Would you care to address Bradley's regress? — Banno
First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. — Sam26
PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke
PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible. — Fooloso4
In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean: — Fooloso4
I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use — Sam26
In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. — Fooloso4
There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation. — Sam26
It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke
The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.Thought has a transcendental logical structure. You cannot think illogically (3.03) The relations of simple objects share this logical structure. The movement of tectonic plates is accidental.
6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4
Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. — Harry Hindu
...a mental entity — Harry Hindu
"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. So it is necessary to use the appropriate terms if your goal is to communicate your ideas efficiently. It would also seem necessary to learn a language before you can use it. If those are necessary causes for communication to happen then why wouldn't other relations in the world not be causal in the same way? What's so special about language use when language use is simply another process in the world?No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity. — Fooloso4
Entities are patterns of properties.Not an entity, that's the thing. A linguistic regularity. A pattern. — bongo fury
"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. — Harry Hindu
6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.
6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4
So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen? — Harry Hindu
I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to.Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.
"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity. — Fooloso4
Entities are patterns of properties. — Harry Hindu
I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to. — Harry Hindu
It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts. — Harry Hindu
1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.
2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.
2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.
It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. — Harry Hindu
3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.
What the Tortoise said to Achilles — Banno
I wonder if you are familiar with What the Tortoise Said to Achilles? — Banno
The main theme in the Tractatus is that the sole purpose of language is to mirror reality — RussellA
The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions i.e. by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.
For Bradley, it is insufficient to say that "relation C relates table top A to table legs B", it needs to be shown. The problem being that as relation C is independent of its relata A and B, a further relation D needs to be shown relating relation C with relata A and B, leading to the conclusion that relations independent of their relata are not possible. — RussellA
You believe that I am experiencing in my mind the colour red, but you can never know, as it is not possible to know what is in someone else's mind. — RussellA
But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? If there were no other conditions preventing you from doing it, wouldn't you be doing it? If not, then you never intended to do it in the first place. Do any of your posts appear on this screen without you having intended to post them?Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do. — Fooloso4
How would you know what is possible if everything that is the case is an accident? What is not the case isn't necessarily possible. What is not the case is just as much probable as improbable, because you have no evidence to support the probability nor improbability. There is no evidence for what is not the case. So if what you mean by "logical space" is "imaginary" then I guess we agree.What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically — Fooloso4
Not at all. You recognize entities, like your pet or your friend, by their pattern of properties - patterns of sensory properties - their color, shape, the sound of their voice, the feel of their touch, their smell, etc., just as you are able to distinguish between coffee and water, but the pattern of color, smell, taste, etc.Entities are patterns of properties.
— Harry Hindu
At a stretch. Ok. If mental entities include linguistic conventions, then no one counseled dispensing with them. — bongo fury
But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? — Harry Hindu
But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture. — Fooloso4
304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. — Philosophical Investigations
Bradley's argument cannot be given a reasonable parsing in first order logic. — Banno
PI 1 These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands ...
If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — Philosophical Investigations
Which was my point that there would be other necessary, non-accidental conditions that led to different conditions. You're proving my point, not yours.I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time. — Fooloso4
5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.
Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. I'm taking issue with his improper use of language.Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident. — Fooloso4
For what reason? And by giving a reason you end up proving my point that reasons are necessary to accept or reject any assertion of what the case is. Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation.Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected — Fooloso4
Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. The same can be said of Witt having written his books. Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. Did he not infer that others would read his book only after he wrote it? Did he think that others could read his book if he never wrote it? Seems like you and Witt believe that others can read Witts book if he never wrote it.5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.
He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former. — Fooloso4
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