OC 66 begins the second of four divisions in W. notes.

"I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance. How does the degree of assurance come out? What consequences has it (OC 66)?"

In the language-game of epistemology, which is what OC is concerned with, we make assertions about reality. For example, Moore's statement that "This is a hand," his own hand that is, is just such a statement. However, let's consider other such statements in different contexts. For instance, I'm in a room that isn't well lit, and I think what I see is a hand, I say, "I think that's a hand," as you strain to see what it is you're looking at. Another instance might be seeing what a magician presents as his hand while doing a magicians illusion. You're not sure what it is you're looking at. These kinds of statements give us differing degrees of assurance based on context. Much of what we think we know is based on "degrees of assurance," i.e., it's probability based.

One way that different degrees of assurance comes out is based on context. Are there good reasons to doubt in both of my examples. Yes. In my first example there is insufficient light, which gives rise to the doubt. In the second example we're watching the performance of a magician, whose is purposely misleading you. Again, good reasons for the doubt. However, in Moore's example one wonders what a doubt would look like. The case for a doubt in Moore's presentation seems lacking, to say the least, which is probably why Moore uses the example. "[A]re we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that (OC 56)." This is just the way we describe what we mean by hand in English, it's part of the logic of language. It's part of linguistic training. How do you know this is a hand? It's what we mean by hand. When we teach a child how to use the word hand correctly a doubt might arise about whether the child has learned to use the word properly.

The radical skeptic seems to think that his doubts can take place in a rational argument, but the truth is that this kind of doubting undermines all arguments, especially the ones put forth by the skeptic. When the doubts reach this level, you can't even be sure of the meaning of your words. It's self-defeating. The doubt loses all meaning. There are rational doubts, but these must be distinguished from the doubts of the radical skeptic.

Is it even possible that the world around us doesn't exist? Is it possible that we've miscalculated in all of our calculations (OC 55)?" The answer is obvious with a little thought.

The fact that you are doubting your existence, shows your existence. The question, in a Wittgensteinian way lacks sense.

As you know, the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. To exclude mathematical propositions from what is true or false is problematic to say the least. — Fooloso4

I'm going to make one more comment before moving on, because I don't want any confusion about what I'm saying. It's not true that the only example of a hinge proposition is a mathematical proposition. There are mathematical hinges, such as, 1+1=2 or 2+2=4 and so on. However, I'm not sure why you would say these are the only examples of hinges. The reason the book is written is because Wittgenstein is saying that there is something special about Moore's proposition, viz., "I know this is a hand," which is by definition, given the context, a hinge-proposition. Moreover, there are many other hinge-propositions. For example, the rules of chess are hinge-propositions.

I didn't exclude mathematical propositions from being true or false, only hinge mathematical propositions. Only propositions that are hinges (mathematical or otherwise) are excluded from truth or falsity.

We do not doubt hinge propositions because they are somehow beyond doubt, but rather because of everything that hinges on them. To call them into question would be to call everything that revolves around them into question. It is fundamental to the logic of our investigations that certain propositions stand without question. It is fundamental to our way of life that certain propositions are not called into question. "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (343)." — Fooloso4

I agree with some of this, but not all of it. It's the first sentence of this paragraph that is problematic.

If a proposition by its very nature is a hinge, then it's not doubtable. The hinge stands in a certain relation to the reality around us (the objects or things that make up the world), and to all the other propositions that connect to hinge-propositions. It's the hinge that stays put (which is why it's not doubtable), just as the reality around us stays put, at least generally, and it's because of this unique status that hinges cannot be doubted. They're bedrock, i.e., they allow the door to swing. The door being all the other propositions that are not hinges.

Two things must remain solid in order for most of the propositions of language (including mathematical propositions) to function. First, reality itself (the door frame), second, the hinge-proposition (hinge connecting to the door frame), these two remain fixed, which in turn allows the door of our life of language to function. If these things were not fixed, then no linguistic culture, no language-game of epistemology.

Maybe this clears some things up, but I'm not hopeful.

"The Earth revolves around the Sun" is a hinge proposition. But at one time "the Sun revolves around the Earth" was a hinge proposition. It was not simply a matter of correcting a mistake. The fate of man hinged on it. — Fooloso4

I think this misses the point of what a hinge-proposition is. What makes something a hinge is not what people accept as true or false, which are epistemological ideas, but they are concepts that lie outside our epistemological concepts of true and false, and what it means to know. This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's challenge. If hinges can be said to be true or false, then it makes sense that we can doubt that the proposition is true or false. This idea allows Moore's problem (the problem as W. sees it) to creep back into our thinking.

An important part of Wittgenstein's analysis is how he looks at Moorean propositions. Propositions like "This is a hand," "There are physical objects," and "The Earth has existed for longer than five minutes," these propositions seem to have the form of an empirical proposition. "The wavelength of light is around 700 nanometers," is an example of an empirical proposition, and it is capable of being verified or nullified. However, Wittgenstein points out that a proposition like, "There are physical objects," is nonsense (OC 35). These kinds of statements form the logical structure that supports language, which seems to be why Wittgenstein refers to them as logical concepts. They are a kind of bridge between the world and our thinking, and language itself. They are the logical bedrock from which language gains its foothold, without which the language of knowing and doubting would have no meaning. It would be like playing the game of chess without the rules that govern the game.

"I know this is a hand," "...is a misfiring attempt to express what can't be expressed like that (OC 37)"

I can't imagine Moore responding to the skeptic in terms of just his conviction. Obviously he thought it was more than that. However, W. says that this is ultimately what Moore's propositions seem to be, viz., a conviction of sorts. W. probably wouldn't have responded to Moore's papers if they were just expressing a conviction. At least that's my guess. There is something special about Moorean propositions, but not what Moore thinks, and this is what prompts W. response.

Ya, the skeptic would still get the same treatment as far as I can tell. OC probably wouldn't have been written if Moore expressed his argument in some other way.

If Moore was using "I am certain..." as a synonym for "I know.." it wouldn't make any difference (see OC 8).

The radical skeptic doesn't seem to understand the limiting use of the language-game of doubt. Both Moore's use of know, and the radical skeptic's use of doubt have limitations, just as all words do. Wittgenstein is pointing out these limitations by showing how the words break down, how they can lose their sense. He shows how the logic behind their use is lost. It's as if I've removed the bishop from the chess board and I'm playing on some other surface. It may look familiar because it seems to be moving diagonally, but it's deceiving because although it looks like a game, it's not. At least it's not a chess game. We've removed the bishop from its natural setting where it functions, into an unnatural setting where it isn't functioning. I'm making moves that lack coherent sense.

The radical sceptic makes a valid point in pointing out that whilst Wittgenstein argues that each language game has its own set of hinge propositions, he did not justify why one set of propositional hinges should be more exempt from doubt than others. — RussellA

First, hinge-propositions, or what I call basic beliefs or foundational beliefs (foundation carries other baggage though), are outside any of our epistemological considerations (I think this is an accurate interpretation of W.), so they (the hinges) don't require any justification, nor can they be said to be true or false. The only kind of epistemological connection they have is that they're beliefs, but even this falls away when considering non-linguistic beliefs.

Second, the nature of these basic beliefs, is that they're all exempt from doubt for the reasons he gives throughout OC. One being, if we are referring to Moorean propositions, the doubt lacks sense, or as W. points out "what would such a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off (OC 24)." All basic beliefs (or hinges if you will) have this characteristic. If they don't, then they're not basic. Moreover, if it makes sense to doubt "This is a hand," in a particular context, then it also follows that, it's not basic. I think Wittgenstein gives good reasons why all basic beliefs are exempt from doubt.

but I would also agree with Grayling that the biggest philsophical problem with On Certainty is OC 2, in that the framework within which propositional hinges operate are themselves relative, and hard to resist against radical scepticism. — RussellA

I think Grayling is incorrect about this. While it's true that basic beliefs are relative to the reality we find ourselves in, it's also true that the skeptic finds himself in the same reality, so their use of the word doubt is also dependent on that reality. The use of relative here needs to be clarified.

One use of "I know..." that I find particularly problematic in our culture is the tendency to think that only science can give us a firm footing when it comes to epistemology. This tendency limits the use of "I know...," and stifles what it means to have knowledge. No doubt, science is an important tool in gaining knowledge, but obviously it's not the only tool. However, the tendency is for people to use science as a cudgel, as if you don't really know until science investigates it. I don't need science to tell me there is an apple tree in my backyard, at least not generally, I can see it. I don't need science to tell me the orange juice is sweet, I can taste it. Much of our testimonial evidence is not backed up by science. For example, a friend comes back from a trip to England (assuming the friend is trustworthy), and tells me that he saw this and that, I take it as good evidence that what he said is accurate, unless there is a good reason to think otherwise. There are many other examples, but I think you get the point.

Even in mathematics we run into the same kinds of problems. Compare, "I know this calculation is correct (some long drawn out calculus calculation)," with "I know 2+2=4." It's easier to imagine the former use of "I know" being incorrect, than the latter. The latter use of "I know..." is akin to Moore's claim. What would a mistake in the latter proposition look like? What form would a doubt take?

"But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calculation (OC 26)?" However, Wittgenstein asks, "What use is a rule to us here?" After all if we can make mistakes in our calculations, certainly we can make mistakes in applying a rule.

Is there some rule that can be applied to Moore's propositions? No, there isn't, at best we can give something akin to a rule (OC 27), for e.g., "in normal circumstances." "And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones (OC 27)."

"What is learning a rule?--This. What is 'making a mistake in applying it'?--This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate (OC 28)."

Understanding these points gives us a glimpse into why it's difficult to follow Wittgenstein's points about Moore. It's not clear cut, it's indeterminate. You have to wrestle your way to the finish line.

The purpose of this analysis is to try to dig deeper into Wittgenstein's thinking. Many of you know that I've done this before. However, in this analysis I'm trying to shed new light on Wittgenstein's thinking (i.e., new for me, not new in general).

My contention is that Moore's propositions are akin to strong beliefs and/or strong convictions (Wittgenstein seems to say the same thing). The tendency is for us to want to use know when expressing a strongly held belief or conviction, it seems to add some force behind our statement. However, words don't get meaning from some inward feeling or state. The constant contrast between the inner (the subjective), and the outer use of these words (societal or cultural usage) is a contrast one must keep in mind in order to get clear on the problem Wittgenstein is trying to convey. Losing this contrast causes much confusion.

Not only does Wittgenstein compare the use of know with the use of doubt, as pointed out in previous posts, but he also asks us how a mistake would be possible in Moore's use of know. Moore seems to be saying that a mistake is not possible, as he says, "Here is one hand." And, if Moore would have left it at that, he would have had a stronger case, but he attached "I know..." to the statement, and it's here that problems arise. One problem is the connection between "I know..." and doubting, and the other is the connection between "I know..." and making a mistake. Seeing these connections is important if we don't want the force of "I know.." to be such that one can leap from the utterance of a statement (OC 21) to the truth of a statement. As if I can't be wrong or making a mistake. The possibility of being wrong is logically connected to "I know..." in fundamental ways.

Wittgenstein pointed out though, earlier (OC 13), that we can infer from our own statement that we know, but not from the statements of others. It must be demonstrated that you know to others. "'I know' often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement," i.e., we want to make sure you're not making a mistake. What are your grounds (the doubt), let's double check this (making sure there is no mistake). This either leads to "Ahh, you are correct," or "There is a mistake here." The question arises, how does Moore's use of "I know..." allow for the correction? It doesn't. Moore's use of "I know.." is supposed to have the force of truth in and of itself, but that would be weird.

Moore has found something significant though, and Wittgenstein respects Moore's for this. Moore has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements (Moorean statements or facts). They seem to provide a kind of foundational belief that is not only fundamental to epistemology, but fundamental to language. For myself, I have concluded that it leads to non-linguistic beliefs, but I've said enough about that, let's not debate this again. :nerd:

It's tough on philosophers, to be deprived of obvious choices. I know between certainty and doubt, one has to go but to disallow both is going to leave even the best thinkers scratching their heads.

I can get a handle on how certainty can be questioned but to claim, if I read the OP correctly, that doubt ain't it too is as perplexing as it is depressing. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein isn't disallowing the use of know and doubt, he is saying that in some cases philosophers are not using the words correctly. By the way, I know that in some cases we use the word certainty as a synonym for know, but to avoid confusion I stick with Moore's use of know.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another. — RussellA

Yes, part of what Wittgenstein said is that language derives meaning within the context of a language-game, and that meaning is closely connected with how we use a word in language-games. However, this is not to say that all language-games have the same force, or that we can arbitrarily make up any language-game and derive meaning from it. The same is true of use, I can't arbitrarily use words the way I want without the loss of meaning.

Not all language-games or all uses are correct. If I teach a child how to use the word pencil, and later the child points to a cat, and says, pencil, then their use of the word is incorrect, even if it's used in a particular language-game. Furthermore, note that use gets its force within a culture of agreement, and even this has its limits. So, there is a kind of objective reality in our agreement (at least generally). If there wasn't we wouldn't be able to communicate.

If I understand you correctly, you seem to be saying that each of us has a different reality (a subjective view of things), which in turn causes us to interpret things differently. Without getting into your use of the word reality, suffice it to say that you, just as the child in my example, cannot derive meaning based on how you, personally, use words. No more than you can play the game of chess by using your own rules. No one would know what you're doing. You wouldn't be playing the game of chess, as much as you might protest. After all, you might protest, it's my reality.

Meaning is derived within our world of reality, but it's not subjective, i.e., it's not something I personally determine. Meaning is derived from the social nature of language within the confines of an agreed upon reality (the agreement is general in nature). The fact that the Earth has one moon cannot be seen in the same light as the duck rabbit illustration. I don't look at the moon and see two moons while you see one. Reality, in general, is not like the duck rabbit picture.

You seem to think that all interpretations are equal, and this goes back to your subjective view (or the skeptics subjective view as you presented it), as if my interpretation is the only one that counts for me. However, if I want to use language as a tool to communicate, then there are standards that correspond to the correct use of the words within that language. The standard is derived from a community of language users, not through some internal reality.

If the skeptic replies "why should one interpretation have precedence over another," then one could answer, that not all interpretations are equal. In other words, in terms of language and the language-game, again, meaning is not a matter of your personal interpretation. The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. And, this must be viewed from outside our subjective view. It's viewed by looking at the community of language users, not one's personal interpretation. One's personal interpretation may or may not line up with the community, and this corresponds to the correct or incorrect interpretation. When I say correct and incorrect, I'm speaking generally, if it wasn't true generally, language would simply fall apart.

I'm not denying the subjective, I'm simply saying that the subjective has nothing to do with how meaning is derived within a society of language users.

Note that if one claims to know, then it means that in some way he has verified his claim (as pointed out in the previous post). But more than this, it has to be possible for him to make sure that his claim is correct, i.e., that he really does know what he claims to know. However, in Moore's case what would it mean to make sure? Do I have a closer look at my hand to make sure it's not my foot? It's the making sure part that lacks sense in Moore's case.

If I claim to know the history of England, there are ways to verify my knowledge. And, note, that if someone doubts that you are an English historian, there are ways to remove the doubt, so to speak, by objectively verifying one's claim. The doubts of others is why one's claim to know needs justification. But what if one's claim to knowledge brings no doubt to mind. In other words, what if we generally can't doubt a particular claim (like Moore's claim, that he knows he has hands)? I'm talking about particular claims within specified contexts (for e.g. Moore's context). If Moore's claim cannot be doubted, i.e., we cannot imagine its justification, then it's not a knowledge claim. How we come to doubt someone's claim to knowledge is important in terms of understanding the correct use of know. Again, if it's not possible to doubt in a given context, then it's not possible to know. The proper doubts of others, is what tests our claims. This is why Wittgenstein points out the importance of the phrase "I thought I knew." It's the doubt that brings the negation of "I know." It's also the doubt that can affirm one's claim to knowledge.

"It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say 'Of course I may be wrong about this'. We should ask 'What is it like to make such a mistake as that?'--e.g. what's it like to discover it was a mistake (OC 32)?"

"We just do not see how very specialized the use of 'I know' is (OC 11).

"For 'I know seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression 'I thought I knew' (OC 12)."

There are clearly a variety of correct uses of the words "I know," and each of these correct uses reflects one of the several ways we are able to objectively verify how it is we know that something is or is not the case. Some of the ways we verify how it is we know, include, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it), linguistic training (I learn how to correctly use words through linguistic training.), and finally, testimony (much of what we learn and know comes through the testimony of others). These are some of the ways we learn to correctly use the word know. Each of these ways gives a justification to our claim to know. One must demonstrate or show that one really does know. The claim "I know," does nothing by itself. All it is doing is showing your conviction that you know. One's conviction is only an assurance, but surely that is not enough to make the claim that you know (OC 15).

Given that this is the way we use the word know, what is the problem with Moore's proposition? The problem (one of the problems) is that Moore is using the word know in conjunction with a statement that generally has no need of justification. There are some basic statements about reality that do not need any justification, i.e., in some way they are foundational. These propositions (more like pseudo propositions) have the function of supporting our language, and hence, the language-game of epistemology. Wittgenstein never really worked out how we should describe these kinds of statements. He refers to them in a variety of ways. He calls them hinge-propositions, bedrock propositions, foundational propositions, etc. In OC 415 Wittgenstein says, "...certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking." This is one of the reasons I refer to these propositions as a kind of foundation, without which we no language. It seems to follow from this that talk of knowing falls apart without these bedrock propositions.

I think what Wittgenstein is referring to is a bedrock or foundational belief that undergirds everything. I do not think they should be called propositions.

OC 9 brings up an important point about Moorean propositions. Do we in general makes sure that we know that this is a hand, or this is a tree, or that we live on planet Earth? This is not to say that there can't be instances where we doubt these propositions (OC 23), as Wittgenstein points this out, but we are not talking about contexts where it makes sense to doubt "this is a hand," but contexts, like the Moorean context, where a doubt doesn't normally arise. "Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand--my own hand, that is?" No. Do doubts normally arise about such things? And how far would we get if we did doubt such things? This brings us back to the supporting structure that gives language its foothold. The language of doubting is sustained only because the supporting structure (reality) supports it. Remove the supporting structure and there are no doubts, because there is no language. We learn to trust things first, then we learn what it means to not trust.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules. — RussellA

Yes, Moore did believe that his propositions were common sense propositions that all of us know, but Wittgenstein is challenging this idea. To most us it seems that Moore is correct. I mean if we don't know this is a hand, then what do we know?

OC 6 brings up an important point (Wittgenstein says an "extremely important" point) about mental states and the connection to Moore's misuse of know. I think to understand Wittgenstein's point one must understand the context of Moore's presentation, which is given before an audience. "Here is one hand," Moore's claim is that he knows this. Such a statement, as Moore holds up his hand, is what reveals the mental state Wittgenstein is writing about, i.e., according to Wittgenstein Moore's proposition is more of a conviction about what he believes, not a case of what he knows. In OC 42 Wittgenstein refers to the mental state of conviction expressed "by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc." Why does Wittgenstein see it this way? One reason is that Wittgenstein sees Moore's propositions as special kinds of propositions, that in given contexts can't be expressed in this way. Why this is the case is the subject of Wittgenstein's investigation in OC. We will try to bring forth these ideas as we move along.

In OC 7 Wittgenstein points out the important idea of showing a belief. He says, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on." Then he gives an example of showing, "I tell a friend e.g. 'Take that chair over there', 'Shut the door', etc. etc." These are only one or two examples of how we show a belief. The mere act of sitting in the chair or opening the door shows that we believe there is a chair or a door. Acts alone, show, or have the potential to show what we believe.

The idea that there is a supporting structure to language is very important if you want to understand Wittgenstein's thinking about knowing and doubting (and words in general). The supporting structure (reality, if you will), and the culture that develops within this structure, sets the limits of use. Just as a board in chess limits the use of its pieces within the game, although, language is a bit more flexible in terms of the use of words. But, not so flexible that we can do whatever we want with the words we use. The tendency is for us to think that there is something within (the inner subjective me) that controls meaning and/or the use of words. This isn't always easy to see or understand, Moore fell victim to it without realizing the implications of his use of know.

Once we understand the limits of language (how we use words like know and doubt), then we can see how some uses of words have gone beyond the board of use. It's as if we've removed the bishop from the board and are using it in our imaginary game. However, it's even more strange than this, because others are also playing the same imaginary game. When others join in, this gives us the illusion that we're really playing the game. There is a very subtle loss of meaning when we do this. It certainly looks like we're playing the same game. After all, we're using the same pieces (same words, i.e., they're spelled the same), but we're moving them in strange ways. Ways that violate the original intent of the pieces and their use.

Yes, good response.

The point Wittgenstein is making about Moore's claim to know is that it's a misuse of the word know. Moreover, he contrasts knowing with doubting because of the close association between the use of these words. "I know..." is suppose to have the intended effect of tamping down any doubts that you don't know. Both knowing and doubting must be reasonable, i.e., the implicit rules that govern these words must be followed. To doubt everything, as Descartes did, not only trivializes the concept of doubting, but shows a fundamental misunderstanding of how doubting logically works. To doubt everything as Descartes did lacks sense. There has to be a framework in which doubting gets its meaning. That framework allows doubting to take place, to gain a foothold. You have to at least be sure of the meaning of your words, otherwise what would it mean to doubt. Descartes didn't really doubt everything. He surely didn't doubt what it means to doubt.

Radical skepticism is incoherent. On the other hand, so is Moore's argument that he knows "this is a hand." The same thing that grounds the correct use of doubting, also grounds the correct use of knowing. Both inextricably rely on the backdrop of reality itself, otherwise there is no foothold for doubting or knowing to get their meaning. Just as chess relies on the board and pieces in order to play the game. If you doubt the board and pieces, where do you go from there? You can't play the game.

The rules of language, or the rules of correct usage, tell us how we are to use these concepts (knowing and doubting). They're not created in a vacuum, but in a culture of correct usage. We can't just create our own uses, as many people do, and expect something coherent. To be fair, though, it must be said that many incorrect uses have to be pointed out because they're very difficult to see.

"13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is so". Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie. - But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I know etc."? Yes; and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there". But from his utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it."

There's some beautiful analysis of first, second and third person accounts here.

Anyone care to unpack this? — Banno

Because someone asserts that they know, that in itself is not enough to conclude that one does indeed know. That one knows needs to be demonstrated in one of the language-games of knowing. Even if it's determined that your not lying when you utter the words "I know...," it still is problematic without the demonstration of how you know.

Can you infer from your own utterance that you know? Yes. I can infer that I know based on the evidence that leads me to the conclusion that I know. I know that I know.

"There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there." If he indeed does know there is a hand there, i.e., he knows the evidence behind the claim, then he indeed knows it. However, this is a far cry from concluding that one does indeed know simply from the utterance "I know X."

"The very act of sitting at a computer and typing shows my belief that there is a keyboard; that I have hands; that I am controlling my fingers; that what I type is saved to a hard drive, etc, etc. I don't even think about it, i.e., I don't think to myself and say, "Is this really a keyboard?" After all there is no reason to doubt it, and even if I did doubt it, would that doubt really amount to anything? That I am certain of these beliefs is reflected in what I do. We all act in ways that show our certainty of the world around us. Occasionally things do cause us to doubt our surroundings, but usually these things are out of the ordinary. I am referring to our sensory experiences, i.e., generally we can trust our senses even if occasionally we draw the wrong conclusion based on what we see, hear, smell, etc."
— Sam26

This is either naive realism or pragmatism. All it establishes is that we have a consistent experience of a world. It's not a defeater for skepticism, because the skeptic begins here, and then goes on to point out everything that leads to the problem of perception. — Marchesk

This criticism misses the point. It's our consistent experiences that make radical skepticism lack any force. The point is that doubting in some circumstances is unreasonable, i.e., our doubting needs good reasons, just as our knowledge claims do. Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out, "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on (OC 7)."

Of course there are problems with perception, however, note that if I have a perception of X, and it turns out there was a problem with what I perceived, then obviously the doubt is warranted. Most of what we perceive is unproblematic, which is why I use the example of sitting at the computer typing. The so-called defeater for radical skepticism is in the unproblematic cases.

Just as Wittgenstein points out Moore's incorrect use of the word "know," Wittgenstein also points our the incorrect uses of the word "doubt," both have their problems. No one is saying all skepticism is problematic. One needs to come to terms with where these words break down (knowing and doubting).

This is an interesting video discussing among other things some of the objections to NDEs.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2OGtxV0a6f8&t=860s

One of the ideas I've been working on, as some of you know, is the idea of presenting the argument in this thread so that it allows me to make the epistemological claim, that, "I know consciousness survives the death of the body." So, I brought everything I knew about logic and epistemology together with what I believe to be strong testimonial evidence and made the argument. However, the problem is that unless you've had the experience it's difficult to see these experiences as veridical (coinciding with reality). It's much easier, depending on your world view, to write them off as hallucinations, drug induced, lack of oxygen to the brain, or some other brain induced phenomena. Each of these objections must be analyzed to see if there is any credence to the objection. I'm more than satisfied with my investigations to make the claim that none of these objections hold up to scrutiny. However, I'm also well aware that it's easy to write NDEs off as, say, a hallucination because they are so different from what we might call "normal" conscious experiences. It doesn't take much work to write NDEs off as hallucinations or some other brain phenomena because it's an easy way to dismiss them. It takes more work to study the nature of hallucinations, and how the psychiatric community generally defines hallucinations, then compare them to NDEs.

How do we determine whether a particular experience is veridical or not? Very basically it's done by agreement. Moreover, we also agree that other experiences have a nature quite distinct from our normal everyday experiences, such as dreams, hallucinations, delusions, etc. And, we use these words as a way to describe experiences that are not veridical, nonetheless real experiences. We tend to separate out these experiences because they are so subjective, i.e., we can't objectively verify these kinds of experiences. Whereas, if I say there is an apple tree in my backyard, there is a way for others to check the claim, viz., we can see it for ourselves. It can get more complicated, because what if I have a dream that there is an apple tree in my backyard, and there is really an apple tree in my backyard, does this mean the dream is veridical? Obviously not.

So, part of the problem, as in many philosophical arguments is weeding through the semantics of the argument. In many ways it's related to some of things Wittgenstein worked on, viz., how we use words. What do we mean by "real," "dream," hallucination," "conscious," etc? Understanding the use of these words can help clarify the argument and get us closer to the truth.

Don't really know what to say about ghosts. I try to stick to things that I'm currently working on.

I've been continuing my studies of NDEs, in particular I've been listening to people from other cultures and their experiences. The following is one of those experiences.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yl3OS7aA1gg

As I've said before, testimonial evidence, or if you prefer anecdotal evidence, is generally the weakest form of evidence, but it's not always weak.. So, if someone tells me a story, the strength of that story depends on a number of factors. Can we verify the story, because sometimes we can verify the story. For example, if someone tells me a story about an old women living in a cabin in the woods, there may be a way for me to verify whether this is true or not. And, there are a number of ways for me to do this. I can go into the woods myself to see if the cabin is actually there, or I may be able to talk to others who have had the same encounter. There may also be other ways of checking the reliability of the story. For instance, there may be something written down about the existence of the cabin and the old lady who owns the cabin. Obviously if there is no way to verify a story, then it's indeed very weak, but even here it depends on a number of factors. In our everyday lives we don't need to verify every story told to us in order to believe the story. We generally accept as true many of the stories told to us by family and friends we trust.

Everyday stories are one thing, but what about stories out of the ordinary, stories that go against the accepted science of the time. Well, in such a case we need more than just a few testimonials that can't be verified, we need very strong evidence to counter the prevailing view. This is why I've pointed out over-and-over again that we need not only a strong number of reports (in this case 100's of millions of accounts), consistent accounts, a wide variety of accounts from different cultures, an objective way to verify the accounts, etc., etc. If this can be done, and it has been done, then the evidence becomes very strong. In fact the evidence can be so strong that it becomes unreasonable to reject it.

The argument I've made is based on logic, not opinion. It's based on what makes a good or strong inductive argument. So, it's not just a weak anecdote that cannot be verified.

Also my argument has a strong epistemological point to make, viz., that we can claim to know some things based on strong testimonial evidence.

DNA evidence that Jones's hand was on the knife is good evidence that Jones killed Susan. That Jones has a bit of a shifty look about him is not. — Bartricks

That's just stupid Bartricks. I don't think you would know reasonable if it jumped up and bit you. I've seen many different arguments against NDEs, but nothing as ridiculous as yours. It doesn't seem to me that you know how to evaluate testimonial evidence.

We'll just have to disagree about the interpretation.

I do think that it is possible to enter into heightened states of awareness of without dying too, including out of body experiences. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I agree. One can have similar experiences through meditation, or by taking DMT. There were also studies done years ago on the brain where someone touching a particular area of the brain produced an OBE, or at least a partial OBE.

I had a college tutor once who saw near death experiences as leading to a possible eternity of being in that dimension. At the time, I was swayed towards that idea. However, looking at that way of thinking now, I am inclined to think that that state would not be permanent. Personally, having read 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead,' I wonder if the near death experiences is an entry into the bardo state, and would be a period of time and lead to eventual rebirth. Of course, I realise that this is only a speculation. — Jack Cummins

My view is that we are eternal beings, and that there is some evidence to support this from NDEs and other sources. However, the evidence to support this is not as strong as the evidence to support the conclusion that we do survive bodily death, which is what I'm claiming in this thread.

Think of it this way, there may come a time in our future where we essentially do away with aging, in fact, we are making strides towards this now. It's not hard to imagine that in the future we could download our consciousness into some other kind of body and continue living for long periods of time, barring an accident of some sort. If you can imagine this now, given what we know, imagine beings billions and billions of years ahead of our technology. They might be able to make a copy our consciousness in case there is some kind of accident. All you would have to do is reload it, and bang you're alive again.

There is good evidence that whatever is in the afterlife, it is far beyond anything we can imagine. I would think that life eternal is probably a small problem to solve. Not only is this a good possibility, but the way time passes there may also play an important role in how long we live. It could be that one year here could be an eternity there.

Since you brought up rebirth, I'll say a little about this. There have been thousands of reports by people who have had NDEs that we can choose to come back here in a different body. Now I don't believe in reincarnation as spelled out by some religion, but I do believe that we can choose different lives to live, either in this world or universe or other worlds and universes. I don't think it's forced upon you, but you can choose it. There is also some evidence that what we experience here has been planned out prior to our birth, and that the memories we have of who we really are is suppressed. This can be seen in some NDEs. What happens is that many people who have an NDE all of a sudden remember who they are and why they are here. Some of them are told that they will not be able to remember these memories when they return to their bodies. It's as if remembering too much hinders our life here in some way. There is much more that can be said about this, but it's a bit off topic, not much, but a bit.

We can only get so much information from NDEs. There are many more questions than answers, but there are some answers. We will see our loved ones again, including pets believe it or not. That our true home is there not here. That we are loved and cherished beyond words. Also, that there is no reason to fear death, or some religious idea of hell. Moreover, I don't think any religion quite captures the essence of the afterlife. Is there a God? I don't know, if there is it's probably nothing like the God as presented in any religion.

Well, that's the case with near death experiences and with dream experiences. There is no serious question that we do have the experiences constitutive of dream experiences, and no question that such experiences have a great deal in common, are attested to by virtually everyone, and, while one is subject to them anyway, can have representative contents as vivid as that contained by any phenomenal experience. And there is no serious question, I think, about near death experiences either - or at least, you won't find me questioning it. But in both cases we are in unusual circumstances - circumstances that operate as undercutters for those experiences. When it comes to sleep, we are unconscious. Our normal sensory modalities are not functioning. And so the more reasonable explanation of these experiences is not that they are accurate and that sleep transports us all to a bizarre other realm in which other laws of nature operate, but that we are hallucinating. And the same is true of near death experiences: those who have them are unconscious at the time and furthermore their body is under extreme stress. The idea that we become 'more' reliably hooked up to reality under those circumstances seems to me to be utterly bizarre and one only someone quite unreasonable would make. — Bartricks

We agreed until we got to the above paragraph. There is no question that both dreams and NDEs are unusual. And, it is true that there are common elements as attested by many who experience dreams and NDEs. It may be the case that while experiencing a dream we believe it to be real or veridical, but most people who awake from a dream do not confuse the dream with reality. They may say that the dream seemed real, but most (99% or higher) don't go on to argue that it was real. Dreams do produce intense feelings that are just as real as what we experience in our waking life, there is no doubt about this. However, there is nevertheless a quality about dreams that is just different from our waking life, which is why most people don't confuse dreams with reality. And, unusual circumstances don't always act as defeaters for a particular argument. They can, but it depends on the combined strength of the argument, and other factors.

Here are some key differences that lead many people to believe that NDEs are real. First, and I mentioned this in another post, people are reporting on real events, and this is corroborated by people who are not having an NDE, but are at the scene where the NDE is taking place. For example, people who are experiencing an NDE in a hospital setting (say in an operating room) are able to describe what is going on in the operating room in detail. Not only do they describe what's happening to them, but they are later able to describe the conversations between the doctors and nurses who are performing the procedures. Some also describe conversations that are going on in other rooms of the hospital. This happens to people even if there heart has stopped, or even when there is no measurable brain activity (including blood being completely drained from the brain). Now you want to tell me that NDEs are like dreams. Our dreams don't overlap with reality in this way. There is an added component to NDEs that dreams normally don't have, viz., the NDE overlaps with what others are experiencing in their waking life. This has been documented thousands and thousands of times, so it's objective evidence that has been corroborated. You just don't get this kind of overlap in our dreams, and if you do, it's very rare, not the norm. This is the norm with NDEs.

You say that it's unreasonable to argue that NDEs are real. I say that the evidence to support NDEs as real experiences (unlike dreams, hallucinations, or delusions) is overwhelming, and to deny it reflects someone who hasn't studied the data, is biased, or is just being unreasonable. I think it's more likely that you haven't studied the data, and your argument reflects this.

It's not my logic, it's logic, period. Because dreams seem real, that's not the same as people claiming they are real. And what about the corroborating evidence, you are not addressing the argument. You are just giving me an opinion.

The question Bartricks raises is that the same inductive argument that I'm making about NDEs could be made about dreams. Is this correct? Let's compare the two arguments. But first let's also reiterate what makes a good inductive argument, and this is just simple logic. The following link gives the criteria of a good inductive argument (this is important): https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/483632

There are five criteria that make a good inductive argument, and these are explained in the link above.

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

My argument makes the claim that NDEs are veridical. In other words, not only are they real experiences, but the place that NDEers go to is real. In fact, most if not all NDEers claim that their NDE is more real than our normal everyday experiences, and that their sensory experiences are more expansive. Moreover, their feelings of love, peace, harmony, empathy, go far beyond what we experience here. There are literally hundreds of millions of people who have experienced an NDE, so in terms of numbers the argument fulfills the first criteria.

Bartricks makes the claim that this same argument could be made about our dream states, i.e., that it's a real place with physical laws etc. But, do we actually have large numbers of people making the claim that their dreams are real, i.e., that they are going to a real place? No. His argument comparing the two falls apart right from the start.

It's true that there are large numbers of people claiming to have dreams, and that there are a wide variety (second criteria) of people having dreams (across cultures, age groups, etc), but the key here is what they are claiming about their dreams.

Even if people were claiming that their dreams were taking them to a real place, where is the corroborating evidence? The fourth criteria in the argument I use (truth of the premises) involves corroborating evidence, viz., there are people who were at the scene of the NDE that can confirm the accuracy of the OBEs (accuracy of what people have seen while claiming to be out of their bodies). There are a large number of accounts that can be corroborated. Given that so many can be confirmed we have a way of objectively verifying the accounts. Again, even if people were claiming that dreams are real, we have no objective way to verify it, no corroborating evidence. A good example of this is Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA on Youtube. This is an important part of my argument, since you need a way to objectively verify what people are claiming. It can't be purely subjective.

You can read what I said about the consistency of the testimonials in the link above. This, obviously is another important part of the fourth criteria.

Bartricks also says that the argument is unreasonable, but nothing can be further from the truth. The argument is very strong and very reasonable. Granted, testimonial evidence is generally very weak evidence, but what people fail to acknowledge is that it can be extremely strong under the right conditions. And, I have given the conditions under which testimonial evidence can be strong.

I believe that I have given an inductive proof that consciousness extends beyond our biological bodies. The evidence that forms the core of this conclusion is based on good testimonial evidence. I'm not going to reiterate the argument because I've already explained the argument at least three time in this thread (It was last given on page 21 in two posts).

Based on this argument my claim is that I know consciousness survives the death of our bodies. If this is true, it still doesn't get us any closer to understanding what consciousness is, other than to say it's more than the sum of our physical bodies. More specifically, it's more than brain activity.

At a very basic level, consciousness is awareness. Awareness of what? Awareness of ourselves as distinct things in relation to our surroundings. However, it seems obvious that there are different levels of awareness or consciousness. An earthworm's level of awareness is very rudimentary, nonetheless, it seems aware on a very basic level. We know this by the way the worm interacts with its surroundings.

Human consciousness, on the other hand, is more expansive. In other words, human awareness extends to thinking about our awareness, i.e., being aware that we are aware (introspection). Hand-in-hand with human awareness is the ability to communicate our awareness, and to not only think introspectively, but to think about our surroundings in ways that other living things can't.

If consciousness is more fundamental than our brain, what is that composition? I believe that consciousness is at the core of all reality, i.e., that the unifying principle of all reality (everything that exists, seen and unseen) is consciousness, or an intelligent mind or minds. However, what gives something awareness apart from biological matter (or any kind of matter) is a mystery that we are not even close to solving. It's much easier to suppose, or to conclude that consciousness arises from the stuff of the known universe. The composition of consciousness may not be anything physical at all. Moreover, composition implies component parts, but there may be no component parts in the way we think of components. Answering this question would be like trying to figure out alien technology that is billions and billions of years ahead of us.

One might ask, how did consciousness arise or begin? Maybe consciousness is timeless in some sense. It could be the source of all love and knowledge - all that is, will be, and has been. If everything is happening at once the question of a beginning or end lacks sense.

One final comment. I don't think this means that one has to be religious to believe that an intelligent consciousness is fundamental. I find there are too many dogmas in religion, and too many dogmas in atheism.

:ok:

The discussion of pre-linguistic beliefs (with you and others) goes back to my thread on Wittgenstein in the prior forum. I'm wondering if your position has changed much?