It is always an embodied person who has an alleged out of body experience. It is always an embodied person who related their experience. — Fooloso4

So, your conclusion is that because it's an embodied person who does the reporting, it follows that disembodied existence is not true or couldn't happen? Don't you think that's a rather weak argument? After all, how could an embodied person report on something I believe is not possible.

What does it mean to be disembodied? Who or what is it that is without a body? "You"? Is it not you who gets hungry? You who feels pain? You who feels loves and desires? What would such things be for a disembodied you? Is it not you but a body that somehow happens to be yours that experiences these things? — Fooloso4

To be disembodied simply means that we can exist as persons apart from a biological body. Just because someone can't answer all the questions of how it's possible, that doesn't negate all the testimonial evidence showing that it's possible. In fact, it's more than possible. I will state emphatically that it's not only possible that people can be disembodied, it happens all the time. There is just too much evidence that it happens to discount it.

Yes, it's me that gets hungry and feels pain, etc, and it would be me as a disembodied being who would feel some of the same things.

I can't discount reports like Pam's out of Atlanta, GA who underwent surgery for an aneurysm deep in her brain. While not only sedated, but the blood drained from her brain, and her heart stopped, she described what doctors and nurses said and did to her, including describing instruments they used. And, she described it from a position outside her body according to her. Moreover, her eyes were taped shut and there was a covering shielding her face from the rest of her body. Her description of the proceedings were verified or corroborated by doctors and nurses at the scene. Now one incident is not particularly convincing, but there are literally millions of accounts across the world of people having similar experiences. The testimonial evidence is just too vast to just discount these experiences.

"disembodied dancing" doesn't make conceptual sense — 180 Proof

Well, again, in this case, as in many other cases, what you believe makes conceptual sense is determined by your presuppositions, or your worldview. If it's true that people are having an OBE, and they are seeing deceased relatives and friends (as has been reported in thousands and thousands of accounts), then is it your contention that if one of these deceased relatives danced it wouldn't make conceptual sense? The only way it wouldn't make conceptual sense is if it's not logically possible to be disembodied. Don't you think that's a bit too dogmatic? Are you saying disembodied dancing has the same conceptual problem as a four-sided triangle? At the very least it would be metaphysically possible to dance as a disembodied person.

I know, and I was trying to be funny, but failed. lol

Actually I'm not kidding. :grin:

There are papers on the following site about reincarnation.

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/category/academic-papers/

Ahhh, true. :ok:

Following Searle and others, mind is to brain as digestion is to gut. That looks pretty clear to me, if still debatable. Suppose that someone were to suggest that digestion could become disembodied. That the digestion from one body could move to another. Would you think this idea had conceptual issues? — Banno

I don't think Searle's analogy holds any water, to say the least. First, it's clear that digestion is a biological process, there's no debate amongst philosophers and scientists about that. However, it's not clear that consciousness or mind is strictly a biological process. Of course if you assume your conclusion, then yes, it's a biological process, how could it be otherwise (being facetious)? It only has conceptual issues if you assume your conclusion, viz., that consciousness is a product of biology. However, this is the debate, and I for one would argue against Searle's analogy as being specious at best.

There are two main factors, and obviously others too, that make us who we are, continuity of memory, and continuity of experience. There has to be continuity of the self in order for anyone to say that that is Banno. I can't make any sense out of reincarnation if this continuity isn't preserved. Otherwise, you could claim to be anyone from the past, and there would be no way to distinguish you from anyone else. This would be a genuine conceptual problem.

Can't right now, but will later. Take care.

Thanks for the response. I don't have much more to say.

There is very little evidence in this thread that reincarnation is a real possibility. I'm not saying there isn't any evidence, only that in this thread there isn't much in the way of evidence.

I would tackle the problem a bit differently. I would start with, is there any evidence of out-of-body experiences? Because the idea of reincarnation is dependent on whether or not it's possible that one's consciousness can exist apart from our present body. If it can exist apart from our bodies, then we have evidence that consciousness is more than brain activity. Thus, moving into other bodies (reincarnation) would be a real possibility, since we can move in and out of our present body.

Furthermore, I would still contend that even if we don't understand the mechanisms involved, we have a considerable amount of testimonial evidence that OBEs do indeed happen. It is also true that since the claim is rather fantastic to some, that you need an extraordinary amount of evidence to support the idea that disembodied existence is possible or highly probable. My contention, and I've made this claim in other threads (viz., Does Consciousness Survive the Body), is that there is an enormous amount of testimonial evidence to support the conclusion that consciousness does survive the body.

I often read, "There's no evidence," it's as if testimonial evidence, is not evidence. While it's true that testimonial evidence tends to be weak, it can also be strong under the right circumstances. What makes testimonial evidence strong is exactly what makes an inductive argument strong. What follows is a list of what makes the argument strong.

First, number, how many people are claiming to have had an out-of-body experience? Gallop did a poll years ago, and estimated that about 5% of the population had an NDE. Worldwide that's hundreds of millions of people. Now numbers aren't the be-all-and-end-all of inductive arguments, which is why you have to have more than just numbers.

Next, variety, viz., is it happening across cultures? Are there different age groups involved? Is the experience happening in a variety of circumstances? Has it happened through history? Is it happening to people with differing worldviews? The answer to all of the question is yes, it happens in a wide variety of situations and contexts, even to people who aren't near death.

Third, consistency of the testimony, the consistency of the testimony has been examined by many, and it has been found to be consistent. People are seeing basically the same things. Moreover, the consistency of the testimonial evidence is just as consistent as any testimonial evidence that involves large numbers of people. There have been many academic studies out of the University of Virginia detailing the consistency of the testimonial evidence. Here is a link to one such paper -

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/wp-content/uploads/sites/360/2020/11/Nov-2020-NDE-C-CC.pdf

The fourth criteria is truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It lends credence to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on Youtube.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence are firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are literally thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near Death Studies (IANDS). Moreover, according to polling, there are millions of firsthand accounts of NDEs.

There are other points that can be made about what strengthens an inductive argument, but this is a good starting point.

The testimonial evidence, i.e., the various reports are all over the place, but IANDS is a good place to start.

I don't see how you get more compelling testimonial evidence, it's overwhelming. Do I need to know the mechanism for OBEs in order to know if NDEs are veridical? Do I need to know the mechanism of any experience to know if the experience is real or genuine? Of course not. We have firsthand experiences all the time without knowing the mechanisms involved.

There are a variety of academic papers on the following site dealing with the subjects of this thread.

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/category/academic-papers/

Here's the question again: what is it that is reincarnated? — Banno

Before I respond, let me just say that because reincarnation carries a lot of religious baggage I don't like the term. However, that aside, I'll respond a bit to Banno's question.

First, even if the question can't be answered fully that doesn't mean there isn't evidence to support the idea that consciousness survives death, and may indeed be able to reside in other bodies. So, "...what is it that's reincarnated?" The answer is, your consciousness, viz., whatever it is that makes you, you, for example, your memories and your experiences. Do we know how that's possible? No. Do we know the mechanism? No. Do we understand any of the physics of such a process? It's doubtful.

Many investigations start out with unanswered questions, and many theories have unanswered questions, but that doesn't mean that there isn't evidence to support the theory. The question really is, is there any evidence to support the idea that consciousness survives the death of the body? The answer is emphatically yes. There is a ton of strong testimonial evidence, and there is some evidence to support the idea that consciousness can move out of a body, and back into another body, as a choice, i.e., we can choose to do it. If the testimonial evidence for NDEs is veridical (genuine objective experiences of reality), which I believe they are, then they, at the very least, demonstrate that our consciousness can move in and out of our body, and probably other bodies as well.

There are many unanswered questions about consciousness, but that doesn't mean that consciousness doesn't exist, or that consciousness isn't more than brain activity.

As I read it, the author isn't saying that grammar is completely independent of nature. He makes this clear in the first part of the paper. Moreover, I haven't decided yet if I'm in complete agreement or not. Grammar does seem to have an arbitrary aspect to it though.

The arbitrariness feature, an aspect of the autonomy of grammar,
does not mean that it is unimportant, capricious, or even discretionary;
it means, and this point is crucial, that it cannot be said that grammar
is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, by appealing to how things are
in reality (cf. [5]).

p. 80

So, if I understand this correctly, when using the concept fact (state of affairs), it's not what's in reality that determines how we use the word fact, rather, it's the grammar involved in language that determines it's correct use. So, our grammar is isolated from reality in an important sense, and that sense seems to be how we use language in a culture, and it's arbitrary features. There is nothing in reality that tells me how to use the word fact correctly. The arrangement of things in reality (the state of affairs) is not what determines the correct use of the concept fact.

In the same vein, Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations ([29], 1953, PI), claims that grammatical rules can be called arbitrary if that means that the purpose of grammar is the same as the purpose of language (cf. PI, §§372, 496, 497), and points out in Zettel (1967, Z) that cookery rules are not arbitrary because cookery is defined by its purpose, while grammar – or language – is not (cf.Z, §320). Thus, “[d]ifferent grammatical rules, unlike different cookery rules, are not right or wrong, but rather determine different concepts”([4, p.193]).3

p.80

It wouldn't be correct to say, it seems to me, that there is no correct or incorrect use of grammar, but that there is no correct or incorrect use as defined by something in reality. By comparison Wittgenstein points out "...that cookery rules are not arbitrary because cookery is defined by its purpose, while grammar - or language - is not (Z. 320)." So, the rules of bread making, for example, are correct or incorrect based on how the bread turns out, i.e., the outcome in reality determines the correct or incorrect recipe. It's in this sense that the recipe for bread making is not arbitrary. However, the rules of grammar are arbitrary, i.e., they are not dependent or determined by reality.

The question, at least for me is, how does this affect what Wittgenstein means by hinge-propositions? Is epistemology completely determined by the rules of grammar, or is it akin to cookery rules?

I'm working on another thread, analyzing On Certainty.

Many Christians believe that there is strong evidence to support the conclusion that Jesus rose physically from the dead. What do you think?

These are interesting points, good job.

The problem that arises, is with the idea that since language is not completely independent of reality, it may lead to the incorrect idea that language is conditioned or determined by facts of nature. This does seem to fly in the face of how Wittgenstein viewed language, viz., that it is autonomous. That language is autonomous has nothing to do with language being completely independent of language, but rather that, it is not "...accountable (or answerable) to any reality in terms of correction; and it is, in an important sense, arbitrary (p. 80)."

And also, "...language itself, grammar itself, constitutes what is meant by fact, and hence by reality. This is why grammar is presupposed when we speak of facts. In other words, in order to speak about facts
we already presuppose a grammar that constitutes what is meant by fact (p. 79)."

A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts? — Sam26

The reason I'm bringing this up has to do with a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein that is probably incorrect. Moreover, I want to check my own interpretation against the points brought up in this paper.

So, the question is, is language conditioned by certain facts of nature? First, what does it mean to say that language is conditioned by facts of nature? According to this paper conditioned by certain facts means something like "that there are essential and necessary features of reality such as general facts of nature, and that this is a truth about reality, which by way of different mechanisms, for instance by repeated exposure, condition our grammar (p. 78)." The question is, is this what Wittgenstein is saying? It's one thing to say that without reality there would be no language, but it's another thing to say that language is conditioned by certain facts of reality. Another way to say this, if I'm correct, is that language had to form in a certain way because of particular facts in nature or reality. It would be like saying that objects in nature condition our grammar (as pointed out in this paper).

The paper isn't rejecting that there is some kind of relationship between the facts of reality and language. It's rejecting the notion that language is conditioned by these facts. "[T]his is a metaphysical illusion produced by projecting onto reality what should remain within grammar (i.e. grammar tells us what is a general fact of nature) (p. 78)."

My idea has been that reality is foundational to language, i.e., that without reality there would be no language. This seems obvious.

Finally, this paper is contrasting the IMoyal-Sharrock’s interpretation against the Rhees' interpretation. The Rhees' interpretation is important because of his association and discussions with Wittgenstein regarding OC.

Before going on I have to say that I'm reconsidering the idea that basic mathematical propositions are hinge-propositions. Although, with the caveat that there is a lot of debate on this issue. Moreover, it's not a simple issue to resolve. So, Moore's proposition, viz., "I know this is a hand," is not the same as 2+2=4 in terms of a hinge. The problem though, is that there are similarities between the propositions of mathematics and Moore's propositions, and Wittgenstein used mathematical propositions to bring out some point of comparison, or to clarify some point. The comparison of the two statements (Moore's propositions and basic math propositions) has given rise to the idea that basic mathematical propositions are hinge-propositions.

If you are going to say that basic mathematical propositions are hinges, then you have to be consistent and say that they are not true or false in the same way that Moore's hinge-propositions are not true or false, i.e., not epistemological.

This next part is taken from the introduction.

A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts?
Sergio Mota

"Accordingly, the goal of this paper is twofold, as it were. On the one hand, it is my interest to show that the proposition ‘grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature’ has no metaphysical, absolute
sense (i.e. that ontology does not condition grammar). By the expression “metaphysical sense” I mean expressions that refer to the essential, necessary, and universal features of reality. Thus, to say that grammar is conditioned by certain facts of nature may mean that there are essential and necessary features of reality such as general facts of nature, and that this is a truth about reality, which by way of different mechanisms, for instance by repeated exposure, condition our grammar. Furthermore,
to say that grammar is conditioned by certain facts sounds as though there was an absolute conception of grammar, as though everything we call grammar was conditioned by facts. However, I do not read Wittgenstein as though he were relating a bit of language to a bit of the world. In other words, we are not relating a bit of grammar and a bit of the world as though they were ontological items. Rather, in the same sense that grammar tells us what kind of object a thing is, grammar tells us what is meant by fact. But this does not mean that facts condition our grammar, or that objects condition our grammar (see below for further discussion). So I am not rejecting that there is a relationship between grammar and facts, I am just saying that this relationship is not captured by speaking of facts as conditions.1 However, when it is said that grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature it seems that it is the grammar as a whole that is conditioned, without focusing on concrete language-games. It seems that it is claimed that this class of general facts of nature is that on which the possibility of language itself
depends. I think that this is a metaphysical illusion produced by projecting onto reality what should remain within grammar (i.e. grammar tells us what is a general fact of nature)."

As is mentioneded this paper Rhees' has something important to tell us. And, along with this, is must be mentioned that Rhees' had discussions with Wittgenstein on this topic. Therefore, his insights shouldn't be overlooked.

So, there is a distinction according to this paper between the proposition that 'grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature,' and the idea that "grammar as a whole is conditioned, without focusing on concrete language-games" i.e., that a certain set of general facts of nature, gives us the possibility of language. So, language depends on reality in some important sense. The question arose, "How could language be conditioned by certain facts of nature?

I'm not sure I quite understand this yet. Time to read on.

I've been doing some reading, and it may be that I haven't paid close enough attention to Wittgenstein's idea of grammar. I think this paper I'm reading has something important to add to how OC is interpreted. However, I haven't fully grasped the idea yet, so I'm going to continue reading.

For those of you interested, I'll provide a link:

http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Permanent/Kriterion-mota-01.pdf


A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts?

Sergio Mota

Abstract

"This paper is more than a plea for Rhees’ reading of the work
of Wittgenstein (particularly of On Certainty). My interest in
Rhees’ interpretation lies on its resemblance with my own reading,
on the one hand, and on its being (surprisingly) unmentioned by
other interpreters, on the other. The two core aims of this paper
focus on Rhees’ main ideas. First, I argue that although certain
facts that are accepted beyond doubt belong to the method,
which in turn is included in grammar, this does not mean that
these facts are expressions of rules of grammar. Second, I argue
that grammar is not conditioned by a certain class of facts (i.e.
general facts of nature), but a language-game is possible because
we do not call in question certain facts (i.e. grammar is not
conditioned by something like ontology). The point is that those
facts that are not called in question are beyond truth and falsity,
but this does not mean that these facts must be true. The logical
role these facts (and the sentences used to express them) play
in a language-game is not that of being true or false. Moreover,
grammar itself constitutes what is meant by ‘object’, ‘fact’, or
‘general fact of nature’."

So, you don't think there are mathematical hinges? No one is saying that there are instances where one can doubt a mathematical proposition. Just as there are instances where you can doubt that "This is a hand." Let's say I'm in the context that Moore is in, and I say, "It's true that 2+2=4." Isn't it just as out of place as, "I know this is a hand?" A doubt in that situation is just as silly.

Of course if you change the context you make sense of the doubt. The point is that there is an inherited background that allows you to distinguish between true and false.

If it were the result of Wittgenstein's philosophy that hinge propositions are neither true nor false, have you considered that this might not be because they are indubitable, but because they are usually non-propositional (except for W's exposition of them)? If memory serves, I believe that Daniele Moyal-Sharrock regards hinges as non-propositional. — Luke

I do think of hinges as basic beliefs, and that they are non-propositional. I said this earlier in my posts. It might be that indubitable is the wrong word. I very seldom use the word indubitable, but on occasion I have. It seems to me that any system of belief, must have basic beliefs, including mathematics.

Ya, I was a bit harsh on Fooloso4.

Of course it is true that 2+2=4. No one here doubts that. — Banno

I do hold to the idea that if a proposition is basic or hinge, then to say that it's true is just as mistaken as saying "I know this is a hand." So yes I'm saying that Banno. My interpretation of OC is not unique, there have been many papers written on this subject. However, I'm not saying there aren't instances where it makes sense to say that 2+2=4 is true. The thing about hinges is that they depend on context. If I'm teaching someone how to use the word hand in English, then I might say "I know this is a hand," i.e., I've learned that this is what I call a hand. So, in this case "I know..." means that I have learned how to use the word hand. The same can be said of 2+2=4, in some contexts it can makes sense to say it's true, other contexts not so much. I don't know what Wittgenstein would say about this. OC 10 doesn't give enough information. Moreover, Wittgenstein never edited his thoughts in OC, it's just a rough draft.

The fact that it doesn't make sense to doubt Moore's propositions, seems to also hold for the mathematical proposition 2+2=4. Can I doubt that it's true that 2+2=4. It seems senseless to doubt it.

Obviously your interpretation is the correct interpretation. And yes, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation, but whether it's a hinge or not is. It seems to be more about ego with you than getting to the truth about what Wittgenstein is saying.

I could say the same thing, but it gets us nowhere.

We disagree and that's fine, but I'm moving on to continue the analysis.

Let me try a different approach. It probably won't help, but that's life.

If Moore's propositions or hinges cannot be known, it follows that there are no grounds/justification or reasons/evidence to say they are true. If it's nonsensical to claim that Moore can know "This is a hand," then it follows that it cannot be true either. It follows also that these basic beliefs cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed, i.e., they are arational beliefs or hinges.

If we know X, then at the very least we know they're true, but Wittgenstein is claiming that Moore's statements have no grounds to secure their truth, and thus they cannot be known. Hinges are fundamental arational beliefs that ground any talk about epistemology. They are a given, part of the reality around us. They are not ordinary propositions or statements.

Yes, I know I'm repeating myself.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

No, but I think it follows from his ideas.

The negation of 2+2=4. Maybe you haven't been following everything that's been said. I've been pointing out that these basic mathematical propositions are hinges, so that generally we don't say that they're true or false, except in particular contexts.

Wittgenstein points out that one of the ways we can see how unclear the sense of Moore's proposition is, is to point out its negation. I think we can do this generally with all hinge-propositions, which is why I said to consider its negation. It's false that 2+2=4.

Hi Luke,

One thing is for sure much of this depends on context, even Moore's proposition "I know this is a hand," has a use on particular occasions, Wittgenstein stipulates this. This seems to be what he's saying in OC 10 when he says, "'2x2=4' is a true proposition of arithmetic--not 'on particular occasions' nor 'always,'"
although, to be honest, I'm not sure. Again, though, consider its negation.

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know". — RussellA

My interpretation and the interpretations of others who agree is that Wittgenstein found Moore's statements interesting because he found something special about them, not because there were similarities in their thinking. In fact, Wittgenstein goes to great lengths to point out the contrast between the way Moore is responding to the skeptic, and the way he might respond, or the way we should respond to the radical skeptic. It is true that Wittgenstein disagreed with Moore's use of the word know, this we know for sure.

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition. — RussellA

For Wittgenstein, even the statement "There are physical objects (OC 35)," is nonsense. He goes on to ask, "Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?" Moore did say "here is one" in the sense that you put forth, but that still would have failed (if I'm following your point). Moreover, Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that?

We do not question their truth we accept it. — Fooloso4

It's true that we accept hinge-propositions, but we don't accept them because their true, truth has nothing to do with it. In fact, they're not even propositions in the true sense of the word, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them in many different ways. If Moore had said "It's true that I have a hand," it would have been just as unintelligible. In order to see how unclear the statement is, consider it's negation (as Wittgenstein points out in OC 4), "It's false that I have a hand," and here we see just how senseless the statement is. Only in certain contexts would these statements make sense, just as in certain contexts Moore's statements would make sense, but generally to utter these kinds of statements is a misfiring attempt to say what cannot be said.

And, most, if not all of the quotes you give that you think lend support to your position, don't. However, I'm not going to go through each quote when all that is needed is to look at the beginning of OC. He spells out the problems with these kinds of statements.

I may later address some of these quotes, but not at the moment.

Hinge concepts are indubitable. That is, they are not to be subject to doubt; hence, they are "outside our epistemological concepts of true and false"... I don't think Sam is overdoing it here. That 12x12=144 is not subject to doubt; it could not be false, and hence is outside our considerations of true and false... that's how I am reading Sam, and I think WItti thought along similar lines. — Banno

This is correct. As soon as you allow true and false to enter the picture it destroys the idea of what a hinge is supposed to be. It allows the doubt to enter the picture. If I ask how you know it's true, or how do you know it's false we are back to Moore's mistake. Hinge-propositions are what support our language of epistemology. They provide the foundation to epistemology.

A bit of personal information before I go: I have more than a passing acquaintance with this text. I did my dissertation on Wittgenstein. It is gratifying to see that in the years since I presented a new generation of scholars have come to see things as I do. — Fooloso4

That's great that you did your dissertation on Wittgenstein. I too welcome you to the discussion. I also have more than a passing interest in OC and Wittgenstein. I've been studying W. off and on for over 40 years. Moreover, I can cite plenty of scholars who agree with how I'm interpreting W. However, this doesn't mean that either of us can't be wrong. There are many scholars who have misinterpreted W., the universities are littered with them. To be honest though, in all my readings, I've never encountered your interpretation, that's not to say that others haven't interpreted W. the way you do. I just have never encountered it in my readings.

I don't believe QM violates the law of non-contradiction either. I suspect that most physicists don't believe it, but I'm not sure. Much of this depends on how one interprets QM, and/or what theory of QM you believe. None of us are experts in QM, so I think we're a bit out of our depth.

I'm going to back up a bit and try to clarify. Why is it that Wittgenstein writes OC? It's specifically in response to Moore's papers (Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense).

I'm going to reference Ray Monk's book The Duty of Genius because it's probably one of the best researched books ever written on Wittgenstein's life.

"Wittgenstein's own view of scepticism remained that succinctly expressed in the Tractatus: 'Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.' And it is in connection with this view of scepticism that he found something philosophically interesting about Moore's 'common sense propositions'. They do not give examples of 'certain knowledge', but, rather, examples of cases in which doubt is nonsensical. [This is the hallmark of a hinge-proposition.] If we could seriously doubt that Moore was holding up two hands, there would be no reason no to doubt anything else, including the trustworthiness of our senses. And in that case the whole framework in which we raise doubts and answer them would collapse: 'Certain propositions belong to my "frame of reference". If I had to give them up, I shouldn't be able to judge anything.' One such proposition might be the statement: 'That's a tree', said while standing in front of a tree:...

"The idea that there are certain judgements (among them, some of Moore's statements of common sense) that belong to our frame of reference [another hallmark of a hinge-proposition], and as such cannot sensibly be doubted, was developed by Wittgenstein in the work written during the eighteen months left of his life following his visit to the United States [referring to On Certainty] (pp. 557, 558, Duty of Genius)."

In OC 1 Wittgenstein comments that "If you do know that here is one hand, [taken from Moore's two papers] we'll grant you all the rest." So, Wittgenstein is challenging Moore's use of the word know in Moore's statement. However, keep in mind that the idea of a hinge-proposition doesn't even come up until later, he hasn't yet developed the idea, but if you read OC carefully you'll see how the idea immerges from Wittgenstein's thinking.

In OC 2 we again see one of the hallmarks of a hinge-proposition, "What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it." Doubt what? Doubt Moore's proposition, given in OC 1. In OC 4 Wittgenstein gives another example of this kind of statement, i.e., a statement like Moore's. "I know that I am a human being." In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider it's negation." Considering the negation of a hinge-proposition is a way of seeing how unclear it is to doubt the statement.

OC 6 asks, "Now can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused." The point is that we don't know what Moore claims to know in these statements, they are unusual to say the least, and Wittgenstein points this out as he tries to figure out the nature of Moore's propositions.

So, there is a reason Wittgenstein doesn't call Moore's propositions hinges, he hasn't yet developed the idea fully. In fact he dies before ever developing the idea fully.

Most interpetations of OC include Moore's propositions as hinge-propositions. I just don't see how you can read OC without coming to that conclusion. It seems rather obvious. I've read a good deal on this subject and it seems to be the consensus.

I'm not asking you to leave, I'm just saying that maybe you have something important to say, and that might be done in a different thread. You can continue making comments makes no difference to me.

I think that you have grossly inflated the significance of what is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. More importantly, this traditional picture of foundations is rejected by Wittgenstein. He reverses the order: — Fooloso4

Maybe you should start your own analysis in another thread.