does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. — J

In the sixth meditation he says:

Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it – intermingled with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unit.If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt ...

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. — J

The essence of something is its nature. He says:

... nature or essence...

... nothing else belongs to my nature or essence ...

About the concept of nature he says:

... I have been using ‘nature’ ... to speak of what can be found in the things themselves

and:

... my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

On the one hand:

I know that I exist and that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing

but on the other:

... the nature of man as a combination of mind and body ...

If nature is what is essential and in the things themselves, and among the things bestowed on him by God is his body, then it would seem that the nature of the self is to be both mind and body.

And yet he says:

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

He distinguishes between his nature or essence and the nature of man, just as he distinguishes between a badly made clock which:

... conforms to the laws of its nature in telling the wrong time.

and a clock that work badly:

... a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’

In the first case he is talking about the nature of a particular clock, a badly made one, while in the second he means the nature of clocks, that is, what it is to be a clock.His nature as a particular man is not the same as the nature of man. We might say of someone, for example that it is his nature to be timid or gregarious. It is Descartes' own nature to be a thinking thing. In this he aligns himself with an idea of the philosopher that goes back at least to Plato's Phaedo.

But there is another aspect to this. What he seems to be hinting at is made more clear when we take note of the fact that what he calls the mind is what the theologians call the soul. In the sixth meditation he says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.

If the nature or essence of man is a combination of mind or soul and body, then the theological teaching that the soul is what is essential and Descartes claim that he is a thinking thing, to the extent it disregards the body, is like a badly made clock and its maker a poor craftsman.

But the idea that the self or I is a soul persists. If, however, the soul is the mind then it is given the kind of agency that may be missing from the concept of soul. Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was the groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature. We might say, of his nature to find the Archimedean point from which to move the earth.

I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” — J

What does this mean? Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human?

Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. — J

How much of the problem of consciousness can be found in Descartes?

Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? — J

Where does Descartes discuss the problem of consciousness and the unconscious? Or is the problem that he does not discuss this? An analysis of consciousness is not his concern. That he is conscious suffices.

Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? — J

The thinking thing is the most important part for his purposes - to displace the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking/reasoning subject.

What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence? — Corvus

One must exist in order to think the negation of existence.

I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case? — Corvus

A paradox but not a contradiction.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? — Corvus

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. — J

At the risk of being obtuse, what is the unwarranted conclusion? I agree that what he says falls short of the task of self-knowledge, but that is not Descartes' task. It does seem clear though that whatever he is in its fullness he doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, imagines, and senses.

Paul Ricoeur also raises this question of the nature of the "I" of the cogito -- whether what it is is self-evident as a consequence of the cogito. — J

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

No, Jack Smith's immunity filing in the case of The United States v. Donald J. Trump, if nothing else, becomes an important historical document for future historians.

It preserves the words and the deeds of Trump in trying to overturn a legal election. — Questioner

I agree. An historical perspective will counteract the current hype-partisanship and denialism.



.

Do you agree with my prima facie reading of the Meditations? That Descartes claims to deduce knowledge of God's existence on the basis of the foundation of certainty he finds in the Cogito? — Moliere

I agree, but do not think it prima facie. I think all the stuff about God is nothing more than a rhetorical defense to avoid the fate of Galileo. Descartes took his motto from Ovid:

He who lived well hid himself well. (Bene qui latuit bene vixit)

In that moment where else would you say the idea of perfection comes from? — Moliere

Contrary to Descartes' claim, it comes from a lack or want, from a need or desire to improve, to have or be without defect.

With regard to the perfectibility of man, perfect comes from the possibility of avoiding error by limiting what I will to what I know.

In the third meditation he says:

My knowledge is gradually increasing, and I see no obstacle to its going on increasing to infinity. I might then be able to use this increased and eventually infinite knowledge to acquire all the other perfections of God. In that case, I already have the potentiality for these perfections ...

In the fourth meditation:

It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience as so great that I can’t make sense of the idea of its being even greater: indeed, my thought of myself as being somehow like God depends primarily upon my will.

And:

When I look more closely into these errors of mine, I discover that they have two co-operating causes – my faculty of knowledge and my faculty of choice or freedom of the will. My errors, that is, depend on both (a) my intellect and (b) my will.

He asks:

Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has, so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don’t understand. Instead of behaving as I ought to, namely by restricting my will to the territory that my understanding covers, that is, suspending judgment when I am not intellectually in control, I let my will run loose, applying it to matters that I don’t understand. In such cases there is nothing to stop the will from veering this way or that, so it easily turns away from what is true and good. That is the source of my error and sin.

What first struck me when I began reading the Timaeus is how odd it all seemed. Not the least of which is Socrates uncharacteristic silence throughout most of the dialogue. When at the beginning he says that in his opinion Timaeus has reached the very peak of all philosophy (20a) is he being sincere or ironic?

When Timaeus says:

So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised. But if we provide likelihoods inferior to none, we should be well-pleased with them, remembering that I who speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

... it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

(29c-d).

Socrates responds:

Excellent Timaeus! And it must be received entirely as you urge.

(29d)

Why must likely but contradictory stories concerning the gods and the birth of the all be accepted? How many different likely stories should be accepted? This one is inferior to none, but that does not mean it is superior to all others.

Since the chora, this third kind in addition to Forms and sensible things, is graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, as in a dream, and is hardly to be trusted, is it reasonable to treat it reasonably in the same way we do Forms and sensible things?

The "chora itself" is not like a Form or a thing itself. It is like something to be looked to as in a dream, but it is not like the images of things seen in a dream. In attempting to reason about it we cannot make use of the image/original distinction.

So it sounds like Plato had the sceptic and mystic elements in his thoughts on the world, human life and the gods. — Corvus

The term'mystic' has been used to mean what is beyond our knowledge and understanding and also to mean what the mystic knows through transcendent experience,. I think Plato points to the former and provides a myth about the latter.

I meant was the others from the philosophers, not from the mystics. — Corvus

Paine pointed to Plotinus. They are mystic philosophers.

Have you read the other Plato such as Timaeus? It is filled with cosmogony and the Gods. — Corvus

I have. I started a thread on it here.

Whose direct, unmediated apprehension? — Corvus

The philosophers of the Republic.

Are we able to apprehend them via direct unmediated apprehension — Corvus

I don't think we are, but according to the mythology of the Republic, some humans are.

If we can apprehend them, then it seems to be a bridgeable gap between the world of the Forms and the world of materials. Why was your reply a negative? — Corvus

My argument is that we cannot apprehend the Forms. This is a rejection of Platonism, but not of Plato. The Platonists believe in the reality of Forms. On my reading, Plato does not.

The Forms are hypotheticals.
— Fooloso4
In what sense? Is it what Plato said? — Corvus

From the Phaedo:

... I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

We don't know if the gods are noble and good.

Right. You said:

[/quote — Corvus

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods — Corvus

I should have asked who they are. I don't think there is anywhere in the dialogues that Socrates makes any claim about the gods. He does, however, refer to common beliefs about the gods.

The transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic were the founding principles of the later occultism, Gnosticism, mysticism, and the Hermetic Kabbalists in the medieval times. There seems to be far more implications to the concept than just a philosophical poetry. — Corvus

There were many in Plato's time who believed the poet's myths. The Forms are not presented as poesis, that is, image making. Many then and now believe there is a transcendent realm of Forms as presented in the Republic. If Socrates had presented them as stories they would not have the power they do.

Who are the "Others"? — Corvus

Don't those you just listed believe in a transcendent realm that can be known directly? Isn't that a feature of mysticism?

Is the gap between the knowledge of the Forms and everyday life bridgeable by any actions or methods? — Corvus

I don't think so. Knowledge of the Forms is a matter of direct, unmediated apprehension. From and earlier post:

The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself. — Fooloso4

Or are they two distinct entities which are inaccessible to each other? — Corvus

The Forms are hypotheticals.

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods. — Corvus

Well, if the gods are noble and good then we are wise to know that we do not know anything about them.

Whatever the case, doesn't it sound like some sort of mysticism on their part? — Corvus

On whose part? On my reading the transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic is Plato's philosophic poetry. An image to compel the lover of wisdom to continue to journey.

Others believe it exists and that there are some who have direct knowledge of it.

What do you mean by "such knowledge"? — Corvus

Knowledge of a reality that transcends our everyday reality. In line with the Republic it would be knowledge of the Forms.

Why is it reserved for the gods? — Corvus

In Plato's Apology Socrates makes a distinction between human wisdom, which is knowledge of our ignorance, and divine wisdom. Socrates says he knows nothing noble and good, (21d) It is reserved for the gods because they know such things and we don't.

Which gods do you mean here? — Corvus

No particular gods are identified.

a two-stepper — Moliere

I have problems with the second step. What is at issue is the problem of judgment, that is, whether the idea, the image in his mind, corresponds to something outside the mind. In order to solve this problem he introduces the idea of God and perfection. But God is not the only possible source of the idea of perfection.

Toward the end of the third meditation he says:

I understand that I am a thing... which aspires without limit to ever greater and better things.

And in the fourth meditation:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ...

So, it seems that the source of his idea of something perfect and without limits could come from himself. If an:

... Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created ...

is not certain then certainly this cannot be the foundation of the certainty of knowledge. Descartes' certainty of his own existence, established by reason, is his Archimedean point. At the end of the fourth meditation he says:

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection. His will is perfect and thus the proximate and more likely source of his idea of perfection. But he goes further. It is not just the idea of perfection, but the reality of perfection, as he avoids error and becomes more perfect, that is within him.

In Plato, truth is supposed to be hidden until it is disclosed (alethia). Does it mean truth is mysticism in Plato? — Corvus

On my reading the philosopher does not possess such knowledge. It is reserved for the gods.

If Plato was indeed an initiate it makes him a textbook example. — Wayfarer

I think Plato's cave mimics initiation into a mystery cult. There is, however, a notable exception. There is no secret initiation rite. According to the Phaedo:

... sound-mindedness, justice, courage, and wisdom itself are purifications ... And the Bacchae are, in my view, none other than those who have properly engaged in philosophy.

(69c-d)

What is the source of Descartes' certainty according to the Meditations?

So what will the clown do? :chin: — Christoffer

Blame everyone but himself.

.How many will follow Gaetz and not even make it through the beginning of the nomination process? Hegseth seems like a good bet.

My revisionist interpretation is that forms can be understood as logical principles, arithmetical truths, and all the many elements of thought that can only be grasped by reason. — Wayfarer

In the Phaedo, Socrates attributes causal power to the Forms:

For it appears to me that, if anything else is beautiful except beauty itself, then it is beautiful because it partakes of that beauty and for no other reason. And I say the same about all the others. Do you accept this sort of cause?

((100b)

In the Republic:

... the form of the good bestows truth upon whatever is known, and confers the power of knowing on the knower.

(508d-e)

... it is reckoned to be the actual cause of all that is beautiful and right in everything ...

(517b-c)

The chapter on Plato in particular, in which he criticizes the customary idea of there being the 'separate realm' of Forms. — Wayfarer

If you are objecting to my use of the term 'realm' both Plato (in translation) and Perl use it. Perl says:

What is given to the senses, then, and hence the entire realm of the sensible ...

(36)

Plato:

... in the realm of reason, relates to reason and whatever is known by reason, so does the sun, in the realm of sight.

(Republic 508b)

As to separate, I agree that it is not another world. Perl points out, and as you note, there is a sense in which they are separate as discussed in the section 'The Meaning of Separation'.

I appreciate Bloom's scholarship while deploring his politics. — J

Me too .

Within allegory, of course we have nothing but images -- as you say, what else could there be? — J

The one who escapes the cave does not only see images. She sees the Forms. But she can't bring the Forms back to the cave for others to see. There is no knowledge of the Forms transmitted from her to others. It is a common mistake to here about the Forms and think that one has thereby gained knowledge.

But this is not an allegory about images; it's a story that uses images to try to explain how knowledge may be attained. — J

The cave is said to be "an image of our nature in its education and want of education". (514a)

If the people were to vote for a candidate, it would have been Sanders. — Christoffer

You do not know that. The approval of Democratic donors is not the same as the approval of "the people".

Banning people who actively lie is a protection of the democracy. — Christoffer

Not unless it is done democratically. How would that work?

it's like when someone is banned off this forum, people would complain that this is anti-democratic — Christoffer

It is anti-democratic! I don't know what the forum would look like if it were democratic, but my guess is that I would prefer it the way it is.

banning people off this forum is there to protect the standards of quality that this forum has. — Christoffer

I agree.

It's the same principle. — Christoffer

It is not the same principle. One is a government regime the other is a forum.

It's not rocket science. — Christoffer

Right, it is not. Rocket science is much less complicated.

Is Sartre worth reading? — Manuel

He would not be on my shortlist. If someone is interested, however, I would recommend Existentialism is a Humanism

In this work he says:

... there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective.

Without Sanders, she's third, and that's including all the public exposure she's got as a VP. — Christoffer

Donors who gave to Bernie over other Democrats only shows that Democratic donors favored him, not that he had the support of the people.

... a representative democracy should actually work as one and have true representatives ... — Christoffer

But that is not what we have. The question is how to democratically make it a representative democracy? Banning people from the halls of power is anti-democratic.

it seems a strained reading to say that therefore nothing he goes on to teach can be taken as true, or as different from what we see in the city/cave. — J

What aspects of the divided line do you take to be true? Is there a realm of Forms? Are there philosophers who know these Forms? Do you know the Forms themselves? I think there are things to be learned from the divided line, but they may not be the same things that you have learned. One thing that I learned is that we should not mistake what is said about the Forms as knowledge of the Forms. And without such knowledge the ontology remains is an image.

It [the Line] shows that reality extends far beyond anything the practical man ever dreams and that to know it one must use faculties never recognized by the practical man." — J

How does it show this? To assert that there is in not to show that there is.

Here is a quick amusing story about Alan Bloom from Seth Benardete a fellow students of Leo Strauss:

He was heading home after a conference with Stanley Rosen (another friend and student of Strauss) and Allan Bloom in the car. Bloom spotted some deer by the side of the road. They stopped the car. Bloom wanted to get out to see them. He asked: "Do you think they'll attack if I got out and approach them?" And Rosen said: "I don't think they've read Closing of the American Mind".

I think Bloom's translation and notes on the Republic is a good introduction, it was my introduction to Plato, but Benardete and Rosen go much deeper and much further.

... or else give it a reading in which the one who returns brings back only another image. — J

What else could he have brought back? He could not bring back what he saw. At best he could tell them what he saw, but that is an image and not the thing itself.

I think the aporia is often constructed by Socrates himself, as a teaching tool. — J

I agree that he sometimes deliberately confuses his interlocutor, but this does not do away with the problem.

I read back, starting from the discussion about astronomy et al., and I can't find this. Where do you see the forms fitting in here? — J

He is talking about the power of dialectic that:

... leads what is best in the soul upwards to the sight of what is most excellent among things that are ...

(532c)

Namely, the Forms.

And Socrates does not know it either. He knows only how it looks to him.
— Fooloso4

Begging the question, no? It's the very thing we're debating. — J

I don't think that the distinction between the truth as it appears to him and knowledge of the truth itself begs the question. If it were why would he not insist that it is actually so?

The map over donors from the public towards candidates is a pretty clear indicator of what the people want. — Christoffer

Unless I am missing something, if donations are any measure then Harris would have won.

The fear mongering using "socialist" is just the right playing their cards. — Christoffer

I am not sure that is entirely true. It may be that people do not understand Sander's proposals, but a proper understanding of a candidate's position has never been a requirement for voting.

This is why I want to ban anyone from halls of power who's not a true representative of the people and who constantly lies. — Christoffer

So, you are not in favor of democracy.

I'm not really sure what this reply is supposed to mean. Is the claim that Plato doesn't really buy into the psychology and means of self-determination he lays out across several dialogues (not just the Republic, but the chariot of the Phaedrus, the Golden Thread of the Laws, etc.)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two things, first, the psychology is far more complex than the clear three part division makes it appear to be. How, for example, does the Symposium's erotic desire of wisdom fit in with this?

move past what merely "appears to be good," (appetitive) or "is said to be good," (spirited/passions) in search of what is "truly good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Second, it is not simply a matter of psychology but of epistemology. The movement in search of what is 'truly good" is still within the realm of what appears to be.

A charming story but if this were to happen today you might have ended up in trouble with the administration.
When I was in school this was not at all uncommon. What changed?

After the courts found in the 1990s that universities could be financially liable for sexual harassment, many institutions — among them, the University of California and Yale — adopted formal policies forbidding sexual or romantic relationships between faculty and students.

From New York Times:New Harvard Policy Bans Teacher-Student Relations

Bernie had the support of the people, so that's a good hint at what type of Democrat the people actually want. — Christoffer

We really don't know how many people would have voted for him. The label "socialist" still scares a lot of people. I do think, however, that targeting wealth disparity might be a winning message.

I suppose we could view Socrates as trying to block rational thought at these points of aporia, but I'm not sure that's his purpose — J

A bit more on this. The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself.

But to be fair, in this case Wayfarer asked you about metaphysics and mysticism. — Leontiskos

With regard to mysticism - there is a lot of different stuff called mysticism. If we regard mysticism as the experience of a reality that transcends our everyday reality, that is something I know nothing about. I have never had the experience of such a reality. I don't doubt that others have had an experience that they attribute to a higher reality, but I lack the measure by which to evaluate some of these claims as true and not others.

From a thread on Plato's metaphysics:

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.

Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.

In the Philebus, Plato raises the problem of the “indeterminate dyad” . The limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron) is, as Aristotle called it, an indeterminate dyad.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.

We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.

Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.

The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.

The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.

Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.

The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)

The Whole is by nature both good and bad.

The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.

The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.

I think the grammatical and spelling mistakes are an indicator of what your thesis does to Fooloso's temperament. — Leontiskos

Wayfarer and I go way back. We often disagree, but not always. I consider him a friend. We have often recommended books and papers to each other. I know his positions well, and he knows mine.

Your comment about temperament seems to be projection. Both Wayfarer and I understand that the nature of philosophy involves dispute, but we also understand that there is a difference between disputes over matters of interpretation and personal attacks.

If the divided line isn't for would-be philosophers, I can't imagine who else it's for. — J

The lowest level of the divided line is not transcended or abandoned. It is our abode, the city, the cave. In the Phaedo Socrates calls Forms hypothesis. In the dialectic of the Republic too the Forms are hypothetical, and remain so unless or until one is able to free themself from hypothesis. In the dialogue Socrates is clear in stating that he has not done so.

In none of the dialogues do we find someone who has attained divine knowledge. Philosophy is, according to the Symposium, the desire for wisdom. They do not possess wisdom. The philosophers of the Republic stand in opposition to the philosophers of the Symposium.

... the idea that we are meant to go through aporia is so enticing. — J

Yes. And her Plato rivals the best of the poets in inflaming Eros. In this case the desire to be wise.

I suppose we could view Socrates as trying to block rational thought at these points of aporia, but I'm not sure that's his purpose — J

It is not that he blocks rational thought but that it has reached its limit.

We could look at specific dialogues for that, but we'd need a new OP. — J

If you do a search of the forum you will see that I started several threads that do just that.

I don't see this as being about the Forms themselves. — J

It is about knowledge of the forms, or lack of such knowledge.

But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on. — J

He continues:

And should we not also insist that the power of dialectic alone would reveal this, to someone with experience in what we have been describing just now, and that this is not possible in any other way?

To which Glaucon agrees. Why does Glaucon agrees? Certainly not because this is something he knows. And Socrates does not know it either. He knows only how it looks to him. Why does Socrates insist? I think it is because he thinks that holding this opinion is better than the alternatives. It is a moment in the movement of dialectic, that is:

... making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses - that is, steppingstones and springboards - in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.

They have not reached that point and will not reach it. They are thinking dialectically, via hypothesis.

With that said, we both know Plato well enough to be aware that, like the Bible, you can find support for diametrically opposed positions depending on what you quote! — J

Yes, but the goal is not simply to support a position but to consider different positions in order to find the one that seems best. But we may not always find one that seems best, and so, we leave things open and continue to think.

The scholars who have influenced my work attend to the texts themselves, not to secular culture or metaphysical assumptions. They take seriously Socrates' notion of human wisdom. Not being divine beings they do not presume to know anything about matters of divine wisdom or a reality that transcends reality hear and now in our comfy cave.

but I am thinking in terms of centuries and millennia. It helps prevent one from falling into fads. — Leontiskos

I agree. These scholars are well versed in the centuries and millennia. In fact they often point to the centuries and millennia of commentary in order to see beyond what you refer to as "the common view". I think it telling that you dismiss the work being done as a "fad" without having actually read any of it. Careful reading that does not treat a dialogue as if it is dressed up discourse is not a fad.

The rational part of the soul has proper authority because it can unify the soul, and move past what merely "appears to be good," (appetitive) or "is said to be good," (spirited/passions) in search of what is "truly good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

See my earlier response to J:

In the Republic after Socrates presents the image of the Forms Glaucon wants Socrates to tell them what the Forms themselves are. Socrates responds:

You will no longer be able to follow, dear Glaucon, although there won’t be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer seeing an image of what we are saying, butthe truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it really is so or not cannot be properly insisted on.(emphasis added)
— 533a — Fooloso4

This is the common view, and the way Fooloso reads Plato looks to be idiosyncratic. — Leontiskos

It is not at all idiosyncratic. There are many highly regarded scholars who support this view. Stanley Rosen and Seth Benardete have led a generation of Plato scholars to part ways with the common views. Anyone paying attention to the scholarship for the last fifty years or more knows that that there have been significant changes in the way Plato has been interpreted. See, for example, Christopher Rowe's Methodologies for Reading Plato for a good overview.