I am not beginning with moral principles with respect to my ethical theory: I am a virtue ethicist. — Bob Ross

Whatever your moral principles may be, in this thread you are beginning with moral principles. In addition, virtue ethics is often cited as an alternative to principle based ethics.

the assumption of naturalism, that life arises from the self-assembly of chemical constituents — Wayfarer

It is not as if one day there are chemical constituents and the next that they have assembled themselves to form "life". There is not even a clear borderline between living and non-living, as can be seen in the case of viruses. The root of this problem is conceptual. Both in the categorical sense of the way we divide things in the world and our inability to conceive how life emerges.

The Phenomenon of Life, Hans Jonas. — Wayfarer

Yes. I have read Jonas, but it has been many years. If I remember correctly, I agree with the idea that we should not lose sight of the human dimension of scientific inquiry. The question of the meaning of life need not and should not be forbidden from scientific inquiry, but, in my opinion, this does not mean that the supernatural has thereby earned a place at the table of what is fundamentally an investigation of nature.

Throughout history, time after time, claims of the supernatural as the only viable "explanation" for a wide variety of phenomena have given way to natural, rational, demonstrable, transmissible scientific knowledge. This is not to say that we will eventually have a complete explanation of everything, but it does suggest that based on prior examples the appeal to supernatural because we do not have a natural explanation seems unconvincing.

Everyone who adheres to an ethical theory imports principles into any moral conversation. — Bob Ross

Treating questionable stipulations as if they are established moral foundations can only lead to the collapse of the edifice.

There is a difference between a principle and a moral principle. Those who begin with ethical theory based on moral principles begin, in my opinion, at the wrong end, as if where the inquiry might lead has already been determined before we begin.

An unknown – unknowable – mystery (re: "intelligence behind the universe") doesn't explain anything because answering with a mystery only begs the question of how/why of anything. — 180 Proof

I agree. What needs to be examined is a) the assumption that there must be an agent, whether personal or impersonal, and b) the illusion that having posited an agent that we have done more than simply assert this assumption as if it were an explanation. Rather than provide an explanation it forecloses the search for explanations, as if a mystery behind the mystery does more than multiply mysteries.

If you stipulated different moral principles then you might come to the opposite conclusion. This demonstrates the futility and impotence of moral deliberation based on stipulated conditions.

I thought the Fed was apolitical and does whatever it wanted? — Mr Bee

Trump has made it clear that if he is elected it will have to answer to him.

The fundamental reason for believing in the permanence of the soul is the desire for it to be so.

Though Euthyphro's account of his just action in prosecuting his father seems odd to me. — Ludwig V

The question of whether Euthyphro acted justly is not answered directly in the dialogue, but I think it is clear that he was not the expert on piety and the gods that he professed to be. Based on the stories of the quarrels between the gods it seems that they too are unable to distinguish between justice and injustice. The proper relationship between civic piety, familial piety, and piety to the gods, remains unresolved.

Yes, the Crito is certainly a warning to law-makers, and enforcers. It does seem a bit odd that Socrates doesn't show any sign of concluding that rebellion against unjust laws is justified. — Ludwig V

The political upheaval of that time casts a shadow over the question of one's allegiance to the city and its laws. With regime change the identity of the city becomes problematic. The regime of the Thirty Tyrants, installed into power after the defeat of the Athenians by the Spartans, although short-lived, made changes to the laws and constitution. During that time Athens was no longer a democracy. To what extent was it still Athens?

Socrates played the long game, he was not involved with active politics, and instead looked to the future, to the youth, to the reform of law, and more moderately phronesis. The question remains to this day, what is to be after rebellion.

My question is: why did his accusers (as shown in the title) accuse him. — NocturnalRuminator

It is a matter of political expediency. In many ways analogous to politicians today who are beholden to the Religious Right attacking "woke culture", a term that is used so broadly as to apply to such things as the National Weather Service and their attempt to dismantle it, equal rights, and reproductive rights.

The story of his divine mission in Plato's Apology and the reaction of people whose ignorance he exposed is, presumably, meant to refute the charge of asebeia. — Ludwig V

The irony of this should not be missed. In heeding his daimonion the question arises as to the extent to which Socrates was guided by the gods of the city. On the porch of the court before his trail he has a chance encounter with Euthyphro, a self-professed expert on piety. Socrates questions him about what piety is. Euthyphro says that by doing what the gods do he is acting piously. He assumed that by imitating Zeus, “the best and most just of the gods” (5e) that he too will be doing what is best and most just. The question of what is pious is then connected to the question of what is best and just.

As the dialogue progresses two things become clear: the actions of the gods as told in the myths are often unjust, and, to be just is to be pious. The first is an impious truth in so far as claiming that the gods could be unjust is impious. The second places justice above the gods. So, in one sense Socrates was guilty of impiety, but if being pious requires being just then Socrates, by heeding his daimonion, was just.

This relates to the change of corrupting the youth. Socrates undermines the authority of the gods and the ancient ways. In doing so, he leaves the youth adrift. This is a key to his obedience to the law. By his actions, rather than by argument, he acknowledges the authority of the laws of the city. This serves as a guide to the youth. It leaves open, however, the question of whether the law is in all cases just. This is the question of the Crito. What is at issue is larger than what one old man should do. One might flee, but there is a lesson here for the next generation of law-makers, both those involved in politics and those interested political philosophy, that is, those who preserve the law and who make and uphold just laws. The latter is not possible without the former.

What are your thoughts about the current state of the GOP? — Shawn

The current state of the GOP is that it perished under the onslaught of Trumpism. It bears no resemblance to the party of Lincoln, T. Roosevelt, or Reagan.

My point was not to defend tariffs. It was an example of a way to gain compliance without the unreasonable expectation that people will change.

. Trump wants to have a much greater role in Federal Reserve policy and decisions. At a news conference yesterday he said:

The Federal Reserve is a very interesting thing and it's sort of gotten it wrong a lot ...And you know that's very largely a — it's a gut feeling. I believe it's really a gut feeling ...I feel the president should have at least say in there, yeah. I feel that strongly. I think that, in my case I made a lot of money. I was very successful. And I think I have a better instinct than, in many cases, people that would be on the Federal Reserve or the chairman.

A "very successful" businessman who was bankrolled and bailed out by his father several times, who declared bankruptcy six times, and repeatedly cheated contractors. What he is most successful for is selling his name and image, letting others do the work and walking away when things do not work out.

It is not clear whether he thinks the federal government can operate this way. His "better instincts" do not include the understanding that the United States of America is not a business, however much he wants to slap his name on it.

If there cannot be global agreement to tax the rich, individual countries can impose taxes through tariffs. It might be argued that this puts the burden on those who are not wealthy, but if a company is going to pass on costs to the consumer it will do so whether that tax is in the form of a tariff or not.

You choose to have the next generation, — schopenhauer1

You can choose not to procreate but there are others who will not make that same choice.

Aristophanes was a comic poets making serious social commentary. No doubt the play drew a great deal of laughter from the audience. In terms of teaching by example the son learned his lesson well. One thing the audience is left to consider is what it might mean to honor your father when your father is not honorable. On a larger scale what is at issue is the problem of the ancestral.

I think that incremental change is possible. We already have a global economy. We may not be able to get to the point of global agreement but we can impose tariffs and wealth taxes on those who move capital from place to place in order to avoid paying taxes.

.

Piketty's Capitalism in the 21st century — Benkei

Concise summary: wealth inequality (wealth or capital versus income) is high and rising,

What is to be done: global agreement to tax the rich.

Obviously, this is the exact opposite of what the Party formerly known as "Republican" advocates and practices.





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And if a parent smoked a kid might argue that if their parent did it than why should they feel compelled not to even though it's clearly not a good decision in general? — TiredThinker

This reminds me of Aristophanes The Clouds where after attending Socrates "thinkery" a son argues with his father, who sent him there in order to learn how to argue his way out of his father's having to pay his gambling debts, that if it is right for a father to beat his son then it is right for a son to beat his father. The father's response is to burn the thinkery down.

What bothers me the most is that they fantasize about such an authoritarian model, but only far away from their territory. — javi2541997

I agree but the territory in question is not just geographical. It is a growing threat in the U.S. and Europe. Those who favor authoritarianism want change, but change in itself is not good. They cannot see that change can be for the worse.

the best form of government for the people. — praxis

The demagogue appears to be the champion of the people, but with his rise to power reveals what he is, an autocrat. The rhetoric of the book is transparent. The "innocents" versus the "unhuman". Only some of the people are truly "the people". At a minimum the unhuman should have no role in government.

Franco and Pinochet are regarded as heroes.

The article quotes from the book:

Our study of history has brought us to this conclusion: Democracy has never worked to protect innocents from the unhumans,

Of course if the "unhumans" are not regarded as human they need not be treated as human. As such things go, it is likely that just who is or will be counted as unhuman will be a growing group that will include everyone that does not support their revolution.

There is an article in the NYT: "JD Vance Just Blurbed a Book Arguing That Progressives Are Subhuman" Until recently the book, Unhumans: The Secret History of Communist Revolutions (and How to Crush Them) could be be dismissed as too far to the extreme right to be taken seriously, but with Vance's endorsement and a forward by Stephen Bannon, it has entered the Republican mainstream. The author, Jack Posobiec, promoted the conspiracy theory that Democrats ran a satanic child abuse ring beneath a popular Washington pizzeria.

The Southern Poverty Law Center describes him as:

... a political operative and internet performer of the anti-democracy hard right, known primarily for creating and amplifying viral disinformation campaigns ... He helped lead the “Stop the Steal” campaign ...He has also collaborated with white nationalists, antigovernment extremists, members of the Proud Boys, and neo-Nazis in his capacity as an operative.

I would very much like to believe its over, but I don't. I doubt that the continued focus on Trump will sway voters. Outside of the MAGA cult most who will vote for him will do so despite who he is and what he says. The Dobbs decision will play a role. Beyond that the key factor will be the voter's own financial well-being, both in fact and perception. The case can and I think will be made that Trump failed on his economic promises and Biden did more and Harris will continue to do more for American industry, small business, infrastructure, and jobs.

He was in a coma, — Relativist

A medically induced coma. The Esquire article cited above includes factual details of his medically induced coma. Each time they woke him and he became conscious he would thrash about so the put him back under.

I started a thread on Plato's metaphysics a few years ago in which I discussed this. From that thread:

Aristotle identifies three kinds of number:

arithmos eidetikos - idea numbers
arithmos aisthetetos - sensible number
metaxy - between
(Metaphysics 987b)

Odd as it may sound to us, the Greeks did not regard one as a number. One is the unit, that which enables us to count how many. How many is always how many ones or units or monads that are being counted. Countable objects require some one thing that is the unit of the count, whether it be apples, or pears, or pieces of fruit.

Eidetic numbers are not counted in the same way sensible numbers are. Eidetic numbers belong together in ways that units or monads do not.

The eidetic numbers form an ordered hierarchy from less to more comprehensive.

... the "first" eidetic number is the eidetic "two"; it represents the genos of being as such, which comprehends the two eide "rest and "change". (Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra).

Considering that the make-up gets darker and darker I think he may be aiming for one of those black jobs. It seems that there is no longer much demand for orange ones.

I am analyzing the ‘goodness’ of such a species within the context of their species qua whole and not nature qua whole. — Bob Ross

Yes, and that is where your analysis fails.

You have to demonstrate why I should think of it in terms of nature and not the species — Bob Ross

I do not think it necessary to demonstrate why a part cannot be adequately understood without regard for the whole of which it is a part. The problem of wholes and parts is fundamental to Aristotle, as it is to much of Greek philosophy. Where in Aristotle does he reject this?

...for me, both are capable of separate analysis since ‘goodness’ is relativistic. — Bob Ross

For you that might be the case, but unless you want to sidestep Aristotle you need to show that for him the good is relative. In the Nicomachean Ethics, which is about the human good, Aristotle says:

Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.

A distinction is made between some good, which is relative to some thing, and the good to which all things aim. What the good is to which all things aim is not simply a question about any one thing but all things. It is a question about the whole. This is not relative to any one thing or species.

Firstly, how does this negate the ‘devils species’? — Bob Ross

It does not negate the devil species, it negates your claim that it has only one function.

You said:

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting — Bob Ross

So too your devil species. But why say that it is a problem for the knife example unless you are claiming that the devil species has only one function? There seems to be some things that were n that exchange that are now missing.

It is a hypothetical meant to tease out the consistent conclusion of Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’: you are trying to migrate it to actuality or practicality. — Bob Ross

In that case you have failed. As you said:

I am having a hard time fathoming how Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue, — Bob Ross

That is not because Aristotle is avoiding it, but because 1) Aristotle is not concerned with fantasy creatures, but with the nature of things as they are, 2) you fail to see why it is incompatible with Aristotle's view of nature, 3) you assume that there is no question of the good for Aristotle, only some good relative to some thing.

They are completely separable: I can analyze the function of a liver in isolation to how the body, as a whole, works. — Bob Ross

They are not completely separable! Livers do not function apart from the body they are in. They are not some separate thing that just so happens to be in a body but have a purpose of their own unrelated to the body.

...if I take your argument seriously, then you would have to go further and analyze everything in terms of the largest context—which would be the good of reality (whatever that may be). — Bob Ross

Right! In the Metaphysics he says:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually …

(982a)

As far as possible means there is a limit to what we know. We cannot know all things. More specifically, it is the beginning and ends, the arche and telos, of all things that we do not know. With regard to each thing too, however, it requires knowing its arche and telos.

The beginning or source of your devil species is your imagination, but if we are to treat it as if it were a real species without knowing its true origin and end we cannot claim to know its nature. To take its being as its end or purpose is to miss the big picture. The good of an intelligent species is not simply to exist. Its nature as an intelligent being must be taken into consideration. Taking the example of man, his intelligence leads him to the question of his aim. It is not some notion of mindless happiness, but the realization of what is highest in man

there's Teleprompter Trump and then there's Truth Social Trump, — Wayfarer

An apt distinction.

NOS is really good at evasion. — frank

Who?

So let me get this straight. The primary voters chose Biden, then Biden said he wasn't going to run. Now you're verklempt over the disappointment the voters must feel about that. Is that correct? — frank

The Trumpsters kvetch but its Meshuggeneh. (That is about the limit of my Yiddish)

Anyone who is honest and paying attention knows that 1) unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary an incumbent president will be the nominee, 2) Biden's performance during the debate is compelling reason to have him step down. Not simply because he was likely to loose but because there is substantive reasons to question whether he is fit and able to be president for the next four years. 3) It is Trumpian conjecture that the primary voters feel that they have been treated unfairly. 4) There is good evidence that Harris enjoys greater voter approval that Biden did before stepping down. Most likely, many primary voters approve of the change. 5) The Trumpsters are pretending that it is a matter of fairness, but the only thing that they really think is unfair is that they spent a lot of time, effort, and money preparing to run against Biden.6) They question Biben's competency and wanted to make it a major campaign issue, but when after the debate more and more Democrats raised concerns and acted on it they cry foul.

The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting ... — Bob Ross

Now you are catching on! Just as a knife has more than one function, a natural species does as well.

There is a difference between something that is in a species' nature and what that nature is. You misunderstand what he means for the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing to be relative to its nature. What is relative to its nature and what its nature is with regard to its telos is not the same. It is good for birds to fly, but as Icarus learned, not for men to fly. Hubris and violence may be in our species, but that does not mean it is good for us to be hubristic or violent.

Now, it does not become a ‘bad’ or lesser ‘good’ X because one cannot grab it; because we stipulated its sole function is cutting. — Bob Ross

The example is meant to illustrate the problem of postulating an intelligent species with only one function. If intellect is, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the part of the soul by which it knows and understands, then any species that is intelligent must have as part of its nature the capacity to understand. Any species that has a mind, has more than one function. At a minimum, it has the function of thinking, or reasoning. An intelligent species that is not intelligent is a contradiction.

It seems like you are denying that what is good is for a thing to fulfill its nature and instead it is for a thing to fulfill its nature if it is a proper part of the whole. — Bob Ross

That a species is a proper part of the whole is essential for understanding what a species is, that is, for understanding its nature. It is not as if these are two separate things - its nature apart from nature and its nature as part of nature. We can, when discussing such things, make a distinction, but the distinction does not exist in the nature of things.

This doesn’t seem accurate to me; because then a thing could be bad which is fulfilling its nature. — Bob Ross

Right! That is the problem with your devil species. One more once:

It is asking how something bad is good. — Fooloso4

and:

A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is. — Fooloso4

Moreover, the relation of a thing to a bigger whole isn’t necessarily an aspect of its nature: is a part of a rabbit’s nature to get eaten by a fox? — Bob Ross

The whole of nature is not an event in nature. What it is to be a fox or rabbit is not to eat or be eaten by the other. What it means to be your devil species, on the other hand, is as you would have it, to destroy other species. Just as we do not understand foxes and rabbits in terms of eating and being eaten, we cannot understand your devil species in terms solely of destroying and being destroyed.

His campaign specifically wanted to increase his support among blacks from 12% to 20%. I don't think he accomplished that. — frank

This tells us something about him and his campaign. Their bad judgment is one thing. Trump's wild overestimation of his abilities to win people over is quite another. He had some success with the Art of the Schmooze in his business dealings, at least until his reputation caught up with him; but his attempt to dominate a room of journalists as if they must be put in their place and lying to them, shows how out of touch he is. No doubt the Trumpsters will applaud, but they are not the people he wants to convince.

Why did his handlers even let him appear? — Wayfarer

He has no handlers because he cannot be handled. He cannot even control himself.

Suppose someone invents a knife. As a knife it fulfills its function - to cut. As such you might say it is a good knife. It is so "good', in fact, that it can cut through anything, and does. It cuts right through the cutting board, the table, and everything else it comes near, leaving behind a path of death and destruction. Having witnessed this from what is at the moment, a safe distance, would you still say it is a good knife? Now before answering too quickly, consider the other attributes of a good knife, most importantly, how well it handles. This knife literally cannot be handled. It would cut off your hand.

You wish to discuss your species in the context of Aristotelianism but you ignore the context of Aristotelianism in order to discuss your imaginary species. The part, a species, cannot be understood apart from or in abstraction from the whole of which it is a part. The whole is intelligibly prior to the part. This is fundamental to Aristotle's Metaphysics, to the problem of what is first, to the problem of first philosophy.

You are sidestepping the hypothetical. It is akin to if I asked you "if you had $1,000,000,000,000,000, then what would you buy?" — Bob Ross

You are sidestepping Aristotle! It has become increasingly apparent that for you Aristotle is irrelevant. This thread is not a "rejoinder to Aristotelian ethics".

Whether or not such a species would fit well into the “ordered whole” of nature is irrelevant — Bob Ross

Mistake the part for the whole. You insist that:

Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, — Bob Ross

but claim that nature, which is the source of species, is irrelevant? You are now reading the Metaphysics and claim to understand Aristotle's points but fail to understand a fundamental point: it is an inquiry into the arche, the source or beginning of things. The question of the goodness of a species cannot abstracted from the question of the goodness of the whole of which it is a part.

You are accepting Aristotle’s concept of ‘goodness’ (as underlined) and then turning around and irrelevantly commenting that it is absurd for such a species to exist as a coherent member of nature—that doesn’t address the hypothetical I have presented. — Bob Ross

The hypothetical you present is incompatible with Aristotle. That is not an irrelevancy. Aristotle was a pretty smart guy. Do you really think that he would not have seen what you see so plainly? It is not that Aristotle failed to consider this hypothetical, it is that such a creature has not place in his understanding of the world.

You would have to demonstrate how the hypothetical (stated above) is inconsistent or incoherent with Aristotle’s concept of ‘good’. — Bob Ross

I have already done that.

I understand the point is that Aristotle thinks that the telos of each species is well-ordered, but I think it doesn’t help his case because of how he defined goodness. — Bob Ross

It is not that the telos of each species is well-ordered, it is that the whole, of which each species is a part is well-ordered. Once again:

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. — Fooloso4

To take one meaning as is it applies to all or the whole leads to your confusion.

quote="Bob Ross;921928"]

Form is the idea of the essence of a thing

If by idea you mean a concept then that is wrong.

the form of a human being is the essence of a human being. — Bob Ross

No. A human being is not a disembodied entity.

If I take your argument seriously (that a human being’s form is fully realized immediately) ... — Bob Ross

The species form "human being" is why the offspring of human beings are human beings, whether they have one arm or two.

You are just going around in circles, trying to distinguish these terms when they are clearly the same. — Bob Ross

Aristotle distinguishes these terms. Aristotle comes to us through Latinized translation. Because of this the meaning of the Greek terms is obscured. See the section Translating Aristotle from the IEP article on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Selections from Joe Sachs's Introduction
to His Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, here

Continuing my previous post:

Its form is what it is to be what it is. What differentiates it from other things or kinds.

Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. The NE begins by saying that all things aim at some good. A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is.

The good of a thing cannot be determined apart from what it is to be that thing, apart from its telos. In his translation of the Metaphysics Joe Sachs points out:

Aristotle does not say that animals, plants, and the cosmos have purposes but that the are purposes, ends-in-themselves ... Aristotle's "teleology" is nothing but his claim that all natural beings are self-maintaining wholes.

We are back again to the absurd notion that a natural thing's telos, its place is the cosmos is to harm other species. Such a cosmos would not be a well-ordered whole.

The form of a thing is its nature ... — Bob Ross

A things form is inherent to it. It is the being at work (energeia) of a thing If it was not continually being at work staying the same (entelecheia) from its beginning it would cease to be.

It's nature is not separate from nature. It is a part of not apart from nature. To understand the nature of a thing is to understand its place and activity within nature.

Form (eidos) and nature (phusis) are not two terms with the same meaning. In Book V, chapter IV, of the Metaphysics he says:

In one sense, nature means the coming into being of things that are born.

Nature encompasses both form (eidos) and matter (hule).

(i.e., its essence — Bob Ross

'Essence' is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Literally it is the “the what it was to be” of a thing. Ousia refers to some specific being. Aristotle or Bob Ross.

In short, to realize one's nature is not to realize one's form of being.

Nothing you said addressed anything I said...at all. — Bob Ross

You said:

if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of “why is it good for a thing to realize its form?”. — Bob Ross

You take what is for Aristotle the question of the Metaphysics, the question of being, and treat it as an answer. Things do not realize their form as if it is something they do not already have, something that they are not already. It's form or eidos is not something that comes after it already is.

Added: This posted before I was done. I continue below.

I've been reading through Aristotle's "Metaphysics", and I think I understand Aristotle's points enough to start tackling this post you made. — Bob Ross

The fact that you think you understand Aristotle's points is probable evidence that you do not. See Book ll.

if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of “why is it good for a thing to realize its form?”. — Bob Ross

These are two parts of the same question, that is, what is for a thing to be what it? What is the good that each thing seeks? This is a question, not an answer to the question of being . What does it mean for a man to realize his nature? What does this look like? With this last question we begin to get closer to the original sense of eidos, which has been buried under centuries of divergent sedimented meaning.

Only recently I began viewing him in the manner in which he doesn't bend over to the establishment or any secret societies and so on. — Shawn

His choose of Supreme Court nominees was decided by the Federalist Society. His come to Jesus charade was created to get Evangelical backing. His sycophant bowing down to Putin requires bending over to kiss his ass.

he really is the man of the people. — Shawn

He really is not. He is the privileged son of a wealthy, racist, corrupt, real estate swindler (Fred Trump) who joined his father's enterprise to bilk the government and battle one law suit after another. His father gave him what he says was a "small loan". It was at least a million dollars with which he started a series of failed businesses, leaving the contractors to foot the bill. In an earlier skin he was shunned by the "beautiful people" of New York he so desperately wanted to be a member of. He tried to buy his way in, but his ostentatious attempts to display class were regarded as too crass even for them. He was obsessed with and courted the gossip columnists, anonymously feeding them stories about himself. The infamous lawyer Roy Cohn was his mentor.

He is a manufactured image promoted by reality TV. Packaged and sold to the American people. A con man who has conned his way to the top.