#6:

Hegel is opposing his claim that:

... truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts

with the claim that it is not the concept but the feeling and intuition or immediate knowing of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is said of it.

With regard to quantum mechanics and time: "Quantum Leaps, Long Assumed to Be Instantaneous, Take Time" https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-leaps-long-assumed-to-be-instantaneous-take-time-20190605/

This illustrates the problem of arguments about reality based on our lack of understanding of the quantum world.

I am agnostic regarding the observer's role at the quantum level, but at larger scales I do not think the observer effects the outcome of what is observed, although what is observed changes with the position of the observer.

With regard to Rovelli's comment about realism and relationalism, I have the same problem I do with all theories of quantum mechanics.

This is part of what Wittgenstein was getting at regarding solipsism. He is not using solipsism in the sense of doubting the existence of an external world or other minds but rather, but as the metaphysical subject. The I alone, solus ipse, sees the world, experiences, describes, lives my life.

First, I assume that the only way to address this is through/from an inward-outward view of the matter, as per the G.E.M Anscombe quote from above. — Wallows

I don't follow. Address what? You quoted several things.

Second, this raises the issue of the nature of experience, I think. — Wallows

Experience is always my experience.

Third, what is ethical and mystical are those features of talking about the inward workings of the mind in an intersubjective manner. — Wallows

I don't think so. The inward workings of the mind would be the purview of psychology. The ethical and mystical relate to the world - that it is and how it is as it waxes and wanes.

3. … the subject matter is not exhausted in its aims; rather, it is exhaustively treated when it is worked out. Nor is the result which is reached the actual whole itself; rather, the whole is the result together with the way the result comes to be.

The whole of the subject matter includes not just the result of what has been worked out but the working out itself, which is to say, the working itself out.

… differentiatedness is instead the limit of the thing at stake. It is where the thing which is at stake ceases, or it is what that thing is not.

The thing at stake, the subject matter, die Sache selbst, is not a thing-in-itself, Ding an sich. In other words, it is not something to be treated as a subject does an object that stands apart.

Instead of dwelling on the thing at issue and forgetting itself in it, that sort of knowing is always grasping at something else.

That is, instead of standing apart one must stand within. The term ‘subject matter’ rather than ‘object matter’ is suggestive.

5. The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of that truth.

The truth exists only in the system of knowledge of the truth.

To participate in the collaborative effort at bringing philosophy nearer to the form of science – to bring it nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing – is the task I have set for myself.

Hegel sees himself as a participant in a collaborative effort with those who are lovers of knowledge, that is, the philosophers who preceded him, of whom it can be said that they are not actual knowers. To the extent he succeeds he will be the first to actually know.

The inner necessity that knowing should be science lies in the nature of knowing, and the satisfactory explanation for this inner necessity is solely the exposition of philosophy itself.

Hegel’s task is the exposition of the inner necessity of knowing, that knowing is the system of science.

However, external necessity, insofar as this is grasped in a universal manner and insofar as personal contingencies and individual motivations are set aside, is the same as the internal necessity which takes on the shape in which time presents the existence of its moments. To demonstrate that it is now time for philosophy to be elevated into science would therefore be the only true justification of any attempt that has this as its aim, because it would demonstrate the necessity of that aim, and, at the same time, it would be the realization of the aim itself.

The exposition of the inner necessity is externally realized in time, and Hegel will demonstrate that now is with his philosophy the time for philosophy to become actual knowing.

So, to present this issue from calculus, as I approach the limit between "my world" and "the world", there is an infinitesimal joint discontinuity, where "my world" ends and "the world" begins? — Wallows

How could we know how close we get? But this is the wrong way to look at it.

With regard to the facts of the world we should be able to agree. But my world is not the world of facts. Consider what he says about the world of the happy man. When I die the world as I know it ends, but this does not mean it ends at that point for everyone else.

The impression I get is that this (commercial) reactonary 'posture' is to suggest 'philosophy' could be a name that might be given to 'a valuable process of hypothesis stimulation and comparison'. — fresco

What are you going on about? There is nothing commercial or reactionary about what he says. He points to Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Bohr and Einstein for acknowledging the importance of philosophy. Are you going to accuse them of commercial reactionary posturing as well?

I recommend you read Rovelli's 'The Order of Time' before you give judgement on his opinion on 'temporality', especially when he devotes part of it to show how 'time' can be eliminated from the fundamental equations of physics. — fresco

You completely miss the point he makes with regard to the fundamental equations of physics. Simply put, they are inadequate as an explanation of the universe, precisely because they cannot account for time.

Rather than pointing to books that some of us have not read, and apparently others have not read carefully enough, I will quote from a couple of interviews with Rovelli that everyone can read.

When asked in an interview about the biggest unanswered question about time, he responded:

The biggest of the open questions is: Why is the future so different from the past? This is something that is not written into the laws of physics — the fundamental laws of physics don’t distinguish the past from the future. This is still something mysterious, I believe.

https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/what-time-physicist-carlo-rovelli-ponders-enigmatic-fourth-dimension-ncna895226

When asked about the atemporality of the universe he said:

I do not think that the universe is fundamentally atemporal. The main point of the book is that there isn’t a single notion of time that is either true or false. What we call time is a rich, stratified concept; it has many layers. Some of time’s layers apply only at limited scales within limited domains. This does not make them illusions.

https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.4.20190219a/full/

What makes you say this is a skeptical argument? — Wallows

There are various forms of skepticism. As opposed to modern skepticism the ancient skeptic does not claim that we cannot know, as if this were a thing known, but only that we do not know.

The limits are knowledge are seen in that we cannot identify or name all of the simple objects, and in the distinction between the world and my world.

You still don't get it. — fresco

No, it is that you do not get it, and you don't seem to be aware of what 'it' is.

The only straw men are of your making - your attack on non-present 'absolutists' and axioms.

As far as I know, relative to some of the issues involving 'time' and 'matter' in frontier physics (Rovelli, for example), 'the age of the universe' has zero status in terms of 'interest value'. — fresco

It is not that the age of the universe is of no great importance. Any lack of interest is due to the fact that there is general agreement as to its age. Despite Rovelli's claim that the nature of time is “perhaps the greatest remaining mystery”, he does not think that the universe is atemporal. He may not be involved with the question of its age but does not dismiss the question as vacuous.

Richard Feynman's riposte to such questions..'Shut up and calculate !' — fresco

Rovelli wrote a paper published in Scientific American entitled: "Physics Needs Philosophy / Philosophy Needs Physics". https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/physics-needs-philosophy-philosophy-needs-physics/

Sean Carroll, Ray Smolin, and others stress the importance of cross-disciplinary work between philosophy and physics. Feynman, who said, "“philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds” is not the final word on this.

So questions like 'Is it reasonable to believe that the universe is 14 billion years old ?' are rendered vacuous, because they are predicated on particular views of 'time' and 'the universe' which are not given, they are human constructs whose reasonable use is contextually bound. — fresco

The question of the age of the universe cannot be dismissed as vacuous by invoking Sellars' "myth of the given". Of course the determination of the age of the universe is not a given. I don't think anyone here has said otherwise. The question of the reasonableness of accepting the age of the universe can be turned around - is it reasonable to deny the age of the universe? And if so then on what basis? The age of the universe represents our best estimate given the current state of our understanding, methods of calculation, instrumentation, principle assumptions, and so on, all of which are subject to change, resulted in a revised estimate.

So, philosophical systems have grown organically. — Amity

In a double sense. It is not just that they have grown individually and separately but that they have grown one from the other to form the whole.

Traditionally, they have been treated only in opposition to each other and arguments made as to which one is right and wrong.

Some things is posted in the Tractatus reading group thread page 14.

5.6
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
— T

What is the significance of his shift from language and the world to “my language” and “my world”? The self cannot be found in the world. It can play no part in logical relationships, and propositions about it are nonsense. My world and my language do not connote a relationship between facts or objects.

My language means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.


5.61
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.
— T

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world.

5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
— T

In what way does the limits of language show that the world is my world? Suppose someone were to reject W.’s claim saying: “There must be more to my world”, to which the response would be: “What more is there”? And of course no answer could be given. If an answer could be given, whatever is said would be within that limit. I take this to be a form of skepticism. He is not denying that there may be more than I can say or think but that it is nonsense to say this because it does not point to anything. It does not mark a limit to the world or to language but to my world and the language I understand. But the same is true for all of us.

Solipsism - solus "alone" and ipse "self”. That language which alone I understand, is that language which solus ipse is understood. If there is a language I do not understand then even though the propositions are in proper logical order to picture reality, they are for me without sense (sinnlos) because I do not know what state of affairs they represent. They cannot represent if they cannot be understood.

5.621
The world and life are one.
5.63
I am my world. (The microcosm.)
— T

The world is all that is the case (1). The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. This is the point of the cube having two facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. A picture is a fact. (2.141)The facts of the world include the representation of facts.




5.631
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—

5.632
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T

“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book is not something that is found in the book.



5.633
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
— T

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world.

That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.

5.634
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.
— T

What is the connection between the metaphysical subject and the contingency of facts?

5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
— T

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.

5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world.
— T
My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.



The soul is not part of the natural world.

The “I” plays a role in determining the facts.

There is a limit to knowledge based on the fact that we cannot identify or name all of the simple objects.

“My language” means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.

There is a relationship between the “I” which is not a part of the world it represents factually.

Solipsism: The “I” alone (solus "alone" and ipse "self”) is a limit of the world, the limit of what I can say and think. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves.

The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. My world, the microcosm, is the world as I represent it.

“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book (The World as I found it) is not something that is found in the book. The I is a limit of the world.

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.

My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.


The self or I or soul or subject is free. It is not a part of the world. The world is for each of us mine - my world, the world as I perceive it, the world as I represent it in my language, the world as I live it. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. This limit marks a form of skepticism.

In Classical Chinese philosophy there is the School of Names. One of its dialogues is "White horse is not horse". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/When_a_white_horse_is_not_a_horse

From #1. The first thing at issue is:

… the way to present philosophical truth.

It is:

because philosophy essentially is in the element of universality, which encompasses the particular within itself … its perfect essence, would be expressed in the goal of the work and in its final results, and that the way the project is in fact carried out would be what is inessential.

What is essential to the question of how to present philosophical truth is not how presentation is carried out, but the final result. The particular must be understood within the universal. The goal is the articulation of the whole. Short of that goal we have not reached what is essential.

#2

One must:

… comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive development of truth …

rather than seeing:

... only contradiction in that diversity.

It is as it is with the plant and its bud, blossom, and fruit:

… their fluid nature makes them into moments of an organic unity in which they are not only not in conflict with each other, but rather, one is equally as necessary as the other, and it is this equal necessity which alone constitutes the life of the whole.

Consciousness must know:

… how to free the contradiction from its one-sidedness …

and:

how to sustain it as free-standing.

It must:

… take cognizance of the moments as reciprocally necessary.

Tim, could you take a look at one of the translations I linked to and see if you can find some common numbering? The two I linked use the same numbering system.

Added: What you have as the beginning of #6 is the beginning of #3:

3. Those who demand both such explanations and their satisfactions may well look as if they are really in pursuit of what is essential. (Pinkard)

3. Demanding and Supplying these [superficial] explanations passes readily enough as a concern with what is essential. (Miller)

Is that remark purely about the link?
Or do you object to using Miller's translation? — Valentinus

It was about the Baille translation. I deleted the link.

I think the Miller is still widely used. It was what we used in the last class I took, but that was 20 years ago. The problem is not with the translation but with what happens when you copy and paste from it. Some letters do not copy correctly and have to be fixed.

I am going to start by using both Miller and Pinkard to see if there is much of a difference.

My "philosophy" here is that no matter how good my vision is, there is always a blind spot ... — tim wood

But not Hegel's philosophy! According to him of course.

I was asking for an example of a weed philosophy might pull. — frank

I was thinking in terms of the development of character which was central to the ancient schools of philosophy but not so much to modern and contemporary philosophy.

I suppose a weed is something that one does not want growing. What some may see as a weed other might see as a wildflower.

I deleted the Baille link. The Pinkard copies and pastes cleanly, the Miller misreads some letters.

Same work by Hegel. Pinkard:

1. In the preface to a philosophical work, it is customary for the author to give an explanation ...

Miller:

I. It is customary to preface a work With an explanation of the author's aim ...

I think that's Phenomenology of Mind - different book. But that's not to say the two prefaces won't compliment each other! — tim wood

The German title is "Phänomenologie des Geistes". Geistes is translated as either Spirit or Mind. Same book. The link I provided is not the Kaufmann translation. It is Baille's.

Could you tell me the first few words of the translation you are using?

Here is another online translation, by Miller: http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Marxist_Philosophy/Hegel_and_Feuerbach_files/Hegel-Phenomenology-of-Spirit.pdf

And another by Pickard: https://libcom.org/files/Georg%20Wilhelm%20Friedrich%20Hegel%20-%20The%20Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit%20(Terry%20Pinkard%20Translation).pdf

Couldn't find an online copy of Kaufmann.

[Deleted. Not the book tim wood is using and not one of the better translations of Hegel]

I will join in.

I got into Plotinus before Plato, so now when I read Plato I'm interpreting it all through Plotinus. — frank

That is a common problem. I am not sure we can really get behind those who came later and stand between us, but being aware of it helps.

Do you interpret Plato through the lens of someone who came later? — frank

Those who influenced my reading of Plato are close readers of the text. It is always a question of textual support, and this means how well the interpretation connects all the parts while shedding light on the whole. There is still plenty of room for disagreement though.

We should do a reading group and see where we agree and disagree. — frank

I cannot commit to leading a group but I would certainly participate. The Republic would be my choice.

Weeds? — frank

Thoughts, beliefs, opinions, habits, attitudes that, so to speak, steal the nutrients and moisture from the soil and block the sun. The words culture, cultivate, and agriculture are closely related.

My approach is not archaeological. The works of Plato and Aristotle, for example, are in my opinion as vital today as they were when they were written. It is not bones and dust but thinkers of extraordinary insight speaking to us. While our world is in some ways much different than theirs, but we are in many ways not so different from them.

In line with the agricultural metaphor, I would say that philosophy not only provides nutrients, it cultivates - it removes the weeds.

I see my remark went right over your head.

The liar-in-chief is at it again (actually he never stops), touting under his administration “America’s environmental leadership”.

Confidential communications sent by British ambassador to the United States critical of Trump and his administration were leaked. He hurt Trump's feelings and Trump now says he will not deal with the ambassador, thus demonstrating the legitimacy of the ambassador's concerns.

If only there was a thread on the Tractatus that discussed this.

Here is an interesting discussion between Davies and scientists from several different disciplines entitled "The Reality Club": https://www.edge.org/discourse/science_faith.html

I'm referring to the units of measurement. — Wayfarer

Light is used as a unit of measurement.

But the units in which it is measured are devised by humans and settled by convention. — Wayfarer

Of course. There is no human activities, including measurements, that are not devised by humans

I have previously quoted this passage in relation to this issue — Wayfarer

Our understanding of time, the quantum world, and the universe as a whole are based on inadequate theoretical models. Trying to draw conclusions based on what we do not understand is fraught with problems.

When LaPlace's daemon held sway, then science was happy to shout it from the rooftops. When Copenhagen comes along, the whole issue is kicked into the long grass. — Wayfarer

Both are very much alive for scientists and philosophers, and both lead to questionable speculative conclusions.

I know that I can't 'do the math' ... — Wayfarer

It is not about the math. We simply do not understand what is going on. We do not even have agreement as to what the theories mean.

... without conceding that it represents the ultimate facts of the Universe, which is what is at issue. — Wayfarer

You overstate the case. It is not about ultimate facts. We plod along. Some are committed to explanations in terms of the stuff of the world, others claim that this is not sufficient. My position is that a great deal of progress has been made by those who are committed to the former, while the nay-sayers chase a moving target.




.

As a pragmatist I consider the 'reality' debate to be futile and I doubt whether 'refinement of limits of applicability of scientific paradigms' can be equated with your term 'accuracy'. — fresco

As a pragmatist I would think you would be concerned with what works. Let's, as you suggest:

Consider the demise of 'the aether' — fresco

It either exists or does not exist, or, given your aversion to the term, it is either present and plays a role in the physical world or does not. The assumption of its presence played an important role in the advancement of our understanding of light and gravity. The wave theory of light, was based on the theory of the luminiferous aether.

Einstein concludes an address in 1920 "Ether and the Theory of Relativity":

Recapitulating, we may say that according to the general theory of relativity space is endowed with physical qualities; in this sense, therefore, there exists an ether. According to the general theory of relativity space without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there not only would be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and time (measuring-rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time intervals in the physical sense. But this ether may not be thought of as endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked through time. The idea of motion may not be applied to it.

With regard to the classical notion of the aether Einstein retained only the notion that space has physical properties. Part of the progress of science is through its mistakes, but another part is through the correction of its mistakes. But there can be no mistakes or corrections if there is no accuracy of description and explanation.

One thing I find interesting is the support of the "west coast Straussians", academic political philosophers, conservatives and followers of the late Leo Strauss who frequently teach and write about Aristotle. They may give lip service to issues of character and human excellence and yet seem to turn a blind eye when it comes to Trump. Despite their extensive learning with all their learning they seem to have not learned some very basic things about demagogues and tyrants.

Are you making a connection between them or are they two separate subject matters that interest you?

The word 'fact' comes from the Latin facere -to construct. — fresco

The Latin for construct is 'construo'. Facere means more generally to act or do, and by extension to make or construct. Regardless of the etymology the question remains whether a fact is an artifact.

Bohr can be paraphrased as saying, ''atomic particles' are the names we give to particular types of expected interaction we have as observers'. — fresco

I am not going to get into the debate of the Copenhagen interpretation. I know enough to know that I am not properly equipped to enter into such a discussion. Although there are some who think it has been settled, the debate continues between those who are so equipped.

There is no 'representation' implied. If 'breaking atomic bonds' is a concept which observers find useful to predict further observation — fresco

I used representation in response to the quote by Kant cited by Wayfarer. The images of molecules breaking chemical bonds is not simply a concept useful to predict further observation it is itself something observed happening, the observation of a process. The process is real.

Added:

The description of the process may be incomplete or inaccurate but the history of science shows that we are capable of providing more accurate descriptions over time. The more accurate the description the closer it is to the way things are, not simply from the human conceptual and observational perspective, but in relation to the events themselves.

Actually, didn't Trump settle with this rape victim? I remember it happening just before the election. — ssu

According to Newsweek he lawyer claimed the suit was dropped because of "numerous threats" against her. It seems likely there was also money changing hands. It's a familiar pattern with Trump - deny, deny, and deny and if necessary intimidate and pay them off.

There's no evidence that Trump had sexual contact with underage girls. It's not his style. He likes beauty queens, showgirls, glamour girls. Look at his wives. I don't believe he directly did anything. — fishfry

Apparently he likes the beauty queens who compete in Miss Teen USA. In his own words:

Well, I'll tell you the funniest is that I’ll go backstage before a show, and everyone's getting dressed and ready and everything else, and you know, no men are anywhere. And I'm allowed to go in because I'm the owner of the pageant and therefore I'm inspecting it. You know, I'm inspecting, I want to make sure that everything is good.

You know, the dresses. ‘Is everyone okay?’ You know, they're standing there with no clothes. ‘Is everybody okay?’ And you see these incredible looking women, and so, I sort of get away with things like that. But no, I've been very good.

Some of these "incredible looking women" were as young as 14 and none older than 19.

There is a big difference between Trump's trophy wives and females he grabs by the pussy or allegedly rapes.

With regard to Epstein Trump told New York Magazine in 2002:

He’s a lot of fun to be with. It is even said that he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side.

One might take this to mean that Epstein likes them on the younger side, but given Trump's behavior at Miss Teen USA, he does too.

None of this is evidence of Trump having sexual contact with underage girls, but then there is the story from 1994 of the 13 year old girl who filed suit against Trump for raping her in Epstein's apartment. From Newsweek, 11/16/17:

In 1994, Trump went to a party with Jeffrey Epstein, a billionaire who was a notorious registered sex offender, and raped a 13-year-old girl that night in what was a "savage sexual attack," according to a lawsuit filed in June 2016 by "Jane Doe." The account was corroborated by a witness in the suit, who claimed to have watched as the child performed various sexual acts on Trump and Epstein even after the two were advised she was a minor.

"Immediately following this rape Defendant Trump threatened me that, were I ever to reveal any of the details of Defendant Trump's sexual and physical abuse of me, my family and I would be physically harmed if not killed," Jane Doe wrote in the lawsuit, filed in New York.

The lawsuit was dropped in November 2016, just four days before the election, with Jane Doe's attorneys citing "numerous threats" against her.

I think the subtle point you're not seeing here, is that even 'this vast universe' you speak of, is still considered here from an implicitly human perspective. — Wayfarer

I don't think the point is subtle at all.

... science measures time in units relative to the rotation of the earth around the sun and distances of kilometers and so on. — Wayfarer

This is simply not true. Physicists use light. The geological time scale is based on prior events of earth's history.

But the reality is vaster than even that, because it is not constrained by our human sensory and intellectual faculties. It's 'vast' in a way that even science can't imagine! — Wayfarer

And this shows the limits of the subjective pole and why it is only related to our limited understanding and not to what is.

I'm not sceptical in the sense of doubting scientifically-established facts as we rely on them every day. — Wayfarer

What I am getting at is whether these facts are artifacts. Do molecules break atomic bonds or is it this just a "mere representation"?

Hence the soul is as the hand is; for the hand is a tool of tools, and the intellect is a form of forms and sense a form objects of perception. — Valentinus

I saw this when I found the other passage. I wonder how far he intends for us to push the analogy. The tool requires the hand to manipulate it. If the intellect is analogous that suggests that the reception of forms by the intellect and senses is not passive.

What I'm arguing, however, is that there is an ineluctably subjective pole or aspect to all of our knowledge of the world, including scientific theories about the age of the world, and so on. — Wayfarer

I agree with this, but I also maintain that the world is as it is independent of our knowledge of it. We do not know the world as it is but as it is for us. It is here, the world as it is for us that we find the two poles. Most of what is going on in the universe we know nothing of. Some of those things we will come to discover but others we will never know anything of given the vastness of the universe.

One question that remains is whether our knowledge must always be as it is because we are as we are. Is it possible to know at least some things as they are? We know, for example, the results of what happens when chemicals combine. A chemistry text book will tell us about atoms and molecules and chemical bonds, but is this just "our ways of seeing and acting on things"? We have images of molecules breaking chemical bonds. These images would not be possible without our instrumentation but are they merely artifacts of it or does the image capture what is really going on at the molecular level?