the end made me really question how I think about everything. — theUnexaminedMind
SOCRATES (469-399 BCE)
Of smart know-it-alls there's a huge glut,
But they're dolts when you're down in a rut.
The one person to see
If your life's up a tree,
Is an ignorant pain in the ----.
WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (1288-1347)
I sing of the great Ockham’s razor,
That sharp philosophical laser.
A theory that’s bloated
Will fast be demoted,
And blasted with Captain Bill's phaser.
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844-1900)
“Thank God for eternal recurrence,
For endings I have an abhurrence.
I just love Groundhog Day,
When it’s done, press Replay,
Thank God for eternal recurrence."
“God is dead,” said Herr Nietzsche, “He’s toast.
He’s no more than an axed talk show host.
Though he sports a white beard,
And makes Christians afeard,
He's as dead as an ex-parrot's ghost."
AND ONE FINAL META-LIMERICK
That iambic pentameter’s cool,
Had to learn it in primary school.
But trimeter’s the best
When the foot’s anapest:
In great poetry limericks rule. — A History of Western Philosophy in 108 Limericks
I'm not sure serenity, contentment or happiness is at all compatible with whatever Nietzsche was advocating with such phrases as "Will to Power" and "The Overman." — Nils Loc
It would've never occurred to me to call contemporary statue tippers iconoclasts but it fits with the original spirit of the term quite well. — Nils Loc
They [Hashtags ] can be seen as a way to help or start a revolution by increasing the number of supporters from across the world who have not been in contact with the issue.[7] It allows people to discuss and comment around one hashtag. Hashtag activism is a way to expand the usage of communication and make it democratic in a way that everyone has a way to express their opinions.[7] Especially it provides an important platform for historically disenfranchised populations, enabling them to communicate, mobilize and advocate on topics less visible in mainstream media. — Hashtag activism
If one could imagine an alternative history where Socrates gave up his work (the public practice of Elenchus) to remain alive, would he remain the so called "father of Western philosophy". It's kind of a great mythic/legendary opening to the movement of Western philosophy — Nils Loc
There is a point beyond which philosophy, if it is not to lose face, must turn into something else: performance. It has to pass a test in a foreign land, a territory that’s not its own. For the ultimate testing of our philosophy takes place not in the sphere of strictly rational procedures (writing, teaching, lecturing), but elsewhere: in the fierce confrontation with death of the animal that we are.
— Costica Bradatan, NYT Opinionator: Philosophy as the Art of Dying
Philosophy as an Art of Dying by Costica Bradatan — Nils Loc
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534860'...Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead (64a)'
What are we to make of this startling and puzzling claim? — Fooloso4
Avicenna, an 11th century Islamic philosopher, gave his "floating man" thought experiment to prove the existence of a soul, or a transcendent self. He asks us to imagine a person with no sensory experience at all:...
David Hume, six hundred years later, ran through basically the same thought experiment, but came to the opposite conclusion. That there was no such thing as a self without some experience attached to it:..
Thought experiment: what if we took other people's intuitions as seriously as our own? — existential comics: thought experiment
I am not sure about having original hypotheses or even if there was great future 'pay-off'.
— Amity
Iconoclasts! The movers and the shakers, any of those, can be condemned by the current era conservatives to uphold the status quo as a matter of faith or power. — Nils Loc
Iconoclasm (from Greek: εἰκών, eikṓn, 'figure, icon' + κλάω, kláō, 'to break') is the social belief in the importance of the destruction of icons and other images or monuments, most frequently for religious or political reasons. People who engage in or support iconoclasm are called iconoclasts, a term that has come to be figuratively applied to any individual who challenges "cherished beliefs or venerated institutions on the grounds that they are erroneous or pernicious."[4] — Wiki - Iconoclasm
The statue of the slave trader Edward Colston has gone on display in Bristol, almost a year to the day since it was dragged from its plinth by Black Lives Matter protesters and thrown into Bristol harbour.
Daubed with red and blue graffiti, and damaged so it can longer stand upright, the 19th-century bronze memorial has been displayed at the M Shed museum. Visitors will see it lying supine on a wooden stand alongside placards from the protest on 7 June 2020 and a timeline of events.
David Hume at 300
Howard Darmstadter looks at the life and legacy of the incendiary tercentenarian.
In 1734, David Hume, a bookish 23-year-old Scotsman, abandoned conventional career options and went off to France to Think Things Over. Living frugally and devoting himself to study and writing, he returned after three years with a hefty manuscript under his arm. Published in three volumes in 1739 –40 as A Treatise of Human Nature, it attracted little attention. Reflecting on the event near the end of his life, Hume joked that it “fell still-born from the press.”
The Religious Skeptic
Hume had become a religious skeptic in his teens, and remained so until he died. The manuscript for the Treatise originally contained a chapter, ‘Of Miracles’, which argued that “no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof.” [Again, see this issue.] Hume was prevailed upon to remove the chapter from the Treatise, but he included it in the first Enquiry. Hume’s initial hesitation is understandable: as recently as 1696, a young man had been executed in Edinburgh for blasphemy. Scotland last hanged a witch when Hume was seventeen.
Hume soon rallied, going on to enjoy a long and successful career as an historian and political essayist (the accomplishments for which he was best known in his lifetime) and as an important contributor to the infant science of economics.
Hume approached his own death with a cheerful calm that bordered on disinterest. A few months before his death, he composed a brief autobiography in which he described his situation:
“In spring 1775, I was struck with a disorder in my bowels, which at first gave me no alarm, but has since, as I apprehend it, become mortal and incurable. I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a moment’s abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that were I to name a period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted to point to this later period. … It is difficult to be more detached from life than I am at present.”
David Hume, My Own Life, penultimate paragraph — Howard Darmstadter
“But the life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than that of an oyster.” — 130 David Hume Quotes
The interim decision has been taken because of the sensitivities around asking students to use a building named after the 18th century philosopher whose comments on matters of race, though not uncommon at the time, rightly cause distress today...
Some have also urged the removal of the statue of David Hume from Edinburgh’s Royal Mile. The statue was erected in 1997 and is a popular attraction (and not just among traveling philosophers). — Justin Weinberg: Should We Continue to Honor Hume
If the wench doesn't drown, she's a witch, and therefore must be burned at the stake. — Nils Loc
Socrates’ great speech in the Phaedrus —the so-called ‘palinode’—begins with the somewhat shocking claim that ‘the greatest goods’ come from madness. Understood within the dramatic frame of the dialogue, the meaning of this claim is clear enough: the previous two speeches had argued that a beloved who is being wooed ought to prefer a non-lover to a lover, on the grounds that the ‘mad’ lover has no control over himself and is incapable of acting toward what is best.
Yet such a view directly contradicts the fact that Eros—being a god—can-not be the cause of anything bad; hence, Socrates must now recant his earlier disparagement of μανία [ manía ] and instead extol the virtues of madness. The palinode would then seem to be an elaboration and defense of this revaluation of madness.
In particular, the palinode seems to suggest that, in the best of circumstances, the madness of eros not only to an intense and beneficial interpersonal relationship but also to the highest kind of philosophical cognition. The apparent conclusion here is that there is a close relationship between philosophy and madness.
But just what is the nature of this relationship? Indeed, while the praise of madness might very well make sense as part of the dialogical-dramatic movement of the Phaedrus, it becomes problematic when set against the moral psychology of such dialogues as the Republic.
After all, the latter’s strong arguments in favor of rational self-control would seem to lead to an unequivocal rejection of any sort of ‘madness’ in the soul, and would hardly countenance madness as a part of philosophy. So is Plato seriously suggesting in the Phaedrus that the philosopher is ‘mad’? And if so, in what sense?
At least two responses are possible. First, there is what we might call the ‘literalist’ reading: the notion that, yes, the philosopher is literally mad, in the sense that he lacks complete rational self-control or self-awareness, and hence there are times when losing one’s mind or reason is a good thing.
Second—and diametrically opposed to the literalist reading—there is what we might call the ‘ironic’ reading: the notion that the philosopher is not ‘mad’ or ‘un-self-controlled’ in any way, and that any apparent suggestion to the contrary is made purely for rhetorical, dialogical, or ironic reasons.
What I wish to argue here is that—as is so often the case with Plato’s dialogues—the most plausible interpretation of the Phaedrus lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
To see that this is the case, we must be clear about how Plato is defining‘ madness’ in the first place. The speeches of the Phaedrus initially present us with two distinct types of madness: a human type involving an internal state of psychic disharmony, and a divine type involving possession by a god...
— Daniel Werner: Plato on Madness and Philosophy
The internal voice (the Daimonion) that told Socrates no whenever he was about to do something wrong sounds far weirder than his method, which was probably more annoying than crazy. But maybe it's just a creative take on what we call the conscience (though one doesn't audibly hear it). — Nils Loc
In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)
There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy. — Fooloso4
I'd like an example of a crazy/insane philosopher. The heresiarchs of the old days, those who questioned institutional reality (Christian cosmogony) with original hypotheses were possibly insane/corrupt by the standards of the time, but there was great pay off for future generations — Nils Loc
How could a serious pessimist like that exist and ought you really call him a philosopher rather than a poet. Or is it a kind of poets play/humor that is detached from his character, an artistic salve/work for the condition he was in. — Nils Loc
At the moment we converse about Poirot, the lines between "fact" and "fiction" are blurred or even vanish. This, to most philosophers and psychiatrists, would be treated as confusion or delusional respectively. The question is, are they correct? — TheMadFool
We must not ask how many children Lady Macbeth had. We must not think of characters as “our friends for life,” or feel that they “remain as real to us as our familiar friends.” We must not talk about the “unconscious feelings of a character,” for that would be to fall into the “trap of the realistic fallacy.” — The Point mag: Literary criticism and the existential turn
Writing a novel whose characters can escape into the real world does feel “a bit like writing software,” Fernyhough continued. “Or laying a minefield for the heart. You want to shape how your readers think and feel – not in prescriptive ways that leave them no room to bring their own experiences and interpretations, but to allow them enter the minds of people they are not, and to have something of their experiences.”
Docx compared the characters whose voices get into readers’ heads to secret friends. “You wish you were great pals with Holden Caulfield, that you could sit around and trade wisecracks with him,” he said. “Obviously it’s a form of madness, but then all fiction is a form of madness.” — Guardian: Fictional characters - Experiential crossings
It doesn't matter much what the physical configuration of the person is, it matters that we conceive of them as being John (or Mary), etc. — Manuel
When the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel announced impressively to one of Oxford’s philosophical clubs that human freedom was the ‘ontological counterweight to death’, Austin invited him to explain what he meant.
The request, made with his characteristic courtesy, was followed up repeatedly with appeals for further clarification.
Marcel ended up saying he meant that the fact we are going to die makes all our earthly doings ultimately futile, but we carry on in full awareness of this by investing some things with value by an exercise of free will. Was this true?
Maybe, maybe not, but at least that question could now be intelligibly posed. — Aeon essay on J.L. Austin
it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics
— Banno
Is there a 'right' way to 'do' metaphysics?
Is there an easy or a hard way...a 'just right' way..
Superficial or deep and wide-ranging...
https://www.wikihow.com/Study-Metaphysics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
What kind of metaphysics...
An SEP search - 1290 documents.
Feminist, Arab & Islamic, Chinese, Aristotle... — Amity
One response to what I've said is simply to ignore it. If that's what you want, go ahead. — Banno
Wittgenstein says this nicely: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This can be interpreted in many ways, I take it to mean that we should avoid being held captive if we do not proceed with the way we are phrasing and/or thinking about a question. — Manuel
Austin's Philosophical Papers.
Also,
How not to be a chucklehead — Banno
Given the critical role of language and definitions in ordinary discourse, I am not surprised that the context and usage of words can play such a critical role in managing apparent contradictions and ambiguities in narratives involving metaphysics.
Can you recommend an easy to understand essay or paper exploring the process you used above? I tried reading Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations but it is beyond me. — Tom Storm
My bolds.When the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel announced impressively to one of Oxford’s philosophical clubs that human freedom was the ‘ontological counterweight to death’, Austin invited him to explain what he meant.
The request, made with his characteristic courtesy, was followed up repeatedly with appeals for further clarification.
Marcel ended up saying he meant that the fact we are going to die makes all our earthly doings ultimately futile, but we carry on in full awareness of this by investing some things with value by an exercise of free will. Was this true? Maybe, maybe not, but at least that question could now be intelligibly posed. — Aeon essay on J.L. Austin
The point of me asking for a person to give an example of a metaphysical problem dissolving through language use and one which does not is simply to see if people are willing to point to one example in which analysis or clear use of words can put a problem to the side tends to show that philosophy of language can be useful. — Manuel
Fricker (2007) argues that there is a distinctive kind of injustice that has to do with the inability to properly understand and communicate important aspects of one’s social experience: she calls this hermeneutical injustice. According to Fricker, people in a position of marginalization are prevented from creating concepts, terms and other representational resources that could be used in order to conceptualize and understand their own experiences, especially those having to do with being in that position of marginalization. People in a position of power will tend to create concepts and linguistic representations that help to conceptualize the experiences and phenomena that matter to them, rather than the experiences and phenomena that matter the most to people in a position of marginalization — SEP: Feminist philosophy of language
Feminists like Spender and Catherine MacKinnon (1989) argue that male power over language has allowed them to create reality. This is partly due to the fact that our categorizations of reality inevitably depend on our social perspective: “there is no ungendered reality or ungendered perspective” (MacKinnon 1989: 114). Haslanger (1995) discusses this argument in detail. — As above
I will be honest and admit that the 'another poster' is he whom this present member is in the habit of addressing with the perpendicular pronoun. — Banno
All I ask is for two things: 1) what metaphysical problems do you think can be resolved by analyzing our language and 2) which metaphysical questions are actually substantive? — Manuel
It looks like a false dichotomy. A metaphysical problem could perhaps be *both* substantive *and* resolvable by analysing our language. — Cuthbert
It should thus not come as a surprise that there could be a specifically feminist metaphysics, where the question of prime importance is to what extent the central concepts and categories of metaphysics, in terms of which we make sense of our reality, could be value laden in ways that are particularly gendered.
In this way, feminist theorists have asked whether and, if so, to what extent our frameworks for understanding the world are distorting in ways that privilege men or masculinity. What, if anything, is eclipsed if we adopt an Aristotelian framework of substance and essence, or a Cartesian framework of immaterial souls present in material bodies ?
— SEP: Feminist Metaphysics
it's other purpose is to discuss the right way to do metaphysics — Banno
This topic was prompted by another poster: to state it simply are there legitimate metaphysical questions as opposed to problems related to language use?
That is, is the long history of metaphysics one in which, by analysis of language use alone, we may dissolve such problems? — Manuel
It's not so much that there are no metaphysical issues, as that the problems we call metaphysical are characterised by conceptual confusions, and hence the path to dealing with them is in conceptual analysis with an eye to untying the knot of confusion — Banno
I try to avoid using "just"
— Manuel
It's a good indicator of something fishy going on. — Banno
The “Surely” Klaxon
A “Klaxon” is a loud, electric horn—such as a car horn—an urgent warning. In this point, Dennett asks us to treat the word “surely” as a rhetorical warning sign that an author of an argumentative essay has stated an “ill-examined ‘truism’” without offering sufficient reason or evidence, hoping the reader will quickly agree and move on. While this is not always the case, writes Dennett, such verbiage often signals a weak point in an argument, since these words would not be necessary if the author, and reader, really could be “sure.” — Dennett: seven tools for critical thinking
Anyone help with further information ? — Amity
In another life, I discussed 'secular spirituality' - it acknowledges that it is not an either/or reality.
— Amity
Indeed. Theism or belief in a spiritual reality does not bring with it ipso facto superior virtues or capacities. — Tom Storm
it makes at appear as if one post is the correct answer. — Jack Cummins
↪Fooloso4
I wasn't aware that of what you describe as the thread having come to a close. I was about to write a couple more replies but fell asleep. Are you thinking the thread so poor that it should stop, and I don't think you have expressed your view on reality yet? — Jack Cummins
I hope that my question is not too vague to be seen as worth exploring, because I see it as central to all philosophical exploration.
Edit: I have changed title, to make it more a topic for philosophy reflection, because I was a bit surprised by how the topic was being explored. Of course, it may not alter any answer because the objective idea of reality may be the way you see it anyway.
View Answer — Jack Cummins
I'd buy this compilation album Rubber Dung . — 180 Proof
Edit: I have changed title, to make it more a topic for philosophy reflection, because I was a bit surprised by how the topic was being explored. Of course, it may not alter any answer because the objective idea of reality may be the way you see it anyway.
View Answer — Jack Cummins
I recall in another forum you talking about Robert Solomon, maybe his "Spirituality for the Skeptic". — Fooloso4
It also seems to me that spiritual pursuits so often are a form of abstracted status seeking - all that talk of 'higher level' things - accessible only to special states or special people. It's like crass materialism has been sublimated into a type of crass higher consciousness virtue signalling. — Tom Storm
He [ Jesus ] is teaching us the ultimate method of self-protection. Jesus is showing us how to get out of “even exchange” consciousness. He recommends spiritual one-upmanship—going to a spiritually more expansive understanding. Jesus advocates asserting our self-respect and dignity. When we “turn the other cheek,” we are realizing that we, not the other person, have the power. We are the one who has the choice. We are not subjugated. When we “turn the other cheek” in consciousness we discover that wise practical actions come to mind. — Unity Church, Austin
5 Ego Traps That Make Spiritual People Fall into Narrow-Mindedness
5 ways the ego can turn our intention to be spiritual people into something less wholesome. — Learning mind - ego traps
Sure, reality may consist of waves with discrete blobs of energy floating upon it... But at an important level this is insignificant to a life lived. — Tom Storm
Eight central attributes of secular spirituality can be identified: eclecticism, self-growth, relevance to life, self-direction, openness to wonder, authenticity beyond churches, metaphysical explanations, and communal and ecological morality. The persistence of both traditional and nontraditional forms of religiosity and spirituality should adjust the current popular views of secularism. — Robert C. Fuller
After your reply, I am tempted to put the thread back in the main discussion chamber. I partly moved it because I am creating too many. It can be a bit addictive, but I do enjoy inventing them as I don't have many creative outlets at the moment. — Jack Cummins