No, intuitively he's not justified. Come one now, that just is the lesson to draw from our intuitions about knowledge. Yes, he is justified on the JTB definition, but the scenarios are meant to highlight how JTB fails as a definition. (I think Sam26 wants to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition, but that seems wrong -- unless we want to accept that knowledge is defeasible, which nobody wants to accept.) So, in both scenarios, there is something amiss with the justification. In other words, he's not justified. This is why people have moved from JTB to WTB (warranted true belief, where the "warrant" guarantees us that neither of the knowledge claims you described count as knowledge). — fiveredapples

You're right I do want to argue that JTB doesn't fail as a definition. I want to separate the definition from it's actual application, i.e., the definition works, but it's application is fallible. The application of the definition, due to a number of human fallibility factors, is never infallible. We are always updating and changing what we think we know. So, built into the application of the definition (we could in a sense call it a kind of formula) is the understanding that for various reasons/causes it could turn out that my justification wasn't correct, thereby nullifying my reasons for thinking I was justified. If we later find out that the clock was broke, then we weren't justified - period. Just because you thought you were justified, doesn't mean you are or were justified. This is why often our justifications need testing, because we are often wrong. Fallibility always includes the possibility of being wrong, even if it's a very low probability.

False premises can and do lead to true conclusions, as was shown in the argument. The real question is about justification.

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand and people think it refutes JTB. When examined closely the cases are not really justified. All Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge (for e.g., thinking one is justifed when you're not), as opposed to actual knowledge. So, if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end it lacks proper justification, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB.

I believe Five that a form of your argument can be used against Gettier. Gettier's examples fail to either be properly justified, or not true. I've always believed that Gettier's examples fail to undermine JTB.

Nice to hear from you again fiveredapples.

I'm not really writing to debate with people on this subject. Although I'll entertain a challenge or two. I'm just writing to explain what I've gleaned from my study of On Certainty. People will either see the points or they won't. I do appreciate the input though.

We just disagree when it comes to knowledge as a skill. I have to move on, I don't want to get stuck on that particular disagreement.

Let me say a few more things about basic or bedrock beliefs, and I'm mainly thinking of prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. First, Moore's claim that he knows he has a hand, is one such belief, i.e., we know that Moore is incorrect to say that he knows such a belief for many of the reasons Wittgenstein points out. The reason Moore is making such a claim is to attack the skeptic (extreme skepticism), who claims that one can't know such a thing. One cannot know, for example, that there are physical objects. Thus, Moore starts out by making a claim that most everyone seems to agree with, viz., "Here is one hand," and "Here is another," and I know it. After all who would deny such a claim.

Second, how do we know that Moore's beliefs are not knowledge? We know for various reasons. As I pointed out above we know this belief is formed without justification, it's part of our inherited background. I find myself believing that I have hands as I interact with them in the world around me. These beliefs are causally formed through sensory experience. It has nothing to do with knowledge as a belief, especially since knowledge as a belief requires language.

Another reason that these beliefs are not what Moore thinks they are is that they cannot be doubted sensibly, which is why Wittgenstein points out the negation of Moore's propositions - "I don't know this is a hand." Remember we are talking about normal circumstances. Wittgenstein points out that there are instances where it would make sense to doubt such a claim, but Moore's context is not such a context. What would a doubt or mistake look like in Moore's context. Moore is giving a lecture before an audience and holding up his hands.

If you know something such as Moore is suggesting, then you are able to justify how it is that you know it, but what would such a justification look like? Do I observe the hand from different angles to make sure it's my own? Do I feel it or pinch it to make sure I know it's my hand? No, none of this happens. We find that we believe such things and many others as part of the world around us, outside the language-games of epistemology. These are some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions.

That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out.

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so — Harry Hindu

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. We can observe knowledge as a skill, for example, tying your shoes, but there are many other examples. Riding a bike and counting to ten are skills. Knowing that bikes have wheels and that 2+2=4 are beliefs.

There have been times in the past where I stated that prelinguistic man doesn't have knowledge, but I was mainly thinking of the language of knowledge in terms of propositions/statements. It's clear though, if you want to be precise, that prelinguistic man and even young children display certain kinds of skills, which is another aspect of knowledge. You don't necessarily need language to demonstrate a skill, but you do need a language to demonstrate knowledge as a belief. Knowledge as a belief is necessarily linguistic.

So, I agree that you can show that you have knowledge (knowledge as a skill) without the use of language. Your example of tying your shoe is just that.

Beliefs are much more basic than knowledge, so the act of tying your shoe or skinning an animal shows that you have certain beliefs about the shoe and the animal. In both these cases we see very basic (bedrock) beliefs and knowledge as a skill.

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle

Hello Mcdoodle.

Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. I agree that to use language is an act, but I also believe that all beliefs are actions of a sort. If someone walks into the woods with an axe, walks up to a particular tree and start chopping it down, it would be weird to say that the person doesn't believe there is a tree in front of them, or that they don't have an axe in their hand. Our actions, linguistic or not, show that we believe certain things apart from the linguistic act of saying (verbal or nonverbal) "I believe..." There are all kinds of things we do on a daily basis (opening doors, starting our cars, brushing our teeth, etc) that reveal that we believe certain thiings, all of which are acts of a kind.

I'll continue tomorrow.

If belief is prior to language, than it exists in it's entirety before our awareness of it. — creativesoul

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. You need that as the foundation before you can build a structural understanding of what language even is. The idea of language is built on the idea that there is an external world with other minds, and that my mind is a representation of that world including how human being communicate. Language would have no foundation to stand on if there wasn't the foundational idea of an external world, for what purpose would language serve to a solipsist? How would the idea even come about in a solipsist mind? — Harry Hindu

Actually Harry this is a pretty good summary of some of my thoughts. I've been trying to work on a theory of epistemology based on some of these ideas.

Some of this is going to be difficult to understand, especially if you have not studied Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, or especially if you haven't studied On Certainty. Although much of what I'm writing is an extrapolation of what I believe follows from Wittgenstein's On Certainty. These are my own thoughts, which I believe follow from some of Wittgenstein's remarks.

The structure as I see it, consists of the world, minds, and language; and the relationship between these three. The world is the backdrop, and we find ourselves existing in it. Our mind helps us to interpret the world (it's in the relationship between our minds and the world that bedrock or basic beliefs form); so in a sense our mind is the center between the world and language. However, before we get to the language of beliefs, I want to say a few things about prelinguistic beliefs.

Without language we have the most basic of all beliefs. These beliefs are formed (I believe) causally between the mind (sensory experiences) and the world. More importantly these most basic of beliefs (states-of-mind) are not revealed linguistically, but are revealed in our actions (remember I'm talking prelinguistic beliefs). They are mostly seen in animals and children (and prehistoric man - OC 284). This is not to say that you don't see these kinds of beliefs in the language of modern man, it's only to say that they are most clearly seen in the actions of animals and very young children.

What is the relationship between my mind and the world? The initial relationship seems to be between our sensory experiences and the world. We come into direct contact with the world through sensory experience. We observe this initial contact (between the world and sensory experience) in animals and in young children. However, I'm not saying that adults don't exhibit these kinds of beliefs, only that they're most clearly seen in the actions of animals and young children who only have a rudimentary language.

One of the problems in seeing prelinguistic beliefs is language itself. It's difficult to look past the beliefs we express in language in order to see the beliefs I'm referring to. The key to doing this is in our actions. Actions express beliefs. In some ways actions tell us more about what we believe than statements (written or verbal).

Try to keep your responses limited to two or three paragraphs, or about the length of this post. It's difficult to read anything longer.

Guys and gals, I'm a little slow with my typing due to 'essential tremors,' so please don't take offense if I don't answer all of the questions/comments. Sorry my age is slowing me down. :yikes:

Hello fdrake. My next post is going to talk more about the structure, and what the structure is. It's not unique, in fact, it's quite familiar to us. The problem, as usual, is how we talk about it, and therein lies the problem that's difficult to explain.

As to your second question or comment, the problem is epistemological, and as you say philosophical, and since philosophy has something important to tell us across all subjects, it even has something to say about phantom limb pain. Especially Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, which I believe is important to understand.

If you were familiar with Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions in his notes called On Certainty, you would know that I'm not asking the question that you are answering. This is not a linguistics class, at least not a typical linguistics class.

I don't have a particularly good attitude towards Christianity either, but Wittgenstein would never make such remark. Moreover, he would never say that the soul is an illusion, and neither would I. The word soul isn't necessarily a religious word, although it's associated with many religions, especially Christianity.

During Wittgenstein's lifetime he published the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a children's dictionary, and a lecture on ethics. However, the Philosophical Investigations along with a long list of other notes was publisihed posthumously. Here's a link to a list.

https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/WITT/WITT.bib.html

There are obvious limitations to logic. First, not every premise within an argument can be proven, or shown by inference to be true. Knowledge using logic comes to an end, and the premises must be shown to be true by some other means such as linguistic training, testimony, or experience. Logic (inference or proof) is parasitic, it requires knowledge by other means which it can then use to extend what we already know.

Second, logic is person relative in two important ways. Any proof or inference is limited to what a person already knows. Thus, logic (inductive or deductive reasoning) is limited by a person's current fund of knowledge. A proof, in order for it to be effective, must start with what a person already knows. Also, a proof is limited to what a person can follow in a proof. In other words, it's more than knowing the premises are true, but understanding the moves of a proof. How does the inference flow from the premises; and knowing the difference between an inductive argument verses a deductive argument.

Third, and in many ways one of the most powerful things to influence an argument, is psychology. Because a person may not like you they may be unwilling to listen to the argument, or refuse to draw the proper conclusion.

Finally, even though all of this may be true, logic is still a very valuable tool.

I do, I wasn't being sarcastic. I didn't read all the posts. I just read a couple of posts.

Okay, fair enough.

In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, — Janus

There are many things that we know are the case without knowing why it's the case. We know for example that quantum entanglement is a fact (it is the case that quantum entanglement occurs), but we don't know the whys of quantum entanglement. I can also know that so-and-so murdered Mary, but not know why so-and-so murdered Mary. In some cases we know why, but in other cases we don't. Just because we have good evidence or good reasons (logic) to support a conclusion that doesn't mean we know for example the causes behind the conclusion, or even all the reasons behind the conclusion.

There are at least two ways of being certain for Wittgenstein. There is the subjectively certain, which expresses an inner conviction, often we use this expression to convey our feelings toward what we believe to others. One may use it to express one's faith for example. Wittgenstein often refers to what Moore claims to know as an inner certainty, "I know this is a hand." This was done through Moore's gestures and tone of voice, it reveals a particular state-of-mind. Moore thought he was expressing what was objective certainty, but Wittgenstein demonstrates throughout OC that Moore's propositions were not ordinary propositions. They were not the kind of propositions that one could claim to know in the ordinary sense. Wittgenstein calls them hinge-propositions or bedrock propositions.

Wittgenstein also demonstrates that not only is there certainty which is subjective, but there is objective certainty, which is akin to knowing. Objective certainty is backed up with facts, evidence, or good reasons.

When Wittgenstein talks about certainty in connection with the "spirit" he's referring to the idea that there is some transcendent certainty or knowing. As if we can know apart from some language-game - it's an internal metaphysical knowing that he was criticizing or pointing out. This can be seen in religious contexts. It's more than pointing to something internal, it's like pointing to something ethereal.

As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein plays an important part in my epistemology. Consider where I talk about the many uses of the word know, which is taken from the PI and especially OC.

Robert Kuhn and Sam Parnia have a short talk about consciousness and the death of the body. The following is my response to the talk.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hz_4FGdWVF8

As some of you know I'm not religious, but I do think there is evidence or good reasons to suppose that consciousness survives death (I go further than Sam Parnia). Also, some of you know that my two areas of interest are epistemology and near death experiences (NDEs), which I've been studying for many years. My views on epistemology inform my views on NDEs; and one of the most common mistakes made when I hear people (educated or not) talk about NDEs is the place or priority they give to scientific evidence (sometimes justified, sometimes not) as opposed to other kinds of evidence. The mistaken idea is that if science hasn't answered the question, then we don't have knowledge of the question at hand. This is the mistake that Kuhn makes all the time, and Parnia is making when he talks about the evidence for consciousness surviving death.

It only takes a cursory look at the way we use the word know to understand that knowledge is arrived at in at least several ways besides experimentation. I surely don't need science to inform me that there is an apple tree in my back yard, or that the orange juice I'm currently drinking is sweet. I also don't need some experiment to inform me that I know algebra, or that German and French are languages. Correct reasoning (logic) also informs what I claim to know, i.e. inductive and deductive reasoning. Finally, one of the most pervasive ways of gaining knowledge is through testimonial evidence, i.e., much of what we know is handed down to us from scientists, historians, mathematicians, and physicists, to name a few, so, there are at several ways of attaining knowledge apart from science. If this is true, and I believe it is, then appealing to science all the time for our fund of knowledge is a fallacy. I'm not saying that science doesn't have an important place in what we claim to know, I'm simply saying that science is not the end-all and be-all of what we claim to know.

Much of what Sam Parnia claims about consciousness relies on the testimonial evidence of NDEers. If this is true, then I believe that he's either ignoring some of the testimonial evidence, or he doesn't think it's strong enough for some reason he hasn't enumerated. For example, there is plenty of testimonial evidence that supports the idea that consciousness survives for much longer than he concludes. Many people who have NDEs report seeing their deceased relatives, which by definition means that they have survived, in many cases, for many decades after their bodies have decomposed. Moreover, there is other firsthand testimonial evidence that suggests we've been around for many lifetimes.

The following was taken from page 14 of this thread. I want to reiterate what makes a strong inductive argument based on testimonial evidence. Or, one could ask, what makes strong testimonial evidence?

As many of you know, the criteria for a good inductive (in this case an inductive argument based on testimonial evidence) argument is much different than the criteria of a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say X happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers, because numbers in themselves are not sufficient.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. When examining the conclusion of an inductive argument the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. The difference being what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), verses what necessarily follows (deductive arguments).

Third, scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph. It means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are more difficult to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend.

Fourth, truth of the premises. Clearly this means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that makes a good deductive argument, i.e., a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness means the argument is valid and the premises are true).

(a) Also, since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the fourth criteria of a good inductive argument, viz., the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or second-hand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So, although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely hear this criteria, but it's very important in terms of effectiveness. Any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true. You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. Thus, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an arguments effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

Finally, the main point of this post is to point out that we can know many things apart from what science tells us, and I think this is where Kuhn and Parnia go astray.

Our consciousness seems to access this reality through the brain. My best guess is that experiments must be done with DMT, and more studies need to be done on NDEs.

If I was to speculate about consciousness, I would say that consciousness unites everything. It's at the bottom of all reality. It creates all that we experience. There is nothing more fundamental than consciousness.

Consciousness reveals itself not only in our subjective experiences, but it also reveals itself in others, which makes it objective too. So, it has both a subjective component and an objective component. We see and hear from others those same subjective experiences that we experience; and in so far as they are separate from our experiences they are not only subjective, but objective too.

No matter how much information you get there will always be something unprovable within your system.

There are limits to reason/logic, so not everything can be proven via a chain of reasoning. Knowledge by inference or proof comes to an end, i.e., not every premise can be shown by inference to be true. Inference and proof is parasitic; it requires knowledge by some other means so that it can extend what is known, for example, knowledge by experience or linguistic training.

I would go a bit further, i.e., if grounds for doubt are lacking, then it's not only a matter of not being able to sensibly doubt, one couldn't sensibly know either. There are certain bedrock beliefs that are so fundamental, that without them there would be no knowing or doubting. In other words, the language of knowing and doubting wouldn't get off the ground without such basic/background beliefs. "I exist," is one such belief.

By doubting your existence, you affirm your existence.

Dr. Sam Parnia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkTh6wNlYao&t=995s

In trying to revisit some theories relative to EM fields of consciousness : — 3017amen

It's a very interesting topic, but this thread isn't about theories of consciousness. I don't think we have enough information to come up with a good theory. It's fun to speculate, and I do some of that when talking about NDEs. I don't consider my argument to be speculation, but there are some areas of NDEs where we can speculate because there isn't enough evidence to make a good inference.

An important epistemological point is that one of the main ways we justify a belief is through testimony, i.e., we learn things from people who are in a position to know. How do we know that Mary was at the party? Because several of our friends, who were at the party, told us. How do we know that Mr. Smith robbed the bank? Because several witnesses saw him rob the bank. How do we know that quantum physics is a reality? Because scientists have told us that countless experiments have yielded the same results over-and-over again (e.g., the many 2-slit experiments). Most of us are not involved with these experiments, i.e., we take the word of others (testimony).

The amount of information we learn from others is massive, and much of it is conveyed by testimony. Moreover, we don't doubt most of it, because if we did, we would be reduced to silence. Even our concepts and words are learned from others. Our culture would fall apart if we doubted the truthfulness of all such testimony.

However, this doesn't mean that everything that is conveyed to us is true. Thus, the need to question testimonial evidence. For example, is the person in a position to know? Were they there? Second, is the person skilled in the area in question? Third, is the person trustworthy? Fourth, does the testimony harmonize with other known truths?

and yet I still fail to see the relevance of NDEs in relation to the question of mortality — sime

Because a large percentage of NDEs and pre-death or death-bed visions are interactions with the deceased. Therefore, one can conclude based not only on this, but given all the other points that have been made, that we are much more than simply this body (the brain, etc).