imperfection the act of denying a life when the life is imperfect itself since the beginning. — javi2541997

It could be argued that it is an act of benevolence. That is is only man's imperfect concept of God's perfection that would lead to the conclusion that a perfect being would deny living things existence.

The rest of your post: Muddled — Agent Smith

I take it you do not see a distinction between being sentenced to death and being prevented from living forever. You make a distinction between someone being put to death and the rest of us dying. It should be noted that Cain was not put to death for killing his brother.

God does not want man to become gods. They have already become godlike with knowledge of good and evil. With immortality they would become gods. Some might think this would be a good thing, but it might mean endless war and the oppressive rule of deathless kings.

When God tells Cain that sin is crouching and he must rule over it, he is saying something quite different than what the concept of original sin says. We are not born evil. We can rule over sin.

I think that today it is incontrovertible that the earth revolves around the sun, so it would be a hinge ... — Luke

@Sam26

And therefore not a proposition? And that is because a proposition can be either true or false and a hinge can't? So at one time, the sun revolves around the earth was a hinge and not a proposition? But now it is not a hinge but a proposition?

Where does Wittgenstein make this distinction between hinges and propositions?

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage.

It reminds me of a quip by Wittgenstein:

Philosophers use a language that is already deformed as though by shoes that are too tight.

Just as waking is made difficult in shoes that are too tight, thinking is made difficult by a language that is too restrictive.

is 12x12=144 susceptible of being false? If so, then it is not a hinge. — Luke

Are you claiming that a hinge is not susceptible to being false? Or are you making a claim about mathematical hinges?

Is the concept (I am trying to avoid the term proposition and the confusion it may cause, independent of OC) of the earth revolving around the sun a hinge? Is it susceptible of being false? At one time the sun revolving around the earth was a hinge.

It could be argued that to deny living things their existence is an imperfection.

In this model of God, omnibenevolence is always directed first at itself: “In willing himself primarily, he wills all other things” (Aquinas SCG, 1.75), — spirit-salamander

But in your scenario God does not will all other things or even any other thing.

Descartes makes the argument that the perfection of what God has created cannot be judged by some part of it. It is the whole that is perfect not some part.

If the absence of benevolence is an imperfection then a being who creates a world where only it exists is not a benevolent being. Neither it nor the world it creates would be perfect.

Can a being who is not perfect know what the most perfect world is?

If benevolence entails benefit to what is other then oneself, the a God who limits existence to the creation of itself would not be benevolent.