He wanted the Church to reform, and he thought he could help it do that. — frank

Wouldn't the Church consider this heresy? Rather than reform the Church he attempts to reform man,

But all thoughts are private to the thinker. — Corvus

Not f he reveals them of makes them public.

Therefore your claim that whoever thinks, must exist, is false? — Corvus

I don't see how this follows.

Would you not agree it is a commonsense knowledge rather than a contemporary Science? Even ancient Greeks would have known about it. — Corvus

You asked about the scientific point of view, which is not the same as common sense knowledge. In any case, he cannot be deceived about his existence because he must exist in order to be deceived. As to whether he first exists and only subsequently thinks, he rejects this. He exists as a thinking thing. As such, it makes no sense to separate his existing and this thinking.

We see how conflicted Descartes is ... — J

I am not so sure. I ascribe to the idea that when a careful writer says things that seem contradictory that is is sign that we need to look closer and attempt to resolve the conflict.

He also clearly has trouble with using "mind" and "soul" interchangeably. — J

I think it is an intentional rhetorical strategy.

If his own nature is a "totality of things bestowed by God," surely this is the soul, rather than a thinking thing. — J

In the language of theology it is a soul, but in Descartes terminology a mind.

All these represent criticisms of Descartes on his own terms, pointing out contradictions or inconsistencies. — J

I am attempting to point beyond the contradictions and inconsistencies. It is part of his art of writing to conceal certain things that the attentive reading will attempt to make sense of. A few quotes from the
online appendix to Arthur Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines":

Descartes writes to one of his more imprudent disciples:
Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.
Why is it necessary for you to reject so openly the [Aristotelian doctrine of]
substantial forms? Do you not recall that in the Treatise on Meteors I expressly
denied that I rejected or denied them, but declared only that they were not
necessary for the explication of my reasons?
– René Descartes to Regius, January, 1642, Œuvres de Descartes, 3:491-
92, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’
Sincerity,” 363

From the first paragraph of Descartes’ early, unpublished “Private Thoughts”:
I go forward wearing a mask [larvatus prodeo].
– René Descartes, “Cogitationes Privatae,” in Œuvres de Descartes, 10:213

Descartes took care not to speak so plainly [as Hobbes] but he could not help revealing
his opinions in passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by those
who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects.
– G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, 2.1:506, quoted and translated
by Richard Kennington in On Modern Origins, 197

For example, here is Leibniz, reacting to Descartes’ seeming embrace of the view that all
necessary truths, like the principle of non-contradiction, are the product of God’s free and
arbitrary will:
I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously of this opinion….
He only made pretence to go [there]. It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his
philosophic feints: he prepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he
discovered a trick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in
the strictest sense.
– G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, 244 (2.186)

Whatever he recounts about the distinction between the two substances [mind and body],
it is obvious that it was only a trick, a cunning devise to make the theologians swallow
the poison hidden behind an analogy that strikes everyone and that they alone cannot see.
– Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Machine Man, 35

After corresponding with Descartes concerning the issue of whether animals were mere
machines, Henry More concluded that Descartes was “an abundantly cunning and abstruse
genius” who insinuated that mind as an incorporeal substance is a “useless figment and
chimera.”
– Henry More, Philosophical Writings, 184, 197-98

Thus one is right to accuse Descartes of atheism, seeing that he very energetically
destroyed the weak proofs of the existence of God that he gave.
– Baron d'Holbach, Système de la nature, 2:150, quoted and translated by Hiram
Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’ Sincerity,” 355

Does it entail then,
God thinks (doubts), therefore God exists? — Corvus

It does not entail that God thinks, but if God does think then God exists.

But that is not the case from the scientific point of view. — Corvus

No doubt that if Descartes has the benefit of contemporary science some of his views would change.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance?
— Corvus

Just realised that you have not answered to this question. What's your thought on this point? — Corvus

In response to your first question I said:

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

With regard to the second question, if he were to have stopped there then yes.

I don't exist is untrue (not from cogito, but from my sensory perception), therefore it implies cogito is untrue as well. Agree? — Corvus

No.I must exist in order to have sensory perception. He does not doubt that he senses. What he doubts is the judgment that what he senses corresponds to anything outside his mind.

What is that something? — Janus

In terms of a what that something is thinking. In terms of a who it is Descartes.

He wouldn't have needed to displace the authority of the Church if that was his agenda. He could have just left and gone to live in Protestant territory. — frank

But Descartes' concern was not simply personal. It was to displace the authority of the Church from the mind of the thinking man,

does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. — J

In the sixth meditation he says:

Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it – intermingled with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unit.If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt ...

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. — J

The essence of something is its nature. He says:

... nature or essence...

... nothing else belongs to my nature or essence ...

About the concept of nature he says:

... I have been using ‘nature’ ... to speak of what can be found in the things themselves

and:

... my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

On the one hand:

I know that I exist and that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing

but on the other:

... the nature of man as a combination of mind and body ...

If nature is what is essential and in the things themselves, and among the things bestowed on him by God is his body, then it would seem that the nature of the self is to be both mind and body.

And yet he says:

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

He distinguishes between his nature or essence and the nature of man, just as he distinguishes between a badly made clock which:

... conforms to the laws of its nature in telling the wrong time.

and a clock that work badly:

... a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’

In the first case he is talking about the nature of a particular clock, a badly made one, while in the second he means the nature of clocks, that is, what it is to be a clock.His nature as a particular man is not the same as the nature of man. We might say of someone, for example that it is his nature to be timid or gregarious. It is Descartes' own nature to be a thinking thing. In this he aligns himself with an idea of the philosopher that goes back at least to Plato's Phaedo.

But there is another aspect to this. What he seems to be hinting at is made more clear when we take note of the fact that what he calls the mind is what the theologians call the soul. In the sixth meditation he says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.

If the nature or essence of man is a combination of mind or soul and body, then the theological teaching that the soul is what is essential and Descartes claim that he is a thinking thing, to the extent it disregards the body, is like a badly made clock and its maker a poor craftsman.

But the idea that the self or I is a soul persists. If, however, the soul is the mind then it is given the kind of agency that may be missing from the concept of soul. Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was the groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature. We might say, of his nature to find the Archimedean point from which to move the earth.

I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” — J

What does this mean? Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human?

Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. — J

How much of the problem of consciousness can be found in Descartes?

Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? — J

Where does Descartes discuss the problem of consciousness and the unconscious? Or is the problem that he does not discuss this? An analysis of consciousness is not his concern. That he is conscious suffices.

Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? — J

The thinking thing is the most important part for his purposes - to displace the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking/reasoning subject.

What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence? — Corvus

One must exist in order to think the negation of existence.

I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case? — Corvus

A paradox but not a contradiction.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? — Corvus

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. — J

At the risk of being obtuse, what is the unwarranted conclusion? I agree that what he says falls short of the task of self-knowledge, but that is not Descartes' task. It does seem clear though that whatever he is in its fullness he doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, imagines, and senses.

Paul Ricoeur also raises this question of the nature of the "I" of the cogito -- whether what it is is self-evident as a consequence of the cogito. — J

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

No, Jack Smith's immunity filing in the case of The United States v. Donald J. Trump, if nothing else, becomes an important historical document for future historians.

It preserves the words and the deeds of Trump in trying to overturn a legal election. — Questioner

I agree. An historical perspective will counteract the current hype-partisanship and denialism.



.

Do you agree with my prima facie reading of the Meditations? That Descartes claims to deduce knowledge of God's existence on the basis of the foundation of certainty he finds in the Cogito? — Moliere

I agree, but do not think it prima facie. I think all the stuff about God is nothing more than a rhetorical defense to avoid the fate of Galileo. Descartes took his motto from Ovid:

He who lived well hid himself well. (Bene qui latuit bene vixit)

In that moment where else would you say the idea of perfection comes from? — Moliere

Contrary to Descartes' claim, it comes from a lack or want, from a need or desire to improve, to have or be without defect.

With regard to the perfectibility of man, perfect comes from the possibility of avoiding error by limiting what I will to what I know.

In the third meditation he says:

My knowledge is gradually increasing, and I see no obstacle to its going on increasing to infinity. I might then be able to use this increased and eventually infinite knowledge to acquire all the other perfections of God. In that case, I already have the potentiality for these perfections ...

In the fourth meditation:

It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience as so great that I can’t make sense of the idea of its being even greater: indeed, my thought of myself as being somehow like God depends primarily upon my will.

And:

When I look more closely into these errors of mine, I discover that they have two co-operating causes – my faculty of knowledge and my faculty of choice or freedom of the will. My errors, that is, depend on both (a) my intellect and (b) my will.

He asks:

Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has, so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don’t understand. Instead of behaving as I ought to, namely by restricting my will to the territory that my understanding covers, that is, suspending judgment when I am not intellectually in control, I let my will run loose, applying it to matters that I don’t understand. In such cases there is nothing to stop the will from veering this way or that, so it easily turns away from what is true and good. That is the source of my error and sin.

What first struck me when I began reading the Timaeus is how odd it all seemed. Not the least of which is Socrates uncharacteristic silence throughout most of the dialogue. When at the beginning he says that in his opinion Timaeus has reached the very peak of all philosophy (20a) is he being sincere or ironic?

When Timaeus says:

So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised. But if we provide likelihoods inferior to none, we should be well-pleased with them, remembering that I who speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

... it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

(29c-d).

Socrates responds:

Excellent Timaeus! And it must be received entirely as you urge.

(29d)

Why must likely but contradictory stories concerning the gods and the birth of the all be accepted? How many different likely stories should be accepted? This one is inferior to none, but that does not mean it is superior to all others.

Since the chora, this third kind in addition to Forms and sensible things, is graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, as in a dream, and is hardly to be trusted, is it reasonable to treat it reasonably in the same way we do Forms and sensible things?

The "chora itself" is not like a Form or a thing itself. It is like something to be looked to as in a dream, but it is not like the images of things seen in a dream. In attempting to reason about it we cannot make use of the image/original distinction.

So it sounds like Plato had the sceptic and mystic elements in his thoughts on the world, human life and the gods. — Corvus

The term'mystic' has been used to mean what is beyond our knowledge and understanding and also to mean what the mystic knows through transcendent experience,. I think Plato points to the former and provides a myth about the latter.

I meant was the others from the philosophers, not from the mystics. — Corvus

Paine pointed to Plotinus. They are mystic philosophers.

Have you read the other Plato such as Timaeus? It is filled with cosmogony and the Gods. — Corvus

I have. I started a thread on it here.

Whose direct, unmediated apprehension? — Corvus

The philosophers of the Republic.

Are we able to apprehend them via direct unmediated apprehension — Corvus

I don't think we are, but according to the mythology of the Republic, some humans are.

If we can apprehend them, then it seems to be a bridgeable gap between the world of the Forms and the world of materials. Why was your reply a negative? — Corvus

My argument is that we cannot apprehend the Forms. This is a rejection of Platonism, but not of Plato. The Platonists believe in the reality of Forms. On my reading, Plato does not.

The Forms are hypotheticals.
— Fooloso4
In what sense? Is it what Plato said? — Corvus

From the Phaedo:

... I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

We don't know if the gods are noble and good.

Right. You said:

[/quote — Corvus

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods — Corvus

I should have asked who they are. I don't think there is anywhere in the dialogues that Socrates makes any claim about the gods. He does, however, refer to common beliefs about the gods.

The transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic were the founding principles of the later occultism, Gnosticism, mysticism, and the Hermetic Kabbalists in the medieval times. There seems to be far more implications to the concept than just a philosophical poetry. — Corvus

There were many in Plato's time who believed the poet's myths. The Forms are not presented as poesis, that is, image making. Many then and now believe there is a transcendent realm of Forms as presented in the Republic. If Socrates had presented them as stories they would not have the power they do.

Who are the "Others"? — Corvus

Don't those you just listed believe in a transcendent realm that can be known directly? Isn't that a feature of mysticism?

Is the gap between the knowledge of the Forms and everyday life bridgeable by any actions or methods? — Corvus

I don't think so. Knowledge of the Forms is a matter of direct, unmediated apprehension. From and earlier post:

The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself. — Fooloso4

Or are they two distinct entities which are inaccessible to each other? — Corvus

The Forms are hypotheticals.

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods. — Corvus

Well, if the gods are noble and good then we are wise to know that we do not know anything about them.

Whatever the case, doesn't it sound like some sort of mysticism on their part? — Corvus

On whose part? On my reading the transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic is Plato's philosophic poetry. An image to compel the lover of wisdom to continue to journey.

Others believe it exists and that there are some who have direct knowledge of it.

What do you mean by "such knowledge"? — Corvus

Knowledge of a reality that transcends our everyday reality. In line with the Republic it would be knowledge of the Forms.

Why is it reserved for the gods? — Corvus

In Plato's Apology Socrates makes a distinction between human wisdom, which is knowledge of our ignorance, and divine wisdom. Socrates says he knows nothing noble and good, (21d) It is reserved for the gods because they know such things and we don't.

Which gods do you mean here? — Corvus

No particular gods are identified.

a two-stepper — Moliere

I have problems with the second step. What is at issue is the problem of judgment, that is, whether the idea, the image in his mind, corresponds to something outside the mind. In order to solve this problem he introduces the idea of God and perfection. But God is not the only possible source of the idea of perfection.

Toward the end of the third meditation he says:

I understand that I am a thing... which aspires without limit to ever greater and better things.

And in the fourth meditation:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ...

So, it seems that the source of his idea of something perfect and without limits could come from himself. If an:

... Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self, and every thing else that is (if any thing do Actualy exist) was created ...

is not certain then certainly this cannot be the foundation of the certainty of knowledge. Descartes' certainty of his own existence, established by reason, is his Archimedean point. At the end of the fourth meditation he says:

This is where man’s greatest and most important perfection is to be found ... If I restrain my will so that I form opinions only on what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, I cannot possibly go wrong.

He has within himself the ability to become more perfect by avoiding error. Note that he allows for degrees of perfection. His will is perfect and thus the proximate and more likely source of his idea of perfection. But he goes further. It is not just the idea of perfection, but the reality of perfection, as he avoids error and becomes more perfect, that is within him.

In Plato, truth is supposed to be hidden until it is disclosed (alethia). Does it mean truth is mysticism in Plato? — Corvus

On my reading the philosopher does not possess such knowledge. It is reserved for the gods.

If Plato was indeed an initiate it makes him a textbook example. — Wayfarer

I think Plato's cave mimics initiation into a mystery cult. There is, however, a notable exception. There is no secret initiation rite. According to the Phaedo:

... sound-mindedness, justice, courage, and wisdom itself are purifications ... And the Bacchae are, in my view, none other than those who have properly engaged in philosophy.

(69c-d)

What is the source of Descartes' certainty according to the Meditations?

So what will the clown do? :chin: — Christoffer

Blame everyone but himself.

.How many will follow Gaetz and not even make it through the beginning of the nomination process? Hegseth seems like a good bet.

My revisionist interpretation is that forms can be understood as logical principles, arithmetical truths, and all the many elements of thought that can only be grasped by reason. — Wayfarer

In the Phaedo, Socrates attributes causal power to the Forms:

For it appears to me that, if anything else is beautiful except beauty itself, then it is beautiful because it partakes of that beauty and for no other reason. And I say the same about all the others. Do you accept this sort of cause?

((100b)

In the Republic:

... the form of the good bestows truth upon whatever is known, and confers the power of knowing on the knower.

(508d-e)

... it is reckoned to be the actual cause of all that is beautiful and right in everything ...

(517b-c)

The chapter on Plato in particular, in which he criticizes the customary idea of there being the 'separate realm' of Forms. — Wayfarer

If you are objecting to my use of the term 'realm' both Plato (in translation) and Perl use it. Perl says:

What is given to the senses, then, and hence the entire realm of the sensible ...

(36)

Plato:

... in the realm of reason, relates to reason and whatever is known by reason, so does the sun, in the realm of sight.

(Republic 508b)

As to separate, I agree that it is not another world. Perl points out, and as you note, there is a sense in which they are separate as discussed in the section 'The Meaning of Separation'.

I appreciate Bloom's scholarship while deploring his politics. — J

Me too .

Within allegory, of course we have nothing but images -- as you say, what else could there be? — J

The one who escapes the cave does not only see images. She sees the Forms. But she can't bring the Forms back to the cave for others to see. There is no knowledge of the Forms transmitted from her to others. It is a common mistake to here about the Forms and think that one has thereby gained knowledge.

But this is not an allegory about images; it's a story that uses images to try to explain how knowledge may be attained. — J

The cave is said to be "an image of our nature in its education and want of education". (514a)

If the people were to vote for a candidate, it would have been Sanders. — Christoffer

You do not know that. The approval of Democratic donors is not the same as the approval of "the people".

Banning people who actively lie is a protection of the democracy. — Christoffer

Not unless it is done democratically. How would that work?

it's like when someone is banned off this forum, people would complain that this is anti-democratic — Christoffer

It is anti-democratic! I don't know what the forum would look like if it were democratic, but my guess is that I would prefer it the way it is.

banning people off this forum is there to protect the standards of quality that this forum has. — Christoffer

I agree.

It's the same principle. — Christoffer

It is not the same principle. One is a government regime the other is a forum.

It's not rocket science. — Christoffer

Right, it is not. Rocket science is much less complicated.

Is Sartre worth reading? — Manuel

He would not be on my shortlist. If someone is interested, however, I would recommend Existentialism is a Humanism

In this work he says:

... there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself. What they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective.

Without Sanders, she's third, and that's including all the public exposure she's got as a VP. — Christoffer

Donors who gave to Bernie over other Democrats only shows that Democratic donors favored him, not that he had the support of the people.

... a representative democracy should actually work as one and have true representatives ... — Christoffer

But that is not what we have. The question is how to democratically make it a representative democracy? Banning people from the halls of power is anti-democratic.

it seems a strained reading to say that therefore nothing he goes on to teach can be taken as true, or as different from what we see in the city/cave. — J

What aspects of the divided line do you take to be true? Is there a realm of Forms? Are there philosophers who know these Forms? Do you know the Forms themselves? I think there are things to be learned from the divided line, but they may not be the same things that you have learned. One thing that I learned is that we should not mistake what is said about the Forms as knowledge of the Forms. And without such knowledge the ontology remains is an image.

It [the Line] shows that reality extends far beyond anything the practical man ever dreams and that to know it one must use faculties never recognized by the practical man." — J

How does it show this? To assert that there is in not to show that there is.

Here is a quick amusing story about Alan Bloom from Seth Benardete a fellow students of Leo Strauss:

He was heading home after a conference with Stanley Rosen (another friend and student of Strauss) and Allan Bloom in the car. Bloom spotted some deer by the side of the road. They stopped the car. Bloom wanted to get out to see them. He asked: "Do you think they'll attack if I got out and approach them?" And Rosen said: "I don't think they've read Closing of the American Mind".

I think Bloom's translation and notes on the Republic is a good introduction, it was my introduction to Plato, but Benardete and Rosen go much deeper and much further.

... or else give it a reading in which the one who returns brings back only another image. — J

What else could he have brought back? He could not bring back what he saw. At best he could tell them what he saw, but that is an image and not the thing itself.

I think the aporia is often constructed by Socrates himself, as a teaching tool. — J

I agree that he sometimes deliberately confuses his interlocutor, but this does not do away with the problem.

I read back, starting from the discussion about astronomy et al., and I can't find this. Where do you see the forms fitting in here? — J

He is talking about the power of dialectic that:

... leads what is best in the soul upwards to the sight of what is most excellent among things that are ...

(532c)

Namely, the Forms.

And Socrates does not know it either. He knows only how it looks to him.
— Fooloso4

Begging the question, no? It's the very thing we're debating. — J

I don't think that the distinction between the truth as it appears to him and knowledge of the truth itself begs the question. If it were why would he not insist that it is actually so?

The map over donors from the public towards candidates is a pretty clear indicator of what the people want. — Christoffer

Unless I am missing something, if donations are any measure then Harris would have won.

The fear mongering using "socialist" is just the right playing their cards. — Christoffer

I am not sure that is entirely true. It may be that people do not understand Sander's proposals, but a proper understanding of a candidate's position has never been a requirement for voting.

This is why I want to ban anyone from halls of power who's not a true representative of the people and who constantly lies. — Christoffer

So, you are not in favor of democracy.

I'm not really sure what this reply is supposed to mean. Is the claim that Plato doesn't really buy into the psychology and means of self-determination he lays out across several dialogues (not just the Republic, but the chariot of the Phaedrus, the Golden Thread of the Laws, etc.)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Two things, first, the psychology is far more complex than the clear three part division makes it appear to be. How, for example, does the Symposium's erotic desire of wisdom fit in with this?

move past what merely "appears to be good," (appetitive) or "is said to be good," (spirited/passions) in search of what is "truly good." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Second, it is not simply a matter of psychology but of epistemology. The movement in search of what is 'truly good" is still within the realm of what appears to be.

A charming story but if this were to happen today you might have ended up in trouble with the administration.
When I was in school this was not at all uncommon. What changed?

After the courts found in the 1990s that universities could be financially liable for sexual harassment, many institutions — among them, the University of California and Yale — adopted formal policies forbidding sexual or romantic relationships between faculty and students.

From New York Times:New Harvard Policy Bans Teacher-Student Relations

Bernie had the support of the people, so that's a good hint at what type of Democrat the people actually want. — Christoffer

We really don't know how many people would have voted for him. The label "socialist" still scares a lot of people. I do think, however, that targeting wealth disparity might be a winning message.

I suppose we could view Socrates as trying to block rational thought at these points of aporia, but I'm not sure that's his purpose — J

A bit more on this. The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself.