None of this will be settled here. I read some of the comments, and some of you haven't understood what I've said, and the confusions still stand. I don't want this thread to be solely about epistemology, although it's important to my claims about consciousness.

Some of what I said isn't clear enough, so I'll have to re-write some of it.

I spent a lot of time writing that long post to answer these questions, and you're making me re-write what I already wrote.

I'm talking about the act of communicating with concepts using language. The creation of language is mind-dependent, but the actions as we use language with one another is mind-independent, it's part of the reality of language use. For example, you can watch someone play chess and know objectively that they are familiar with the rules. You can see them move the pieces and plan their moves. Part of the objective nature of language is how people use the concepts, are they using the concepts according to the rules of language.

Hi, I think your approach to the idea of life after death is decent. However, I was wondering, if you avoid the religious/spiritual point of view, what will you say about consciousness that makes it something that should survive after death. In other words, why should it?
Secondly, how is consciousness in relation to our human lives, that is, does it have the capacity to act beyond our physical domain while we're still alive or does it have to wait until the body dies? — BrianW

Good question. One of the reasons to conclude that consciousness survives death is that one of the common elements of NDEs is that people see their deceased mother and father, and deceased friends. So the continuity of our consciousness seems to remain intact after we die, and there are other reasons too, but this is one of the common reasons.

Your second question is more difficult to answer. My opinion, based on some evidence, is that we do have contact with the other side, and the other side is familiar with what's going on here. I also think that we are much higher beings than we are in this human form. This reality is a dumbed down version of reality, almost like an illusion of the mind, and there is good evidence for this.

I addressed this in my long post. The facts of logic are instantiated in language use. Language has a reality of its own, and we can observe this reality as we observe how language is used amongst people.

Ya, I turned into Michael on that last post.

Nope, not confusing anything. Whether the Earth has one moon is an objective fact. Whether x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact. And no knowledge is objective. (Propositional) Knowledge is justifed true belief. Well, least controversial there is that beliefs are mind-dependent. Beliefs do not obtain mind-independently. — Terrapin Station

You agree that the Earth having one moon is an objective fact. Okay, we agree on this. However, you also say in your next statement that "[w]hether x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." I would say it depends on what you mean. I'm assuming you mean that in logic when using a deductive or an inductive arguments, the method used in logic to justify an argument is not objective fact. In other words modus ponens is not an objective fact of logic.

I still think that part of the problem is in our views of subjective and objective. I would say that something that is subjective is mind dependent, so I like orange juice is dependent on what I feel or think about oranges. So the fact is dependent on me in a significant way, the fact would cease to be a fact if later in life my tastes changed. This is not only an example of a subjective fact, but also contingent fact. Of course all subjective facts are contingent. One could also say that it is a contingent truth, since the truth of the statement depends on me. It must also be pointed out that statements are said to be true or false, that is, epistemology (knowledge as justified true belief) is something that occurs in language (language-games). Facts, whether subjective or objective either obtain in reality or not. We use statements to reflect facts, so if I say, "Sam likes oranges," then I'm saying that it is true of that statement, that it reflects a particular fact, viz., that I like oranges. So there is a correspondence between this particular statement and the fact in reality (whether subjective or objective). The statement mirrors, reflects, or corresponds with reality. Note also, that the fact associated with the statement, "I like oranges," is also an abstract fact, or an abstract truth, it does not reflect a physical object like the statement, "The Earth has one moon."

Objective facts are mind-independent, that is, the fact is not dependent on me, but is separate from how I think about it. No matter how I feel or think about the fact that the Earth has one moon, the fact will still be a fact even if I cease to exist, and even if there are no minds to apprehend the fact. This is quite different from a subjective fact, which is dependent on me. If I cease to exist there would be no present case of Sam liking oranges. It would only be a fact of the past. The statement that the Earth has one moon is a statement that reflects an objective truth. Again, though, when talking about truth, we are talking about statements. When talking about facts we are talking about things, whether physical or abstract, that exist in reality, apart from how we talk about them. There is much more that can be said about abstract ideas and minds in relation to reality, but I will refrain for now.

There are facts about language too, so facts can reference things in or about language, and this is also part of reality. However, it is also true that language is mind-dependent, so how can there be objective facts of language? Is not part of the definition of subjective, mind-dependent? Yes. However, not everything that is mind-dependent is subjective. There are things that minds do that reflect facts in the world. Thus, minds create language, and as such language is an objective fact of the world.

There is something interesting here that makes me think of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein points out a problem with trying to create a private language, and the problem is associated with rule-following. Rule-following is not something I learn in isolation, that is, I learn to follow rules in a linguistic culture, so it necessarily has a social component. Note that we can objectively observe whether someone is following a rule, based on the rules of a particular language-game. Thus, correct language usage is an objective part of the reality of our lives. This is true even though minds are a necessary component of language.

Now let us consider the statement, "...x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." Logic is a language, and logic is based on the rules that define how we justify arguments. The rules that define how this is done is not based on any one person's idea of how or what it means to justify an argument (it is not subjectively defined). The rules of logic are objective, that is, mind-independent in that they are part of the reality of language use. We can objectively observe whether or not you are following the rules of logic.

There are two aspects of mind-dependence that we have to be clear about. It is true that language is mind-dependent, but this does not take away from the fact that language, although created by minds, has an objective reality that is independent of any one mind. The creation of cars is dependent on minds, but once the car is created, it is an objective fact of reality, and the fact is independent of a mind/s. There is a lot more to this idea, and it is not simple to understand. Unfortunately I will not be able to work out all the details of this in a few short paragraphs.

My point though, is that it is an objective fact of logic, that arguments are justified in particular ways. Thus, I would dispute the idea that "...x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." And while it is true that propositions reflect truth, it is also true that the way propositions are used, can reflect objective facts about their use in language.

I cannot believe that you think there is no knowledge that is objective knowledge. This is a misunderstanding of knowledge, and the meaning of knowledge. There are tons of examples of objective knowledge. I do not feel I have to even defend this, because it is so obviously false, for more reasons than I can count.

Of course beliefs are mind-dependent, but so what, that does not mean that beliefs cannot reflect or mirror objective reality. Stated beliefs do occur independently of minds, they occur in language, which although created by minds, has an objective component as part of the reality of language. There are beliefs that are nonlinguistic, but this is outside our epistemological language-games.

Where in the world did you get this epistemology from? It would takes months of writing to unravel so many confusions. It did make me think of some new ideas though.

You certainly don't think that anyone equally has every opinion of the tastiness of anchovies simply because it's only a matter of personal taste. (As if you'd think that anyone simultaneously thinks all of "They're yummy," " They're awful," "They're my favorite food," "They make me nauseous," etc. --you'd have to have no conception of what opinions even are to think that something being an opinion would suggest that anyone considers all opinions to equally apply.) — Terrapin Station

You seem to be confusing the concept of subjective and objective. It's true that my personal tastes about anchovies is subjective, and it's based on a subjective opinion. My personal tastes are mind-dependent. So if I say I like anchovies based on my subjective opinion, that in itself doesn't hold much weight in terms of other subjective opinions on anchovies. However, I'm not talking about subjective feelings, which don't amount to a hill of beans in terms of having objective knowledge or asserting an objective truth. My feelings about the Earth having one moon has nothing to do with the objective knowledge or truth about the Earth having one moon. It's an objective fact that the Earth has one moon, and your feelings about that fact, have nothing to do with whether the fact obtains.

That said, what I was asserting in my previous posts, is that correct reasoning is not based on your feelings either, it's not like giving you my feelings about anchovies. Take a test in calculus based on your subjective feelings or opinions and see how far that gets you. There are objective rules and principles that guide correct reasoning (logic), so it's not a matter of subjective opinion like you're claiming. This is also true of mathematics, we're not talking about subjective feelings when it comes to doing the problem correctly. You either follow the rules, or you get it wrong.

I don't know how much you've been following my writings on epistemology, but I'm not new to this subject. I've been studying the subject for many years, and I've given a lot of thought to it. That in itself doesn't make me right, but it does lend weight to what I'm saying. I'm not just pulling these thoughts out of midair.

First, were not talking about something true or false. We're giving opinions about what sorts of epistemic grounds justify actions, beliefs, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is the difference between what you're saying and what I'm saying, viz., I'm not giving opinions, you are. Opinions in my book aren't worth much. How to correctly reason to a conclusion is not a matter of opinion. Besides if you're just presenting an opinion, why are you so adamant that you are correct. One opinion, as far as I can determine, is as good as another.

Physical evidence is necessary. — Terrapin Station

This is obviously not true, and can be demonstrated with even a cursory examination of the subject of testimonial evidence. I don't need physical evidence, although it helps, to make a reasonable conclusion, we do it all the time. Not only do we do it all the time, but it's central to how we form many justified beliefs. For example, if I have ten people who make the claim that you shot someone at 10th and Main street in Pittsburgh, PA at 2 pm on Monday October 3, 2018, then after a careful examination of the testimony (as presented in my argument on page 14), I can reasonably conclude that you in fact shot someone. Obviously there are things that can strengthen the argument, that's the nature of these kinds of inductive arguments.

On the other hand, if I had one person making the claim, and that person's memory was incomplete, or it couldn't be corroborated, or there was no other evidence, then you would be correct. However, in the cases I'm citing there is a ton of testimonial evidence. It is corroborated, and it can be objectively verified in many of the cases.

If we couldn't generally trust the testimony of people, much of what we know would be invalidated. In fact, much of what we know is based on the testimony of others. There is a huge amount of information about science, history, philosophy, etc., passed to us through testimony. It would be irrational to doubt most of it. Why? Because our very understanding of each other, the world around us, our society and culture is based on the concepts and words we learn from others. Without such testimony we would be lost and reduced to silence, period, end of story. What we learn from our culture and from others relies on the truthfulness of most of what is conveyed to us.

We shouldn't just go by testimony in cases where anything important is at stake. — Terrapin Station

Of course, and if you read my argument carefully, you would know that I deal with this question. I deal with it by pointing our what makes testimonial evidence strong, as opposed to weak.

This is the unedited preface to my book.

Preface

The goal of this book is to look at near death experiences (NDEs) in terms of the testimonial evidence. Some of the questions are, starting with the primary question of this book: Does consciousness survive the death of the body? Do NDEs give us enough testimonial evidence to warrant belief in an afterlife? Will we see our loved one’s again? Should we be afraid of death? These are some of the questions that mankind has grappled with for thousands of years; and although the conclusion of the main argument is about whether consciousness survives death, there are many other implications and conclusions that can be inferred from the evidence.

We will not only examine the testimonial evidence, but we will examine it as a measure of what we can claim to know about surviving death. Can we say with confidence that there is enough evidence to make the claim that, “I know my existence extends beyond the scope of my physical body.” So, part of the thrust of this book is an epistemological journey, namely, one of knowledge. This is what will separate this book from others that have been written on the subject of NDEs, namely, what can we know?

The subject of what we can claim to know, especially in terms of testimonial evidence, is highly controversial. Especially since testimonial evidence is seen by many in the scientific community as not reliable enough to establish the conclusion we are seeking. In fact, according to some, testimonial evidence is generally not seen as a reliable source for grounding many of our beliefs. While this is true in many instances, we will try to disabuse you of the notion that testimonial evidence is always weak. In fact, testimonial evidence can be very strong under the right conditions.

The analysis of the testimony will not be from a religious perspective, which is to say, that we will not look at the evidence in terms of any religious point of view or doctrine.

The book will be divided into three parts. Part 1 is a common-sense view of NDEs, which will present the facts and arguments in a relatively easy to understand format. Part 2 will be about what we can speculate about, that is, a portion of the speculations will have some evidentiary support, while other speculations will have little to no evidentiary support. This will be the fun part of the book. Sometimes it is fun just to speculate what might or might not be the case based on little to no evidence.

For those of you who want a more in-depth analysis of some of the subject matter, there will be a third section added at the end of the book. This third section will defend, for example, the epistemological view taken in the first chapter.

Finally, after looking at the evidence we will make a bold claim about what we can know, if anything, about surviving death. So, part of the goal of the first section of this book is to establish knowledge, not to express an opinion, nor to express an article of faith. We want to know! Can we?

I'm currently writing a book on this subject. I've started the first chapter, and I have an editor lined up. My book is going to be a bit different from many of the books on NDEs, because I am concentrating on what I believe is a mountain of testimonial evidence in support of the claim that consciousness survives bodily death.

I will be posting only the first chapter in this thread, starting with the preface. The members of The Philosophy Forum will get the first look at the book. What I start posting in here will be the unedited pages. Once I have the edited pages, I will repost the chapter. I have been wanting to do this book for years, but keep putting it off, and I am not getting any younger, so I better get going.

Posting in this thread has helped me make the argument stronger, so I appreciate those of you who have given good arguments against my argument (as stated on the 1st and 14th page). Also, since I am in the middle of writing the book, any suggestions to make it better would be appreciated. I want to thank @fdrake for his comments, because some of the issues he raised has helped me to think about the testimonial evidence in other ways.

Thanks,
Sam

P.S. I am still trying to decide on a title. One possible title is...

Does Consciousness Survive Death?
A Philosopher's Look at the Evidence

Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein? — bloodninja

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy by K. T. Fann - you can get it used for a few dollars.

The objectivity in the example you gave that you mentioned above seemed to be that the pain was undeniable and it was caused without reason, thus it must be immoral. You are assuming I suppose that this is a necessary fact about the world we live in? Is it that we call actions that promote life “moral” and things that promote death we call “immoral”? — tenderfoot

Yes, the pain is undeniable, i.e., we can be as objectively certain about the pain, and the other components of the act (the arm on the ground, the blood, the pain of observers, etc). And of course the other important component is that the act was committed without good reason.

I don't want to word it the way to you did, viz., "...actions that promote life "moral" and things that promote death we call "immoral"?" For purposes of my argument, all I want to say is that all immoral acts have the property of causing harm, and for most of these kinds of actions we're able to discern the harm, and thus make the claim that it's immoral. Again, though, it must be pointed out for others reading this, that not all harm is immoral, but all immoral acts do cause harm.

is it possible for this biological basis to be independent of evolution? Looking at the tenacity of life and how throughout history there is a drive in human beings to survive and create good lives, it makes sense that these life-promoting values be things we know a priori due to the “background reality of our biology.” If the inclination to follow that objective moral truth is innate in human beings, is it distinct from an evolutionary mechanism optimizing survival and reproduction? The question becomes: are actions moral on account of evolutionary advantage or are they moral in themselves and also coincidentally evolutionarily advantageous? The core of my questions here is whether these morals are based on an independent truth value or the product of random variation and natural selection (I sure hope not — tenderfoot

When I talk about biology in reference to this argument, I'm simply pointing out that it's a fact of our biology that we experience pain; and this fact is part of what contributes to our experiences of pain, and how we talk about pain (pain behavior). Moreover, it's not something derived from my personal experience of pain, although there is that component, but our concepts are developed as we interact with others in social settings. So, we use the concepts of immoral, pain, objective, subjective, reason, etc., as we interact with others, so we learn to use these concepts in relation to others. They aren't dependent on metaphysical constructs. That doesn't mean there isn't a metaphysical reality, only that the way we talk about things, including immoral things, and what we mean by these concepts, is not dependent in a way that forces us to appeal to the metaphysical.

Let's use this analogy, let's say that I learned logic from professor X, but I don't need to appeal to professor X every time I make a claim about a deductive argument. So, if I say a deductive argument must be valid, I don't need to also add, because professor X said so, but I make the claim because those are the facts of deductive arguments. This analogy isn't perfect, but it illustrates an important point.

One could claim, if you believe in God, that God has access to the same facts about what makes something immoral, and therefore gives a set of commandments based on the same reasoning about harm.

I think there is something much deeper here than evolutionary mechanisms. I see some things as having an intrinsic worth, or intrinsic value, and causing harm without good reason is one such value that serves us well across a wide swath of our lives.

To answer your last question would take a lot of time, but since I've been writing about epistemology in another thread, let me refer you to the last few posts in the following:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1314/a-wittgenstein-commentary

I disagree with the claim that this would be objective. You already state it yourself; "... for no good reason." Who decides what is a good reason? The perpetrator? The victim? A neutral third? All of these will have very different ideas of what a good reason might be. And why would any of their opinions be more valuable than that of the other? — Tzeentch

This response is also to Tenderfoot.

Let's get back to my example, which by the way, needs no appeal to anything higher in order to determine that it's immoral.

If I walk up to any person and cut their arm off without good reason, then I've have committed an immoral act by definition. Moreover, it's not a subjective claim, it's objectively immoral based on the harm done; and I don't have to appeal to anything religious to recognize that it's immoral.

If I understand you correctly, there is nothing about this example that is objectively immoral? The screams of the person in pain, the arm on the ground, the blood, the anguish of friends and family, none of this is objectively true? This, it seems, is a paragon case of immorality. One doesn't need to appeal to anything beyond the case itself. Are you saying that the concept of immorality doesn't apply in this case, independent of what I happen to think?

If I was teaching someone how to use the concept immoral, and they didn't use it in this case, I would assert that they didn't know how to use the word correctly. In virtually every case of immorality, the harm done is the reason it's referred to as immoral. And in cases where we argue over whether something is or is not immoral, usually it's because we don't see the harm, i.e., it's not clear that harm was done.

The question is, why do I need to appeal to anything beyond the example to defend the idea that this act (my example) is immoral? Are you making the claim that the only way I would know this act is immoral is by appealing to something metaphysical, for example, God?

All I need to appeal to is the harm, nothing further. If I can make a clear case of the harm done, then I can make the claim that it's immoral, as in the example.

Who decides what's reasonable? We do. There are principles of correct reason that are applied, just as there are principles of mathematics that determine the correct and incorrect use of mathematical symbols. Moreover, I would say that these principles are discoverable. They are built into the universe, i.e., they are built into the background of reality. For example, the principle of noncontradiction is not something I can simply deny based on someone's whim. If you deny it, then you deny the very ability to talk about these ideas in a rational manner. You couldn't even posit if there was religious truth without it. How would you argue that your ideas are true verses my ideas or arguments? So it's not a matter of someone deciding what's reasonable, it's about the objective principles. It's about the very idea of reasoning from one proposition to another.

However, I think the question still remains: where does this notion of morality come from? When you say, “it’s objectively immoral based on the harm alone,” do you mean that there is some independent moral truth that exists which humans have the ability to perceive, connecting the pain to “wrongness”? Or, do you mean that the widely accepted idea that senseless suffering is wrong is a sufficient basis for the term “objectively immoral” because of its popularity? — tenderfoot

There is an error in the quote, it should read, "...it's objectively immoral based on the harm done," that's what I meant to say. However, your questions stand.

I think there is an objective moral principle that we generally follow as people, viz., that we shouldn't inflict undo pain on others for no good reason. I believe this is an objective moral truth that most civilized people adhere to. I don't think popularity has anything to do with it. It may be true that most people believe it, but it's not a matter of popularity. Even if a majority of people rejected it, that still would not make it right.

There is an objectivity to the facts involved (in the e.g. I gave above) that make it stand apart from what I happen to think, i.e., it's not dependent on what anyone thinks. It has to do with what makes for a good life for humans, inflicting pain on others without good reason is not something anyone in their right mind would desire. In fact, we tend to generally avoid pain, even if the pain may have a good outcome, like having an infected tooth pulled. I believe what I'm saying is not only objectively true, but I'm saying that most people recognize it as true, it's self-evident for most people.

Another final point that I already alluded to, but needs to be emphasized. It also has to do with what we value in our lives, and a life free of senseless pain seems to be a something that almost all people value; and this arises out of the kind of biological beings we are (and I'm not thinking necessarily in terms of evolution), i.e., it's the background reality of our biology, what we value, what we feel, how we reason, etc.

Hope this helps.

As I see it, faith proper is almost entirely a matter of affect. It consists in feelings: of reverence, of awe, of love, of aspiration, of a sense of the divine, the sublime. Whatever is said as an expression of faith should be taken as metaphor, as allegory.

The existence or non-existence of God cannot be known; first you would need to understand what it could mean to say that God exists. — Janus

Okay, so faith consists of feelings of reverence, of awe, of love, of aspiration, etc. Faith as I see it, involves trust, if I have faith in someone or something, I'm trusting someone or something.

However, let's use reverence as an example, reverence is respect for someone or something, usually when Christians use the term reverence they are talking or referring to someone, viz., God. If they talk about love, it's love for someone, so it's more than a feeling, although it's that too. Even very liberal churches, at least many of them, have tenets of faith, beliefs that they put their faith in. Your idea seems very subjective, viz., faith is whatever I want it to be, a kind of mysticism or metaphor. My argument is with those who put their faith in specific beliefs.

Your way of thinking about it would need to be tackled in a different way. Moreover, the two main religions don't think of it the way you're thinking of faith, at least generally.

The purported truth, in any propositional sense, of what one has faith in is irrelevant, not even coherent, I would say. Faith is not properly held in propositional terms at all; if it is, it is mere irrational belief, some form of fundamentalism. — Janus

I don't follow your thinking. If we're talking about the existence of God, and having faith in a God, what are we talking about if not whether such a being exists, whether it's true or not. If it's not propositional, then what is it? How do you express it? There has to be a belief of some sort, we are not talking in a vacuum of beliefs. I don't know of any religious faith that doesn't hold to some kind of propositional faith or belief. Moreover, if someone asked, what is your faith in, what do you believe, how do you do express it without expressing statements or propositions of some sort. I guess you could chant.

think my analogy is exactly the point i am trying to make - what is your basis for thinking our ability to actually comprehend the true nature of God is in anyway at all better than a 2 year old's ability to understand calculus ? Because we think we can ??? — Rank Amateur

First, a two year old has no conception of what calculus is, that is, they don't understand the concept calculus, or the concepts used in calculus, so they may as well be talking gibberish. We are able to understand the concepts we use about God. For example, does God exist, i.e., is there an instance in reality where it might be metaphysically possible for such a being to exist. We don't need a perfect definition, or even a perfect understanding of the concepts to talk reasonably about the subject, we do it all the time in quantum physics. We do it all the time in fiction too. I don't need a perfect definition or a perfect understanding of my friends to know they exist, so why do I need this when speculating about God. I don't think I can talk about God, I know I can, we're doing it right now.

and ants can communicate their understanding of their world to each other. And their perceptions of their world can be perfectly reasonable to their fellow ants who share the same perception of the world. And it can even be useful - they can tell them follow this trail and food will be there. And to any any other ant this world description is 100% true - but it has nothing at all in common with what our human view of the world is. — Rank Amateur

I'm not sure what your point is here. Nothing is reasonable to an ant, reason plays no part in their world or understanding, and neither does truth. I agree that ants have nothing in common with our human world, well almost nothing. They are biological after all, and there are probably other common elements.

But that's what the argument is about, the validity of the statements, are they true or false. It's not nonsense to talk about the existence of such a being, and your analogy of a 2 year old making statements about your calculus book just doesn't hold any water. It's not the same at all.

P1 - we have no basis at all to believe we can make any statement at all about the nature of God.
P2. - any statement that any human makes that assigns any characteristic at all to the nature of God is by definition anthropomorphic and we have no basis at all to know if it is or is not true.

Conclusion - any argument that contains a premise about the nature of God fails, because there is no way at all establish the truth value of the premise. — Rank Amateur

I've heard this argument before, but I think it's wrong, i.e., I think premise one and two are false. We can and do make statements about the nature of God all the time, and the basis for these statements have to do with the concepts we use. Now one might argue that the concept God has no instance in reality, but I think it's incorrect to say that "...we have no basis at all to believe we can make any statement at all about the nature of God."

Premise two states that many of our statements about God are anthropomorphic, but that in itself doesn't make it true or not true, it just means that we have no way to determine if it's true, at least none that I see. After all it's conceivable that there is a God, and that some of the anthropomorphic statements about God are true.

So given these rebuttals the conclusion doesn't follow. Moreover, I would not conclude that there is no way at all to determine if it's true that God exists. All we can say is that given our present knowledge there is no way to determine if there is a God in the religious sense, Christian or otherwise.

I'm an atheist when it comes to a religious God, but agnostic when it comes to whether there is some being that might fit the bill in some sense. I just don't know.

God - a word about which, if it is to be a meaningful word and not a nonsense word - is all about faith. As such, it is not about philosophy, metaphysics. logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics or really anything else. — tim wood

In this quote you say it's all about faith, "...not about philosophy, metaphysics, logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics..." Later you say that if it's brought out of the sphere of faith, then it turns into nonsense. You seem to want to separate the faith from the reason, but faith is about the beliefs, i.e., if it's not about the beliefs, then what is it about? If I have faith that God exists, then I believe God exists. Thus, we want to know what the reasons are for those beliefs. Faith without belief is meaningless.

Faith, as distinct from merely arbitrary belief, or idle entertainment of ideas, has affective power. No one will feel devotion or love for, or be profoundly inspired by, the Spaghetti Monster or Russell's Teapot.

It is not so much that one faith is better than another but that there is real faith and then there is mere belief and then something even less significant than that. — Janus

There is no doubt that faith, which are about beliefs by the way, have power, but that doesn't make them true, and that's what I'm concerned with, not wishful thinking.

Faith without reason is no better than mere belief, that's all it is; and by mere belief, I mean opinion. Now if reason plays a part, as some religious people contend, then we can look at one's faith, one's beliefs, in terms of the evidence or the reasons that support them. Tim seems to want it both ways, at least that's how I read what he's saying.

Finally, people can be inspired by false beliefs, it happens all the time. Beliefs are powerful, and this is true even if the belief is false.

As faith qua faith, none is better, imo - you can believe what you want. But is it that simple? In most faiths there's a component of action. I imagine you would agree with me that some actions are better than others. And there is also the internal logic of any system, which is merely the application of reason - logic - to the system itself without reference to anything outside the system - usual tests being for internal consistency and the presence of contradiction. — tim wood

For me, it's not a matter of believing what I want, I want to have knowledge. What's true is what interests me, not some opinion that may or may not be true.

I do agree that some actions are better than others, and that's based on reason. However, you're going beyond reason, to say that faith is better, but you don't give a reason, you just make a statement, as if the mere statement conveys the truth.

1. If there is a monotheistic God, she is omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2. God can not be both omniscient and omnibenevolent.
3. Therefore, there is no monotheistic God.

For my second premise, I make the argument:
a. Either God had advance knowledge that humans would be sinful (forbidden fruit, world wars, genocides, crocs, etc.) or she did not.
b. If God did not have this knowledge, then she is not omniscient.
c. If God did have this knowledge, and still made humans the way she did, then she is not omnibenevolent.
d. Therefore, God can not be both omniscient and omnibenevolent. — Yajur

Your argument is a good one. What is funny is that people don't seem to understand the argument, based on some of the responses.

Other implications of this argument are as follows: Any being that creates other beings with a free will, knowing that those beings would commit the kind of evils that would send them to hell forever, is an evil being, period. These are not the actions of a benevolent being, by definition. Basically what this says is that the Christian idea of God is either flawed, or that if this being exists, the being is not worthy of worship. In fact, this being should be shunned. I don't believe such a being exists, at least in terms of any religious idea.

God - a word about which, if it is to be a meaningful word and not a nonsense word - is all about faith. As such, it is not about philosophy, metaphysics. logic, reason, science, quantum mechanics or really anything else. These other things, to be sure, as tools can be applied to theology for the benefit of theology. But no application of them brings theology out of its own proper sphere of faith without turning it into nonsense. — tim wood

The idea that God is just about faith is an idea that I think most people understand, but if it's just a belief based on faith, what makes one faith better than another. It's funny because when I ask this question to religious people they start using reason to defend their faith, but the claim is that reason has nothing to do with faith. So which is it, I ask, faith or reason? If it's purely faith, without reason, then I suppose I could have faith in anything I please. One faith is no better than another.

"Being" is our shuttlecock of the moment. If we cannot simply affirm that, what can we affirm? And lacking that affirmation, what else can reason arise from? — tim wood

I edited out that comment about arguments for the existence of God because I didn't want to get into that can or worms right now.

Reason arises out of the language of reason, we reason from one proposition to another, that's what we do in logic. However, as I've already stated, there are beliefs that have nothing to do with the language of reason. These beliefs are shown in our actions, they have nothing to do with the logic of reason. We show these beliefs everyday in our actions. I open a door, I sit in a chair, I pick things up, all of these actions show certain fundamental beliefs. I don't justify them, no more than I need to justify my belief that I'm sitting at my computer typing, again, they are part of the background of our reality. I believe that being or the thing that is fundamental to reality itself, I refer to as consciousness, is such a foundational or fundamental thing.

For me, I am comforted by the chance that there is an afterlife—an opportunity to keep on existing—but for those that believe in physicalism, there would be nothing after death. Isn't it scarier to believe in nothing than something? — Play-doh

There is something comforting in a belief in an afterlife, especially if you believe that you're part of that group. God loves you, God saved you, etc,. this is a comfort for people, and it does drive belief. These are simply psychological causes for belief, not reasons. One shouldn't base a belief on the fear of being damned, one should base a belief on the evidence, or on the reason that support the belief. Nor should one base a belief on the chance that they could be wrong.

Don't you mean exactly in terms of epistemology? It may be that it's difficult to say what being is, but that is no relief from a duty to try to say what it means. I'm willing to take the lazy way and accept it as fundamental - foundational, as you say - but that would be precisely in epistemology. — tim wood

No, I think that there are things that are so foundational that they support all that comes after. Especially when it comes to epistemological constructs, which are based on the language of knowing. For example, "I don't know that I have hands," I just have them, it's a belief that is fundamental to our reality. It's like the pieces and the board of the game of chess, one might say the pieces and the board are foundational to the game. One cannot have the game without the board and the pieces. One cannot have epistemological language-games without there being first something foundational, and I believe that our background reality gives us such a foundation.

The nature of being, as you seem to propose, is that it falls under the construct of epistemology, as, for example, a first principle of knowledge. My thinking is that there is something so fundamental that it defies our epistemological constructs, it's not a matter of knowing, but a matter of what's fundamental, foundational, or bedrock to all that is, including what it means to have knowledge.

First, the ontological argument doesn't work for a variety of reasons. One is that you can't infer the existence of something based on a concept or concepts. If that was true you could infer the existence of all kinds of things. There is no good argument for the existence of God.

Second, granting that there is a religious God, it's possible that abstract objects like number are just part of the mind of God, as Devans suggested. They along with a myriad of other abstract ideas, objects, and properties could just be part of what God knows. In other words, they would not be within the realm of the creatables. Think of it this way, if God is omniscient, or even if there is a being that possessed omniscience, that would mean that that being knows all that can be known (simple definition), as such it would know, presumably, the number system. However, if numbers are creatable things, then what you're saying is that an omniscient being, prior to the existence of the number 2, didn't know there was such a number. It doesn't make sense.

The other problem that Devans alluded to is that religious people, at least some, think that if numbers and other abstract ideas don't fall under God's power, then somehow this takes away from God's omnipotence. However, that's just a problem of understanding what omnipotence entails or means.

So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist. — Sir2u

Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is not pictures of the objects. In fact, it's not even clear what an object is. It is though, a picture of a fact, which is composed of atomic facts, and atomic facts are composed of objects.

A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a picture. So, if we say the Earth has one moon, that proposition is a picture of the relationship between the Earth and the Moon. The words of a proposition stand in a certain relationship, just as a fact in reality mirrors a certain relationship. It mirrors reality, and many propositions are like this. However, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he demonstrates that propositions do more than picture facts.

If a picture is a picture of a fact, then the fact has to exist first, i.e., if it is true. If the proposition is false, then it's a negative fact, i.e., one that has not obtained (it reflects a possible picture of reality), but one that is possible nonetheless. But strictly speaking pictures are only possible given certain facts. For example, if there were no people, then there would be no propositions, and without propositions there would be no pictures of facts. So pictures of facts (positive or negative facts) are dependent on the propositions and the people who express them. In this sense pictures are secondary and dependent or contingent.

You seem to be worried about the metaphysical implications of what Wittgenstein is saying. As if the picture implies some intelligence in back of reality, but you're stretching his ideas way beyond what they mean. Wittgenstein does believe in the mystical, but not in terms of propositions. Propositions for Wittgenstein are confined to the world, not the mystical, which is beyond the world. The mystical can only be shown, not expressed in terms of propositions. How is the mystical shown? One can show the mystical by certain actions (prayer, meditation, chants, etc).

I struggle with making friends. Almost all my intellectualizations are safely put in through this forum and I'm a really intellectual person. — Posty McPostface

One of the best things in life are friends, so I would put that top on your list of things to do, i.e., making friends. I've always had two or three really good friends, but it's never been easy for me to make friends either. Hopefully you'll find a friend of like mind. Good luck Posty.

So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from? — Sir2u

A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?

No, I'm not leading in any direction. But if one had to explain where the picture came from, creationism would be an easy answer I think. That sucks. — Sir2u

You're chasing the boogie man.

His ontological views would take some explaining. I'm currently trying to write a book, but not on Wittgenstein's ideas.

What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus. — Posty McPostface

There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications.

As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so?

Here's something I posted on Quora. This was written to answer the following question:

What did Ludwig Wittgenstein mean by "the limits of my language are the limits of my world"?

To answer this question one needs to have a good understanding of the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish. There are three main ideas in the *Tractatus*, and these three ideas will help answer your question.

First, though, one must understand what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s goal is to investigate the essence of language, that is, how it functions, and how it is structured. Second, he assumes that the function of language is to describe the world, and he assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic. Why did Wittgenstein think that logic would reveal the structure of language, and reveal how language is connected to the world? We have hints here and there, but it seems that not only did he believe that logic lay at the bottom of all science, but he also believed that there was something universal about logic (his idea of logic has ontological implications), a peculiar depth (PI 89). In fact, logic is one of the three main ideas behind his work in the *Tractatus*, the other two are language and the world.

Wittgenstein starts his investigation in the *Tractatus* with the world. The beginning statements of the *Tractatus* can be thought of as conclusions, which are required by his theory of language. There are two components of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, *the picture theory* and *the truth-function theory*. Wittgenstein believed that if we can talk about the world, then propositions must be logically connected with the world. In this way, the truth of a proposition is not connected with other propositions, but connected with the world. He called propositions that are directly connected with the world, *elementary propositions*. So you have propositions (complex propositions), which are made up of simpler propositions called elementary propositions that are directly connected to the world. Two questions that naturally arise, how are elementary propositions related to complex propositions, and how are elementary propositions logically connected to the world?

First, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus, if a complex proposition is broken down into elementary propositions, then the truth-value of the proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component parts (seen in truth-tables), namely, the elementary propositions that make up the proposition. Second, elementary propositions connect with the world in that they are pictures of atomic facts, which are the smallest constituent parts of facts.

Wittgenstein believed that his process of analysis, in terms of the structure of a proposition, must come to an end, but “…what will the end be?” (Nb p. 46). Once we have completely analyzed the proposition, that analysis will have the same complexity as its referent (Nb p. 46). The referent being facts in the world.

However, we are not done with propositions. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have more basic parts, namely, a nexus of *names *(T 4.22). Do not think of names like pencil, cup, chair, etc, these kinds of names are not what Wittgenstein had in mind. For Wittgenstein a *name* is a primitive sign, and he uses the symbols x, y, and z to refer to them. These names cannot be dissected any further. They are, in one sense, the end result of the analysis, in terms of the elementary proposition.

So how do propositions correspond to facts in the world? Keep in mind that in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy he holds to the traditional view of language, that is, a name’s meaning is directly associated with the object it denotes (T 3.203). Thus, this is carried over into his thinking in the *Tractatus.*

The totality of facts* *are what make up the world (T 1.1). Facts are divided into atomic facts, just as complex propositions are divided into elementary propositions. There is a direct picturing correlation between an elementary proposition and an atomic fact. The elementary proposition, which is made up of *names*, has its counterpart in the world of facts, because the smallest constituent part of a fact is an *object *(do not think of objects in the normal sense), objects for Wittgenstein are simple, just as names are simple.

The elementary proposition is in touch with the world via *names*, which are in direct contact with the world via *objects*. The arrangement of names in the elementary proposition must have the same logical structure as the arrangement of objects within the atomic fact. If it has the same arrangement, then it’s true, if not, it’s false.

Propositions show their sense by their logical structure, and if that sense is correct or true, then it matches the facts in reality, or it mirrors reality. Think of a picture, a picture has a sense, the sense is given by the arrangement of things in the picture, but that sense need not match reality (the way things are), the same is true of a proposition according to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.

So how does all of this answer your question? Well, for early Wittgenstein language is completely descriptive, that is, it attempts to describe the world, either truly or falsely. The limits of language, or what can be said, is the limit of our world. Things that have sense happen only within the limits of language. Senseless propositions attempt to say something about the limit of language; and attempts to go beyond the limits of what can be said, result in nonsense. It follows from all of this that the limit of language is the limit of our world.

The logical positivists misunderstood Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* in that they thought his work was anti-metaphysical, on the contrary, he thought that philosophical propositions that try to go beyond the world were attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend language, and thus the world. And although Wittgenstein tried to set out what can and cannot be said (in terms of propositions), he did think that that which transcends our world was important; and although that which transcends the world cannot be stated, as Wittgenstein tried to show, the mystical could be shown.

Hope this helps.

So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc? — Marchesk

Language ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World
| |
Proposition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fact
| |
Elementary Proposition --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atomic Fact
| |
Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Object

Think of this as a mirror image. Moreover, don't think of names or objects like you normally think of these words, or you'll get confused. The smallest constituent part of a proposition is a name, and the smallest constituent part of a fact is an object. There is a one-to-one correspondence between an object in the world and a name in a proposition. Names form elementary propositions, which then form propositions. Objects make up atomic facts, which then form the facts of the world. Wittgenstein believed that there had to be this relationship between language and the world, so he constructed a logical (a priori) relationship.

Wittgenstein wasn't saying there aren't things like apples, trees, people, etc., how these are arranged would be the facts, but facts are broken down even further, into smaller parts (objects). You can think of objects as occupying a place in space.

It's much more complex than this, but what I'm trying to get across to you is that objects and names are not what you would think they are.

Wittgenstein would tell you that you would be better off learning something like carpentry. I would say that most philosophers do not contribute much. Why? Because much of what passes for good philosophy is mostly confusion. This might be a bitter pill, but it is the truth.

Good luck Posty.

Damn, Fdrake you ended the thread in one post. :gasp:

Yes, it is misleading but it does have a point, though, which is to warn against the naturalistic fallacy. — Pierre-Normand

Agreed.