Philosophers desire to know the truth, they create arguments based on the truth and ignore this fundamental aspect to any understanding, interpretative relevance. — Judaka

Certainly not philosophers concerned with hermeneutics and the interpretation of texts.There is a extensive and active literature on these issues.

This leaves me to question the idea of a rule that you appear to be referring to which is somehow removed from this "larger activity". — Luke

That might be the case when someone who is unfamiliar with the larger activity comes across the rule, an anthropologist, for example, studying a tribe.

Therefore, rules or grammar determine proper and improper meaning. — Luke

The syntactical rules determine word order or structure of a sentence but the understanding of the those rules do not tell us what it means to put the cat on the mat. If I do not know the grammar I might say: "Put you out the cat". You may understand each of the words but not the combination. If, on the other hand, the direction was grammatical you will not understand what you are to do unless you understand the meaning of each of the words. Then again, you might understand the words but still not understand what you are to do. What does it mean to put the cat out? Out of the room? Out of the house? Anesthetize? Are you to put the cat out just now or every time the cat is in?

Spinoza's formulation is "God or Nature", that is, God = Nature.

Some are of the opinion that he used the term God as an expedient or subterfuge. One could not at that time speak as freely as we do today. Others think that he was truly pious, a believer, only not a believer in the traditional characterizations of God.

You are right that there is no referent or bearer of the name God. Perhaps that should be your focus.

126. The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

There is a connection here with 90:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

The possibility of new discoveries and inventions is the possibility of new phenomena. An abuse of language stands in the way of such possibilities.

Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. (90)

This inquiry is preliminary, clearing away misunderstanding by:

... call[ing] to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. (90)

Wittgenstein makes a connection between the kinds of statements we make about phenomena, how we represent phenomena, and the possibilities of phenomena. Overcoming conceptual confusion engendered by an entanglement in grammatical rules requires seeing things from the perspective of a representative overview. A representative overview is not simply a matter of what is seen from this vantage point but via representing, picturing, conceiving, imagining.

The "fertile point of view" of "a Copernicus or a Darwin" is a conceptual revolution, the displacement of the Earth as the center or the rejection of kinds in favor of variations. We do not simply see things as the are but according to the way we represent or picture them.

With regard to himself, Wittgenstein says:

Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV42)

This is another way in which phenomena are made possible. Another way in which connections are made. Another way of seeing things.

One’s way of seeing things was of central importance to Wittgenstein:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV 16)

I trust that you are using the generic "you" here, as I was only trying to get a better handle on the section. I thought the article might be helpful to anyone else who might have had difficulty with the section. — Luke

"You" in this case meant me and "someone" is Sluga.

Just to return to this, would you agree that meaning can be found in the rules (perhaps even typically)? — Luke

If one understands the rules then one knows what to do, but a set of rules is meaningless if one does not understand them. The meaning is not in the rules but in some larger activity. If, for example, the rules for how a knight or bishop moves in chess cannot be understood without knowing what these pieces are, that they are moved on a chess board, etc. The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use.

But yet these two Phenomena are Categorically different things. The Electromagnetic thing is explained by Science but the Redness thing has no Scientific explanation. — SteveKlinko

Since we cannot explain the "Redness thing" we cannot determine whether mental phenomena are categorically different, except in the sense that one can be explained and the other cannot. If the mental can eventually be explained in physical terms then whether they are categorically different would depend on how one categorizes things.

But the earliest church took the strands of the record (passed on by recounting stories) and made executive decisions about what would be kept and what would not be kept. We don't have the minutes of those editing sessions. — Bitter Crank

We should not assume that these stories were intended to be historical records. The practice of chreia, found in compositional textbooks used to teach writing and rhetoric, called Progymnasmata were standard pedagogical exercises that school students at that time learned. A chreia is defined as: a brief statement or action that is aptly attributed to some person. Something that is "aptly attributed" is not something the person actually said or did but shows us something about that person. These rhetorical practices influenced the writing of the gospels (see David B. Gowler's article in "The Historical Jesus in Context").

As to "minutes of those editing sessions" we have the writings of Irenaeus, including "Against Heresies", which rejects gospels influenced by Gnosticism. He appealed to the "rule of faith" which he described as:

…this faith: in one God, the Father Almighty, who made the heaven and the earth and the seas and all the things that are in them; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who was made flesh for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who made known through the prophets the plan of salvation, and the coming, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the bodily ascension into heaven of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and his future appearing from heaven in the glory of the Father to sum up all things and to raise anew all flesh of the whole human race…

Gospels that supported these beliefs were included and those that did not were rejected as heretical.

We should not overlook the importance of inspiration, but this cuts both ways. Literally the indwelling of spirit, inspiration was considered the word of God, the Holy Spirit, except, of course, when the inspired writing did not fit the criteria set out in the orthodoxy of the rule of faith.

The gospel of Mark was problematic because it originally ended with the empty tomb. No story of resurrection. The solution was to add a new ending.

Something that someone just knows but cannot put into words? — Pussycat

Yes. We went over this.

I am asking, because it looked like a sermon to me, and I wouldn't take Wittgenstein to be a preacher. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein was deeply concerned with religious and moral matters. But here you are quoting me regarding things known that cannot be put into words. That is not a sermon by Wittgenstein.

Thanks Luke. Always nice to see that someone agrees with you.

With regard to connections, I think there is a connection between what Wittgenstein says in the draft of Philosophical Remarks about writing only for the few, the key to the lock, and the importance of seeing connections. There are connections made in the text that are not made explicit, connections that we have to make if we are to unlock the door.

One suggestion is to pay attention to where there is a paragraph or two that seems out of place, disconnected with the issue that seems to be under discussion.

You are trying to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot.

I actually am trying to make a distinction between Scientific Phenomena and Mental Phenomena. — SteveKlinko

So this is why I said there was an ambiguity with the term phenomena. In one sense all phenomena are mental -the way something appears or shows itself to us. But the term is also used to mean what is experienced in the sense of the object that is experienced. In the latter sense some distinguish phenomena from noumena.

As to whether there is a difference between scientific phenomena and mental phenomena, since, as you say, there is an explanatory gap, the distinction is questionable. If there will eventually be an adequate explanation I think it is likely to be a physical explanation, although others do not think consciousness can be reduced to the physical.

It seems like you actually think there is 670nm Electromagnetic Waves banging around in your Brain when you have a Dream about something Red. Any Electromagnetic Phenomena in your Brain has nothing to do with the 670nm Phenomena in the external World. — SteveKlinko

No, I do not think that there are 670nm Electromagnetic Waves banging around any more than I think there is a little house and a little dog banging around in my brain when I have a dream about a house or a dog. What I actually think is that there are brain states and that we are learning more and more about how to identify and measure them. The brain is able to detect something red and the resulting brain state will differ from the detection of something blue. It would be theoretically possible to conclude from the brain state that someone is seeing something red. Since the state of the brain is different when we dream, seeing something red in a dream may differ from seeing something red in the external world, but in both cases there are corresponding brain states.

Any Electromagnetic Phenomena in your Brain has nothing to do with the 670nm Phenomena in the external World. — SteveKlinko

It is actually not simply an electromagnetic phenomena in your brain. There is, however, a physical brain state that corresponds to the 670nm phenomena in the external world.. It is a far more complex physical state, but that brain state is a physical phenomenon. One that can, at least theoretically, be detected and measured. There must be some change in brain state when we see something red that differs from the brain state of seeing something blue.

The source of our disagreement starts here:

Conscious Sensory Experience seems to be in a Category of Phenomena that is not part of any known Category of Scientific Phenomena. — SteveKlinko

I took this to be a distinction between scientific phenomena and some other kind of phenomena, mental phenomena, that is outside the bounds of science.

Looking back I see you said:

It is not Super Natural but it is Super Scientific, and I fully expect that Science will get it's thinking together and figure this out someday. — SteveKlinko

I do not know what you mean by "Super Scientific", but we are in agreement that it is something that science can figure it out. We are still at the beginning stages of such an understanding.

What valid reasoning/logic allows for solipsism to not necessarily be true? — gsky1

If you take solipsism seriously then why would you ask others who you cannot be certain exist about it?

It is this idea of of a necessary truth that creates the snag. Doubt can be raised but the possibility of raising doubt is not a good reason to doubt. Why would one even think that solipsism is true? What does one have to give up in order to accept it as true?

But that has been my point right along.

Are you agreeing with me...or are you disagreeing? — Frank Apisa

If that has been your point right along then I am agreeing, although I have been known to disagree with myself.

Sorry, Fooloso...not meaning to be rude, but I have no idea of what the hell you are talking about or where you are heading with your comments. — Frank Apisa

Really? I think it is quite clear. Not knowing whether God exists or not does not mean we should conclude that it is as likely that he does as it is that he does not.

In order for you to prove that or for me to prove that i think you are wrong we would both have to read many books and do several years of study. In my opinion the writings of Paul very finely compliment what Jesus wrote. I believe Jesus came across as rational and i also believe Paul came across as rational. The old testament has things to say also that would both agree with what was said about Jesus in the new testament and as well what Paul said. — James Statter

Neither Jesus nor Paul would have referred to the Hebrew Bible as the old testament. If we look at Jesus' Sermon on the Mount it is clear that he wished to fulfill the Law not abolish it. It was central to his teaching, although his interpretation differed from the Pharisees. Paul, however, contrary to Jesus, declares the Law is not necessary. I don't think the difference can be any clearer.

We really have no idea what Jesus might have said and what was filtered and altered by the followers of Paul. What we do know, according to Paul, is that Jesus' disciples were in fundamental disagreement with him regarding the importance of the Law.

One other thing should be pointed out. There were a variety of gospels that were censored and destroyed by the early Church Fathers. Based on those that have survived it is clear that the superficially uniform message of the NT could not have been maintained if the self appointed authorities had not imposed an official canon.

That is why I wrote: "...we cannot even narrow it down to "it is more likely no gods" or "it is more likely at least one god exists."

You were taking exception to that. — Frank Apisa

We do not know if there is life on Mars but this does not mean that it is as likely to be true that there is as it is that there is not. We do not know if the sun will rise tomorrow, but that does not mean that it is as likely to not rise as it is that it will rise. Not knowing something does not mean that it is as likely to be true as false. We need to consider why someone thinks something is or is not likely to be the case.

Okay...a challenge.

Using reason, logic, math, or science...present an argument that...it is more likely that there are no gods than that there is at least one. — Frank Apisa

What one takes to be likely is based on evidence and temperament. I find no evidence that leads me to think it is likely that there is a God. I have no convictions that lead me to think that there is a God. Someone else, however, may have strong convictions that there is a God and believe that everything is evidence that there is a God. For him it is not only likely that there is a God, but he does not even think it possible that there is not.

I see no way or even any reason to resolve these differences.

There is no Electromagnetic Phenomenon of any wavelength present ... — SteveKlinko

Except the electromagnetic phenomena detectable in the brain.

That Redness is an internal Conscious Mind Phenomenon and is not even Correlated with any external 670nm Electromagnetic Phenomenon. — SteveKlinko

I think that is a questionable assumption. How is it that we can agree that a particular color is or is not red? How are we able to tune a string to 440 Hz?

...we cannot even narrow it down to "it is more likely no gods" or "it is more likely at least one god exists." — Frank Apisa

I do not think it is so simple. Many things that had previously been attributed to the work of God now have physical explanations in which the supernatural plays no role. Newton set out to demonstrate the hand of God at work, but it turned out that his physics left no room for the actions of God. It was the work of natural forces not God at work. There are some who appeal to some form of intelligent design, but natural explanations increasingly leave no place for the hand of God. The only place left where a God may play a role is with claims that God is the ground or source of existence. But if we ask why there must be a ground or source, something other than what is as the reason for what is, then such claims seem less likely.

What if a patient was admitted into your hospital and said that they didn't want any black doctors operating on them? Would it be right to refuse the patient service and kick them out of your hospital? Would you give them what they want? — Harry Hindu

One is free to refuse treatment. If the only doctors available are black then the hospital is under no obligation to provide a doctor for this patient who is not black. If other doctors are available then the patient's wishes should be honored. His prejudice is not a good reason to refuse to provide treatment.

The limits of reason has been a central topic of philosophy at least since Socrates. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason provides a rational defense of the choice of faith. He saw rational proofs of the existence of God, however, as a source of disbelief because rationally they fail. Reason can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God or resolve the other antinomies. Since these questions cannot be resolved by reason that leaves room for faith.

A larger question that informs such discussions is whether the world is rational and thus fully understandable through the use of reason. Is that a reasonable assumption? Does the world exist because existence is rational and non-existence is irrational? Is what happens governed by reason? Or is reason just our way of making sense of things?

I do not know what these pastors have in mind, but it might be something along the lines that a religion is a set of beliefs and practices. Christianity is not a set of beliefs and practices but an earth changing, soul changing event. Beliefs and practices are of human origin, the coming of the Messiah is of divine origin.

With regard to a surveyable representation, consider the following from Culture and Value:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a new true theory but a fertile point of view.

Maybe I'm just unclear on why you move from discussing the representative overview to discussing meaning. — Luke

He says at 125:

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen.

If one is entangled in the rules and the rules prevent one from saying what he means, then the meaning is not the rules. The survey, that is, the representative overview, throws light on this.

If one is able to follow the rule then he knows what he is to do, but we know that there are some who have a great capacity of misunderstanding. The rule says +3 but they interpret this perversely. They don't follow the rule because they do not understand what is meant by +3. Repeating the rule does not make its meaning clear to them.

122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

A surveyable representation, an übersichtlichen Darstellung, a representative overview is said to be of fundamental importance. For it is from this vantage point that we see connections between things, how they relate to each other.

125. This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases, things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is
just what we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: “That’s not the way I meant it.”
The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life - that is the philosophical problem.

An examination of grammar does not show these connections. The rules do not yield a representative overview. A representative overview, rather, makes clear how we have become entangled in the rules. The last remark regarding civil life may seem puzzling until we make the connection between language and life. The overview encompasses not just language but its place and function within our forms of life. Meaning is not determined by an analysis of grammar. Meaning is not in the rules.

The fundamental importance of an übersichtlichen Darstellung is something that Wittgenstein will continue to develop. He is no longer concerned with the Tractarian question of the conditions for the possibility of representation, but rather with the ways in which representation, how we picture things, is how we look at them, and can both stand in the way of and lead to new ways of seeing connections.

But you have not answered my other question. If my memory serves, this is at least your fourth thread with exactly the same arguments. You have received correction, instruction, guidance, both with good will and without. — tim wood

If you include other forums the number of threads is much more.

I'm starting to get the impression that you haven't read the Philosophical Investigations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please do not insult me. I do not generally discuss my background, but let it suffice to say my credentials say otherwise. I went against my better judgment by getting into this and so now I am getting out.

Given the title of the thread, questions regarding "Skeptics," Science, Spirituality and Religion.

But speculation is not, of itself, persuasive, as you say. It can be interesting, though, and it can spawn ideas that eventually turn into something a lot more definite.... — Pattern-chaser

There is a general sense in which I think this may be true but it is not clear how this relates to the stories we tell ourselves about man and God and the whole. What is the more definite thing? I can see how it may affect human behavior but this leaves open the questions of God and the whole.

So yes, I agree with you: there's no reason to suppose that, if there is a Creator ... — Pattern-chaser

Is there good reason to suppose that there is a Creator? I can't think of one, other than comfort. I do not find questionable interpretations of things we do not understand, such as the origins of the universe, the quantum world, and consciousness, persuasive.

One problem I have is with the move from the absence of a reasonable explanation to some story of powers, or forces, or realms, or reality, or Being, or beings. or a particular being or relationship between two special beings: God and man. In such stories man often has some unique privilege or place is the larger whole. It could be argued that such a possibility cannot be ruled out, but why should it be ruled in? Do we have good reason to think that this is the way things are other than the comfort this way of thinking may bring to us?

what is at the foundation of language is vague unbounded concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is at the foundation of language is, as he makes clear in On Certainty, quoting Goethe, is our acting in the world.

But in this description he now comes across the notion of seeking an ideal, some sort of absolute precision, or clarity in defining terms, to give an unmistakable understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The ideal of absolute precision and clarity is based on the assumption of a logical structure underlying both language and the world. It is a holdover from the Tractatus, not something new and different. It is this structure that was presumed to allow for precision and clarity. The rejection of such a structure is not a rejection of precision and clarity. Unmistakable understanding does not require such precision and clarity, but that does not mean that we always understand things unmistakably. Whether we have understood can only be determined by the specifics of the case.

This is what he describes in Philosophical Investigations, such vague concepts where we might create boundaries to produce clarity for specific purposes. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I say "wait here" this does not mean that if you move an inch in one direction or another you are no longer standing here. If I am teaching you to play the violin, on the other hand, and I say "put your finger here" this requires a great deal more precision. If you do not put your finger in the right place you are not playing the right note, but on the other hand, microtonality might or might not be important. What is considered to be within the tolerable range of frequencies is not set. In fact, many musical instruments are designed and tuned to a compromise, that is, they use a tempered scale. One can, nevertheless, play music on a piano or guitar. To use another analogy, one does not use a micrometer to measure a piece of wood used to frame a house.

As I described to old, "the ideal" here in PI is similar, if not the same as Plato's "the good" in the Republic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not going to pursue that tangent, but this simply wrong.

In Plato's allegory, the philosopher is supposed to go back into the cave, to lead the others to the same revelation, toward the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

A basic premise of the allegory is that the majority will never leave the cave. It is not that the philosopher will make philosophers of the unphilosophical but that he or she (Plato allowed for female philosophers) will rule the city based on his or her knowledge. The noble lie is essential to the city.

Instead, Wittgenstein goes back in the cave and tells the others not to look out there at the ideal, that we ought to stay within the cave and settle for what serves our purpose, instead of seeking the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

To continue the cave analogy, the ideal is an image on the cave wall. An image the philosopher would recognize as such if he were able to break the chains.

The gaping hole is that he replaces the fundamental pictures at the foundation of language with vague, boundless concepts, families of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

He replaces it with observations about the actual practices of language. There is no foundation of language, just as there is no foundation of action.

The striving to achieve a purpose is absent from the Tractatus — Metaphysician Undercover

This is fundamentally wrong. The purpose is to see the limits of language and how they leave unsaid what lies beyond those limits, the ethical/aesthetic.

It is you who has misunderstood, please reread the 80's. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not going to rehash that. My intent is to move forward, to get passed the stall that threatens to be terminal.

And this is how he avoids the infinite regress of requiring rules to read rules, which you and I discussed earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

An infinite regress is avoided by the correction of one's actions. If you have not followed the rule then corrective measures are necessary - the knight in chess moves like this and like this but not life that or that. Once the rule is followed correctly then nothing more is required. One could, as you seem to be doing, always find some possible exception, some perverse way of reading the rule that leaves it unclear what one is supposed to do, but this is not a deficiency of language.

The rule is a sign-post ... "85. A rule stands there like a sign-post--" — Metaphysician Undercover

Standing there like a sign-post does not mean that it is a sign-post, but that it functions as a sign-post does. A pointed finger does not tell us in what direction to look. We learn how to read the sign. We learn the rule - look in the direction the finger is pointing. Those who have raised children and/or dogs knows that there is nothing inherent in the pointed finger, the sign-post, that tells us how to read it. They may look at the finger or back at the person pointing. One does not then look to other rules to explain how this rule is to be followed, but rather you may direct their attention by turning their head in the right direction or walking over to the thing you are pointing to. It is possible, however, that some may never get it. This does not mean that pointing is ineffectual even though it may be in this case.

God is difficult to grasp for some people, but I can tell you that assuming there is a God, specifically the one in the Bible — OpinionsMatter

There is no one God of the Bible. There is not even one Bible. Christians have relegated the Hebrew Bible to an old testament. Not only did they attempt to usurp the authority of the Hebrew Bible, they displaced the God of that Bible in favor of a pagan god and his progeny. In addition, the Christian Bible does not end with the words found in the books. There is, for example, no trinity in the Bible yet many Christians conceive of God as a trinity. The divine status of Jesus is not something that was determined by the Bible, but by the Council of Nicaea, based on some questionable interpretative claims.

The interpretation of Genesis 1 as creatio ex nihilo is dubious. The use of the plural "our image" and in the second and different story of the beginning "like one of us", raises questions about monotheism. In Exodus there is the problem of the name of God. However else one might interpret it, it is clear that there is an attempt at unification, whatever your ancestors may have called their god it is the same god. The commandment that you shall have no other god before me is not a claim of monotheism but of henotheism - this god and no others is to be your God. Monotheism is a later development, one that can be found in Isaiah but not earlier.

I realized that for the Bible to be used and interpreted correctly you need to read quite a lot of it, because other wise you won't understand the context. — OpinionsMatter

The Bible is a patchwork collection of books and stories. Consider, for example, the story of the Flood. It is not a single story but two different stories or versions with different and conflicting details woven together. For example, we are told both that there was one pair of each kind of animal (7:15) and seven of each kind (7:2). There are two diametrically opposed stories of the beginning, one in which everything is fluid and nothing separate or distinct from anything else, and a second in which everything is static and distinct until the rains come.

There have been different interpretations that are as old as the stories themselves. The idea that there is a correct interpretation is incorrect. One more interesting story that occurs in the beginning. God tells Adam not to eat of the tree of knowledge, but from God to Adam to Eve to the serpent what God said has already been altered. Eve embellishes the story, not only are they forbidden from eating the fruit of the tree, they are forbidden from even touching it. In addition, the tree "in the midst of the garden" is not the tree of knowledge but the tree of life. One might think that the move from an oral tradition to a written one has solved that problem but it has not. It is not a question of not hearing correctly or not remembering correctly but of interpretation. It is not simply a matter of the words of God but of their interpretation. The serpent understood this. He spoke the truth when he assured Eve that they would not die on the day they ate of the tree. But his reputation for subtlety is well deserved. It is because of what they did on that day that they would die. As a literal interpretation of God's warning the serpent was right, they did not die on that day, but that was not the whole of it, as he knew. He wittingly deceived her, but we, wittingly or unwittingly, deceive ourselves; interpreting things in such a way that they conform to some larger picture or structure of belief.

Yes, but the issue of SJW goes beyond what you have specified. We might agree that such actions are wrong but still not understand what is at issue. Not everyone who might identify with SJW condones such extreme actions. There is, however, a deliberate attempt in some quarters to discredit any attempt to promote social justice by labeling it extremism based on examples like those you point to.

It seems that you're still focusing on speech. I'm not saying anything about speech. My problem with SJWs is that they want--they WANT to control people to that extent. — Terrapin Station

The social/political order is always about control, whether it is those who are in control or those who want to be in control or those who simply want to bring about change. Using the term SJW to discredit a group or individual is a form of control, a way of dismissing out of hand whatever it is that one says or stands for . Pointing only to extreme cases is a form of control - as if fighting for social justice is extremism.

Right, so you do not see the gaping hole now? Wittgenstein has dismissed what he had assumed made it possible to represent the world with language. Is it now impossible to represent the world with language. Is all language use just a big misunderstanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

The only gaping hole is the one in your understanding. If he concludes that this is not the way language works that does not mean language does not work or that there is some unsolved mystery of language.

They are two distinct things, because in the Tractatus, he posited the fundmental elements of crystalline purity as existing things which language is composed of. But in the Philosophical Investigations,"the ideal" is something we might strive after. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the PI he is referring to the Tractarian assumption not some other thing. It is this structure that would make possible precision, exactness, or certainty. Since that structure does not exist, precision, exactness, and certainty are never perfect, but typically sufficient.

Now he is left with nothing but inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is inconsistency in language but that does not mean we are left with nothing but inconsistency. We do, after all, communicate and make ourselves understood.

The rules are sign-posts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Blame it on the inconsistency of language but you have completely misunderstood this. Sign-posts must be read according to rules. They do not contain the rules for reading them.

We cannot say that logic is the rules, because reason and logic is how the mind deals with the rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Logic is not some independently existing entity that is employed in order to deal with rules.

We can say that different games have different rules, but we have no principle whereby we can say that the logic differs. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a matter of determination by principle. The logic of the game is the rules by which the game is played. If you do not understand the logic of the game you could not know how to play.

But we do not need to do that, we can stay and contemplate the relationship between the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You really have made a mess of all of this. There are no elements of crystalline purity. Crystalline purity refers to the Tractarian assumption that there is a logical structure that underlies both the world and language that makes it possible to represent the world in language. Wittgenstein came to see that this picture is wrong and abandoned it.

In the Tractatus logic is form. The elements or substance or the world are simple objects. The elements of language are the names that correspond to those objects. There is no relationship between
the fundamental elements of crystalline purity, and the ideal. They are not two different things. The crystalline purity is the ideal, an ideal which once again he came to reject.

In order to understand this we must look at the role of the logic of language in the PI. It is no longer some independent structure, but the rules of the language game. Those rules do not exist independently. They are determined by how the game is played. Different games different rules.

Some do, some don’t. Doesn’t change anything much. — I like sushi

How they use it changes what they mean when they use it.

The etymology of phrases and terms is interesting, but once they become popular they mean what they mean. — I like sushi

The point is that what it means varies depending on who is using it and to what end. For some it is a term of derision, but as such it fails to distinguish between a legitimate concern for social justice and misguided efforts to promote social justice. That failure is in some cases deliberate, an attempt to shift focus from the problem of social justice, to dismiss the problem in toto, as if there things are fine as they are and that those who attempt to make changes in the name of justice are only causing harm.

You may distinguish between social justice and a social justice warrior but others will call anyone who is concerned with or raises issues of social justice a social justice warrior.