Cheers

Yes, exactly.

His point was that you cannot doubt your existence. It's not the kind of thing that can be doubted. I took that to be your point. — jamalrob

Well, my opinion is that his whole approach is incorrect. Of course I'm not a fan of Descartes.

It is my point, but Descartes analysis is not the same as Wittgenstein's analysis in OC, which is what I was trying to represent. :grin:

What? Descartes was confused about the whole notion of doubting.

For those of you who haven't already, study On Certainty (Wittgenstein's final notes), it helps to clear up some of these misunderstandings. Then again, you might read it, and think, what in the world is he talking about? :wink:

"Cogito ergo sum." I think therefore I am. If I did not exist, I could not think, therefore thinking alone proves undoubtedly to myself that I exist. — god must be atheist

The idea that one would need a proof to convince oneself that you exist, is ridiculous, better yet, it's just nonsense. How would a doubt about your own existence arise? And, if you could doubt your existence, which again, is nonsense, who would be doing the doubting, if not you? Presumably a proof is supposed to give you knowledge of your existence? I mean, if you could doubt your existence, then surely you could doubt the very words you're using to form the proof. There are certain beliefs that are so fundamental, so bedrock, so basic, that they need no justification, i.e., they fall outside the domain of epistemology. These beliefs form the very backdrop needed to have these kinds of conversations. If you can't be certain of your own existence, what could you be certain about? Nothing! Even being certain would lose all meaning.

Saying some of the same things again, from a slightly different angle.

If Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived.

Wittgenstein asks the following question in PI 243, “…could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” He’s not asking if we can use the language that we’re familiar with, to write down our private feeling, moods, etc., obviously we are able to do this. He’s asking if we can use words “…to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” So, the person in this example is using a completely private language, to refer to his/her private sensations. Remember, no one else understands the language of this person, it’s completely devoid of any social context.

Next, Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense (PI 246).” It’s wrong to think that people “surmise” you’re in pain, as if they have to guess it, i.e., they see your screams of agony, or they see your injury - it’s not a matter of surmising. Of course, someone could be faking their pain, or lying, but generally it’s true that for the most part we know when someone is in pain. Wittgenstein’s interlocuter asks, “Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself (PI 246)!” It’s here that we get to the crux of the matter, for what could such a statement mean? Do I discover or learn that I’m in pain? Having knowledge, or the process of knowing, is a process of discovery. Again, do I discover that I’m in pain, or learn that I’m in pain? This seems to be, and is, nonsense. Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.”

Could you be in pain and not know it, then somehow discover it? The closer we look at these kinds of statements, the more nonsensical they become. We need to ask, “What would it mean to not know I’m in pain?” One of the ways to understand the use of the word know, is to consider its negation, again, “I don’t know I’m in pain.” Knowing and not knowing have to be seen in juxtaposition. This seems to be why “I know I’m in pain,” amounts to no more than, “I’m in pain.” Why? Because there is no not knowing I’m in pain. I’m either aware of my pain, or I’m not aware. It’s part of being conscious.

No harm done.

That's true, but not applicable here. If I tell you I've solved the hard problem, you wouldn't just take my word for it. — RogueAI

Ya, you're right, it isn't applicable to the hard problem. I was just addressing something Janus said as a side issue.

I was pointing out that in certain circumstances, just telling someone what's in your back yard doesn't cut it as a good explanation. As the stakes go up, the need for verification increases. — RogueAI

Of course there are exceptions where we need to verify someone's account of things, but my point is, that there are many instance of knowing that don't involve the perspective of science.

What if your life somehow depended on guessing correctly that there is a tree in my yard? Would you just take my word for it if I said there wasn't, and that answer would get you killed? Wouldn't you want to verify my answer? — RogueAI

But my life doesn't depend on guessing correctly, if it did then things would be much different in terms of what we know.

they cannot be counted as explanations, because a good explanation should be testable. — Janus

If I explain what's in my backyard, isn't that most likely a good explanation of what's in my yard, or do you need to test it. There are plenty of good explanation we use everyday that don't need testing. This gets back to the notion that somehow if science can't do experiments to confirm one's claim, then it can't be knowable, or it's somehow not real knowledge.

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Sam26

Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. In other words, one may say, "I know X is true," as a way of emphasizing one's subjective certainty. Hence, one confuses one use of the word know with another. In the case of the quote above, Gertie equates know with an experience, but not a sensory experience, but a kind of pointing to something unknown, the beetle-in-the-box kind of thing. Often religious people do this when they say that the Holy Spirit revealed something to me.

The reason the PLA was invoked was to dispel the notion that meaning can arise in this way. It seems then, that using know as an a kind of emphasis, can be shown in the way one expresses the word know, or gestures as one uses the word know. This is legitimate use, but it shouldn't be confused with objective knowledge or objective certainty.

It's as if Gertie has some private interpretation of know, an epistemological use without any objective confirmation.

Looking again at the matter of rule-following, and its importance in determining how a word is used, and how use is related to meaning. This must be seen the idea that meaning somehow arises in the mind, as an idea, or some other mind-dependent phenomena. The tendency is to give too much credit to one’s own mind as the determining factor in meaning. Although the mind is crucial, meaning is not a function of one’s own mind, rather, it is a function of many minds working in conjunction with one another. Many minds being the correlate to a group of language users, and how the practices of language users determines meaning. Its these practices that show the rules of the language-game. Just as the movement of the pieces in chess, show or demonstrate the implementation of the rules of the game.

What needs to be emphasized over and over, is the idea that meaning is an outward manifestation of language as a “form of life.” Forms of life have to do with “customs (uses, institutions),” namely, those things Wittgenstein cited in PI 23 (giving orders, reporting an event, play-acting, telling a joke, speculating, testing a hypothesis, etc.). The focus should be on what is happening in language from us as individuals. This change of focus, helps us to see the nature of meaning, i.e., it changes the focus from what is happening in my mind, to what is happening as the group functions in social settings (going from the internal to the external).

What is problematic is that since language is an activity of the mind, in the sense that it is me who is speaking, one wants to overemphasize the importance of the “me” or “I” in terms of meaning. However, it is not the “me” or “I,” it is the interaction of each of us with others, viz., the other language users. It is this interaction, that gives us a regularity, or a norm of use.

Another confusion that seems to raise its ugly head, is, my intention, what was, or is my intent as I use the words, i.e., some think that intent drives meaning, or has a significant role in meaning. However, this is also a misunderstanding. Our intentions have nothing to do with meaning. We learn the meanings in social settings, and use what we’ve learned to convey our intentions.

But hobbits are part of a shared game, the rules of which, although set by Tolkien, are subject to modification; Hobbits are a communal exercise. — Banno

Well, people so all sorts of strange things, maybe hobbits are running around in people's minds. :wink:

existence is not treated as a predicate in logic. That is, there is no simple way to parse. "Xtrix exists". — Olivier5

I think it's correct to say that existence is not a predicate or a property to be ascribed to individuals such as God, unicorns, Abraham Lincoln, or any other individual (fictional or not). When we say that X exists, we're saying something about the concept, i.e., either the concept has an instance in reality or it doesn't. This would seem to be the case in order to make sense of the statement, "Hobbits do not exist." In other words, for a claim to have meaning it must be about something, but since Hobbits don't exist, what could the statement be about? Simply put, it's about the concept, Hobbits. Thus, existence is not something individuals possess, but is rather, a way of expressing something about concepts.

A question for due consideration is whether Wittgenstein thought that language games were incommensurable. — Banno

I don't think there is a yes or no answer to this question. Some language-games are commensurable, and others are not. It seems clear that Wittgenstein thought that using the language-game of science to judge religious language-games is incommensurable. However, there would have to be something in common with the language-games of both to be able to have a conversation, i.e., there has to be some overlap. If the religious person, for e.g., is using the word know the way you're using it, as say, an objective justification, then both language-games are commensurate. However, if they're using the word know as a subjective justification, then it would seem to be incommensurate. It would be like one person playing chess, and the other is playing checkers.

There is no standard by which we could judge all language-games, there are just the games themselves. Each game has it's own rules, but there is a certain amount of overlap. There are rules that apply to all language-games, and there are rules that apply only to the language-game being played. There is no asking, "Which language-game is better?" It depends on what you're trying to do, or how you're using the concepts within the game. This doesn't mean that it's all relative, you can't just do what you want and expect to mean something with your words. There are norms of use, but you have to be careful just how far you extend that norm, just as with any concept.

Well, both of those questions could be asked within the same game. I'm asking if there is some standard by which we can judge the language-game itself. For myself, I don't think this is a legitimate question. Although, I haven't fully come to terms with it, but I'm leaning this way. I might be missing something, not sure.

There doesn't seem to be any absolute standard by which we judge one language-game over another. I don't believe this leads to a kind of relativism as some suggest. It's like asking if there is some standard by which we judge chess games. The standard would seem to be the actions within the game itself, the moves we make, etc.

Lately I've been trying to answer this question for myself. I've thought of possible answers, but nothing definitive. My problem is that most of my studies of Wittgenstein have been in isolation from much of what has been written. Mostly I've tried to read just Wittgenstein (the primary sources) just to see how my interpretation would later compare with others.

I ran into this problem on my own without reading what others have said, and have been puzzling over it.

Just a further remark about sense.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense.

For example, I might use the word know in the following way, viz., to reflect my feeling of subjective certainty, which is reflected in the way I respond or gesticulate. This is far removed from how I might use it in terms of an epistemological justification for what I believe. The problem is that we try to apply a sense that's applicable in one language-game, but not applicable in another language-game. This is probably why Wittgenstein was against religious arguments. He seemed to think that we were applying the language-game, say of science, to the language-game of religion. The two language-games are just different games with different moves. Some of the moves would obviously have to be the same, but some of the moves are just different, with different senses.

You might think that this is just another way to say that context drives meaning, but it’s not. In other words, use is normative, but context is not, you can’t just change a words sense, by giving it just any context.

The question I am focused on is whether, in denying that a sentence is useful in some circumstance, do we deny that it is meaningful? Do we deny that it could carry a truth-value? — Srap Tasmaner

Depends on how we're using the term meaningful. In other words, I could use a sentence that isn't meaningful to demonstrate what is meaningful. So, in such a case the claim that, for example, "I know I have a headache," is meaningful in the sense that it's use shows where we go can go wrong. I would generally say though, that it has no truth-value, especially if the use is vacuous.

One alternative might be to say that "I know I have a headache" is necessarily true, and that the apparent failure of the negations or of the 'doubt' version, regardless of context, show that. The peculiarity of saying "I know I have a headache" would not be, then, due to a semantic catastrophe (that it's nonsense) but something else. — Srap Tasmaner

This doesn't seem right, viz., that "I know I have a headache," is necessarily true (not that you're necessarily saying this :smile:). So, the statement, "I know I have a headache," would be similar or the same as "All triangles have three sides," or "All bachelors are unmarried." In the case of "All triangles have three sides," what we mean by triangle is by definition, having three sides. However, you can't think that this is the same as, "I know I have a headache?" At least not in these cases. Is there something else you have in mind?

I can't seem to get my question across, because people keep telling me what I already know. I'll chalk it up to my inability to convey my question in a way that's clear. :smile:

If I say: "bad means good", is that in accord with or contrary to the rules of the language game? That depends on the language game is being played. A musician might understand what it means if someone says "that guy's a bad mofo", but someone unfamiliar with the language game might well think it means something very different. — Fooloso4

Of course it depends on the language-game being played. The meaning of a word IS its use in a language-game. Obviously there are various kinds of language-games that can occur with the same word, and even though this is the case, we still say meaning occurs within those specific language-games.

Moreover, not every use of a word has to accord with a rule, no more than every action in a game accords with a rule. For example, (Searle uses this e.g.) there is no rule that governs how high a ball is thrown when serving in tennis.

That said, no one seems to be following my point about language-games. It's been said that there are only language-games, not incorrect and correct language-games. Wittgenstein doesn't talk this way, supposedly, and this may be correct, but I'm not sure just yet about this. It seems weird to refer to language-games without reference to correctness, and it seems self-sealing. I can always say someone else's language-game isn't a language-game, because the word is not doing anything. And, in many cases this can be demonstrated, but in other cases, it's not an easy thing to do. Does this mean that there are cases that will never be resolved? Maybe that's just what it means. Is that just the nature of language. It seems to be. This is the point about my post.

I have no doubt about that, but I'm wondering if it's a problem. It doesn't seem to be easily resolvable.

You've missed my whole point. I guess I didn't explain it well enough. :lol:

Language-games

I believe that Wittgenstein’s methods in the PI are important, and at least for me, I see him applying his methods in OC. He points out subtleties that are very difficult to apprehend (which is seen in various interpretations), and very difficult to use.

That said, what I’m trying to convey here is based on the conversation I had with @StreetlightX earlier in this thread.

Most of us agree that W. puts forward the idea that meaning is derived from use in social settings; which is the setting where rule-following takes place. So, use and rule-following are two sides of the same coin; and they form the basis of the language-game. The corresponding analogy is the game of chess, i.e., the pieces move, but they move in accordance with the rules of the game. If you’re not moving the pieces in accordance with the rules, then obviously you’re not playing the game. By analogy, if you’re not using your words in accord with the rules of the language-game, then you’re not doing anything with your words – your words lack meaning. And moreover, not just any use conveys meaning, which brings me back to what I said originally to TMF, viz., the notion of correct use, which seems to be trivial, as @StreetlightX pointed out, but is it?

Aren’t many of our arguments over the correct use of a word? Even those of us who claim to understand Wittgenstein, argue over what the meaning of knowledge is. In fact, philosophers have created all kinds of language-games to convey what the word means. However, language-games are only language-games if they are language-games proper. Not every use of a word that occurs in a social setting can be said to be a language-game. Again, the analogy being, just because you’re playing what looks like a game of chess, that doesn’t mean you are. However, this analogy breaks down (as many analogies do), because the rules of chess are very explicit, and easy to understand. But, understanding which language-games are THE language-games, i.e., those language-games that are language-games proper, is what’s most difficult to discern. In terms of our use of the word knowledge there are many different language-games that convey how the word know is correctly used. There is no one language-game that will give you the correct use, i.e., the essence of the word know. And, this corresponds to what W. said about the definition of the word game, i.e., there is no exact definition that will convey every possible use in our language.

The real question is, how does one know if a particular language-game is correct or not. It’s easy enough to say that meaning occurs in language-games, but there is no easy method for determining what looks like a language-game from that which IS a language-game. There has to be some criteria by which we judge correctness here. And yet, nothing is definitive. Obviously, some cases are clearly not being played by the rules of the game, but language is much more complicated. There doesn’t seem to be any firm ground that isn’t slippery in some setting.

It seems to me, to say, that X isn’t a language-game, so there is no correct use in this context, begs-the-question, doesn’t it? Maybe there just isn’t any precision here. It’s just like the command, “Stand here!” There is no X that marks the spot, but this response can’t be satisfying, at least not to me.
So, is there a problem in what Wittgenstein is saying? Are there insurmountable problems in what W. is trying to communicate? I’m not sure, just thinking out loud.

Insanity is coming here everyday thinking you'll find answers. :worry:

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that
he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrec­tion - ifhe could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed. — Joshs

So, what's your point, and how does this lead to me recanting or reconsidering what I said. I've read enough of Wittgenstein to know that he had a mystical side. All you would have to do is read my thread on NDEs, and you would know that I'm not against the mystical. And by the way, the "make me ill" comment could also easily be made against the materialists, naturalists, and many atheists who think that their way of seeing the world is somehow intellectually superior to any view that looks beyond the material world. So, to be fair I'll add that little bit to the mix. And, I don't think that Wittgenstein is some kind of god, i.e., even if you pointed to something W. said that contradicted my point, that somehow isn't going to make me think I'm wrong. I enjoy W., and I think he contributed some important things to philosophy, but I don't think he was correct about all his musings. I'm sure you don't either.

I don't know whether there is a God or not, but it seems to me that if you're going to claim such a thing, you need some kind of justification. And, I don't think anyone is warranted in believing in some kind of inner knowing or inner justification.

What makes me use the phrase "makes me ill" in relation to religious belief is the conviction that they have some special access to knowing that the rest of us don't; and where this kind of thinking logically leads.

Justification is a linguistic concept, and the use of the concept takes place within our epistemological language, viz., propositions. The idea that justification is something within us, is just anathema to me, and to my way of understanding W. If you don't get anything out of W. surely this would be the one thing that sticks out for most student of W., viz., that meaning doesn't arise from within. Meaning by its very nature, is public; and, recently this has been argued about in the many threads that have sprouted up about W.'s thinking.

Second, as I've mentioned in the first post that kicked this recent tranche of posts, comparing the proposition "I have hands," to "God exists," in terms of W's bedrock or hinge-propositions is a bit of a stretch (which is what Pritchard is implying). One can see this if you compare doubting that one has hands to doubting that God exists. Hell, even Christians doubt their belief in God from time to time, but I'd find it amazing if they doubted the existence of their hands in ordinary circumstances from time to time. The key, at least the way I'm interpreting W., to understanding what a basic belief (or Moorean proposition) is, is that doubting them doesn't make sense, at least generally.

Now of course you can retort and claim that you have direct experiences with God, and if this is really true, then you would have access to something most people don't. However, most of these claims are very subjective, and are open to many different interpretations. Not only that, but they tend to be self-sealing, you can make any experience you have conform to a belief in God in some way. I compare this to the way many Christians, not all, but many, think of answers to prayer. There isn't a non-answer, every event in their lives is made to conform with an answer, i.e., even if they didn't get what they specifically prayed for, it was an answer, specifically a no answer. It's a self-sealing view. It doesn't allow for counter-evidence. What would a non-answer look like? In the same way, if every experience you deem to be of God, is of God, how would you know if you're wrong. These kinds of experiences are even worse than pointing to something internal and saying, "There is my pain." Why? Because at least with a pain there is something external to latch on to, a cry or a scream. But, the experiences many religious people refer to as "an internal knowing" have nothing external to latch on to. There is no corresponding ouch or other kind of thing that attaches externally to the experience, other than a claim. Surely this is the proverbial beetle-in-the-box, maybe worse.

I'm joking. Geez. Can't you tell by my body language?

You may be querying the basis of the way in which Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas but I find your claim that it makes you 'ill' as a bit extreme, even though I realise that you may be speaking metaphorically. — Jack Cummins

No, I literally threw up. :groan:

Extreme or not, I find their interpretation of W. to be very problematic to say the least.

I was going to post a paper I wrote, but decided to wait. Instead I would like to evaluate a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0j3uoH_-A8) in which Dr. Duncan Pritchard (background is seen here: https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=6341) sees Wittgenstein's views in OC as a kind of support for religious epistemological views. So, Wittgenstein is seen in OC as giving us arational supports for our epistemology, and many philosophers, including myself, believe this is the case.

So, there are some Christian philosophers who are saying that there are very basic arational beliefs that support Christian conclusions. This would mean that the statements "This is a hand," and "God exists," are equivalent, neither require a justification in that they are arational. I don't see this as a correct interpretation of what Wittgenstein is putting forward in OC.

I don't see that Moore's statement, "I know this is a hand," is equivalent to "I know God exists," i.e., I don't agree that Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's statement would be the same critique of "I know God exists." In the former statement the doubt makes no sense. It's hard to imagine such a doubt. Note though, in the latter statement (I know God exists."), it makes perfect sense to doubt that such a being exists. It's not in any way equivalent to "This is a hand." Many Christians want to say that their inner sense of God is equivalent to having a hand, i.e., it's so basic that it's foundational to their beliefs. So, in this sense it's beyond knowing, it's a kind of arational belief that goes beyond the epistemological.

This to me is an attempt to escape the required justification for the existence of God. And, many Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas to claim that many of their beliefs are this way. This makes me ill. :sad:

Basically, epistimology is not the only way things make sense: are meaningful, have conditions, are judged by criteria, have identity, etc. The PI is showing that our relation to the world is not always epistemological (you're missing the third act where all the fun happens). — Antony Nickles

Of course "...epistemology is not the only way things make sense: are meaningful, [etc]," and I would never imply this. The point was, you don't know you're in pain in an epistemological sense, with emphasis on knowing. You might use know in a way that's not epistemological, as @StreetlightX pointed out above. So, when I say it has no sense, one can see this by pointing out the negation of the sentence, "I know I'm in pain," which must be seen juxtaposed against the statement "I don't know I'm in pain." Now if you want to say it has sense in other non-epistemological ways, that's fine, but that's not my point. Hope this clears up my point.

it's applying the wrong sense of "know". — Antony Nickles

Mostly, it's giving the concept know, no sense, as opposed to the wrong sense. What I mean is, it has no epistemological sense to say, "I know I have a headache."

I'm surprised no one commented on your comment, which is very important in terms of the use of the word know. Moreover, the negation of, "I know I have a headache" - is an important juxtaposition that points to something important about how we go about affirming that we DO know.

I don't think they could act like a conscious being because conscious beings' actions are sometimes caused by their mental states. — RogueAI

The point of course would be, how you could you tell the mental state apart from a programmed response? I don't think, in theory, you could.

Except the zombie is supposed to be identical to me except for being conscious. — RogueAI

Yes, and this is why I said, "...they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self," which was meant to mean they are not conscious. It's difficult to know if such a zombie would really act like a conscious being. It seems that you could in theory make them respond just like us. It would be like playing a game, say, World of Warcraft, and not knowing if you're talking with a real person or not.

f zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

One possible answer, is that the zombie is just programmed to say these kinds of things. If, for example, our reality is a kind of program of sorts, then it's quite possible that some being (what we refer to as a person) might just be part of the program. They act like us, they talk like us, but they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self. It's certainly possible, but unless you were able to remove yourself from the program, it would be difficult if not impossible to tell the difference.

It's hard to see where he's committing a fallacy.

A philosophy major is a humanities degree path that will challenge students to examine questions with no right answers. — praxis

I definitely don't agree with this, but I'm not going to get into this right now. However, I will respond to the following:

Does a degree in philosophy make one an expert? If not, what might an expert training regimen look like? — praxis

I've been studying two subjects for years, viz., NDEs and Wittgenstein, and I definitely don't consider myself an expert in either field. Although, I'm closer to being an expert in the field of NDEs than I am on the subject of Wittgenstein.

A degree doesn't mean you're an expert. It certainly puts you on the path, in terms of knowledge, but it takes years of study in a particular field to become an expert, which is why so many people don't consider themselves experts. I would say that if you've been teaching philosophy for over ten years, that certainly gets you close to being an expert, but not necessarily. The most important criteria is probably what your peers think, i.e., those who have also been studying the same subject for many years. And, in philosophy, as opposed to surgery, you can be wrong about a theory, and yet be considered an expert on that theory. You sure wouldn't be considered an expert in surgery if your procedures were done incorrectly. Even in physics, you can be considered an expert in a particular field, and yet, it could turn out that a particular theory you developed was completely wrong.

I think most can agree that it takes a lot of study and/or writing to become an expert in any field. There isn't a clear answer to this question, just some general things we can say. Others may be able to give a better answer, I'm no expert. :smile:

I am a lazy person and a lazy philosopher. Yes, and I am, if not proud of it, at least resigned to it. This is reflected in one of my favorite quotes, from Franz Kafka, which I use often. I’ve even used it earlier today in Bret Bernhoft's Gnosis thread.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet. — T Clark

Suppose someone told you this about engineering. I'm a lazy person and a lazy engineer. If you're a lazy engineer, then you're probably not a good engineer. The same is true of philosophy. Philosophy, good philosophy, takes a tremendous amount of effort and time. It amazes me how many people jump into philosophical arguments without understanding the basics of the subject. Imagine if someone came off the street, with little to no understanding of engineering, and started telling you how to build a bridge. The arrogance is unbelievable. Of course no one has all the answers, but studying a subject with effort certainly gives you a lead, generally, over those who haven't.

There aren't many people who can do philosophy well, and most certainly you're not going to do it well without spending the time needed to study the subject, just like any subject. And, it certainly won't just come to you while you're alone, unless you're a genius. However, even geniuses have to engage with their ideas. Think of the amount of effort it takes to be at the top of any field, it takes a tremendous amount of effort. Most people have no idea how much effort it takes, and how much skill it takes to be one of the best. Wittgenstein agonized over his thoughts. It reminds me of people who come off the street thinking they can challenge experts in jiu jitsu, it's just laughable.

Now you may have said all this tongue and cheek, but there are many who think this way. You see it all the time.