The approach taken by Fooloso4 is analytical — Amity

Based on the divisions in the article you cite my approach would be "Straussian":

Historically important modes of interpretation, like the Neoplatonic, and their modern counterparts—“unitarian,” “developmentalist,” analytical, esoteric, and Straussian

By contrast Leo Strauss and his followers specifically start from the multiplicity of the dialogues and the characters, situations, and conversations in them. At least in its original form, “Straussianism” is probably—at least in principle—the most sensitive of all approaches to the Platonic corpus (other than the most exclusively literary) to its dramatic aspects. Its methodology is hard to summarize but can perhaps fairly be said to consist in trying to see how the choice of characters, their setting, and their interactions affect the apparent outcomes of the argument.

From an earlier post:

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others. — Fooloso4

These are the people I read and whom I have learned the most from.

An important statement from Strauss's student Stanley Rosen:

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third. — Fooloso4

Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:

Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation? — frank

The alternative isn’t Neitszche’s ‘Uber-mensch’ but a return to philosophical spirituality.
— Wayfarer

Nice words. The devil is in the detail, the myth that will accompany the spirituality, the lie-to-children.

See the Phaedo thread. Fooloso4 perhaps has something along these lines in mind in his account there.

It seems to me that the Ubermensch is in the ascendence. — Banno

A proper understanding of the ubermensch is that it is a return to philosophical spirituality. Only it is not Christian spirituality or any transcendent spirituality. It is Dionysian. A spirituality of the body and the earth.

For Nietzsche it is not the lie to children, but rather the child who has not yet been lied to:

The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes.” (Zarathustra, Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit).

What is necessary is that the deadly truth be hidden. But in truth it is too late. Thus the spirits need to forget and create a new beginning.

That's a good question. I don't think it is a step in logical argument, but I do think that Plato intends for the most thoughtful of us to work through the logic of the accounts he gives. In the next section that I will present (probably tomorrow) he will call the "safe answer" he proposes here as a hypothesis , an "ignorant" or "unlearned" answer, and will propose another.

I think the main purpose is rhetorical. It is the pharmakon against misologic. (89d) The truth is, logos or accounts or arguments cannot accomplish what is hoped for, knowledge of the fate of the soul. But this is not a truth they are ready to hear. Socrates does not want them to give up on philosophy so here he resorts to the myth of recollection, with its promise of knowledge and the safe passage of the soul to Hades and back. In the Republic to the story of the ascent from the cave to transcendent knowledge of the whole. This story in particular has inspired generations to pursue philosophy. And, as Nietzsche nicely sums it up, Christianity becomes Platonism for the people.

From the Rosen interview:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

And from @Amity above:

Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them —more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions — Christopher Rowe

But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....

I think that this is correct. It is something that I have been attempting to show. Cebes and Simmias are the image of just such non-philosophical readers and listeners. They have to have their childish fears charmed away by myth and incantations.
By contrast:

For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do.

It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere.

You said:

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. — frank

In response I quoted Rosen making specific points as to the dialogues being dramas:

in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously.

there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer.

within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue

From an interview with Stanley Rosen, an influential scholar who has written extensively on Plato:

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

Rosen demonstrates the approach in Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image.

A few more points from the interview that are worth considering:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace. — Amity

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different.

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round. — Amity

Consider the following from my last post. Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.(95d)/quote]

As I pointed out:

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d) — Fooloso4

Also consider what Socrates says about incantations. Sometimes we come to believe something is true just through repetition.

There's the real problem with philosophy; our inability to remain silent. — Banno

Some days here I feel like I am about to be cured of that affliction.

Are you sure about that?: — Amalac

If you are asking about Wittgenstein then yes, I am quite sure. If you are talking about theology then in my opinion God is ineffable and theologians are always in one way or another always trying to eff him.

How would you interpret that passage? — Amalac

He is taking you to task. Trying to get you to think. Can you say what an illogical world would look like? Do you not see the problems?

... so it's still important to show why they are wrong, if indeed they are wrong. — Amalac

Why is it important? You can create any God you want, one that is and one or more that is not constrained by logic.

the arguments for their own sake. — Amalac

The argument is in my opinion not worth talking about. You obviously see things differently.

"God does not reveal himself" (Wittgenstein) — Mr.S

The full statement is:

How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
— T 6.432

That statement follows this one:

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
— T 6.42

T = Tractatus

With regard to the existential relationship:

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)

Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16)

NB = Notebooks

God is outside the logical relationships of things in the world. What is or is not logically possible has nothing to do with God.

Since propositions can express nothing higher, talk of God is without sense. What does make sense is what refers to the logical relationships within the world. To what is the case. To facts.

A two-way problem arises in this relationship of God with the empirical world: — Mr.S

You neglect consideration of an existential relationship.

If God existed (which in itself remains to be seen), there would also be an unfathomable gulf between his greatness, his omnipotence, his spirituality and his ability to access the material world. — Mr.S

Is this a concept of God that Wittgenstein endorsed?

The problem with that interpretation is that according to most accepted theological conceptions of God, — Amalac

I suggest that if your concern is with Wittgenstein then stick with what he said rather than concepts he does not explicitly ascribe to. Wittgenstein does not have a lot to say about God but he does say somethings. If your interest is, as the title suggests, Wittgenstein then check the early Notebooks.

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)

As if to emphasize this change, Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

And Cebes said:

There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say.(95d-e)

After Cebes says this:

Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. (95e)

Then says:

"This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. (96a)

One might think that what will follow is a discussion of natural science.

Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it is. (96a)

But he did not find the answers he sought.

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97b-d)

Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his “second sailing” to find the cause. (99d).

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true. (99d-100a)

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself.

With his “second sailing” Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.

I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they
exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion. (100b-c)

Cebes does not really seem interested in the forms and agrees without question in order to get to the point that concerns him, the immortality of the soul.

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound. He settles instead for the “safest answer”. The image of sailing brings to mind, or rather, as we may recall, a “recollection” of the image of the raft sailing through life in the midst of danger.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

According to Simmias' image, if we cannot gain knowledge, the raft will be out of our control and tossed about, unless there is a more stable carrier, some divine account. Is Socrates’ safe account just such an account? What is the cost of passage?

Socrates “assumes” the existence of the Beautiful itself and a Good itself, and so on. He does not try to prove them and does not say how they actually relate to things.

Recollect also the following: Socrates said he persuades himself that what he says seems to be true, (91a) which is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. Is he trying to persuade himself that the forms seem to be true? Has he been successful? However we may answer this, one thing should be obvious: if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest.

Socrates ends with a very odd bit of advice:

Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. (101c-d)

When one is added to one it is not the addition of one to one that makes two but it is two by sharing in Twoness. Socrates tells him that he should “loudly exclaim” this. Yelling has seemed to take the place of persuasion by reason.

And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing both the beginning and what emerges out of it, if you wish to discover any truth … but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.”
What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together. (101d-102a)

Compare this to the description of dialectic the Republic:


"Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too." (511b)

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection.

I didn't know about the Bacchants. — Amity

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed!

Socrates is quite clear it is not rites that purify:

Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and phronesis itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. (69c)

There is, however, one more piece of the puzzle:

There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.(69d)

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. — Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

Surely the expression that ‘there is an ancient doctrine that we’ve recalled’ signifies something more than here-say, in the context of one who believes that true knowledge is recollection of knowledge obtained before this life. — Wayfarer

You seem to have missed the irony. They have recalled the doctrine. They have not recollected. It remains something they have been told rather than knowledge they have attained.

In general, it is a way of looking at the human condition; the bitter-sweet connections, the experiences of pain/pleasure. — Amity

Both Plato and Socrates are more than aware of the human condition - the interplay between body and mind. The need for a sense of humour... — Amity

You make some good points.

As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. Here are two examples from the Phaedo of Socrates laughing.


At 84d: "When Socrates heard this he laughed quietly " (or in other translations "gently")
At 115c: "laughing quietly" (serenely)

This looks interesting:

From the summary of the book "Plato's Laughter":

Counters the long-standing, solemn interpretation of Plato’s dialogues with one centered on the philosophical and pedagogical significance of Socrates as a comic figure.

Plato was described as a boor and it was said that he never laughed out loud. Yet his dialogues abound with puns, jokes, and humor. Sonja Madeleine Tanner argues that in Plato’s dialogues Socrates plays a comical hero who draws heavily from the tradition of comedy in ancient Greece, but also reforms laughter to be applicable to all persons and truly shaming to none. Socrates introduces a form of self-reflective laughter that encourages, rather than stifles, philosophical inquiry. Laughter in the dialogues—both explicit and implied—suggests a view of human nature as incongruous with ourselves, simultaneously falling short of, and superseding, our own capacities. What emerges is a picture of human nature that bears a striking resemblance to Socrates’ own, laughable depiction, one inspired by Dionysus, but one that remains ultimately intractable. The book analyzes specific instances of laughter and the comical from the Apology, Laches, Charmides, Cratylus, Euthydemus, and the Symposium to support this, and to further elucidate the philosophical consequences of recognizing Plato’s laughter. https://www.sunypress.edu/p-6468-platos-laughter.aspx

Socrates mentions his scornful and critical 'comic poet' - ? Aristophanes — Amity

Nietzsche said:

I know of nothing that has caused me to dream more on Plato’s secrecy and his sphinx nature than the happily preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his deathbed there was found no “Bible,” nothing Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic—but a volume of Aristophanes. How could even a Plato have endured life—a Greek life to which he said No—without an Aristophanes?

Socrates is not being presented as believing Homer is divine.

Do you understand that? — frank

Socrates calls him divine. In what way is his calling him divine not presenting him as being divine?

What he means by this is another matter. And whether or not he believes it cannot be determined without first figuring out what he means.

Once again, you said in some cases my interpretation is wrong, but you have not given a single case. So what are those cases? Saying that he calls him divine is not an interpretation. It is a direct quote from the text.

In some cases, your interpretation is just wrong. The bigger problem is that you seem to think there is one right interpretation. — frank

I do not think there is one right interpretation, but you have not given me a single case of where you think my interpretation is wrong. Without details your accusations are empty. Provide specific cases and where you think my interpretation does not agree with what is said in the dialogue, as well as what you think is a better interpretation, and we can talk.

You just posted it. — frank

Do you mean where Socrates said "Homer put it poetically"? (94d) Socrates makes the distinction between poetry and argument several times. Homer does not present and argument. He says:

Odysseus struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you
have endured worse than this.'

Socrates uses this to claim that the soul is not a harmony of the body, but rather the soul rules over the body.

I pointed out that:

But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. — Fooloso4

And:

In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained. — Fooloso4

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this. — frank

I don't know what you mean. If you explain it I will respond. If you mean the appropriateness of using the term 'idealistic' I have nothing further to say.

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates. — frank

It is all Plato we are hearing, from the early dialogues to the end, simply from the fact that he wrote the dialogues. We cannot make a clear distinction between where he might be repeating what Socrates said and where he is not. Some scholars have attempted to do this, but others reject this approach. One thing is clear: With the possible exception of what he wrote while awaiting the poison, Socrates did not write anything and Plato never speaks in the dialogues. In this dialogue attention is drawn to the fact that he was not present. Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues. His dialogues differ from Plato's, even when they are writing about the same thing. Compare, for example, Plato's Symposium and Xenophon's.

In what sense was Plato conservative?

I don't think he was. You said:

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? — frank

And I responded:

As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. — Fooloso4

Plato was an aristocrat but not a conservative. He was truly a revolutionary. Socrates was not an aristocrat but was a revolutionary.

Holy crap, man. — frank

Is this what stands as an argument for you? You have not told me why it makes a difference to our understanding of the text if Socrates was alone in calling Homer divine. It is right there in the text. No one who heard it disagreed or found it odd for him to have said this.

One of the things one could do is analyze the argument that Homer affirms that the soul can be separated from the body. — frank

Where in the dialogue is it? Stephanus number?

Who is Plato arguing with here? — frank

Where?

Who was the great Athenian law giver? — frank

What is the relevance to the dialogue? Again, a stephanus reference would be helpful.

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? — frank

See above. As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. Socrates certainly was not.

None of these things speak to the specifics of your claim that my conclusions are odd. None of them speak to your point that the Greeks did not deify Homer.

The setting of the work is Socrates last day. If you think that any conclusion I have arrived at is odd then I would welcome a discussion of it. The fact is what he called Homer divine. If I am wrong that others did not regard him this way what difference does that make?

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

From the article cited:

"The Hellenistic portrait belongs to another category. The heavy, archaizing locks framing the face, the fillet containing the hair rolled up in the back—also an archaizing trait—and the full, heavy beard all conjure up the majestic aura of a god."

Mention is also made in the Archelaos Relief , also known as, "Apotheosis of Homer":
http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Art/Ancient/en/HomerArchelaos.html

The point that should not be lost is that Socrates called him the "divine poet" in the Phaedo and in the Ion calls him the "best and most divine".

This is not the place to get into the concept of apotheosis. Here is a short quote from Wiki before I move on:

Apotheosis is the glorification of a subject to divine level and most commonly, the treatment of a human like a god.

No. That was simply the first thing that came up on search. For a more scholarly source:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3f59n8b0&chunk.id=d0e3428&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e3009&brand=ucpress

https://sententiaeantiquae.com/2018/07/05/homer-divine-not-human/

A comment made by Valentinus about Cebes got me thinking about why Plato chose to use him to play such an important part in Socrates’ last dialogue with his friends.

Early on Socrates makes a comment that will pr

ove to be ironic:

'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
what anyone may say.' (63a)

As we have seen, this is in part true but in part not. There are things he readily accepts but he keeps returning to the same questions. There is a peculiar mixture of remembering and forgetting. It is Cebes who remembers Socrates’ story of recollection, but he loses the scent of the current argument. He is a lover of philosophy, but not a philosopher. He is like the lover of music who is not musical. He admires what the philosophers have to say, but seems incapable of making the “greatest music”. (61a)

The danger of misologic leads to the question of who will keep Socratic philosophy alive? Put differently, philosophy needs genuine philosophers and not just scholars.

Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. He now introduces what is an all too common problem:

I run the risk of being in a mood not to love wisdom but to love victory., as do altogether uneducated people … I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible. (91a).

What Socrates is saying here may not be what he seems to be saying. He is not saying that he is not interested in “making the weaker argument stronger” so as to gain victory. He is not going to try to persuade others, but to persuade himself that what he says seems to be true. Now persuading himself that what he says seems to be true is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. It appears as if he is taking his own advice when he tells Cebes and Simmias that they themselves might be the most capable of singing their own incantations about death.

If this is correct, then what he is recommending is that sound arguments be put aside and in their place songs to make the soul sound. That something like this is what he has in mind is confirmed by what he goes on to say:

For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death. (91b)

Here, for the first time, Socrates suggests that there might be nothing at all for those who die, that they have met their end. The timing is important, coming immediately after the questioning of the ability of arguments to establish the truth.

Socrates returns to the argument but, following Cebes example of the weaver, introduces a new definition of death:

… this very thing is death - perishing of soul (91d)

Socrates once again returns to recollection, and both Cebes and Simmias agrees that:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body (92a)

With this agreement Socrates returns to Simmias’ argument that the soul is a tuning. It is only with this being agreed on that Socrates is able to dispute Simmias’ argument that the soul is an attunement.

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning
(92c)

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But
there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

Simmias denies this, but note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul".

'Well, but is one soul said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, while another is said to have thoughtlessness and wickedness and to be bad? And are we right in saying those things?'

'Quite right.'

'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?' (93c)

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning? (93e)

Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls. (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis. Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. — Wayfarer

A major theme of the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it? His concern is threefold: what this would mean for him, what it would mean for others, and what it would mean for philosophy if he openly professed atheism. We have seen what it meant for Socrates. What it means for philosophy is a perennial problem. There are always those ready to condemn and censor. What it means for others depends on the person. This is something Socrates will address.

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time. — Valentinus

In the Apology:

"And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. (39c)

He speaks here in his own name.

I checked a few other translations. I think I misread the one I used:

"I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs ..."

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.

Fooloso4 So - who is the reference to? — Wayfarer

The swans owe their prophetic power to Apollo. Socrates says: "I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god ..." which would seem to indicate that his master was Apollo. But (and with Plato there is always more to it) he goes on to say: "... that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo.

Short answer: I don't know.

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed. — magritte

I agree. This openness is a reflection of his zetetic skepticism. Knowing that he does not know he inquires. The other half of his openness may at first seem to be its opposite. The dialogues frequently end in aporia.

Plato brings an intimacy that is special to the dialogues. A chance to be there when they were. — Valentinus

Many who are taught to read philosophy are taught to pay attention only to the arguments. With Plato the setting, characters, and action are all essential elements.

I possess prophetic power from my master.

His 'daemon'? — Wayfarer

In the works of Plato Socrates daemon only warned him away when from doing things. One argument he made is that if death were bad he would have been warned.

In the first section of my reading I discussed Plato's absence. I will have a bit more to say toward the end.

We might still know of Socrates through Xenophon and Aristophanes, but although Xenophon had his admirers, including Machiavelli, he is not held in the same high esteem or enjoy the same popularity as Plato. From Xenophon we know of Socrates as a comic figure hanging from a basket in the Clouds.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. (84c)

This kind of hint should not be overlooked. Plato is well aware that the arguments will not persuade somebody who is going to go through it sufficiently. We see here that he is writing to two different audiences: those who in one way or another will benefit from hearing his “songs” and those who will not be charmed. Socrates will himself make this distinction.

Instead of another argument Socrates says:

… you must, it seems, think I have a poorer power of prophecy than the swans, who when they realize they must die, then sing more fully and sweetly than they've ever sung before, for joy that they are departing into the presence of the god whose servants they are. (84e-85a)

This is Socrates’ swan song. Interlaced with all his arguments are his songs, his music.

I believe, because, belonging as they do to Apollo, they are prophetic birds with foreknowledge of the blessings of Hades, and therefore sing and rejoice more greatly on that day than ever before. Now I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god, that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs, and that I'm departing this life with as good a cheer as they do. No; so far as that goes, you should say and ask whatever you wish, for as long as eleven Athenian gentlemen allow.' (85b)

There is something comical about Socrates’ likening himself to the swans. He is, by all descriptions, not at all like a swan in appearance.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

Later Socrates will talk about his “second sailing”. For the moment I will note only a few things. There is pilot in control of the raft. It goes wherever it is takes. Short of knowledge, what is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. He is fully aware that these accounts may not bring them safely to where they want to go. As an alternative he proposes “some divine account”. This safe account is one that is accepted, but does not stand up to exhaustive examination. They are stories that calm men’s fears and give them courage. Like Socrates’ prophetic swan song.

Simmas:

...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished … (86a-b)

This is an argument that deserves closer attention, but rather than respond immediately Socrates gives Cebes a chance to voice his objection to Socrates’ argument. Cebes says that he too, like Simmias, must make use of “some sort of likeness” (87b) The making of a likeness or image, the use of the imagination, eikasia, plays an important but often overlooked role in the dialogues. The reoccurring play of images operates throughout the dialogues on many levels.

Cebes draws the likeness: the soul is to the body as a weaver is to his cloak.

'The relation of soul to body would, I think, admit of the same comparison: anyone making the same points about them, that the soul is long-lived, while the body is weaker and shorter-lived, would in my view argue reasonably; true indeed, he might say, every soul wears out many bodies, especially in a life of many years-because, though the body may decay and perish while the man is still alive, still the soul will always weave afresh what's being worn out; nevertheless, when the soul does perish, it will have to be wearing its last garment, and must perish before that one alone; and when the soul has perished, then at last the body will reveal its natural weakness,moulder away quickly, and be gone. (88d-e)

Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments have shaken the confidence of the others.

Phaedo:

Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust. (88c)

Echecrates:

'What argument shall we ever trust now? (88d)

Simmias’ likeness of a raft in dangerous waters was prophetic. Can Socrates restore their trust in arguments? This is an issue of grave concern. Socrates suggests they should be in mourning if the argument cannot be brought back to life. (89b) Socrates makes the problem explicit:

“So that we don’t become haters of argument (misologic), as some become haters of human beings (misanthropic); for it is not possible for anyone to experience a greater evil than hating arguments. Hatred of arguments and hatred of human beings comes about in the same way, For hatred of human beings arises from artlessly trusting somebody to excess, and believing that human being to be in every way true and sound and trustworthy, and then a little later discovering that this person is wicked and untrustworthy - and then having this experience again with another. And whenever someone experiences this many times, and especially in the hands of just those he might regard as his most intimate friends and comrades, he then ends up taking offense all the time and hates all human beings and believes there’s nothing at all sound in anybody. (89d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time. (90b-c)

I think that this is a remarkable demonstration of the power of Plato’s insight into human psychology.

The danger here is that they may come to believe that philosophy has failed them. Socrates is about to die because he practiced philosophy and nothing he has said has convinced them that he will be better off for having practiced it. It is because of Socrates that they came to love philosophy, but it may be that philosophy cannot do what they expect of it. They are in danger of misologic, hating what they once loved.

Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures — Wayfarer

Right. I pointed this out. The opposite of soul is body, which would mean that the soul comes from body.

This got me thinking about why Plato chose Cebes to be a major participant in this dialogue. I will be trying to tie some things together in an upcoming post.

'You're right, Simmias,' said Cebes. 'It seems that half, as it were, of what is needed has been shown-that our soul existed before we were born; it must also be shown that it will exist after we've died, no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is going to be complete. (77b)

Cebes does not remember what went before, the cyclical claim about life and death he had agreed to. Socrates reminds them that it has been demonstrated, but is willing to go through it again. Their fears, he says, are childish. (77e) We might then wonder whether Socrates will attempt to persuade them the way one might persuade a child. And sure enough, that is exactly what Cebes asks him to do:

'Try to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather, not as if we were afraid ourselves-but maybe there's a child inside us, who has fears of that sort. Try to
persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as if it were a bogey-man.' (77e)

Cebes is too manly to admit that he is afraid of death.

What you should do,’ said Socrates, ‘is to sing him incantations each day until you sing away his fears.’
Then where, Socrates,’ he said, ‘are we to get hold of a good singer of such incantations, since you,’ he said, ‘are abandoning us?’ (77e-78a)

There are a few things here to note. First, Socrates tells him to sing his own incantations to sing away his fears. Second, Cebes sounds like a child when he accuses Socrates of abandoning them. Third, it appears that he really does not want proofs and demonstrations but incantations to charm away his fears. I think this is why they are so ready to accept what really are weak arguments. It may be why some readers are so ready to accept them as well.

'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' (78a)

Socrates says they could search both Greece and foreign cultures to find a singer of incantations to spend their money on. In the earlier passage on purification he also abruptly talks in terms of monetary exchange, but suggests that thoughtfulness is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold. The incantational songs are the Greek and foreign mysteries and mythologies.

But Socrates says that they are not needed, that there is no one and no song more capable of preparing them for death than themselves by their own thoughtfulness, courage, moderation, justice, and true virtue.

At Cebes urging they return to the point they left off. Socrates uses an argument that Descartes will borrow:

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?' (78c)

Cebes agrees.

Then aren’t those very things that are always self-same and keep to the same condition most likely to be non-composites; and aren’t those that vary from one moment to another and are never in the self-same condition likely to be composites? (78c)

Cebes forgets about “the child inside us”. Their fear of death and turmoil at Socrates’ impending death are at odds with something that is always self-same and keeps to the same condition.

Socrates now returns to the discussion of Being, the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, what is invariant and constant, and contrasts them with the many beautiful things and equal objects, that is, things that change. (78d-e)

'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?' (79a)

Cebes agrees, no doubt he has heard Socrates talk about the Forms. But the distinction between the visible and intelligible realm in the Republic is not the same as the distinction between the visible and unseen. Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchangeable.

In accord with this distinction Socrates divides body and soul, here and There, the senses and thoughtfulness, master and slave, divine and mortal.

'Whereas whenever it studies alone by itself, the soul departs yonder towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying, and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company, whenever it has come to be alone by itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its contact with things of a similar kind; and this condition of it is called "phronesis", is it not?' (79d)

I left the Greek term phronesis untranslated here. The online translation uses ‘wisdom’, Brann uses ‘thoughtfulness’. It is commonly translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Brann’s choice is intended to distinguish phronesis from sophia, that is, wisdom and to emphasize thatphronesis, “ … in spite of its strong connotation with the heights of intellectual vision in this dialogue, refer in its most basic meaning to a thoroughly healthy state of mind - to good sense and sound judgment”.


What Socrates here calls ‘ phronesis’ is instead the state of the soul separated from the body. The condition Socrates elsewhere calls death. The attempted division does not hold. Practical wisdom is about living, the union of body and soul. The soul alone has no use for phronesis or thoughtfulness. We should recall that Socrates previously said that knowledge of things themselves, the Forms, is only possible, if possible at all, in death. Despite the high flown language, Socrates’ feet remain firmly on the ground, tethered byphronesis.

Don't you think the divine is naturally adapted for ruling and domination, whereas the mortal is adapted for being ruled and for service?'
'I do.'(80a)

It is instructive to compare this with the divisions of the soul in the Republic. A tripartite soul undermines the argument for a unitary soul. The problem of self-rule in the Republic is not a matter of competition between the body and soul, but takes place within the soul itself and introduces an element that is absent here: thumos or spiritedness, the love of honor and recognition, loyalty, anger, defensiveness, and so on. With the split between body and soul desire, eros, is atopos, without a place. Socrates has tied it to the body, but philosophy, the love of wisdom is described in the Symposium as eros and is not a bodily desire. Is eros then an in between, between body and soul?


The assertion of separation and the unchangeable nature of soul now becomes more doubtful:

'Whereas, I imagine, if it is separated from the body when it has been polluted and made impure, because it has always been with the body, has served and loved it, and been so bewitched by it, by its passions and pleasures, that it thinks nothing else real save what is corporeal-what can be touched and seen, drunk and eaten, or used for sexual enjoyment-yet it has been accustomed to hate and shun and tremble before what is obscure to the eyes and invisible, but
intelligible and grasped by philosophy; do you think a soul in that condition will be released herself all by herself and unadulterated ?' (81b)

Cebes agrees. Previously he agreed that the soul is unchangeable but he has changed his unseen mind.

What happens next seems to undo what has been done. The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

I will leave him to address your concerns - yet again — Amity

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond. Disagreement is one thing, dishonesty another. Disagreement I address, dishonesty I call out and the conversation ends.