I'm sorry MU, but I'm not going to waste my time going back and forth arguing with your private interpretations of Wittgenstein. I think it ruins the thread.

The idea in PI 128 is a kind of ideal, i.e., if we were able to apply Wittgenstein's methods (it's not method by the way), then clarity would be achieved. There would be no debating the obvious, we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance.

The problem according PI 129 is that what's hidden is what's before our eyes, it's something so familiar that we tend to ignore or miss it because of its "simplicity," or again, its "familiarity." It seems as though the answer to our question or confusion lies in the open, which means according Wittgenstein, that we fail to be struck by it. However, once seen in a new light, it becomes "striking" and "powerful."

A Note of Clarity:

In the first paragraph I speak of an ideal, but this should not be confused with the idea that there is some perfect sense to all our statements, in other words, some meaning that eradicates vagueness. No, the ideal or the clarity spoken of, is the realization the our statements of ordinary use, are in perfect order just as they are. This is difficult to grasp, because when we encounter a vague statement, the tendency is to what to explain it further, but there may not be a need for further explanation. Exactness is not always necessary.

First, let me say that I'm not a religious person, so I'm not trying to defend any particular religion. That said, I think you can make sense of the idea of a trinity.

The problem is in the definitions as some have already pointed out. No definition will satisfy everyone, but that doesn't mean that you can't make sense, in some contexts, of the idea of a trinity. Definitions are just guides, they're not the be all and end all of how we use words. There is no definition that will satisfy every use of the word game, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word to refer to particular games.

My take on the trinity is simply this: There is nothing logically incoherent in saying that there can be three persons all partaking of the same nature and yet be three distinct beings. For example, let's say the nature of God is 1) omniscient , i.e., he/she knows all that is possible to be known; 2) omnipotent, i.e., can do anything that is logically possible; and finally, 3) omnipresent, in so far as one can make sense of what it means to be omnipresent. If consciousness is what is at the core of reality, then it could make sense that a being might be everywhere at once. Moreover, even if you throw one of the three core ideas (say omnipresent) out, you could still make sense of the other two. I think one can make sense of the idea, in some context, or some use of the terms.

The objections are going to be that the definition goes against some religious orthodoxy, but I don't care. My point is to make sense of it in some context or use. Just as we can make sense of children playing a game without the game have clearly defined rules, or without there ever been such a game before. We still know a game when we see it.

For Wittgenstein the process (his methods) take us from confusion to enlightenment. "This is reminiscent of a Zen master's procedure: 'Before you have studied Zen, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but one you have had Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers (D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected writings of Suzuki, pp. xvi-xvii)." It seems that the ideal for Wittgenstein is complete clarity, and clarity, as it were, is what's always been before our eyes.

Each linguistic confusion has a particular cure, which is why Wittgenstein's methods are like curing an illness, that is, there is no one particular method that works for all linguistic confusions. Always ask yourself, "What is Wittgenstein doing (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, p. 104 - 105)."

Even though Wittgenstein wants us to not think of his writings as advancing a theory, I think he is putting forth a theory, a kind of anti-theory. It's a theory of method. It's as though we're looking at the linguistic landscape from a variety of angles, which gives us a better picture of language and how clarity is achieved.

We must remember the cures as we think of the many confusions that arise in philosophical thinking. This gets back to "assembling reminders." If we forget the cures, we will continue to live with the illness (confusion). Each reminder serves a particular purpose (PI 127), that is, it untangles linguistic knots.

I once started a thread, "Does Language Deceive Us?" - this is what I had in mind, namely, linguistic knots or confusion.

Maybe something like the following:

Once some of these passages are understood it will not only make clear some of what Wittgenstein is doing, but also help us to get a better picture of his method/s overall. Wittgenstein's philosophy is a kind of confession, especially as he criticizes his former self (Tractatus). You can see this in passages where he says "I'm tempted here to say," or "I feel like saying." etc. We don't develop theories based on confessions, they are either helpful or honest, or not. Confessions can be seen as cures, because remember, Wittgenstein is showing the fly the way out by clarifying the obvious through a series of case histories, like a doctor might do.

All throughout the PI Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to some very important linguistic facts, and it's each of these facts should serve as reminders. Each case study has something important to tell us about how easy it is to get tied up into linguistic knots. We often forget, especially while doing philosophy, the important ideas that Wittgenstein points out. However, Wittgenstein's cure is to keep these reminders before our eyes, or at our side as cures for what ales us. Reminders are exactly what is needed to keep our philosophy down to Earth and clear, that way, we can find our way about.

We often ask ourselves the wrong questions while reading the PI, it should never be, what kind of theory is Wittgenstein espousing?

Again, what are the reminders, they are the case histories, they help us achieve clarity, as opposed to the confusion that is caused by being tormented by language (as in the bewitchment of language). Once clarity is achieved, then we can stop doing philosophy and rest our minds - we can walk out of the bottle.

/

The main area that I part company with Wittgenstein is in reference to the limit of language. He still believes in the PI that there is a limit, I do not.

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Ironically, lucid dreamers use the presence of their dream hands within a dream as a cue to detect that they are dreaming. Said in this dream situation, is the sentence "I know I have hands" a hinge proposition or an epistemological claim? If a dreamer insisted the former they would fail the reality check and remain non-lucid. — sime

I would say that anytime it makes sense to say, "I know I have hands," whether dreaming or not, then it's not a hinge-proposition. Wittgenstein gives an e.g. in On Certainty where it makes sense to say "I know I have hands," e.g., after waking from an operation with bandaged hands. Hinge-propositions, as you probably know, are non-epistemic. It's senseless to say "I know...," or "I doubt..." if it's hinge or bedrock. If someone insisted in saying that such a proposition was epistemic, it would just be senseless, as in Moore's propositions.

I'm not sure I follow the reality check idea in reference to bedrock beliefs.

Hmm, I don't think that works: "The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections... of just what it is that philosophy is trying to do". — StreetlightX

I have Anscombe's translation (third edition). I'm not sure exactly what Wittgenstein's is saying, you may be right.

Not much to say about these other than they recapitulate, again, that philosophy is descriptive and subtractive, and not explanatory. That said, I'm not sure what it is that the philosopher 'marshalls' when he or she 'marshalls recollections': recollections of what? Any ideas? — StreetlightX

It isn't so clear, but it seems that in context it's reminders of (you must have a different translation, mine uses reminders, not recollections) of just what it is that philosophy, as Wittgenstein sees it, is trying to do (PI 126). This is where I part company with Wittgenstein.

"The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, thing do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules (PI 125)."

This is true not only of mathematics, but of any language we use to describe reality. Part of language's function, as I see it, is to describe reality, and we create language-games (governed by rules) to do just that. The contradictions, may not be contradiction of facts in the world, but the contradictions arise in the way we describe things, and the rules involved in the language-games used.

"A whole series of confusions has arisen around the question of consistency.

"Firstly, we have to ask where the cotnradiction is suppose to arise: in the rules or in the configurations of the game.

"What is a rule? If, e.g., I say 'Do this and don't do this', the other doesn't know what he is meant to do; that is, we don't allow a contradiction to count as a rule. We just don't call a contradiction a rule - or more simply the grammar of the word 'rule' is such that a contradiction isn't designated as a rule. Now if a contradiction occurs among the rules, I could say: these aren't rules in the sense that I normally speak of rules. What do we do in such a case? Nothing could be more simple: we give a new rule and the matter's resolved (Philosophical Remarks, p. 344, Notes of December 1931)."

No problem Wallows, I wasn't complaining just asking.

I'm not sure what any of this has to do with On Certainty. I'm sorry but I don't see the connection between any of this and my points in my paper.

What Wittgenstein is talking about on p. 223 has nothing to do with what I'm talking about.

No, again it has nothing to do with intuitionalist thought. It's quite different. Why would you think that?

/

No it's not an intuition. It's more than that.

I'm repeating myself in a lot of ways, but it helps to re-word some of these ideas to make them a bit clearer. As I've already stated there are two kinds of hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. First, there are those that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock to the game, along with the board and pieces. Second, there are those that occur prior to language. For example, the belief that we have hands is something we learn prior to language, and the belief manifests itself when we use our hands. What can be confusing is that we can state these prelinguistic beliefs once we learn a language, as Moore did (I have hands.). So, how do we know when a beliefs is prelinguistic? Any belief that manifests itself in our acts or actions is most likely a hinge-proposition or bedrock belief.

l

It's interesting to note that foundational doctrines and structuralist assertions within the field of philosophy have only led to very few bedrock or hinge propositions. Such, as "I think, therefore, I am", and the next closest thing as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has been discredited as of late. — Wallows

Actually there are many bedrock beliefs, in fact, too many to list. The examples you give are not bedrock. The following are some...

2+2=4
I have hands.
I live on the Earth.
My name is Sam.
This is a tree.
That is a person.
etc, etc.

Wittgenstein's ideas about hinge-propositions are quite unique as far as I can tell. And by the way, his ideas are not the same as traditional foundationalism.

l

I would have to agree with Fdrake, i.e., that whether we are talking about the propositions of mathematics or otherwise, both can have an empirical side. I'm not that up on Wittgenstein's mathematical views, I'm just giving my take on the language of both mathematics and other linguistic propositions. Either way we're using symbols to describe reality, at least in part.

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How's it going Creative?

The problem of course, is that natural language is it's own meta-language; it is therefore incapable of expressing a distinction between the publicly linguistic and the privately non-linguistic. This is why, contra-Wittgenstein, I think natural language is inappropriate for discussing philosophy. What you need is a special notation for signifying your pretheoretic and private sense of "hand". — sime

I'm not sure how your response is connected with what I was saying. It sounds more like you misunderstood my point.

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l

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Pam's nde, part 1 and 2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNbdUEqDB-k

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osfIY4B3y1U

I really do wonder what impressed Keynes so greatly that he exclaimed that God [Wittgenstein] stepped out of the train [at some time]. — Wallows

He was just much smarter than your average bear. The whole family was a bunch of geniuses, mostly in music though.

Finally, someone else said it. It's really a great saying IMO. Somewhere up there with a rising tide lifts all boats, and there's no free lunch. And maybe even topping, you can't have a cake and eat it too. — Wallows

I just ate my cake. Chocolate, with a think layer of chocolate frosting.

There is really no such thing as "what Wittgenstein is saying". But if we were to look for "what he is saying", wouldn't that just be the theory he puts forward, "his method of linguistic analysis"? — Metaphysician Undercover

To me, it doesn't make sense to say, "There is really no such thing as 'what Wittgenstein is saying.' I think it's plainly contradictory, at least in terms of how we normally use the word say. Also, Wittgenstein is not putting forth a theory, that seems clear also. As usual MU we are far apart on Wittgenstein, but you seem to thrive on living in your private world. Whatever floats your boat.

Why would you assume this, that we are looking for a precise meaning? Have you not attended philosophy seminars? The goal is to discuss the variety of interpretations, in an attempt to understand the various perspectives of understanding, brought to the table by the different backgrounds of the different participants. Sometimes we may be influenced to alter our understanding based on the perspective of another. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm saying that it's easy to get so involved in what Wittgenstein is saying that you forget that he's putting forth a method, so it's the method, and not so much what he's saying in this passage or that, although it's that too. Sometimes it's about the right balance between what he's saying here or there and the overarching picture of his method of linguistic analysis.

In the Tractatus, he is under the mistaken assumption that every proposition must have a definite sense. That a statement must have a fixed sense is reflected in his analysis, that is, the one-to-one correspondence between a name and an object. He inherited this thinking from Frege, as per Frege's idea that a vague concept is not a concept at all, just as a vague boundary is not a boundary at all. However, in the PI Wittgenstein demonstrates that because a proposition is not clear, that does not mean that it has no function (PI, 71). Sometimes being unclear or inexact (in terms of a statement) is precisely what is needed. The method of analysis, as presented in the Tractatus, forces a view of language that is just mistaken, and Wittgenstein begins to realize this in the very early 1930s.

So, philosophers have a tendency, as did the philosopher of the Tractatus, to analyze language as if one is doing mathematics. This method of analysis rears its head all the time. In fact, when interpreting the PI, as is done in this thread, and in my thread on OC, we are making the same mistake. We are looking for that precise exegesis, which leads to a discovery of Wittgenstein's meaning. It does not mean that the work is all bad, it means that sometimes we are searching for the very thing Wittgenstein is criticizing. We think we eliminate misunderstandings by making our analysis more exact. When what we need is a general idea of his method, the PI method. Wittgenstein criticizes philosophers often for looking for the real artichoke beneath the leaves or layers (BB, p. 125). This criticism only goes so far though, because much of the time we are re-wording his writings to look at it from a different angle.

I don't think it is possible for time to be eternal - that would require everything (matter etc...) to exist 'forever' which does not seem possible: — Devans99

There sure isn't anything contradictory in saying that time could be everlasting. You couldn't have time if at some point there was no time. You would have to go from no change to change, how could that be possible? You couldn't get a universe from a completely static state.

If you can talk about it, then you can philosophize about it. It's that simple.

I thought I would quote something from K. T. Fann's book, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.

"Wittgenstein himself wished to publish the Tractatus and the Investigations together because, as he puts it, '...the latter could only be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again..., I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in the first book' (P.I. p. x).

"The relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations is a matter of controversy. On the one hand the passage just quoted has been interpreted to mean that 'Wittgenstein himself viewed...[the Investigations] as a development or deepening of [the Tractatus], and in fact, ... both the one and the other only makes sense when they are seen as complementary.' On the other hand, the majority of commentators seem to agree with Hartnack in maintaining that 'No unbroken line leads from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations; there is no logical sequence between the two books, but rather a logical gap. The thought of the later work is a negation of the thought of the earlier.'

"One asserts that the Investigations, as a whole, is a 'development' of the Tractatus while the other claims that they are 'negations' of each other. Both interpretations are radically mistaken. Wittgenstein himself used to say that the Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. It is important to distinguish clearly the part of the Tractatus which was repudiated from the part which was not. Wittgenstein merely advises us to contrast his later work with his old way of thinking - i.e. his old method of philosophizing. It is quite true that his new and old ways of thinking are poles apart. The Tractatus follows the methods of traditional theoretical construction (even though to construct only a 'ladder' to be abandoned at the end) while the Investigations employs what can best be described as the method of dialectic. However, there is an important continuity in Wittgenstein's conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy. The views arrived at in the Tractatus (that philosophical problems arise from our misunderstanding of the logic of our language, that philosophy is no science but an activity of elucidation and clarification, etc.) continued to serve as the leading thread in Wittgenstein's later works. Thus, Wittgenstein's later conception of the nature and tasks of philosophy can best be seen as a 'development' of his earlier views, while his later method should be regarded as the 'negation' of his earlier method. This, I think [K. T. Fann], is the key to a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole (Preface p. xii, xiii)."

I think this is important.

I would say it is not that statements get there meaning from correct context, but that it is only in a correct context, that is to say, particular circumstances or situations that a statements has a meaning. — Fooloso4

I would agree with that.