I think this is the point that Wittgenstein was trying to get across. That of ethics to be found in the ordinary deed done out of charity in every day life. — Posty McPostface

This sounds like something Wittgenstein would say, viz., that ethics is to be found in the deed.

Is this a quote of Wittgenstein's - "Philosophy is only descriptive, its purpose therapeutic. The only problem to be solved is that of the human psychology." I'm interested in the source.

Thank you for your response. — Dfpolis

:up:

I've come to the conclusion, as did Wittgenstein, that the problems of philosophy are psychological or have their root in the psychology of the speaker. — Posty McPostface

If you want to know what I would disagree with, it would be the above statement. There are many psychological ramifications of what Wittgenstein said, there is no doubt about that, but he would not say that the problems of philosophy have their root in the psychology of the speaker. However, to be fair, Posty you may have something in mind that I'm missing.

I am one of those who have read some Wittgenstein and was not unduly impressed. I take responsibility for that. As a student of Aristotle, who is also a genius and often difficult to grasp, I appreciate the need to study a philosopher in depth to fully appreciate his/her genius. So, as I see it, it is a matter of resource allocation. We have limited time, and so we have to judge, after minimal exposure, where to spend it.

One way to overcome this barrier is to have someone show you an instance of the philosopher's genius. — Dfpolis

Your right, it's very difficult to make time to study some of this material, especially since there is just so much to study. All I have time for is a very limited area of philosophy, there is just too much.

His genius is seen in the Tractatus, even if you disagree with it. It's seen in his transition from his early to his later philosophy. I see his genius in his final notes (On Certainty). I've also seen his genius in what he did outside of philosophy. One example was his work during WW2 at Guys Hospital in England...

“Wittgenstein’s job as a porter was to deliver medicines from the dispensary to the wards, where, according to John Ryle’s wife, Miriam, he advised the patients not to take them. His boss at the pharmacy was Mr. S F. Izzard. When asked later if he remembered Wittgenstein as a porter, Izzard replied, ‘Yes, very well. He came and worked here and after working here three weeks he came and explained how we should be running the place. You see, he was a man who was used to thinking.’ After a short while, he was switched to the job of pharmacy technician in the manufacturing laboratory, where one of his duties was to prepare Lassar’s ointment for the dermatological department. When Drury visited Wittgenstein at Guy’s, he was told by a member of the staff that no one before had produced Lassar’s ointment of such high quality. “

Was taken from the following link: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrs-blog/2009/12/12/wittgenstein-labors-at-guys-during-wwii.html

Thanks for the post, Posty. I'm always interested in hearing how others interpret or use Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Yes, but is it really necessary to study Wittgenstein to spot an equivocal use of terms? Clearly not, for Aristotle discusses different types of equivocation — Dfpolis

Obviously not, but Wittgenstein goes much much further than this, and it's this wide view that Wittgenstein deals with over the course of his life. I think most philosophers would agree that Wittgenstein's thinking was genius, but most present Wittgenstein in very basic ways. When I hear some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein, they seem to be of those who have only read some of Wittgenstein, but have not really studied Wittgenstein in depth. The comparison would be like me talking biology with an expert in biology. It seems naive.

The reason I say some of this is that Wittgenstein is very difficult, and yet people will give his philosophy a cursory reading and think they understand. But now I'm way off topic.

but the nature of language is itself not lingusitic: it belongs to a wider set of practices and capacities which must also be grasped in their specificity. — StreetlightX

I don't follow this, specifically, "it belongs to a wider set of practices and capacities which must also be grasped in their specificity."

Does this apply to ancient or medieval philosophical problems in addition to more modern ones? Because various philosophical problems have been expressed in Greek, Latin, Hindi, Chinese, English, French, German, Arabic, etc.

On an abuse-of-language view, different languages would probably present different forms of abuse. Or so we might expect. — Marchesk

I'm a fan of JTB, and we can trace it back to ancient philosophy, but yes, it does apply to philosophical problems across the board, and throughout history.

Yes, different languages would present different abuses. However, I think for the most part many of the problems are very similar.

(3) Rule following is a non-deliberative component of language use; the 'way of following a rule which is not an interpretation'. As StreetlightX put it, language is extra-linguistic.
(4) Highlighting the importance of aspect shifting (seeing as). — fdrake

The rule-following as I interpret Wittgenstein isn't extra-linguistic, i.e., he's saying that rule-following is a necessary feature of language. And it's this feature that tells us much about how language develops in a social setting and not privately. Our private uses of words are meaningless, which further illustrates that language is necessarily social, as seen especially from the rule-following ideas Wittgenstein put forth.

There is a component of Wittgenstein that goes into this idea of "seeing as," i.e., the duck rabbit picture, but I'm not sure of the connection between rule-following and that idea. I would need to hear more.

The interaction of (3) and (4) have been influencing my thoughts and philosophical studies for some time. It's difficult for me to articulate without jargon, but the rough idea is that nature is suggestive. (3) highlights that we're always in the world with the stuff at our fingertips and (4) highlights that the world springs out into structures when we have both at our fingertips.* — fdrake

This last paragraph interests me because I think maybe I've recently being having similar thoughts. Maybe we're coming at it from different angles. Part of this, if I'm not mistaken, is related to to the problem of consciousness.

No, I don't think you take such a reductive view of philosophy. What issues do you think are dissolved, or nearly dissolved, by looking at them through your preferred lens? I don't have a view of philosophy of language in general, but I am rather prejudiced against ordinary language philosophy because at its worst it thinks there are no substantive philosophical issues and because it espouses a kind of 'first philosophy' which is to be done through the analysis of word use. — fdrake

To answer your first question, the issue I've been working on, viz., parts of the epistemological issues get solved. However, solving the issue doesn't mean that people will agree with it, that's another problem. It also doesn't mean that other problems won't arise within that answer. We see this in science all the time.

The problem with ordinary language philosophy is the way people think of it, viz., that how the ordinary man talks, is the talk that we should strive for, but that's a misunderstanding (not that that is your view). The way I think of ordinary language is how a word, for example, is developed over time in ordinary language. It's home, so to speak, and the use of the word/concept in that setting. For example, some philosophers have come up with a sense/meaning of knowledge that doesn't fit within the ordinary use of the word. Thus, they use the word completely out of it's home. It's akin to calling a car a pencil, as if that use explains cars in a way we haven't previously understood; and that understanding the car now as a pencil gives us new insights.

I guess in some sense it is a "first philosophy" as you say, but that would have to be unpacked a bit.

Isn't the emphasis on language pretty much the entire analytical enterprise of the past century? The idea that if we can get clear on language, then many philosophical problems can be adequately addressed, and philosophy can be turned into a respectable pursuit, similar to science. — Marchesk

I agree with this, but I think many people don't understand the "get clear on language" part, what does that mean via Wittgenstein and Austin for example.

Maybe my emphasis on Wittgenstein is overblown. If you think that, then explain why, but don't do it if you don't understand Wittgenstein.

Implicit is some ground to build up from. Imo, there's definition and consistency and performative utility. Anything else - well - what else is there? If thoughts, what are they? If language, what is that? If meaning, what is...? If the world, ...? It would seem as if the entire endeavor is like climbing a smooth rock face with pitons. You drill and drive them in, in such they'll hold your weight, and there you are.

If you're going to have more, what is that the "more" is made of? — tim wood

I like this Tim, maybe you can explain further.

I think we're getting bogged down into arguing over the same issues, and that's not what I was looking for. I guess I'm looking for more thought provoking issues that arise out of the traditional language problems. For example, what place if any does Wittgenstein's idea that not understanding the logic of language cause problems. Maybe some of you don't think much of the problem, and that's fine, but why?

No. I think failing to adequately reflect on its meaning (the reality it indicates, which I take to be a measure of change), is the source of problems involving time. Once you have a clear meaning, applying it consistently resolves any confusion. Then all that is left is different beliefs about the facts. — Dfpolis

I agree with much of what you're saying, but they're are many definitions (I would say uses) of the word time, that cause confusion. And the way I define it is similar to your definition, it's simply a measurement of change. However, sometimes we look at time like it's a stream, i.e., something we can get in and out of, and it's these kinds of time that can cause confusion.

The idea that any of this could have been resolved through supplying an appropriate definition, or impeded forever by supplying inappropriate definitions, is really far off the mark. It was mostly worked through by people hashing it out, and was enabled by the civil rights movements for people of colour and women. Political problems don't arise or go away through the analysis of language, they arise and go away through targeted change of social systems and behavioural change on a large scale. The analysis of these problems and the activity of addressing them concerns real social systems, not words. — fdrake

These kinds of problems sometimes get solved in other ways besides the ones that I might suggest.

I hope that you don't think that I would suggest that a definition correctly understood would somehow solve the problems that Wittgenstein is referring to. I would suggest that some philosophical problems do go away once one understand some of Wittgenstein's points. And even in the example above one could apply Wittgensteinian methods to help clarify concepts.

Question: is the philosophy of language the philosophy of languages? It seems to me that movement from one to another language changes meaning and message. Is it commonality underlying language, or that that is distinctive to a language that you're looking for. (I wouldn't be asking if you had defined your topic above. — tim wood

I've written heavily on this subject in many of threads (e.g. A Wittgenstein Commentary), but yes, I can see how someone might not understand what in particular I'm talking about.

Wittgenstein was looking at the problems between thought or language, and the world. Questions like: "What is the function of language? What is the structure of language? How is language related to the world? How is it that we can say anything about the world and mean something? What is meaning? These are some of the questions, and there are many more related questions. But not just these questions, but how not understanding how language works causes philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a broad sense to cover all philosophical thought - which is wide and diverse) confusion.

I understand, but surely you're not so hubristic to think that your version of 'significant thought' is going to be universally understood? That's why I was wondering if you were hinting at something more objective (like academic qualifications), but that's cleared the question up, thanks. — Pseudonym

I was very hesitant to put down very specific qualifications because I didn't want push people away from the discussion.

Talking about that goes even further away from poor Sam26's thread topic. Which, I imagine, is supposed to be a series of vaguely Wittgenstein influenced confessions of how the analysis of language has changed how we think about philosophical issues. Emphasis on the specifics, like 'How reading Wittgenstein made me an anti-theist' or 'How reading Austin turned me off Chomsky's approach to language'. — fdrake

Yes, this is definitely what I'm looking for, but I'm also interested in how you think about philosophy of language, viz., its shortcomings and its benefits.

It seems to me that the analysis of most problems don't turn on the analysis of language. To be sure, being a careful reader and writer is useful for understanding and contributing. — fdrake

For me, most, if not many of these problems are about the concepts used. However, that's not to say that there aren't problems that are not part of what we normally think of as language problems. Let's take for example, the concept time, it seems to me that many of the philosophical problems, and even possibly scientific problems, arise because of the misunderstanding the many uses of the word, and the confusions that arise as a result.

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion?

Just hoping I haven’t joined in without proper qualification. Presuming you yourself intend to take part in this 'higher level of discourse' perhaps you could let us know what level of qualification you are so that we know the target we're aiming for? — Pseudonym

I'm looking for people who have given significant thought to the issues, but I don't want to keep people out of the discussion. I say this to give some guidelines for what I'm looking for. There is something to be said for studying these ideas at length and coming to a conclusion, but sometimes even then one wonders about the quality of the thoughts or conclusions.

Ya, it would be interesting to divide the problems up into various kinds.

Sure, but I'm skeptical that analyzing language is some sort of cure for philosophical problems in general. — Marchesk

You won't get much disagreement from me on this, but I do believe many problems are clarified or dissolved, many more than people realize. The question is, which or what philosophical problems are we talking about.

If you don't understand this point, then you don't understand the difference between a claim to knowledge, and having knowledge. One's claim is not equivalent to, or amount to knowledge. So l don't follow your reaction.

"Not my idea... Actually against the position I've been arguing for..."

Then I don't know what you're talking about, and I don't think anyone else does.

I do not agree with Sam regarding what counts as justified belief. It does not require being argued for(the act of justification) on my view. — creativesoul

As I've explained before, this is not quite accurate, i.e., that I believe that justified belief is what's argued for. What I disagree with Creative about has to do with justification being a pre-linguistic concept. Justification can happen in several ways (linguistic ways), argument, inference, and proof is just one of those ways. Justification is used in other ways, viz., through sensory experience, linguistic training, testimony, and it can be tautological. So to say that I think JTB only happens through argumentation is a misrepresentation of my epistemology. When I use the word argument, I'm speaking in terms of logical argumentation. However, for me justification goes beyond logic. That is to say, logic is only one way of justifying a belief.

As I understand Creative he wants to say that knowledge is something that can occur apart from language, i.e., that prelinguistic beliefs can be justified. It happens in our metacognition according to Creative. However, this makes no sense to me. It's akin to saying we can have a private language, which is nonsense, at least from my perspective. Epistemology is a linguistic endeavor, not a private endeavor. To see this one need only look at the role doubt and skepticism play within our epistemological constructs. It happens necessarily in a social environment.

I don't disagree that there is a metacognitive reality, I just disagree about what's going on in that private world. Creative wants to bring in things that only happen within a linguistic and social context. Specifically he wants to bring in the idea that rule-following, which is necessarily linguistic, and necessarily part of epistemology, can happen privately. This follows from what he says because of his idea that justification can happen to prelinguistic humans.

Knowledge 'ought to' be true, but often it is not, because of the mistakes we make in our understanding of the facts. — Cheshire

You're conflating one's statement that something is true, or is a piece of knowledge, with the definition of knowledge. When someone states that he or she knows that something is the case, as in JTB, someone else may come along and ask, "How do you know?" - and it's at this point that you demonstrate your knowledge. If it turns out that you cannot demonstrate, i.e., justify your claim, then it's not knowledge. This is why justification is important, because people sometimes think they're claims are knowledge, but when examined closely we see that they're not.

So the idea that people make mistakes as you say, is built into the idea of what it means to have knowledge. Doubting or being skeptical is built into the language of epistemology. If it weren't, then we could infer that someone has knowledge simply by their claim to knowledge. So when someone claims to know that such and such is the case, we want to know how they justify their claim, because people often do make factual mistakes.

So epistemology does in fact account for error. The definition is quite different though, viz., it says that a belief that someone claims is true, in order for it to be knowledge it must be properly justified. There is no error in the concept, only in people's claims. Again, the two are quite different.

A thing that is knowledge can exist as the content of a book. The book does not have to believe it or justify it, only contain it. So, knowledge may exist without being believed or justified. — Cheshire

Knowledge is made up of beliefs, they are particular kinds of beliefs, viz., beliefs that are true and justified. A book may contain beliefs that fit this definition, so in that sense a book may contain knowledge, but only in so far as the book represents the beliefs of someone.

Knowledge is a success word, it accomplishes a purpose, that of being true. Knowledge is not a matter of simply saying something is true, it requires that the belief be correct.

Epistemological statements occur with in a rule-governed activity, viz., language.

Here's an interesting NDEs...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rK73CZKfWFE

What I see is pretentiousness, as in three generally vague statements devoid of context, presented in an art show pretending to have significance. It's what happens when mediocre minds have nothing to say. They say nothing and stand around and pretend like they said something. — Hanover

I agree with Hanover. You can make these kinds of statements mean whatever you want without context. Apart from a context, they are just words. So what happens is that people give these words their own context, i.e., a subjective meaning based on their private context. We do this with art, and that's fine, but trying to make something significant out it as though there is some deep meaning to it, is silly.

Yes, they can exist in two forms, as propositions/statements, or as something prelinguistic. When they are prelinguistic the beliefs manifest themselves in our actions, i.e., our actions show that we believe we have two hands.

Obviously you have have propositions apart from beliefs, i.e., as a statement standing alone, which is why I said that it's a belief if I assert it as something I believe. You can think of a proposition as an object of belief, and it has the property of either being true or false. It may or may not be justified, i.e., it may be like an opinion, I just believe it. However, if it's a belief for which you have good reasons or good evidence to believe, then it's justified. My own view is that if it's justified, then it's more than a mere belief, it's a piece of knowledge. I can then say that I know that it's true, or at the very least you may just say there is evidence to support it. There are varying degrees of support for some beliefs, it may be strong or it may be weak support, as in an inductive argument.

We make the content of a proposition a belief if it's something someone believes, something someone asserts as true or false. One has to act on the proposition for it to become a belief. If I read a statement that asserts that X is either true or false, I have to to do something in relation to the statement for it to become a belief for me. So I may assert that it's true, or I may assert that it's false, then it's my belief.

I repeated myself for emphasis. Beliefs are an interesting topic. There are other kinds of beliefs that are pre-linguistic.

I neither believe nor disbelieve this as the evidence and arguments presented so far are equally good on both sides. Pyhrro and Sextus made this into a philosophy to live by where all belief was allegedly suspended — Marchesk

Maybe I could word this a bit better. All propositional claims that something is or is not the case, i.e., that someone asserts as either being true or false, are beliefs. One can assert a statement without believing it however, but that just means that it's not a belief that you subscribe to, but that someone else subscribes to. You may even, as you pointed out, suspend your belief, but then it's just not your belief.

I think we do suspend belief in everyday matters. I may come to a fork in the road not knowing which way to turn; and as I listen to two of my friends give equally good arguments for turning left or right, I may just say, "I don't know, which is correct," thus I suspend my belief. Either assertion is not something you believe. They are propositions, it's just that you don't subscribe to either.

Some of these questions seem like homework questions. Just wondering.

By the way, I'm not judging either way whether or not Witt himself held that hinge propositions were beliefs. It seems that he would have. I'm bit baffled why you would think that I've suggested otherwise. I merely pointed out that I cannot remember any of his notes including "hinge beliefs"... — creativesoul

I guess the problem happened when you said the following: "It is also my understanding that Witt never found what he was looking for(a single hinge proposition). He called them "hinge propositions"... not hinge beliefs." In this quote you seem to suggest here that hinge-propositions are not equivalent to hinge-beliefs. All of Moore's propositions are by definition beliefs. If you were simply saying that he never used the phrase "hinge-belief," then I agree. It just seemed strange that you would say that if you weren't pointing out some difference between the two. For the most part they're equivalent.

Also, something that I forgot to say in reference to your statement above. You said that it was your understanding that Wittgenstein never found what he was looking for, viz., "a single hinge-proposition." His point was that all of Moore's propositions were hinge-propositions, which was why he thought there was something strange about using the word know in reference to his hands in response to the skeptic.

Where at in OC does he clearly call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions"? — creativesoul

If you want a specific passage, there is none, but the implication is so clear that virtually no one that I've read thinks otherwise. His whole effort in On Certainty has to do with the special nature of these propositions/beleifs.

What I clearly remember is his description of bedrock beliefs, and talk of the spade turning up. This fed into his expression of not being able to get beneath language. If hinge propositions are bedrock, and the spade turns up here, then given that propositions are existentially dependent upon language, it would seem that we cannot get beneath propositions(language). He then goes on to further bolster this notion by pointing out how all examples are linguistic/propositional. — creativesoul

Yes, but bedrock beliefs is just another way of talking about hinge-propositions, another way of describing their special nature. He also implies they're pre-linguistic as I pointed out in a previous post. I don't find your interpretation of Wittgenstein to be accurate on these and other points. I've already stated, it's not just that you're coming up with an interpretation that goes against my interpretation, but you seem to be going against much of what's said about OC. It doesn't necessarily make you wrong (although I do think you are), but it should make you suspicious of your own conclusions.

I don't know why you're emphasizing JTB in reference to OC, because it's not the main thrust, at most it's a very small side issue.

he could not conceive that simple, rudimentary beliefs are not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

This is another of your points that doesn't follow from the text. I already partially pointed this out earlier, but there is much that contradicts this idea. The mere fact that beliefs are shown, as Wittgenstein points out over and over, demonstrates that these (hinge-propositions) beliefs are pre-linguistic and not dependent upon language.

I've asked at least twice where you came up with these ideas, but you don't seem to want to answer the question. The reason I ask, is that I was wondering if someone besides yourself wrote about these ideas.

In many ways, religion is everything philosophy could hope to be. — Posty McPostface

I think there is an important misunderstanding going on here. Religion is a kind of philosophy (a religious world view), any kind of world view, be it religion or otherwise, has at it's core a kind of philosophical thinking. There are many things wrong with this kind of religious world view, just as there are many things wrong with many non-religious world views. There are philosophical world views that put forth the contention that and truth is a matter of subjective beliefs. I find this just as appalling.

The point is that one can find philosophical confusion no matter where you look. The biggest problem is in epistemology. Religion and many other world views are confused about what it means to have knowledge, i.e., how is truth acquired and defended. Most of the arguments are about how we justify our beliefs. Many Christians believe that the Bible is their primary source of truth when it comes to spiritual matters, and again, this is partly an epistemological problem. This problem spans every world view, so it's not limited to religious belief.

Finally, religion for the most part, is an example of a philosophy that's poorly done.

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Now we might very well take issue with those positions, but it does show how you can go about disputing the empirical, and thus the hinge propositions. — Marchesk

There are many different skeptical arguments that find their way into the thinking of people, some are justified, some are not. I don't think many of these arguments have much force.

In everyday life, they dissolve our skeptical worries, but that wouldn't sway someone like Parmenides. You would have to attack his argument directly, instead of pointing out that he's writing his poem with one of his hands. — Marchesk

Ya, it wouldn't do much good to tell him he can't doubt the proposition because it's an undoubtable empirical proposition that he has hands. His argument can be attacked very easily, but I'm not going to deal with his argument directly. I've already dealt with it indirectly.

The one question that is important to ask, is if it makes sense to doubt propositions like "I have hands," or other propositions that have already been mentioned. Doubting these kinds of propositions makes no sense, i.e., there aren't good reasons to doubt. I'm not saying that there aren't good reasons to express doubts in some contexts, obviously there are, but in Moore's contexts there aren't.

Although I think we agree on some things. In terms of Wittgenstein and what he's saying, we are very far apart, especially on the idea of what hinge-propositions are, and their relationship to epistemology.

I did much on my thinking about OC on my own, and what I find interesting is how well it matches up with many of those who have studied Wittgenstein. Obviously there are other interpretations of Wittgenstein's thinking, but I think much of my interpretation fits rather well with what's being taught, and with what some of his former students have written.

The problem with what you're claiming is that it doesn't fit with the common ideas gleaned from his writings. For example, that "...all other thought and belief are grounded on hinge-propositions," he certainly didn't say that. It's true that hinge-propositions ground epistemological beliefs, but some hinge-propositions (beliefs) are bedrock, they have no ground except as our inherited background. In that sense they are the ground. And this notion that hinge-propositions aren't beliefs is about as far away from what Wittgenstein is saying as you can get. Moore's propositions are expressed beliefs, i.e., Moore makes the claim that he knows he has hands, and if this is not an expressed belief, then what is? Wittgenstein goes on to demonstrate that Moore's propositions/beliefs are hinge-propositions. It seems odd to me that you would suggest otherwise.

Where did you get this interpretation? Is it something you came up with on your own, or did you get it from what others have written, or both? It's a very different take, and of course there's nothing wrong with thinking outside the box. I did some of that myself.

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