One need not put aside the question of truth, but the question of whether what he says is true should not come before the question of what it is he is saying. What he is saying is what is at issue.

I don't know what this is supposed to mean. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle didn't think rational inquiry was useful? Is Plato sceptical of the dialectical having any utility? This would seem strange. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Both terms 'zetetic' and 'skeptic' originally meant inquiry. It is not skepticism in the modern dogmatic sense, which denies the possibility of knowledge, but rather an acknowledgement that one does not possess knowledge. Hence, to proceed by inquiry, which in large part is dialectical, that is, via argument.

... he also seems to allow that they can point to, aid in the remembrance of, knowledge (e.g. the Meno teaching scene) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Recollection (anamnesis) is a myth. As a reasoned argument it suffers from the problem infinite regress. There must have been some previous life in which one learned what in later lives is recollected. In that case knowledge would not be recollection.

Recollection also plays a part in our life here and now. In the Phaedo Socrates gives the following example:

Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.

(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Simmias must be reminded of the argument that learning is recollection. If he is to learn that learning is recollection he learns it by being reminded of the story, not by recollecting something from a previous life. As he says:

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded".

It should not escape notice that he says "undergo". Accepting the story is more like an indoctrination than simply hearing the story.

A person must be ruled over by the rational part of the soul to leave the cave — Count Timothy von Icarus

Reason functions in the same way in the cave:

And suppose they received certain honours and praises from one another, and there were privileges for whoever discerns the passing shadows most keenly, and is best at remembering which of them usually comes first or last, which are simultaneous, and on that basis is best able to predict what is going to happen next.

(Republic 516c-d)

Reason can rule even for us ignorant cave dwellers who are not ruled by the myth of transcendence.

Would it be more accurate to call this fallibalism rather than relativism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Relativism is the term used in the OP as the opposite of an absolute position.

The problem with the term 'fallibilism' is that it is usually defined in terms of epistemology. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were zetetic skeptics. An examination of opinion.

In order to give a complete description of the world one would have to know all the facts of the world. Is there anyone who knows all the facts of the world?

I think he is claiming that facts are not descriptions. That we cannot give a complete description of the world. That we cannot derive the content of the world from its form.

Just to be sure, do you think he is denying one or more of these things? If so, which ones and on what textual basis?

just to be sure, is this what you think Wittgenstein is claiming in the tractatus? — Banno

Is what what I think Wittgenstein is claiming? That facts are not descriptions? That we cannot give a complete description of the world? That we cannot derive the content of the world from its form?

Of course the propositions do not give a compete description of the world, but surely the facts do. — Banno

Facts are not descriptions.

If we knew the totality of facts we would be able to give a complete description of the world, but we do not have the totality of facts. And so we do not have all true propositions. Without having all true propositions we do not have a complete description of the world.

But if you say something about the world, it would be odd if what you say about the world were not true... — Banno

What would be odd is if everything you say about the world is true.

Everything that can be said about the world would not give us a complete picture of the world
— Fooloso4

Then I do not see how you can make sense of Tract 1.1 — Banno

Everything that can be said about the world includes saying things that are not true. A complete picture of the world would not include an equal number of true and false statements. What is false is not a fact. From this description of the world that says everything that can be said you would not know what the facts are.

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is.
— Fooloso4

That's not the point. — Sam26

It is pointless to say that what can never be said can be said.

Quit trying to put words in my mouth. — Sam26

Your words:

If as Wittgenstein believed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world, then everything that can be said about the world, would give us a complete picture of the world. We would have completely described the world, given we have everything that can be said. — Sam26

Everything that can be said about the world would not give us a complete picture of the world but rather a complete picture of the possibilities of the world, both true and false. From this picture we would not know what is the case.

We cannot determine which propositions are true by looking at language . Within the limits of language we do not arrive at a true picture of the world.

I'm using depict in reference to what the picture displays, i.e., the content of the picture. Wittgenstein is saying that a picture doesn't represent its form, it shows or displays it. — Sam26

The form is not the content.

As I read him, Plato is a relativist. Only not the kind of relativist that Schindler attacks. The argument is simple. Knowledge of ignorance means that moral absolutes are beyond our grasp. In their absence Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle must settle for what on the basis of argument seems true and best to them. In the absence of knowledge we cannot say that absolutes do not exist, but we can recognize that we are not in possession of the them. We remain in the realm of opinion.

The problem of misologic is raised at the center or heart of Plato's Phaedo. Simply put, Socrates wants to provide his friends with arguments to support belief in the immortality of the soul. The arguments fail to accomplish this. Those whose trust in reasoned argument is excessive and unreasonable are shattered. They may become haters of argument because it has failed them.

The cure involves, as the action of the dialogue shows, a shift from logos to mythos. Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. Socrates human wisdom, his knowledge of his ignorance, is more than just knowing that he is ignorant. It is knowing how to think and live in ignorance.

If you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world. — Sam26

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is.

If a proposition is true, then the picture, which depicts a particular form, correctly matches reality. — Sam26

The picture does not depict a particular form.

A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.

(2.172)

You are conflating form and content.

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the
possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

(2.15)

Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

(2.151)

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.

(2.18)

A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.

(2.2)

What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of
its pictorial form.

(2.22)

If as Wittgenstein believed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world, then everything that can be said about the world, would give us a complete picture of the world. We would have completely described the world, given we have everything that can be said. So, if this is true, then the limits of our language, i.e., everything that can be stated about the world, would completely describe the limits of our (or my) world. — Sam26

This is misleading. We would not have completely described the world. The reason is twofold:

First, given all the simple objects we know all their possible configurations but do not know their actual configurations. Simple objects make up the substance of the world (2.021) They determine a form and not any material properties. It is the configuration of objects produce the material properties. (2.0231) The substance, the simple objects, subsist independently of what is the case, independently of the facts. (2.024)

Second:

There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

(6.37)

Sam starts out looking in the right direction with the limits of what can be said, but continues in the wrong direction. The limits of my language does not mean that we have completely described the world, but rather, that what can be said about the world is limited by what it makes sense to say, by propositions that have meaning. Propositions picture the world. An illogical picture would represent an illogical world. The world is logical and so what is pictured in language must be logical.

Wittgenstein's claim that logic is transcendental differs fundamentally from Kant's transcendental idealism. Logic is the condition for both the world as the totality of facts and our representation of those facts in language. A fact is a state of affairs, a combination of objects or things. Things exist in logical space. This is not a claim about how things are for us, but how they are, necessarily, in themselves.

His claim that ethics/aesthetics is transcendental, on the other hand, is about how things are for us. Not as a matter of fact, but of value. Not as something that can be said, but as how we see or perceive things, how we experience the world.

Logic is the transcendental condition for the world. Ethics/aesthetics the transcendental condition for my world.

A form of life includes something that is missing from both Tractarian logic and ethics/aesthetics - what we do, how we live, and how the world is shaped by us. Rather than drawing limits Wittgenstein is now more interested in possibilities:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

He does this not by marking limits to what is possible but by clearing away misunderstandings.

The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

(PI 126)

He has reversed the direction of his investigation. From the conditions for to conditions against, to what stands in the way and prevents us from seeing new possibilities. Related to this is the phenomena of seeing aspects:

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something a because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

(129)

Here the shift is from the condition for the possibility of experience to the experiences themselves.

The problem with this perspective is that illogical thought is actually quite common, and even illogical speaking cannot be ruled out. — Metaphysician Undercover

A common response to this is: "think" or "think about it" or "think it through". We might also ask for an explanation.

The lack of an underlying logical structure is the position Wittgenstein moved on toward in the Philosophical Investigations ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You are late to the party. This has been part of the discussion since the OP.

Why are you and I one of those beings and my hat is not? — Arne

Ask your hat.

Is it necessary that there be a logical structure underlying mind in order to identify a contradiction? If someone is given contradictory orders they will be at a lot as to what to do if they attempt to follow those orders. Even an obedient dog will not be able to.

and doesn't there also have to be a logical structure underlying mind? — Arne

I think Wittgenstein would say no:

Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake.—What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

(3.02)

It is the logical structure underlying language and not mind that is a check against illogical thought. I take this to mean that any illogical thought or propositions would evidently involve a contradiction.and would not be accepted.

Back when I used to pay a bit of attention to such things there was, as you note, disagreement as to whether he meant the human form of life or human forms of life.

With regard to an overarching singular form of human life, on the one hand:

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

He quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

On the other:

If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.

(PPF 327)

In this case, however, I think it more likely to be a difference in life form rather than form of life.

... unlike Fooloso4's representation of "Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible." — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not my representation. It is what Wittgenstein says. I cited it. Unless you are claiming that he means something else by the term 'transcendental.

Incidentally, I tend to think of forms of life hierarchically, as if there’s a multiply nested plurality all within the general human form of life. — Jamal

I would argue in favor of forms of human life.

It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle. Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No and countless other things. —– And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.

(PI 19)

To imagine such a language is to imagine a form of life that is different from ours.

“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.

(PI 241)

What we in our technologically advanced world say would not be what less technologically advanced peoples would agree with. They would think we were crazy.

Look also at Wittgenstein's use of an imagined people or tribe. Their way or form of life differs from ours

We could imagine that the language of §2 was the whole language of A and B, even the whole language of a tribe.

(PI 6)

When we do philosophy, we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this.

(PI 194)

We also say of a person that he is transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards our considerations that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. One learns this when one comes into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even though one has mastered the country’s language. One does not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We can’t find our feet with them.

(PPF 325)

Are logic and language separable? — Arne

According to the Tractatus language pictures the world. This is possible because there is a logical structure underlying both language and the world.

The above quotation is where you can see it most clearly, and several commentators describe it as a peculiarly linguistic flavour of transcendental idealism. — Jamal

I think this misses the mark. It is logic rather than language which is transcendental. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes language possible. Language and the world share a logical structure. Logic underlies not only language but the world. It is the transcendental condition that makes the world possible.

The claim that:

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

(5.6)

is followed immediately by:

Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

(5.61)

Note the shift from language - my world to logic - the world.

However:

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

(5.62)

I am my world. (The microcosm.)

(5.63)

The world is my world but my world is not the world, for my world is not anyone else's world.

In the Tractatus both logic (6.13) and ethics (6.421) are transcendental.

Ethics stands outside the limits of language. (6.421)

Logic stands on one side of the limit of the world. Ethics on the other.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

(6.43)

The proposition that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world does not mean that all there is is the linguistic or propositional world. That all there is is what can be said.

The language games that constitute the lives of human beings thereby constitute the human "form of life," because human beings are linguistic to the core. — Jamal

Human forms of life are linguistic but language games cannot be understood by abstracting or isolating what is said from what is done, from the other activities of our lives.

In other words, the limits of my form of life mean the limits of my world. — Jamal

This does not mark the same kind of limit.

In the Tractatus limits are drawn to what can be thought by way of what can be said. The primary reason for doing this is similar to Kant's denying knowledge in order to make room for faith (CPR Bxxx). Ethics is experiential. Outside the limits of the propositional. He later abandons this line of investigation:

Theology as grammar

(PI 373)

The form of life of a cloistered monk is not my form of life, but it is possible for me to become a monk and for the monk to leave the monastic life.

Things are not so different today. Stories and songs still play a major role in shaping what we find desirable, and what we desire is the basis of what we regard as good.

...my legs are like works of art. — Zolenskify

When making arguments it is good to have a leg to stand on, to take a stance, and have a proper and I assume in your case fetching attitude.

I thought Plato saw poetry as immoral, distracting folk from truth. Doesn't he also agree that poetry has a role some later works? — Tom Storm

For Plato the distinction between philosophy, poetry, and sophistry is not as clear-cut as he makes it seem. Without getting too far into it, his writing is a kind of philosophical poetry, making extensive use of images, myths, and likely stories. It intends to persuade and to that end he engages in sophistical and rhetorical argument. Above all it is dialectical. Together with the engaged reader it moves and remains within the realm of thinking.

How are we to understand this today - sounds like a culture war. Was it that poetry functioned a bit like sophistry, using its artfulness to manipulate rather than identify the good? — Tom Storm

It was a culture war. Only today there is no one comparable to Plato or Aristophanes. I don't think it was a matter of manipulating the good, but rather, in the absence of knowledge of the good, making images of its likeness.

First as in preeminent not chronologically.

The term poet comes from the Greek poiein which means to make. The poets were the makers of myths, of stories, of images of men and gods. They were not simply entertainers, they were the primary educators. First among them was Homer. In the Republic the poets are the makers of the images of those things whose shadows are cast on the cave wall. The shadows or images of images the prisoners, that is, people, take to be the truth.

Socrates wants to banish the poets from the just city. The philosophers and not the poets should be the educators, the myth makers, the makers of truth, and of proper conduct toward men and gods.

I'm sure there are appropriate platforms for it. — Vera Mont

This platform will do just fine. I did not start this topic. Others crop up all the time. If you have an issue with it take it up with the moderators. It was your choice to participate and to respond to me.

The question of the order of authority between reason and revelation is a perennial philosophical problem. Plato referred to it as 'the quarrel between philosophy and poetry'. Tertullian might have been the first to use the phrase 'Athens and Jerusalem'. In any case it remains an issue for both philosophers and theologians.

You said that you are:

Anti-religious only when provoked. — Vera Mont

Unless I have read you wrong, it looks to me that you feel that you have been provoked. Why?

They will simply have to do whatever people who questioned have always had to do: decide what they believe. — Vera Mont

Of course. But they need not be alone in doing so. They might find discussion and the articulation of questions helpful.

Christianity got itself established quite firmly in the world without benefit of the pedigree you seem to require. — Vera Mont

What pedigree? There is no pedigree. From the beginning there have been factions and differences with regard to both belief and practice.

Christianity has a history, much of which has been suppressed, lost, or forgotten. It did not become firmly established without two things:

1) The Church Fathers successful unification of what they misleadingly called the Catholic Church
by declaring certain texts and doctrines to be canonical and official and others heretical. The heretical texts include inspirational writing, testifying to the indwelling of spirit. Some regard this as the true genius of Christianity.

2) Prior to the establishment of the Church there were for the most part a small group of Jewish followers of Jesus who believed he was the promised messiah, and the Gentile followers of Paul, who in effect abolished what Jesus claimed to fulfill , God's Law. At some point the Gentile Christians, in line with their belief in deification and contrary to both Jesus and Paul, made Jesus a god. Despite their agreement on this, there were differences as to what this meant. These disputes threatened not only the Church, which Constantine at this point seemed to have little interest in, but political alliances, which he was very much interested in. It is an open question whether Christianity would have survived without Constantine.

It will not come undone by some minor quibble over who is what religion and why in a tiny backwater of the internet. — Vera Mont

I agree that it will not come undone in this way. If you think that is what I intend you are wrong. In these discussions it is typical for someone to accuse me of either supporting or trying to undermine Christianity or religion. As if by raising questions and difficulties I must be doing one or the other. I have no interest in doing either.

Given its diversity, any focused discussion of Christianity or more generally religion needs to deal with some degree of specificity regarding beliefs and/or practices. It is not for the sake of a pedigree but so that we are talking about the same thing.

Added: By way of example. On several occasions people have told me that they "love philosophy", but then go on to talk about things that I would not regard as philosophy. I do not engage in a discussion of what I think is or is not philosophy, but I do come to see that we are not talking about the same thing.

It doesn't make the least little difference to what people have done, what people do and what people believe. — Vera Mont

Of course it does! Perhaps not to you but it makes a great deal of difference to some who question whether they can remain Christian and not believe that Jesus was more than human. I have been here long enough to think it likely that some of them might even be reading this. There is more to it than either giving them an answer or telling them it is up to them to make up their own mind. Some might be looking for help in sorting it all out for themselves. For them it may be that the question of this thread: "What religion are you and why?" is something they struggle with. For some it is the questioning, the inquiring, and not the answers anyone else gives that is most important.

Here we are all those years later still discussing it.
— Fooloso4
We were. Now, only you are. — Vera Mont

'We' is not limited to you and me. But now 'we' includes one less participant. At least for now.

In the ancient Greek concept of number the first number is two. One is the unit of the count, what it is that is being counted. We see this here:

... are we strictly talking about igneous rocks, or do you prefer another type? — Zolenskify

The number of igneous rocks is not the same as the number of sedimentary rocks. To answer the question "how many" we need to know how many what.

That's your position, is it? Fine. — Vera Mont

It is the position that is under discussion. The question was raised, and not by me, whether Jesus was a real person. I joined in to say:

My guess is that he did exist but that we know nothing about this man. It may even be that 'Jesus' became the name for a composite from the stories of different individuals claiming or believed to be the messiah. — Fooloso4

This was followed by your post:

I think Jesus was a composite figure ... — Vera Mont

So, we agree on that.

But it does not have to be my position in order to discuss it and what follows from that.

If Jesus was just a man then ... — Fooloso4

Christianity without a Christ seems to be oxymoronic.

Are you aware that this horse died about 1600 years ago? — Vera Mont

?

Do you mean the Council of Ephesus (431)? Or the First Council (325)? Or the Gregorian calendar (425)? Or something else?

In any case, when it comes to theological matters, whatever some group of men come to agreement on is not the end of the matter. Here we are all those years later still discussing it.

I asked the question of how we are to understand Jesus
— Fooloso4
and my answer was: However you can, according to your own lights — Vera Mont

Is it your position that Christianity is whatever you want it to be as long as believers are decent to one another, regardless of what else is believed, said, and done?

Ask a Christian. Ask many Christians. You'll probably get as many answers. — Vera Mont

Right. And many if not most will deny that Christianity without a divine savior is Christianity. My point is not that one must be right and the other wrong but that without some common element or perhaps family resemblance there is no referent. Nothing that distinguishes it from other religions or beliefs and practices.

Who is to say which religion is "a mistake"? — Vera Mont

If Jesus was just a man then it would be a mistake to worship him as a god. If he is a god then it would be a mistake to regard him as merely a man. Of course we are free to decide for ourselves but that does not solve the problem for someone struggling to decide.

Of course there isn't! It's the kernel of all practical instruction for a coherent society. — Vera Mont

Then secular rather than religious?

What, if anything, distinguishes Christianity?
— Fooloso4
The fact that it had Constantine as its patron, at a time when he was gaining power. — Vera Mont

Constantine took sides in the dispute that the Council of Nicaea was supposed to resolve, but political fiat does not resolve theological differences. Consistent with what you said above I would think you would say that it is up to the individual. In which case it would would seem that there is nothing that distinguishes it.

(Paul was a pretty good salesman, but he couldn't have done it at the grass roots.) — Vera Mont

Christianity was at its inception the religion invented by Paul and, according to Paul, at odds with what Jesus' disciples said Jesus preached. This was also the inception of the growing hatred of Jews by those who called themselves Christian.

That no current religions worship those ancient figures, or that I left Gautama off the list, has little to do with their archetypal similarity. — Vera Mont

I asked the question of how we are to understand Jesus against the background of how he is understood within Christianity. Put differently, what does Christian belief and practice look like to Christians who regard him as a moral man.

It's an enormous PR success. — Vera Mont

Right, but its success does not mean it was not a mistake.

be decent to one another. — Vera Mont

There is nothing particularly Christian about this. What, if anything, distinguishes Christianity?

...even though they may have never recognized with with such refinement nor were capable of bringing it to its highest form: universality. — Bob Ross

If you ignore what was actually said and done and evidently valued, and in its place assert your own version of universality, then things might seem to have been as you paint them to be. It is a kind of willful blindness and ignorance.

Anyone who thinks that it is morally permissible to kill and eat an animal for purely trivial reasons — Bob Ross

Trivial reasons? You said:

but whether or not we can to survive is a separate question. — Bob Ross

Is surviving a purely trivial reason?

For much of human history human and animal sacrifice was practiced. It was not believed to be purely trivial. Rather than being regarded as immoral it was what pleased the gods. Beliefs and practices change. The idea that we are progressing toward a state of universal truth and perfection is an idea that should not have survived the 19th century.

How are we to understand him?
— Fooloso4
As a legendary hero figure. (Hercules, Prince Yamato, Odin, Ta Kora, Maitreya, Boewulf...) — Vera Mont

But there are no major religions worshiping these figures. Does this mean that Christianity is an enormous mistake?

If you're interested in the teachings, you'll find their essence in those texts, regardless of distortion. — Vera Mont

How do we distinguish between essence and distortion? What you might take to be essence others might see as distortion because it leaves out what they believe is essential.

What do you mean by 'teachings'?

... reciting speeches

The people who surrounded him decided to exploit his image through his teachings. — javi2541997

I mean such things as the Sermon on the Mount.

He maybe didn't even know how to write, but had everything a religion needs: Poverty, drama, guilt, sacrifice, etc. — javi2541997

How do you know he was poor? Perhaps the drama was part of the stories told about him. Why guilt? What would he have to be guilty about? Guilt inflicted on him by his Jewish mother? Was he either so sinful or thought himself to be so that Yom Kippur was not enough? What kinds of sacrifice?

There is nothing unique about Jesus. He was a normal person like you and me. That's the key to understanding him. — javi2541997

How are we to understand him? If there is nothing unique about him what does this mean for Christianity?

If the stories of Jesus are distortions then what are we to make of the teachings ascribed to him?

I read Kazantzakis some years ago. I do not remember whether he addresses the following. For many Christians death and resurrection is of central importance. If Jesus was a man then the resurrection stories become problematic.

Given the alleged distortions in the gospel stories what if anything is unique about Jesus?

Jesus of Nazareth did exist. — javi2541997

The evidence may not be so solid:

https://aeon.co/essays/why-the-son-of-god-story-is-built-on-mythology-not-history

My guess is that he did exist but that we know nothing about this man. It may even be that 'Jesus' became the name for a composite from the stories of different individuals claiming or believed to be the messiah.