Lots of questions that don't address the question I asked. — javra

Actually my questions are in response to the question you asked.

That worldview is Buddhism. Just as physicalism is an umbrella concept to many a variety, so too is Buddhism. — javra

If that worldview is based on knowledge of reality then why not a single unified view or description of reality?

... it was about sufficient justification to uphold that it might be, — javra

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be?

Something fishy about this affirmation. — javra

Unless I misunderstood you, you argued in favor of the benefit of holding "the Buddhist worldview." My point is that there can be different worldviews that are beneficial.

If a Buddhist monk’s worldview — javra

What is that worldview? Is it individual or common to all Buddhist monks? What are we to make of divergent views within and between Buddhist schools of thought?

at least some Buddhist monks have actual knowledge into the nature of reality that others don’t grasp ... — javra

What do they say about the nature of reality? Why should we accept that what they describe is actual knowledge into the nature of reality?

... then the empirically verifiable benefits of their upheld worldview upon their Central Nervous System would by entailment be nothing more than a wild coincidence devoid of any explanation. — javra

That a worldview has benefits for those who hold it only shows that holding this worldview has benefits, not that the worldview corresponds reality. An unrealistic or false worldview might also have benefits.

What is the basis of the worldview? Is it the result of what is viewed, of what is seen in a way similar to the philosophers of the Republic see? These philosophers are, by the way, markedly different from Socrates or how philosophers are described in other dialogues. Or is it a worldview that is based on opinion and attitude? Something we can all accept and benefit from?

The question is, to what extent is knowledge instrumental in actualizing the possible? — Pantagruel

My question in line with this tread is the extent to which possible knowledge is mistaken for actual knowledge. I might grant that it is possible that someone has knowledge of a transcendent reality that most of us know nothing of, but it is a questionable leap across an abyss from what cannot be absolutely ruled out to ruling it in, to accepting it as privileged knowledge of a higher reality.

A savant card-counter could win a huge amount of money from a game of blackjack that would leave most people broke. — Pantagruel

That they can do this is not merely a theoretical possibility. They can demonstrate their ability to do this. How does one demonstrate that there is a realm of Forms that they have knowledge of?

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible?
— Fooloso4

Possibly. — Pantagruel

Ha! And possibly not.

This touches on my interest in intuition, understood as deep learning in neural networks. It seems to me that there are two seperate issues involved.

1. Having demonstrable knowledge.
2. Having an explanation for that knowledge. — wonderer1

Intuitions often turn out to be wrong. In all such cases there is no demonstrable knowledge.

my impression is that intuition has been mysterious and subject to being explained in supernatural or mystical terms until the 1980s — wonderer1

This has been the case with many advances in science.

More precisely, they would not do anything to prevent what they believe is the prophesied final holy war that will usher in the end time and their being raptured.

"Mystical" could in one sense just mean "beyond our current understanding." — Pantagruel

Does anything more follow from "is possible" than is possible?

Individuals with certain mental capacities are capable of grasping complex mathematical concepts far beyond the ken of most folks. — Pantagruel

If someone claims to have mathematical knowledge it can be demonstrated. Can the same be said of someone who claims to have mystical knowledge?

You keep saying that 'we' do not know and can never know the forms - does this 'we' include Plotinus, Proclus, all the philosophers before and since? — Wayfarer

I think so. But we (you and I) don't know what Plotinus or Proclus knows, do we? They claim to know something we do not. You seem inclined to believe them. I am not. Many others have claimed to know something we do not. I am not inclined to believe them based on their reports of mystical experience.

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. — Edward Feser

According to Plato's Divided Line mathematical objects are not known by noesis. They are hypothetical, objects of reason or dianoia.

Russell's universals unlike Forms are not causes.

See Paine's post above.

I am not interesting in turning this into yet another discussion of the limits and problems of materialism.

What in my opinion and consistent with knowledge of ignorance is that whatever it is we might take the Forms to be we do not have knowledge of them. They remain hypothetical. They remain for us images on the cave wall.

Now you might believe that some have attained knowledge of them, but that is just an opinion. The coin of the realm of the cave.

I find that passage you quote itself open to a wide enough range of interpretations. — javra

This much seems clear:

1)There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise (suggramma) of Plato

and

2) his philosophical thinking does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies.

And so I can't make heads or tails as what type of reply it's supposed to be - this to the question of whether you yourself find the Socratic dialogs are reputable, or else worthwhile, philosophy. — javra

If philosophy is the desire for wisdom we should be wise enough to know that we are not wise. In the Apology Socrates says that he knows nothing noble and good. (21d)Knowledge of his ignorance is the beginning not the completion of his wisdom. It is, on the one hand, the beginning of self-knowledge and on the other of the self’s knowledge of the world.

Socratic philosophy is zetetic. It is inquiry directed by our lack of knowledge. If Socrates is taken to be, as I think Plato and Xenophon intend, the paradigmatic philosopher, then the fact that he remained ignorant until the end of his life should be kept front and center.

You do not say what you regard as "reputable and worthwhile philosophy" but I take it to mean some set of logical propositions that inform us about the truth of things. In that case, you would not regard Socratic philosophy to be reputable and worthwhile. But I do.

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. That idea is made much more explicit in Mahāyāna Buddhism than in Platonism, but I believe there is some common ground. — Wayfarer

What is made explicit, as I have pointed out, is that all of the Forms are beyond coming-to-be and passing away but unlike the Good, they are said to be entirely and to be entirely knowable.

To say that the good is beyond being is not to say that it is less than being, that it is not. It exceeds being, it is more than not less than what is.

While I do not speak Ancient Greek, from my studies the word in Ancient Greek can convey different meanings or else sub-meaning. — javra

Isn't that true of many words? If not 'being' then what do you suggest it means in this context?

To be clear, do you by this intend to express that the Socratic dialogues by which Platonism was established are not rigorous philosophical discussions - this on account of often being poetically expressed? — javra

In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

But thus much I can certainly declare concerning all these writers, or prospective writers, who claim to know the subjects which I seriously study, whether as hearers of mine or of other teachers, or from their own discoveries; it is impossible, in my judgement at least, that these men should understand anything about this subject. There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise (suggramma) of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies (341c)

Corrupt in what way? — GRWelsh

The primary defense used by the MAGA nation is something we learned on the playground as children. "I know you are but what am I" or "I am rubber and you are glue. Whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you".

In response to charges that Trump is corrupt the response is: Willis or Biden the Democrats or the Justice Department or whoever is part of the "anti-Trump movement" is corrupt. Different allegation same response. He would claim that Carroll raped him except he is afraid that would make him look weak.

Here's a translation I found online — javra

There are several newer translations that are preferable to Shorey's.

Wayfarer brought to my attention this new online translation of all the dialogues: https://www.platonicfoundation.org/

Horan translates the passage as follows:

Then not only does the knowability of whatever is known derive from the good, but also what it is, and its being, is conferred on it through that, though the good is not being, but is even beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.

This is in line with the highly regarded Bloom translation. The term in question is ousia. Since there was no equivalent term in Latin Cicero coined essentia, from the Latin esse, to be. It means, literally, "the what it was to be". Given the various way the term 'essence' has come to be used, it causes a great deal of confusion as a translation of the Greek.

Though we disagree in some respects, ↪Fooloso4 beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary. — javra

My example is not to the contrary. It supports it.

You misinterpret what I am asking. I'm not speaking of a citizen advancing a legal opinion. — jgill

These is an important difference between someone thinking it sounds like an invasion and acting to secure the border in a way that courts have determined is illegal. If she claims that she is within her rights to act this way because of an invasion she is advancing a legal opinion.

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. Poetry may be evocative, but it presents no arguments. That which cannot be tested empirically or justified logically is outside the scope of rational argument. That doesn't mean it has no value, so don't mistake me for saying that. — Janus

Much of what we find in Plato, including the ascent to a transcendent realm of Forms in the Republic is philosophical poetry. In the Phaedo, in order to save philosophy from the failure of rational argument Socrates resorts to mythos to overcome misologic. (89d)

Wittgenstein said:

Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry.

(Culture and Value)

and:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

Those who love Plato's image of clear unambiguous world of Forms bristle at what Aristotle calls Plato's "indeterminate dyads".These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

At what point does a citizen reinterpret the flow of illegal immigrants into the USA as an "invasion"? — jgill

At no point. The question of the interpretation of the law is to be left to the courts. Otherwise the law becomes whatever any citizen interprets it to be. What else might an individual or state regard as an invasion? There are many private citizens and in government who believe that this is a white Christian nation. What they might consider "too many" of those who are not white Christians to be an invasion and an existential threat to their God given rightful way of life.

I do agree that there is a serious problem at the border that must be dealt with but it cannot be solved through lawless disregard of the courts.

↪Wayfarer You clearly take issue with ↪Fooloso4 for a secular and, shall we say, 'modern' reading of Plato and Aristotle? — Tom Storm

I think all of our readings are by default modern. We cannot escape being modern. It is our cave. But my reading differs from that of others who are modern.

From an interview with Stanley Rosen, an influential scholar who has written extensively on Plato:

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm
A few more points from the interview that are worth considering:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

This tracks pretty close to my own readings

Neoplatonic mathematics is governed by a fundamental distinction which is indeed inherent in Greek science in general, but is here most strongly formulated. According to this distinction, one branch of mathematics participates in the contemplation of that which is in no way subject to change, or to becoming and passing away. This branch contemplates that which is always such as it is and which alone is capable of being known: for that which is known in the act of knowing, being a communicable and teachable possession, must be something that is once and for all fixed
Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra. — Wayfarer

Klein points out that Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of number:

arithmos eidetikos - idea numbers
arithmos aisthetetos - sensible number
metaxy - between
(Metaphysics 987b)

The third kind is something in between, not an eidetic nor a sensible number. See above:

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c) — Fooloso4

Were Socrates/Plato to have understood "being" within the linguistic and cultural contexts of their time as consisting of that which comes into being and goes out of being, then the affirmation that the Good is not that just expressed would make sense. — javra

It should be quite apparent that for them the opinions of that time or any other time and place are not decisive.

Your affirm this conclusion as thought it is true, or else as though it is the truth of what Socrates/Plato intended. — javra

I do not affirm that it is true, but I think it is an accurate description of what the text says.

Yet how is this affirmation not equivalent to the nonsensical statement that a certain given is neither X nor not-X? — javra

Is what is beyond being something that is or something that is not?

In the Sophist we find the following exchange:

Theaetetus:
We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.
Stranger:
Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.
Theaetetus:
Apparently.
Stranger:
According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.
Theaetetus:
You are about right.
Stranger:
What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?
Theaetetus:
What indeed?
Stranger:
There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. (Sophist 250)

Being is neither at rest nor not at rest. Neither in motion nor not in motion. And yet, we would not to deny that what is is either in motion or at rest.

Added: See also above and copied in my response to Wayfarer below:

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c) — Fooloso4

Right - but if they are 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away', then how can they be said to exist?

An illustration: does the number 7 exist? — Wayfarer

Does the number 7 come into being and pass away?

the nature of their existence is contested by philosophers — Wayfarer

If I remember correctly, you come down on the side of them as always existing and unchanging.

I think it ironic how often Socrates' claim of ignorance is ignored. As I read them both Plato and Aristotle are skeptics is the sense of knowing that they do not know. We remain in the cave of opinion. It is not that we do not know anything, but when we do not know what we do not know and believe we do know we are no longer even in the realm of opinion but ignorance.

As I previously mentioned via analogy of gravitational singularities, this conclusion is erroneous. Here's another example, Kant ... — javra

What is erroneous is importing ideas about gravitational singularities and from Kant in the attempt to understand Plato. You might conclude that Plato is wrong, but that is another story.

And yet you go on to say in another post:

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works. — javra

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations. — javra

See above:

The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

And:

If we cannot know the good then we cannot know that it is beyond being, or that it is the cause both of things that are and knowledge of them. All of this is entirely consistent with Socrates claim that human wisdom is knowledge of ignorance. — Fooloso4

1. The sense in which is God is 'above' or 'beyond' existence, and, so, not something that exists, is central the apophatic theology. — Wayfarer

I suspect this reflects the influence of Plato, but we should not conclude from what is in some way similar that they are the same.

Tillich — Wayfarer

I think Tillich got the idea of God as the ground of being from Meister Eckhart or perhaps Heidegger.

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. — Wayfarer

But the Forms that are affirmed to exist, to be, are said to be 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'.

And so, literally speaking, they don't need to exist! — Wayfarer

In the Republic Socrates says that they are the only things that truly exist because they do not come into being or pass away.

That A cannot know what X is does not imply that A cannot know of X's occurrence and of certain properties by which X is delineated. — javra

Socrates makes the distinction between things that we say are just or beautiful or good and the just or beautiful or good itself. Without knowledge of the thing itself we remain in the world of disputed opinion.

As to the Good being beyond being, while I don't speak Greek, much less Ancient Greek, there seems to be something lost in translation. — javra

In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b) And In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b)

For example, when appraised via modern English, in claiming that "the Good is beyond space and time" the Good is nevertheless postulated to be (although this not in any manner requiring any type of distance or duration). — javra

He does say that the Forms Just and Beautiful exist. But they do not exist in time and space.

But if you can evidence to the contrary, I'd be interested in the evidence you'd have to present. — javra

I have no evidence beyond what can be found in the text. There certainly is disagreement regarding interpretation, but I do not know of one that I find more convincing.

There is, however, another problem. Something I already pointed out:

If there is a Form of the Good but we do not know what the Good is, what can we say about it that we know to be true? It is not that it is difficult to know but that if only what is entirely is entirely knowable and the Good is beyond being, beyond what is, then it cannot be known. — Fooloso4

If we cannot know the good then we cannot know that it is beyond being, or that it is the cause both of things that are and knowledge of them. All of this is entirely consistent with Socrates claim that human wisdom is knowledge of ignorance.

I think it would have been more prudent for her not to get involved in this relationship at this time, but I agree with her that:

any personal relationship among members of the prosecution team does not amount to a disqualifying conflict of interest or otherwise harm a criminal defendant.

Because Trump's actions are indefensible they have resorted to attempts to discredit her by creating a trumped up "scandal".

Speaking of certain topics does result in persecution and censorship today. — Lionino

You are right. My statement was qualified:

We no longer have to worry about explicit discussions of atheism or nihilism either, at least in most communities. The cat is out of the bag. — Fooloso4

This does not mean that persecution and censorship does not exist, but the ideas that philosophers in the past thought they needed to hide are now spoken of openly. If not everywhere, at least in places where free speech is valued and practiced.

From my understanding, the Form of the Good is supposedly the most real of all givens that are or could be. As such, irrespective of how difficult the Form of the Good might be to know, the Form of the Good necessarily is and, hence, necessarily holds being (although of course not of a physical kind). — javra

If there is a Form of the Good but we do not know what the Good is, what can we say about it that we know to be true? It is not that it is difficult to know but that if only what is entirely is entirely knowable and the Good is beyond being, beyond what is, then it cannot be known.

This seems to me in part evidenced by your previous statement:

But as any reader off the Republic knows the Forms are presented as the fixed unchanging truth.
— Fooloso4 — javra

As it is presented by Socrates is not the same as what is true. As he says:

A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me. — Fooloso4

There is a play on words here. The Greek term eidos, means and can be translated as 'look'. But since he is ignorant he does not see the Forms themselves. How it looks to him is how it seems to him it must be if there is to be knowledge.

Hard to say how much truth there is to its scenes of battle, but I greatly liked, and still greatly like, Homer's Iliad on this very count. — javra

Plato's Timaeus begins with Socrates wanting to see the city he creates in the Republic at war. He wants to see the city in action. The fixed intelligible world, the world of Forms, is not the whole of the story. The Forms are part of a whole that is indeterminate, a whole in which there is contingency and chance.

That is no longer as much of a problem
— Fooloso4

That statement is more about you than it is about the politics of our times. — Lionino

What topics or issues do you think should still be kept secret?

Is there an inner circle today?

Is the contemporary esoteric teachings to be found within the exoteric or separate written or oral teachings? Or do you think it is not to be found in what is said but in some experience most of us do not experience?

With regard to the course handout: The "Verstehen approach" is a caricature. A set of claims that neither Strauss nor his more capable students would support. They do not regard any of the philosophers they read as infallible. While they are careful not to use anachronistic terminology, it is not that we cannot put the works into our own terms. We cannot do otherwise. We do not speak or write in ancient Greek. We should, however, be careful not to rely on terminology that is conceptually foreign to the author. The facts are that language changes over time and that philosophers often use terms in ways that are different from more common usage even in the same language in the same period of time.

As did his favorite god. The god who philosophizes. Dionysus.

But in all these, 'reason' is being understood in a sense much nearer to 'logos' than today's 'instrumental reason', is it not? — Wayfarer

This begs the question of how logos is to be understood. I think it is safe to say that it is not instrumental reason.

But just quickly: can you sketch how ones read between the lines? I've read some of what you have written about Plato - in what sense can this (between the lines) be applied to his understanding of the good, for instance? — Tom Storm

One does it by the example of others and practice. In the Phaedrus Socrates says:

... every speech must be constructed just like a living creature with a body of its own, so that it is neither headless nor footless; instead it should be written possessing middle and extremities suited to one another and to the whole.

(264c)

Plato is telling us how to read him. His dialogues are like living creatures. Each part has a function and plays a role within the whole. He is to be read accordingly. As with a living creature, it moves. There are no fixed doctrines in Plato. The movement is dialectical. From hypothesis to hypothesis. "Stepping stones and springboards (Republic 511b). The Forms are these hypotheses.(Phaedo 105c)

But as any reader off the Republic knows the Forms are presented as the fixed unchanging truth. Clearly, we have not arrived at the truth. And that, odd as it may seem, is the key. Socrates, who tells this story of transcendent knowledge, does not know. His human wisdom is his knowledge of ignorance.

in what sense can this (between the lines) be applied to his understanding of the good, for instance? — Tom Storm

Quick answer, the Good cannot be known. The best we can do is determine what through inquiry and examination seems best to us while remaining open to the fact that we do not know.

Not so quick answer:

Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

He makes a threefold distinction -

Being or what is
Something other than that which is
What is not

And corresponding to them

Knowledge
Opinion
Ignorance


The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

The quote at 517 continues:

"… but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it." (517c)

But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.

In the past it was often necessary to keep certain things concealed to avoid persecution and censorship. That is no longer as much of a problem, but if we are to read and understand these works it is necessary to read between the lines and make connections. We no longer have to worry about explicit discussions of atheism or nihilism either, at least in most communities. The cat is out of the bag.

Are there still reasons to write or speak esoterically? Perhaps, but in my interpretive practice I do just the opposite. I attempt to bring things into the light.

A more Spinoza way to put it is to say that the love of God brings a kind of happiness only possible through the freedom of reason as a principle of action. — Paine

Another way to put this is that the more capable we are of reasoning correctly, the more perfect and happy we are (Part V, "The Power of the Human Intellect or Human Freedom, Proposition 31). In other words the more perfect our knowledge the more godlike we become.

But what prompted my question was the appropriateness of attributing mind to God. In what you just quoted Spinoza is talking about the mind of human beings.

The esoteric remains inscrutable. — Tom Storm

This may be true of occult esoteric beliefs but there is a difference between hiding things from children and the idea of some hidden dimension of reality. Philosophers are traditionally and for the most part elitist. They regard mankind as children that they must hide the truth from. But there are a few who by temperament and maturity no longer need protection.

There are not, however, two sets of books. The two different teachings are within the same pages.

What Hume calls here philosophical and pernicious truths are similar to what Nietzsche calls deadly truths. Hume is saying that mankind prefers lies or errors that are salutary and advantageous to society.

On the one hand, if the philosopher seeks the truth then he will favor truth over consequences, but on the other, if he recognizes a responsibility to educate and benefit mankind, he will be compelled to hide them. He will have to develop an esoteric art of writing that will obscure such truths from those who may be harmed by them while at the same time speak truthfully to those who are well suited and prepared to hear it.

The problem is, the term is used in various ways. For some it means something along the lines of occult revelation. Secret doctrines or hidden dimensions of reality.

There is, however, another sense of the term as used to describe the practice of many mainstream philosophers prior to the 19th century. Nietzsche is responsible for bringing to our attention this practice that was once well know but was all but forgotten by contemporary readers:

The difference between the exoteric and the esoteric, formerly known to philosophers–among the Indians as among the Greeks, Persians, and Muslims — Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 30

A recent book on esotericism in mainstream philosophy is Arthur Meltzer's Philosophy Between the Lines. There is an online appendix

A few quotes from a wide variety of philosophers:

Descartes writes to one of his more imprudent disciples:

Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.
Why is it necessary for you to reject so openly the [Aristotelian doctrine of]
substantial forms? Do you not recall that in the Treatise on Meteors I expressly
denied that I rejected or denied them, but declared only that they were not
necessary for the explication of my reasons?
– René Descartes to Regius, January, 1642, Œuvres de Descartes, 3:491-
92, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’
Sincerity,” 363

David Hume (1711-1776):
[T]hough the philosophical truth of any proposition, by no means depends on its tendency
to promote the interests of society, yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory,
however true, which he must confess leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why
rake into those corners of nature which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the
pestilence from the pit in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your researches may be
admired but your systems will be detested, and mankind will agree, if they cannot refute
them, to sink them at least in eternal silence and oblivion. Truths which are pernicious to
society, if any such there be, will yield to errors which are salutary and advantageous.
– David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 257-58 (9.2)
(emphasis in the original)

Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert (1751-1772):

EXOTERIC and ESOTERIC, adj. (History of Philosophy): The first of these words
signifies exterior, the second, interior. The ancient philosophers had a double doctrine;
the one external, public or exoteric; the other internal, secret or esoteric.
– “Exoteric and Esoteric,” Encyclopedia (translation mine)

[T]he condition of the sage is very dangerous: there is hardly a nation that is not soiled
with the blood of several of those who have professed it. What should one do then?
Must one be senseless among the senseless? No; but one must be wise in secret.
– Denis Diderot, “Pythagorism or Philosophy of Pythagoras,” Encyclopedia

The Encyclopedia not only frequently speaks of esotericism–and approvingly–but it also
practices it, as becomes clear from a letter of d’Alembert to Voltaire. The latter had been
complaining to d’Alembert about the timidity of some of the articles. He replies:
No doubt we have some bad articles in theology and metaphysics, but with
theologians as censors... I defy you to make them better. There are other articles,
less open to the light, where all is repaired. Time will enable people to
distinguish what we have thought from what we have said.
– Jean d’Alembert to Denis Diderot, July 21, 1757, Œuvres et
correspondances, 5:51 (translation mine; emphasis added)

Just what this means, Diderot makes clear in his article titled “Encyclopedia.” He is speaking about the use of cross-references in the articles. This can be useful, he explains, to link articles on common subjects enabling their ideas to reinforce and build upon one another.
When it is necessary, [the cross-references] will also produce a completely
opposite effect: they will counter notions; they will bring principles into contrast;
they will secretly attack, unsettle, overturn certain ridiculous opinions which one
would not dare to insult openly....There would be a great art and an infinte
advantage in these latter cross-references. The entire work would receive from
them an internal force and a secret utility, the silent effects of which would
necessarily be perceptible over time. Every time, for example, that a national
prejudice would merit some respect, its particular article ought to set it forth
respectfully, and with its whole retinue of plausibility and charm; but it also ought
to overturn this edifice of muck, disperse a vain pile of dust, by cross-referencing
articles in which solid principles serve as the basis for the contrary truths. This
means of undeceiving men operates very promptly on good minds, and it operates
infallibly and without any detrimental consequence–secretly and without scandal–
on all minds. It is the art of deducing tacitly the boldest consequences. If these
confirming and refuting cross-references are planned well in advance, and
prepared skillfully, they will give an encyclopedia the character which a good
dictionary ought to possess: this character is that of changing the common manner
of thinking.
– Denis Diderot, “Encyclopedia,” Encyclopedia

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914):
[Forbidden ideas] are different in different countries and in different ages; but wherever
you are, let it be known that you seriously hold a tabooed belief, and you may be
perfectly sure of being treated with a cruelty less brutal but more refined than hunting
you like a wolf. Thus the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared,
and dare not now [in America, circa 1877], to utter the whole of their thought.
– Charles Sanders Pierce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Philosophical Writings, 20

The desire for freedom is in the nature of reason. — Paine

I don't follow.

Just as we should not assume that nature acts for a purpose, we should not assume that nature acts out of a desire for freedom.

As you quoted, in the scholium he says:

For one must note, above all, that it is one and the same appetite by which a human being is said both to act and to be acted on. — Ethics, Spinoza, Part 5, Prop 4, translated by Silverthorne and Kisner

What may be right conduct according to reason is a different question from that of acts of God/Nature and the ascription of mind to God/Nature.

Following up on the question of whether Trump will comply with Supreme Court decisions.

It may seem improbable but THIS
may the writing on the wall of what is to come from the Republican Party:

Rep. Chip Roy (R-Texas), who has said Texas should ignore the Supreme Court’s order allowing federal authorities to remove barbed wire along the southern border, compared the decision Tuesday to the 1857 high court ruling that upheld slavery.

Roy is among a number of Republicans who have described immigrants crossing the border as an “invasion” and said during a House hearing Tuesday that he will not let “statute books” stop him from defending his home.

Governor Greg Abbott issued a declaration arguing he has the legal power to overrule federal authorities in case of an “invasion.” What this means in practice is that he is claiming and acting on premise that the state and not the Supreme Court gets to interpret Federal law.