I don't think there are many people who would agree with Gertie's statement ("Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject."), which I used to start this thread. The point that I was trying to make about the statement, is directly connected to much of what Wittgenstein talks about in the PLA. We've been a bit side tracked, but that's okay.

Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"? — Wheatley

It's a kind of thought experiment. Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people. And, given that language is necessarily a rule-following endeavor (implicit and explicit rule-following), he then concludes that this process, being that they are both done with others, cannot be done totally in private. It's almost like trying to think of the two-sided triangle. He wants you to think about it, try to imagine it.

I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that? — Wheatley

I would be against any philosopher telling me what I can imagine too. Unless the philosopher is telling me I can't imagine a two-sided triangle, then I would think he has a point.

It's okay Wheatley, argue anyway. We learn by arguing, especially when you have to write out your arguments. We're all learning in here. I'm constantly re-thinking my beliefs. It's the way we advance, hopefully.

I was talking to a friend the other day about investing. In particular, about options, viz., a put, a strike price, etc, etc, I didn't have a clue, so it happens to all of us.

"Okay," what kind of response is that? :gasp:

Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?

I can imagine it. Prove me wrong. — Wheatley

This has nothing to do with limiting human imagination.

All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it. Ya, so you're right, I probably can't prove you wrong, the idea of proof here is too subjective.

Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains?

Ya, I agree, it's a matter of learning his method of analyzing.

↪Banno If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed. — Janus

Ya, answer that in your one sentence reply. :yikes:

↪Sam26 Discussions of the argument usually get stuck - as this one - in explaining it. It'd be interesting to move on to critiquing it. — Banno

Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. In fact, some of what he says, seems, at first glance, to be plainly incorrect. When Russell first read the Tractatus he completely missed the point. Moreover, it's difficult to explain some of these ideas, which is why we get stuck. We end up just repeating ourselves.

But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe. — Janus

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g..

Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language? — Banno

I like figuring it out from the primary source. Some of these philosophers may or may not understand Wittgenstein's points. However, this is also true of me. Too many of these so-called Wittgenstein experts just have it wrong. Although you and I are excluded. :wink:

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification. — Janus

It's not a matter of knowing you have a pain. Contrast this with it's negation, "I don't know that I have a pain in my toe," it doesn't make sense. If we claim to have knowledge, then this has to be juxtaposed with not having knowledge, which is why it's important to understand the importance of the doubt. What would it mean to doubt you're in pain? Wittgenstein asks the same question of Moore's proposition, viz., "What would it mean to doubt this is your hand in the context Moore's using it?"

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having.

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus

Usually when we refer to sensory experiences we're talking about the five senses, so in this sense feeling a pain is not sensory. We do use the words in similar ways, i.e., the grammar is the same, viz., "I feel the pain" vs "I feel the table." Our sensory experiences generally refer to things in reality. I see the tree, hear the trumpet, touch the table, smell the flowers, etc. However, pain manifests itself as a cry, or the word ouch for example.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them.

'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point. — Banno

No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.

Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Banno

I'm trying to show why statements like,

Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject

are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.

I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure.

The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.

but it's just as real,
— Sam26

Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ∮293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.

Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer. — Banno

The referent, is where the pain is, viz., in my hand. It's not the hand. The hand just happens to be the location of the pain. The point of the beetle example is that someone doesn't know "...what the pain is only [my emphasis] from his own case (293)!" In the case of "the pain in the hand," I'm not suggesting that anyone knows what the pain is from their own private case. In this case (the pain in the hand) we've learned how to properly use the word pain in social settings, and we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. Moreover, pointing to the hand as the location of the pain, is not deriving meaning based on this context. In other words, my example doesn't make this mistake, and this is the mistake we should concern ourselves with.

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch.
— Sam26

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno

In 245 it seems that he's saying you can't use language to get between pain and its expression. There's nothing between me having the pain, and the expression ouch. The ouch is an outward expression (linguistic expression) of the inner experience. The ouch replaces other outward natural expressions, i.e., we learn to replace crying with words and sentences. So, the ouch is bringing the natural expression into language. At the end of 246 I think we see what he's getting at, it's the mistaken idea that ouch somehow describes crying. It doesn't describe it, but replaces it. If we were trying to use the expression of pain as a description of crying, this, it seems, would have the affect of "...try[ing] to use language to get between pain and its expression."

This also means that we don't learn the language of pain by referring to an object, like we might learn to use the word cup, i.e., we would teach a child how to use the word cup by pointing to objects that are it's referent. We can refer to where we're having the pain, for example, in my toe. We do this all the time with others, so we know that to refer to where I'm having the pain, is a correct use of the word. It's not as though I'm deriving meaning from this context, the context of pointing to my toe as the source of the pain, and this is the point.

I agree with you that the meaning of pain is not the name of a sensation, but I can use the word pain to refer to where I'm having a pain on my body. I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. We're not naming the sensation on our bodies, we're simply showing where its located. The location of a cup is not the meaning of cup. Where is the cup, or where is the pain, is something different. I have to learn to use these words first before I can locate them. Although the pain location is not as specific, unless we're pointing at a cut on our toe, then the pain location is a little more specific.

To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation. — Banno

I don't quite follow this paragraph. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that we're talking about what is ordinarily meant by these words. The only thing out of the ordinary is the incorrect use of language.

I agree that the use of the word pain in a sentence has the same grammatical structure as the use of the word phone; and this is where some of the confusion lies. But, again, I disagree that we only express pain, we also refer to them, and we do it all the time. Of course it's not exactly the same as referring to the phone. And, I wouldn't call it a superficial reference when referring to the pain in my toe. You seem to think it's superficial because the pain is not a thing like a phone, but it's just as real, so it doesn't seem superficial. And, in this context what would superficial mean except some subjective view of referring.

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. Ouch replaces the natural pain behavior, like crying etc, but that doesn't mean that the pain in your neck is the same (not sure what you mean by same) as ouch, that would be weird.

The child is learning new pain behavior, but that doesn't mean we can't refer to pain. For example, a doctor asks, "Where are you having pain?" You respond, "Here, in my big toe." It's true that a child in Wittgenstein's example (PI 244) learns to replace crying with "ouch" or "that hurts," but this doesn't mean that it's always muddled to refer to pain. It depends on how we're referencing the pain. If we think that meaning is attached to my pain, then that for sure is muddled. It's also muddled to say, "I know I'm in pain." but we can definitely refer to pain in certain contexts. Remember he's starts out talking about meaning in reference to a private language, and how that's nonsense due to rule-following and such. He then goes on to explain how we learn to associate words with certain behaviors in social contexts. He's not denying in the last paragraph of 243 that we can express or refer to our inner experiences. He's denying it in particular contexts.

By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard. — Janus

Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge.

My revised question still does the same thing I guess. Are you saying we can't question the existence of concepts, because they are more like principles or models to explain things? — Yohan

Concepts have a use in language that's governed by rules (implicit and explicit), and they exist insofar as they have that use. Either the concept has a use or it doesn't, if it does, then it exists as something useful in our language. You may question how a concept is used, viz., its application, but I don't see how you can question the existence of the concept causality. If someone tries to create a concept, you might question if that concept is part of a language, so I guess in that sense you could question if the concept exists. Even concepts without a referent have existence. For example the concept unicorn, even though unicorns don't exist it still has a use as something that fictional writers might use.

Ya, this debate has been going on a long time. My philosophy professor back in 1978 actually had Cora Diamond as one of his professors. He was working on his doctorate around 1973 at the UVA. I remembered his disagreements with her, only vaguely though. These interpretations, I'm sure, will go on forever.

Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations. — Joshs

I've got three or four threads going in two different forums, so it's hard to keep up with everything that's going on. But, I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein.

I think the question, "Does causality exist?" reflects a misunderstanding of how the word causality is used in linguistic settings. It's like asking, "Does 2 exist?" they exist as concepts which are used in particular ways. Asking if causality exists, is not like asking if the Earth exists, so I think the question reflects a confusion, but this happens all the time when philosophizing.

Actually the awareness of those who have an NDE is not dreamlike. In fact, most of them say that it's more real than what they normally experience. It's a heightened awareness. Many say that this reality seems dumbed down by comparison, as if it were dreamlike. This is interesting because you would expect, especially if the brain/body was shutting down, that reality would be fading, not becoming more vivid.

I'm not too keen on using the word soul in reference to NDEs. I prefer consciousness, but I know what you mean. I'm not religious, so I prefer not to use that word.

If we refer back to the OP, and in particular to how we use the word know, how we use this word is governed by the rules of use, much of course is implicit and difficult to weed out. We can see this by the many different theories of epistemology, some just point to one or two kinds of uses, and other theories are just confusions, grammatical confusions.

How do we learn the use of the word know? Understanding this gives us clues to the rules of use. We know we don't learn it in private, there's not some innate knowing, it's done with others, and only with others. It's a social word. We justify what we know to others, it starts socially, by learning the concept and using it correctly. Knowing has to be seen in the context of being wrong (I thought I knew), but how in the world could you be wrong about "I know this is my hand" in Moore's context? A grammatical mistake, right? Can we be mistaken in Moore's context? The same is true of our sensations, "I know this is my pain" what?

"The proposition 'Sensations are private' is comparable to: 'One plays patience [solitaire] by oneself (PI 248].'" The confusion is a grammatical one, not an empirical one. How else could you play patience? And, in what sense are sensations private? These kinds of propositions are also similar to others that Wittgenstein points out, viz., "Every rod has a length." or "This body has extension."

My understanding of Wittgenstein's grammar is that grammar sets out the rules governing the moves we make in language. Similar to the rules of chess governing the game of chess, viz., the moves. This is a correct move, this is an incorrect move. So, grammar is what we use to govern whether someone has made a correct move, to reiterate the point. The rules are difficult to grasp because some rules are explicit, but others are implicit and not easily understood.

That depends on how one defines "death". True death is not the cessation of cardiac function, and the flat line on the EKG monitor; such hearts are regularly caused to resume their functioning with the application of electric impulse to the torso. True death has occurred when the brain has died, and cellular metabolism has ceased. You are correct in stating that semantics fail us here... — Michael Zwingli

Semantics don't fail us here, mostly in here we're talking about clinical death. You can sometimes be brought back from clinical death. Moreover, with reference to an NDE, it's a near death experience, obviously you didn't die in the absolute sense. Doctors often use the word death in reference to those who have been brought back, it's perfectly acceptable.

By inference. We presume that others are just like ourselves. I think it’s a perfectly valid presumption. ‘I know how you must feel…’ ‘I can’t imagine how you must feel…’ and other such statements are intelligible statements.

I can't remember the context of what you're referring to, but ya, I agree (I can't find where I said that). This is why solipsism doesn't have a good argument.

"'Only you can know if you had that intention.' Wittgenstein, explains how we might use such a statement, i.e., how it might make sense to use know in this way. The only way it would make sense, is as an expression of doubt, not as an expression of knowing. Only you could know? What does that mean? In other words, as he said earlier, you don't know it, you have it, viz., the intention, in this context.

This must be hell for English teachers. Why is it impossible? — Luke

Of course, English teachers always tell their students, "Your use of a word is just as good as any other use." :wink:

Of course not, dreams, are just that, dreams, they're not happening in objective reality, but that's not what's happening in an NDE. People who are having an NDE are saying they saw and heard X,Y, and Z, and then it's being verified or corroborated by doctors, nurses, friends, and family. These kinds of observations are easy to check. You verify what actually happened, did the doctor do X, did the nurse actually say Y, did the conversation in the next room actually happen with friends and family. If they did, then it's not dreamlike or a hallucination, it's what really happened. How do we normally check the statements of others if we want to make sure the statement reflects reality? We check with others, we verify, we corroborate. If there wasn't an objective means to verify these experiences, then yes it would be more similar to a dream. However, you would then have to ask yourself, "Why are people having the same dream?"- or the same kind of dream? This would be harder to defend without the objective component.

It's a difficult topic to discuss for various reasons. I'm currently arguing this in https://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/posting.php?mode=quote&f=2&p=394748 . Many of the responses I get aren't arguments at all, there just opinions based on misinformation. Part of the problem is that some people think it opens the door to some religious belief, and it may. However, I haven't found that one needs to believe anything religious in order to believe that consciousness is not dependent on brain activity. To be honest I don't care where it leads. I want to know the truth, and that's it, period. People get wrapped up in their worldviews, which locks them into their ideologies. This may not be true of everyone, but it's true of many.

Continuing with the end of PI 246.

I think the important thing is to stick to what Wittgenstein is saying, try not to get off on tangents.

"Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,--for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them." That we don't learn our sensations is important to the understanding of what it means to know. I'm thinking back to the statement made by Gertie in the OP, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject." It's common for people to think this. Why? Because we're able to talk to ourselves, so we think we can just use words (our e.g., know) willy nilly, i.e., as we have our internal conversations, and as we refer to our internal sensations. We forget that we learn language socially, i.e., meaning is socially derived. The social aspects of language put limits on what we can do internally with language. What we can do internally has to be directly connected with the social parts of language. Knowing is not something I can do strictly with myself, i.e., in isolation from social contexts. Why? Because of the rule-following aspects of language. In other words, my internal conversations are constantly being reinforced by the rules of language, and what I've learned socially. This, I believe, is why Wittgenstein gives the example of having a private language, and the associated rule-following that necessarily goes along with language. The rules of use must be done in conjunction with other people. Otherwise there is no way for rules of use to get a foothold. How do I check myself in a strictly private language? This is why Wittgenstein makes the comment, "Whatever seems right to you, is right." Rule-following will become whatever you think it is.

However, someone might argue that once we learn the rules of use socially, then we can apply the word know to private sensations. The reason is, we're able to go back and forth between our internal conversations and our social conversations, so we're able to apply and check the rules of use. So, their argument might be, we know what it means to know, so we know how to justify a belief. We know this is our pain, because we're the ones experiencing it, just as we know that the orange juice is sweet because we've tasted it. We often know things through sensory experience. So, the same can be said of Moore's proposition, he knows this is his hand through sensory experience, and because this is what we mean by hand linguistically. So, isn't Moore correct, and Wittgenstein wrong? How would you argue against this?

Continuing with the PLA...

"For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression (PI 245)."

I would be interested in what others think of this passage. What would be in between pain and the expression of pain? Is there something there that could be referenced? I would think not. I'm not sure what Wittgenstein is getting at. What is it that he's trying to get us to think about?

In PI 246 Wittgenstein asks, "In what sense are my sensations private?--Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain [of course this is the mistaken idea that emerges from those who are making the mistake]; another person can only surmise it." Wittgenstein points out two problems with this statement. First, it's incorrect to think that others can only surmise (or guess) that I'm in pain. This is just wrong, people often correctly infer that another is in pain based on their outward expressions of pain, and it's objectively confirmed. As to the second mistake, "What is it supposed to mean--except perhaps that I am in pain?" It's not a matter of knowing. How could I doubt that I'm in pain? I just broke my nose, I'm having the pain, that's it, end of story. What am I supposed to justify here? Do I look inwardly, and say, oh ya, there it is, the pain, yep, I'm having it. Okay, now I know I'm in pain. Nonsense.

Now you meet the same person again and by chance you are wearing the same thing. The person says, "You look good in that." You respond, "Ha. The last time you said that was in my dreams." The person responds, "Why do you think you were dreaming?" And you respond "I know I was dreaming."

What work does "I know" do? — Ennui Elucidator

It's not as though we can't apply the word know in private after learning how to use it socially. The real question has to do with the meaning of "I know..." being associated with something internal, i.e., something private, including a private language. He's basing his knowledge on a memory, albeit a false memory. It seems as though the "I know..." is doing some work here, in that he believes he is justified based on what he remembers. We often do this, but in this case there is an appropriate doubt emerging, so the further question is, "How do you know?" Of course it will later be confirmed that he is not remembering correctly, so his justification is unfounded.

Note that in OC Moore is saying he knows this is a hand without an appropriate doubt. In fact, the point that Wittgenstein makes, is, what would it mean to doubt in Moore's context? "I know..." in Moore's context is definitely not doing any work. It's empty, he saying no more than, "This is a hand." If we can appropriately say, "I know X," then we could certainly imagine how it is that we can fail to know, fail to be justified in our claim. Hence, the phrase, "I thought I knew," which by the way works in your dream example. So, again, I see the "I know..." in your example as appropriate. At least that's my take.

I'm going to try to post something from the PI next.

Why the talk about 'justification' when this fact of being in pain can be discerned from behavior? — Shawn

You're right, in many cases it doesn't even make sense to say, "I know Mary is in pain," it would be like Wittgenstein's example of a sick man lying in bed, and I say to you, "I know there is a sick man lying in bed," sounds a bit off to say the least, so yes you're right. However, I can imagine a case where it would make sense to have to justify to you that Mary's in pain, i.e., where a doubt might arise. But I can't imagine a case where I would have to justify to myself that I'm in pain. The difference between the statements "I know I'm in pain," and "I know Mary's in pain." A doubt in the former statement seems quite senseless, but a doubt in the latter statement is easily imagined. Maybe a doubt might occur in the former statement if you're questioning your use of the word know because your learning English, so maybe it can be imagined.

I'm actually having this same discussion in two forums, so it's difficult to keep up. I'll try to respond as soon as possible, but I also have to keep the PLA argument going from the PI. There are a lot more passages to analyze.

I don't see how a 'pain' can be justified. A pain is experienced... — Shawn

Yes, the argument is that you don't know you're in pain, i.e., you don't justify it to yourself, you just have the pain. We say, "I'm in pain." However, we can justify to ourselves and others that someone else is in pain, i.e., by observing their pain behavior, so there is an important difference.

But the social begins even prior to the interpersonal understood this way. Between I and myself there is a social , an other that intervenes the moment I point to an experience. This sociality doesnt require the presence of other ‘persons’ to participate in the game. The game is already underfoot between ‘I’ and myself. — Joshs

My reaction to this, is that the word social, as you're using it, is not a normal use of the word. Social contexts require other people, we don't refer to the "I and myself," as something social. Besides what's the difference between the "I' and "myself," it seems to me you're describing the same person, viz., you.

So we can't say, "I know that I see a red coffee cup", or "I know that I had a dream last night of my teeth falling out while addressing an audience in my underwear as a tsunami approached"? — Marchesk

As to the first question, "I know that I see a red coffee cup," whether one knows it or not depends on the context. There are situations where it would make sense to make such a statement, viz., maybe the lightening is poor, or you're closer to the object than someone else who's enquiring about the object, etc. But generally speaking, and this is the same with Moore's statements, it's senseless to say, as we're both sitting in front of a red cup, that you know that you see a red cup. As Wittgenstein points out, what does this amount to, other than, "It's a red cup." Is there some legitimate doubt here? If there is, then yes, the "I know..." would make sense.

Your second example is even more problematic, because it's difficult to think of an example in which it would make sense to say, "I know that I had a dream last night..." Maybe if someone was learning English it might make sense, i.e., learning to use the word dream. Maybe some of this will become clearer as we go through Wittgenstein's argument, or maybe you'll just never agree with W.

That seems to undermine empiricism. Of course we know things based on having experiences. Sensations make up those experiences. — Marchesk

I don't think this affects empiricism at all, because there are things that we can legitimately doubt, that do need an empirical analysis, or an empirical justification. Wittgenstein wouldn't deny this. Do you have to justify to yourself that you had a dream last night? No. You just say you had a dream, and you may describe the dream, but that's about it. Unless you know someone is being deceitful, but that's something else entirely.