In the previous post we mentioned the problem of talking about NDEs, that is, part of the problem is one of linguistics. In other words, what do we mean when we say that NDEs are real or not real? This of course is the central question in the discussion. Many will describe NDEs as a hallucination, which carries with it the idea of not being real, or not conforming to what we normally mean by real. In our everyday lives what is real or not real is dependent on what we as humans generally experience as a whole. This is not to say that just because something falls outside the norm that it is not real, it just means that generally we can question or be skeptical of a claim that does not fit within our general framework of sensory experiences. To reiterate the point, what is meant by the term real, generally, is what fits within our everyday objective reality, namely, what people experience in their everyday lives.

Another important aspect of this discussion is how we incorporate the term real into our world view. Our world view will also shape how we use the term within the scope of how we view our world. If for example you are an atheist, agnostic, Christian, or a Muslim, your view of what is real will have metaphysical implications, either negative or positive depending on your belief system. An atheist may use the term real to refer only to what is physical; whereas a religious person's view of reality expands into an area that the atheist disputes, at least generally. Thus the discussion can get quite cumbersome based on one's world view, as is the case with any philosophical discussion.

We have been talking about what is deemed real in relation to an objective reality, but we also know that what is real does not always fit what we deem to be objective reality. For example, most people will not dispute the reality of their subjective experiences, but they are real nonetheless. However, note that subjective experiences such as pain, happiness, depression, etc., have an objective component that gives meaning to the terms. Therefore, even when discussing our subjective experiences they manifest themselves within a shared environment, and within our shared linguistic framework. Even our thoughts can be demonstrated in an objective way, that is, expressed linguistically or manifested in our actions apart from language.

There is still even more confusion involved in this discussion, and that is, even if the experience is not objectively real, it can still be described as a real experience. After all even hallucinations are real, but that does not mean they are part of what we mean by our shared objective reality. In fact, hallucinations are purely subjective, and not part of a shared reality. For the most part we do not share our hallucinations, they tend to be person relative. More importantly they are not by definition part of an objective reality. However, note again, that this does not mean they are not real experiences. So what we mean by real can be very ambiguous and confusing, especially when talking about NDEs, or any other subject for that matter.

Hallucinations should not be confused with illusions. For example, hallucinations are generally person relative, and do not fit within our shared sensory experiences; whereas illusions can be a shared sensory experience. A magician for example may perform an act where he is creating the illusion of sawing someone in half, which can be seen by more than one person. This is in contrast to what happens when people experience a hallucination.

Part of the problem with this discussion is being clear about what we mean by our terms, that is, we want to be as clear and precise as possible. But given the vagueness of the terms involved, it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak with linguistic precision in absolute terms. However, do not conclude from this lack of precision, that we cannot come to an understanding of the terms involved, or that we cannot ascertain the facts, because nothing could be further from the truth. Language is not mathematics, and we should not expect the kind of precision from language that we generally expect from mathematics.

For many people the question that arises is the following: "Are these experiences (NDEs) real?" People have a variety of experiences, and most sensory experiences can be understood in terms of our everyday lives. However, some experiences are so out of the ordinary that we question whether or not they are real. The problem is, what do we mean by real? For example, everyone knows what it means to have a dream, and we would acknowledge that dreams are real experiences, but dreams are not part of our waking life, namely, what we all experience together as part of a shared reality.

We have labels for experiences that are outside the norm, such as, hallucinations, dreams, illusions, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), and near death experiences (NDEs) to name a few. So the experiences are real in the sense that we all share these kinds of experiences, but what are we asking when we ask if NDEs are real? What most people seem to be asking, is, if these experiences are only occurring within our mind and not part of our shared everyday experiences, then they tend to reflect subjective (inner, single point of view) experiences, and are not necessarily part of our everyday objective reality. So when NDEs are juxtaposed with physical reality (objective reality) how do they compare? Are NDEs simply subjective experiences that lack any correspondence with an objective reality?

Part of the problem when considering NDEs, is how we describe such experiences. We tend to use vague terms like real or reality, words that have a variety of meanings depending on context among other things. There is no precise definition that will work when describing what is real or not. There are just a complex web of uses that correctly fit within a variety of linguistic statements. So if we are looking to be precise in terms of what is real or not, we are not going to find a neat fitting term that works in every context. For example, when physicists use the term real or reality, what they mean by the term reality is much different from what the man on the street means by reality. One of the problems that occurs in philosophy, and in other areas of study, is that we tend to look for some theory or definition that will precisely and absolutely describe or answer the question, when no such theory or definition is possible. All we can do is look at a range of correct uses of the terms involved.

Wittgenstein compared the definition of certain words to family resemblances, that is, there are many overlapping resemblances that fit within the descriptive universe of family members; and just as no one description will adequately describe all family members, so no one definition or theory of meaning will cover every use of certain words. The example Wittgenstein uses in the Philosophical Investigations is the word game, there is no one definition that will describe every possible use of the word game because the universe of uses is just too large to describe precisely.

I'm not familiar with Husserl's argument.

Whereas 'mind' is 'what knows', not 'what is known', so that trying to 'know the mind' is trying to know that which is never 'other' to us. (If this sounds like a Zen Koan, that is not entirely coincidental.) — Wayfarer

I think what you seem to be saying is something akin to the eye verses its visual field, i.e., within the visual field one cannot observe the eye because it's not in the visual field. If this is what you're saying, I would agree, but only if there was one mind, but there are other minds, at least according to my metaphysical take on things, and other minds can perceive and know objectively that these other minds exist.

When I use consciousness, I'm using it as a synonym for mind. So yes, for me at least, it does mean mind. I don't see what else it could mean. And when I use mind in this broad sense, I'm using it as something separate from the brain.

Your comment reminds of people thinking that a flying machine would be magic, it's similar. New ideas, or ideas that seem strange, are always looked at with scorn.

My opinion, it's not an argument, but it's based on some evidence of what people experienced in an NDE, is that there is a primary consciousness that links everything together. This primary consciousness is not emergent, which is why I call it primary. There is nothing for it to emerge from.

Again, another opinion based on some evidence, is that we exist as part of that consciousness, and we can participate in every possible reality that that consciousness can create. We can insert ourselves into various realities. I believe we are eternal, and that our existence never ends.

Well, the flesh and blood brain is just like everything else, quantum information meshed into the holographic fabric. — Rich

I agree with this. Based on my metaphysics, the brain is like a receiver, and it's existence is holographic, just like everything else in the universe.

Moreover, for me, all of existence, metaphysical or otherwise is a product of consciousness. Consciousness, it seems to me, is the fundamental stuff behind all that exists. However, consciousness is not created, it's primary, and it's at the bottom of the universe. All that can be said to exist is set into motion by consciousness.

Here is some interesting video conducted by a quartet of some top theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, discussing how all the information in the universe can be stored as a holographic surface (not volume). — Rich

That's a great video, I've listened to it several times over the past couple of years. I was first introduced to the idea of a holographic universe when I read Michael Talbot's book The Holographic Universe back in the mid 90's. The holographic principle probably explains many things about our brains, which in some ways show signs of being holographic.

I know exactly how you feel BlueBanana. :D

Metaphysics is the limit of what can be discussed, described, argued. — Michael Ossipoff

I didn't say "Metaphysics is the limit of what can be discussed...," I said, "...there are limits to what can be said about the metaphysical." Wittgenstein thought that the boundary between what can be sensibly talked about is the boundary between "the world," and the metaphysical. I do disagree with Wittgenstein on this point. It sounds like you agree with him, if I understand your point.

You make it sound so obvious, as though I'm pointing out a truism. There is much disagreement about these points.

I think we all agree that metaphysics, discussion, description and argument don't cover or apply to all of Reality. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm glad you think we all agree, but you must not be paying much attention to what people write.

Much of the problem with the discussion of consciousness has to do with our epistemological ideas; and thus it's a language problem. It's a language problem because knowledge (JTB) is something that happens with propositions. However, the subjective "I" needs no justification, it's just there. Do I need a justification for my inner experiences to believe that I'm having inner experiences? How could you even doubt that which is required for the doubt to even express itself?

The second problem is also linguistic, that is, how do we describe these states or the mental phenomena behind the "I?" - behind the self. This of course brings us back to an epistemological world view that can limit how we describe what's happening. If our world view is strictly viewed from a naturalistic or physical point of view, then how we describe consciousness (the linguistic descriptions) will be limited by this view; and anything that describes consciousness outside this purview will be viewed suspiciously, and even viewed as irrational.

So science can actually limited what can be said, because it limits the language of descriptions to the field of science, which again is only one way of attaining knowledge. It's not a necessary limitation, but a contingent one based on a particular world view, i.e., science can be expanded, and is expanding beyond the natural or the physical. In a way, the science of quantum physics forces the metaphysical upon us, so it reduces everything to what's metaphysical. Even mathematics is a metaphysical endeavor produced by consciousness.

Once we understand that knowledge isn't limited to science, then we can expand our knowledge base, and expand our understanding of consciousness. However, there just may be limits to what can be said about the metaphysical, i.e., language itself may impose limits on what can be said, but it's difficult to know where those limits are, and why there are limits (if there are limits).

I definitely can't say that I haven't been guilty of similar responses.

I think we have to be careful about shutting down speech. I think you're right in that certain platforms (businesses, etc) have a right to limit what's said. Where I think we have to be careful is in the public square, and at Universities where students are there to learn and be challenged.

But there is something more going on in our society, i.e., some politicians are using the term bigot or racist to shut down the other side (this happens on both sides), so they paint their opponents as bigots or racist in order to shut down their arguments. They create a narrative about someone they don't like (justified or not) in order to shut them up, or to get others to not listen to them, or even hate them.

What I've observed, is that if you want to see racism in someone you'll find it. There are many things we say that might be interpreted as racist, yet not fully reflect a person's belief about racism, or not fully reflect how a person really acts towards others of a different race. For example, someone might say something in anger that may or may not reflect what they truly believe.

People's actions are more complicated than some might imagine. I've seen people talk in a way that's racist, and yet I've seen that same person act with kindness toward someone of a different race. Some people can struggle with immorality in their lives, and yet generally act in ways that are moral. It's more important to look at a person's actions over a long period of time than to look at a couple of isolated remarks.

What you experienced was an NDE, but it doesn't sound like you completely left your body, but you were detached. There is a purpose, it's just not a religious purpose, that is, it's not based on religious dogma. I have a thread on NDEs, but it goes beyond your experience.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1

Another interesting point about lying, i.e., when I tell the judge that I didn't murder my wife (when in fact I did murder my wife), I'm expressing a belief, but the judge, prosecutor, and jury have to judge based on my actions whether it's a belief truly held by me, viz., that I'm not lying. Thus the evidence of the act reflects the true belief held by the guilty party. So lies can be determined based simply on the actions of the person, and thus what's true, in terms of the belief truly held by the guilty party, is seen in the evidence, which reflect the correct belief.

That's an interesting point Cuthbert. In some sense we can also fool ourselves about our beliefs, i.e., I can say that I love my wife, but my actions may indicate otherwise. This is also another example where an action shows the belief. Is it that it's not a sincerely held belief, or is it just not a belief at all, i.e., I can say that I sincerely believe it, but my actions say otherwise?

...what do you do with beliefs that are simply shown and not stated? We know that a belief can be stated given a linguistic context, but not all beliefs originate in linguistic contexts, i.e., they can simply be reflections of our actions, again like Wittgenstein's examples. — creativesoul

Now that I re-read my statement, it's a mistake to say that beliefs are reflections of actions, so you are correct in that actions are reflections of a belief. So I did reverse this, and this is what Wittgenstein pointed out, i.e., I see a particular kind of action, and that action reflects a belief or beliefs. I'll have to re-read my posts because I'm sure there are other errors that I made in my expressions. This though is a kind of typo more than anything else, but I also didn't realize what I'd done when I re-read what I typed.

"Wittgenstein didn't figure it out either," that's really funny, not that he wasn't wrong about some things, but that you would say such a thing. I don't know that I would have the audacity to say such a thing. His mind and philosophy, generally, was just on a different level altogether in terms of genius.

So "Jack has a red ball" must be false because Jack cannot see red? — Banno

I don't follow your logic. Jack has a red ball is not a belief that Jack would have (if Jack is a dog). If I say, "Jack has a red ball," that would be my belief expressed in language.

You're missing the point. I'm not saying that passion is intrinsically bad. I'm saying that passion has nothing to do with the conclusion of a well-reasoned argument. My passion to pursue philosophy can be a good thing, but that's different from saying passion is somehow important to drawing a proper conclusion. That's similar to saying that passion is important to the answer of what is 2x2=?. What's important to logic or mathematics is that you know how to apply the rules that lead to correct outcomes. I can have all the passion in the world and that in itself wouldn't make me good at logic or mathematics. My passion may make me study harder, in which case I may become a better logician, but that again is a separate issue.

It doesn't matter to me that reason tends to be a slave of our passions, which is probably true in many cases. But logic, which is the study of correct reasoning using propositions, it's a study that is devoid of emotional content in terms of the rules of logic. Logic doesn't care whether you're happy or sad, it doesn't care how you feel about the facts. Facts are facts apart from how you or I feel. If I say there is a glass on the table, your emotional state has nothing to do with the objective truth of the statement. Thus, my conclusion either matches with a particular state-of-affairs (a fact), or it doesn't.

Emotional states, which many use to guide their reason, can only lead astray. This is why there is so many irrational beliefs in religion, politics, ethics, etc., etc.

Moral education is about one's ethical duty apart from how you feel about moral right and wrong. Your subjective passions, which many use to guide their reason, are not what makes something moral or immoral. Abortion is a good example, it's the passions on both sides that cloud the issue.

I'm not sharing an opinion, which is what you're doing. I'm telling you what logic is, and logic by definition has nothing to do with emotional responses.

For example,
Modus Ponens in logic...
If P, then Q.
P.
Therefore, Q.

If I am human, then I am a person.
I am human.
Therefore, I am a person.

The conclusion is devoid of emotion and rightly so.

Well, all emotion does is cloud the issue, and logic is similar to mathematics; as such, it needs no emotion to come to a correct conclusion, you simply follow the rules.

Emotion is something that naturally occurs as we present arguments, but good arguments have nothing to do with emotion, and everything to do with evidence or good reasons.

Well, if that is the case, then my response is bullshit. :D

This is just an emotional response, which is bullshit, because it has no place in a philosophy forum, which is supposed to be more about correct reasoning than emotion.

I think clarity start's happening as people use their words to explain the idea.

If you accept that the concept belief takes its meaning from public behaviours, then what of your "private beliefs"? If you are merely saying that there is some internal aspect to belief, as there is e.g. an internal aspect to pain, then I agree - although I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's internal aspect of a belief could be without language. But also, as I've said before, I think it confuses matters to use the word private here, given its Wittgensteinian usage, i.e. where something cannot be made public or can be known only by a single individual. If you accept that the word belief gets its meaning, and that beliefs can be expressed, via external, public behaviours, then it confuses matters to refer to beliefs as private, especially when the discussion is also about Wittgenstein. — Luke

Yes, that's all I mean by private, that there is an "internal aspect" to belief. But then you ask, "...I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's "internal aspect" of a belief could be without language[?]" - It would be just that, a private belief, if kept private, or become public in two ways - first, by expressing the belief publicly via an action apart from language, or two, expressing the belief via language, which are both public.

I do except the fact that beliefs get their meaning in a public way, i.e., the concept belief is a public happening. It doesn't confuse things if you understand that there is an internal aspect to a belief that is a necessary condition for belief (here I'm separating the internal from the external). However, language itself, is not a necessary condition for belief, although it's necessary for the linguistic application, or the expression of a belief, which are public.

I don't think I confused the issue of what I meant by private beliefs, but I can see how others confused the issue. The problem as I pointed out to Banno, was that the concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from the private mental happening. I explained how this idea a couple of times, and how it differed from what Wittgenstein was saying. Now, could I have worded it more accurately, probably, I would have to go back and look at what was written.

If all belief consists of statements/propositions, then Jack has no belief for he has no statements/propositions.

If Jack has belief, then not all belief consists of statements/propositions, for Jack has no statements/propositions. — creativesoul

I say that it is clear that Jack has belief. Therefore, it is not the case that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

Exactly, couldn't have said it better myself. Very precise, and very clear.

It does not follow from the fact that Jack cannot argue for his own belief that he has none. It does follow from the fact that Jack cannot justify his own belief that he does not have the means for doing so. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief is existentially dependent upon language. It does follow from the fact that Jack has belief and no language that not all belief content is propositional/statements... — creativesoul

Again, I like it Creative, very direct and to the point.

I would say that you have this exactly backwards. Behaviours reflect belief. — creativesoul

I don't understand why you would say this, especially since in what you quoted I said, "...they [beliefs] can be reflections of our actions. I've been saying this all through this thread. :-$

I can unite the two, but trying to get people to understand my point on this is a struggle as it is. My metaphysics would be another exercise in futility. :-$

It's the "slightly different" that I'm concerned about. :-O

There is a sense where I would say that my comments are both true and not true also, but that has to do with my metaphysics. Ultimately I believe that at the bottom of everything is consciousness. In fact, I think it's the unifying principle, but this is a discussion for another thread.

I'm not much of a fan of Searle, but I think Austin made some important contributions. Have you read Sense and Sensibilia?

One way to think of what I'm saying is this: We talk about facts using the concept fact, and that concept refers to states-of-affairs, but even without the concept, or without minds to apprehend the facts, there would still be states-of-affairs in the universe. Those facts have an existence quite apart from a mind, and quite apart from any linguistic reference to them. So there is an objective reality in back of our language, but how we talk about that reality takes place in a community. Moreover, the concepts that refer to that reality, get their meaning from how we use the words in language-games.

This is a consequence of what a belief is - a part of the explanation of an action. Explaining is not the sort of thing we can do without language, surely. — Banno

Of course you can't explain a belief apart from language, that's what an explanation amounts to. I'm not talking about an explanation of a belief, I'm talking about how people can show beliefs apart from statements, and thus apart from explanations. Read my reply to Luke.

Some of you seem to be confusing the fact that we can talk about beliefs, share beliefs, explain beliefs, and we're doing this in this thread; but this is quite different from how we show beliefs. Forget about everything prelinguistic, we show our beliefs everyday.

Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar. — Luke

I'm not saying the word or concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from public behavior, of course it does.

When I sit on a chair, am I not showing that I believe a chair is there to sit on? No one has to state the belief to know that the person showing the belief, has the belief. You can state it, or I can state it, but that doesn't mean there is no belief prior to the statement. It's often seen in our public actions even before it's stated.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief.

Sorry I misread that proposition, you're correct. It's getting late for me. I need to go to bed. lol