.

My reservations come from the gap between our perceptions and actual reality, noumena, which means that our common physiological characteristics may result in common end-of-life mental and emotional effects. — Greta

The problem Greta (and thanks for the reply) is that any kind of common perceptual experience can be said to "result in common" life experiences, whether end-of-life or not. I think the way to look at these experiences, especially given there are so many, and given the consistency of the experience, is to look at them as we look at any veridical experience, unless their is wide inconsistency. I say wide inconsistency, because any large group of testimonials about any veridical experience will have some inconsistency, that's the nature of testimonial evidence. Another important point about the testimony is that there must be some objective way of examining the testimonial evidence. The point being that even if you have large numbers of testimonials, if it's completely subjective, then there's going to be a huge problem. In the case of NDEs there is plenty of objective evidence from those who were there and saw what happened, so as to be able to corroborate much of the testimony, or at least some of the testimony. This also includes medical records, as well as doctors, nurses, and family members.

I agree that NDEs are not just hallucinations or dream. In a hallucination or dream, our perceptions are inconsequential to our ensuing physical (if not, mental) reality. In an NDE, when the senses have shut down, the external physical reality is basically over and thus becomes almost completely inconsequential. At that point, subjective reality is everything; there is nothing else, no input, no external future. — Greta

My research indicates that the senses don't shut down. In fact, people report heightened awareness, which is unusual because the brain is in a state of shutting down. This also goes against a criticism of those who think that these experiences are the result of a common brain experience that occurs when dying (as you suggested above). Again though, how is it that if the brain is shutting down people who are blind can see, or people who have been deaf their whole life can hear. These are experiences of those who have been sensory deprived. And those who haven't been sensory deprived report seeing colors that are not part of our normal color spectrum. Also people report have 360 degree vision, and hearing the conversations of those who are miles away from where their having their NDE.

I've already talked above about the subjective critique.

.

Can you give an example of a fact in realty that is not a conceptual fact? — T Clark

For us to talk about the facts (states-of-affairs) we need the concepts, but the existence of facts are not dependent on the concepts, they're only dependent on the concepts if we are to talk about the facts. Any existent thing is separate from the concept used to refer to it, so the fact that the Earth has one moon is separate from anything conceptual. So I think the confusion can be in our talk about facts, verses the thing itself.

Well there is a sense at least in which all truths are dependent on minds, to the extent that truth is a property of propositions, and propositions need proposers. I think you need stronger term than 'dependent on' - would you say that subjective truths are about (states of) mind? But even then, one can establish beyond reasonable doubt mens rea in a court of law. — unenlightened

Talk about truths or facts is dependent on minds, and thus language is also mind dependent. However, the fact in reality is separate from the concept fact, and it's separate from talk about those facts. Thus, objective facts, i.e., the existence of objective facts are not mind dependent in the sense that they can still obtain whether we have the concepts or language to refer to them. So in that sense they are not dependent on minds, they can have their existence quite apart from minds. There is a sense where everything may be dependent on minds or consciousness, but that will take us far afield. This has more to do with my metaphysics.

Subjective truths are about propositions, and how we use them in relation to our mind. I'm not saying that meaning is derived from something in the mind, only that there is a connection, maybe causal, between subjective truths and minds.

I'll go further, if Sam and the rest of us did not exist, earths and moons would also cease to exist. — T Clark

But there is no evidence for this contention Clark. Unless you want to cite quantum mechanical theories, but even there, there is disagreement about what it means to say that something obtains because we're looking at it.

Not true. The term is used in at least two different ways. 1) well supported by unbiased evidence, e.g. the reporter was objective or 2) absolute congruence with reality independent of mind, e.g. the way things would be if no consciousness existed. — T Clark

Both of these definitions support my contention, viz., that there is no need for the word "true" in front of "objectivity." Something is objective if it is either one of those definitions. How does this support your use of "true objectivity?"

Earth has a number of things in orbit around it. We've chosen to call one of them "the moon." We've defined it as one of a kind. Just like Pluto used to be a planet but now it's not. That distinction makes a lot of sense.

We've observed the behavior of matter and energy. Based on those observations, we've concluded that, at the smallest scales, matter is made up of particles which are acted on by specific types of forces. Those distinctions make a lot of sense also, but they don't explain how the world works except in the most simplistic way. That is not predictable from reductionist, so-called objective "facts." — T Clark

How does any of this support the contention that "objective" is synonymous with "omniscience?" I don't see any connection?

My point was that a denial of objective reality is a well-established, well-supported philosophical position. And, no, it's not just a matter of language and words. If you want to say that position is self-evidently insignificant and not worth discussing, that's your choice. — T Clark

We can go back and forth about what's well established, but I don't see any good arguments that there is no objective reality that make sense. Most of these arguments are misunderstandings, and most of them are misunderstandings of the way we derive meaning from words. I'm not saying that it's insignificant, I was simply pointing out that because something is discussed or argued for, that doesn't make it worthwhile, significant, or true. Many things are discussed in these forums and in philosophical circles that bare little resemblance to reality.

If earths and moons ceased to exist, truths about earths and moons would cease to exist. If Sam did not exist, he would not have likes - what's the difference? — unenlightened

Subjective truths are dependent on minds, objective truths are not, so while it's true that if certain objects failed to exist, then truths about those objects would be meaningless. Thus both truths would fail to obtain without the supporting criteria, but that doesn't mean there isn't a difference between the two kinds of truths.

But using the words objective and subjective does not always play out so smoothly, nor is it clear what domain is under consideration even. — Moliere

I agree, but that's true of most subjects, things can and do get muddy. However, generally it seems fairly easy, especially in Tiff's case, to delineate between the subjective and objective.

You deserve a better quote, Sam-I-am; it makes sense to divide knowledge into knowledge of the subject and knowledge of the object, and yet this is not what people have been wanting to refer to. So I will play hard-ball with you for a moment. Whatever is knowledge is true, and therefore objective.I can only know from what you tell me that you like orange juice, but if you are honest, I know the same thing that you know. — unenlightened

If I say, "I like oranges," the truth of the statement is dependent on me, i.e., my likes and dislikes for example, and this is what makes it subjective. It's also a contingent truth besides being a subjective truth. There are subjective contingent truths like the one I cited, and there are objective contingent truths like the Earth has one moon.

Of course if it's knowledge it's true, that's not disputed, but not all knowledge is objective. If you know that Sam likes orange juice, the truth of that statement is dependent on me, not anything other than how I feel or think about oranges. Therefore, it's a piece of subjective knowledge, not objective knowledge. Of course you know the same thing that I know, but the point is that it's dependent on me, that's why it's subjective. Objective knowledge or facts are independent of minds, i.e., we could all cease to exist and the Earth would still have one moon, but if we all ceased to exist all subjective truths would simply be non-existent.

On the other hand, it seems clear to me there is no true objectivity without omniscience. You can add to that the fact that neither exists. The idea that there is no objective reality is not an exotic one. I'm not the first one to think of it. It's been discussed here on the forum a number of times in the year I've been here. I remember discussing it on the old forum too. — T Clark

Why the quantifier true in front of objectivity? Something is either objective or it is not. Why do I need to postulate omniscience in order to say that it's objective that the Earth has one moon? I don't see the connection, nor the need for omniscience. Moreover, many things get discussed in these forums, but that doesn't mean that they have significance, or that they're true, or that the discussion is worthwhile.

Sure many people make the claim that there is no objective reality, but that belies what the words mean and how they're used.

Finally, this was started with the claim that the word objective is somehow synonymous with omniscience. You still have given no evidence that this is the case. The burden of proof is on you, because most people would say what I've said, viz., that they're two different words with different meanings. To be synonymous - you have to have different words with the same meanings, or nearly the same meanings.

Come on Clark, they're two different words with different meanings. I'm loathe to use the term "self-evident," but if there ever was a case that was self-evident, this is one.

Well, to put it another way, the definitions of most non-rigid designators (objective terms) are circular and depends on other words to determine their meaning. So, that can limit the scope of all things that are not ostensibly defined to be categorized into the subjective category, which I suppose many philosophers agree with. But, then if we assume the implications of the private language argument, then doesn't that mean that the feeling of 'pain' and with it the word used is not in some sense also objective? — Posty McPostface

I don't understand the point of bringing up circularity, as if it's a negative. We're not talking about arguments, which is the point of the fallacy of circularity. But maybe you're using circular in another way, I'm not sure.

Yes, the word pain does have an objectivity to it, as I said in the other thread. There is both the subjective experience of pain, but there is also the cries and moans of pain, which it the objective part. I'm not saying that there aren't difficult aspects to the objective/subjective discussion, but that's true of most subjects. If I look at you and you're moaning, it's objective for me that that's happening, but you're expressing a subjective feeling that can be seen by all. So in some cases there is both a subjective component and an objective component.

Which is to say that how other words are used in combination with the word of interest, contextually speaking. — Posty McPostface

To make my point further, if we create a simple language-game with only one word, say, "slab," and we use it to refer to one object, how is it dependent on other words? Sure we use words in conjunction with other words, but that doesn't mean that they get their meaning from those words. If I say, "Go get the chair!" - how is chair dependent, in terms of meaning, on go or get or the? It may be that to form a proper sentence, words are dependent on each other, but that's a far cry from saying words get their meaning from other words.

In the medical field there is a term of SOAP notes on a patient. That acronym delineates the difference between objective and subjective this way. S stands for subjective reporting: that which the patient themselves are reporting. O stands for Objective reporting: that which the Doctor observed of the patient while in their presence. A stands for Assessment: the Doctors diagnosis and P stands for Plan of Action: what treatment is prescribed, for what diagnosis and the anticipated result from the treatment plan. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I think Tiff gave a good response. I'll add a bit more. As Tiff pointed out, if I give you a report of what happening internally, it's clearly subjective, i.e., it originates with the subject. If I give a piece of knowledge that is dependent on me, then it's also subjective. For example, it's true that I like orange juice, and someone can claim that they know that I like orange juice, but this kind of knowledge is dependent on the subject (me). Objective knowledge is not dependent of the how I feel or think, it's independent of how I feel or think. Thus, the fact that the Earth has one moon is an objective fact, i.e., it's not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks. Objective facts can exist apart from minds, subjective facts cannot. This is not that difficult to comprehend. I love the way people want to throw out words that they find difficult, or that they cannot fit into their world view.

The idea that objective is synonymous with omniscience is just silly.

Also, words don't get their meaning from other words, words primarily get their meaning from how they're used.

It's either private or it isn't, not both, and more importantly where do you draw the line? — Posty McPostface

No, that's not the case. The beetle-in-the-box is totally private, i.e., there is no way for us to know what is going on in any of the boxes. However, if I have a pain, there is not only the inner experience of my pain, but there is the outer demonstration of pain (moaning, crying, etc), which is why the word pain has meaning, and the word beetle does not. The word beetle is senseless in Wittgenstein's example, but pain is not.

Where do you draw the line? Well, if there is nothing that shows itself in terms of the inner thing, then one can't derive meaning. If we say we are thinking, then there are things that show themselves to demonstrate that we think. If someone says the Holy Spirit spoke to them, and there is no outward demonstration of that, then how does one know that it's the Holy Spirit? Just like how does one know it's a beetle, there is no way to know, no correct or incorrect use of the word, it's senseless.

That's the point, you can't refer to private content. It can't be talked about; but, somehow manifests in the way we talk to one another. — Posty McPostface

I didn't say it can't be talked about, some of it can be talked about. It's just that if we do talk about it, it can't be entirely private. For example, I can say that I'm in pain, that is private content, but when it comes to meaning, there must be something that shows itself. Thus to learn how to correctly use the word pain, we have to be able to use the word in the real world. So we observe people crying, moaning, screaming, etc, these are the outward signs of pain, at least generally. This is how we know if a child is using the word correctly. If there were no outward signs of pain, how would we know what we mean by pain? This directly corresponds with the beetle-in-the-box, there is no way for me to know what the word beetle is referring too, no outward thing for the word to latch onto, no way for us to know if you're using the word correctly or not.

Strange, this whole time I was under the impression that Wittgenstein was pointing towards the illogicality of there being a private language. To be honest, your claim can not be in any way or form be verified or falsified, which leads me to believe that it's redundant to talk about private content. — Posty McPostface

Yes, Wittgenstein does show that a private language is not coherent, at least that's seems to be the argument. So I agree with your first sentence, but I'm not sure what you mean by the last sentence. You seem to be suggesting that I'm either contradicting myself, or that my argument is self-sealing. My question is, what can't be verified or falsified? I'm not sure what you're referring too. The point about the beetle-in-the-box is to demonstrate that meaning isn't derived by pointing to something subjective, so your interpretation of what I'm saying doesn't seem to jive with what I'm saying.

For example, knowing is not some subjective experience, i.e., the meaning of "to know" is not something private. — Sam26

I'm not sure about that; but, there's nothing I can say about any alternative to that matter. — Posty McPostface

Sure there is plenty to be said about the the alternative, viz., that to say that one knows X, is more than just referring to some subjectivity of which I alone am privy. To know algebra, for example is more than just saying, "I know algebra." It needs to be demonstrated objectively that you know how to do the problems of algebra, which is why there are standards by which we measure your knowledge.

You may explain something clearly, and sometimes people still don't understand it. In fact, when they don't understand they often complain that it wasn't clear. What's clear isn't always clear.

So, from what I gather, you mean to say that I can have private content; but, speak about everything in a public manner. Was that what Wittgenstein meant to portray with the private language argument? — Posty McPostface

It's more than that, viz., I have private content, but meaning is not derived from my private content. It may be that private content allows for language, but meaning in a given language takes place in the open, not by referring to something private. For example, knowing is not some subjective experience, i.e., the meaning of "to know" is not something private. The problem in much of society today is that we give too much credence to private experiences, as though that's what's important, that's what's primary.

Well, to press your point about there being private content withing one's mind, you can think about it as if one were solipsistic. The limits of my language are the limits of my world. — Posty McPostface

All I'm saying is that meaning is not associated with anything private. Meaning happens as we use language with one another. So the beetle-in-the-box example is to illustrate that point. I would suggest reading some of Wittgenstein it might help, if you haven't already.

I don't follow your point, flush it out a bit.

What makes you say that Sam? Seems confusing, like some Kantian noumena. — Posty McPostface

Well, if a group of us have a box with something in it, that only the owner of the box can see and no one else, then whatever is in the box, IS the beetle. Remember I can't see what's in your box, and you can't see what's in my box, so whatever we are associating with the word beetle, is something only the person with his or her box can observe, i.e., it's private. Thus, what you see maybe quite different from what I see. So this is why I say, whatever you see, or I see, IS the beetle, because there is no way to verify if what we're looking at is the same object or thing. This is only true though if it's a completely private thing we're looking at, i.e., there is no way to objectify the thing in the box.

So, just to illustrate what you're getting at Sam, how would you answer the following:

Can there be an action that is morally wrong but contextually right? — Unknown — Posty McPostface

If you're asking if something can be generally morally wrong, but in a particular context be morally right or correct, I would say yes, but for me it's not the context that determines this, but a principle. Thus, in many or most cases it's generally agreed that lying is immoral. However, there are cases where lying is morally correct. The classic case is where the SS come to your home asking if you have Jews hidden in your attic (and you do), but you answer "No." For me this is dependent on the principle of harm not the context. This isn't to say that context doesn't have an important role, but that, for me at least, is subservient to other things.

More about On Certainty...

Philosophers and others want to confine epistemology to their particular theory, which tends to confine the meaning of knowing to their particular use of the word. However, as we read On Certainty Wittgenstein points to the many uses of the word, including words associated with knowing, like certainty and belief, etc. A common misunderstanding, and there are many, is that meaning is associated with the everyday user, but this isn't true. It's not that the everyday user of a term is what determines meaning, as if the man on the street determines meaning, it's that the everyday use of language is the home of how meaning is derived. So in terms of what it means to know, it requires looking at the many uses of the word, being careful not to associate all uses with correct uses. This isn't an easy task, it's very difficult, and it's easy to make mistakes.

I will point out, as I've pointed out, many of the questions and discussions in these kinds of forums are misunderstandings. In fact, most are linguistic misunderstandings.

I think you brought up an important issue that Wittgenstein tried to address in his On Certainty. Would you be able to expand on this issue a little more? I'm genuinely interested. — Posty McPostface

With regard to On Certainty it seems clear to me that Moore was using "I know..." within a context," but using the words incorrectly, as Wittgenstein points out. Moreover, Moore's use of the word/s is also incorrect; and not only Moore, but I believe, as do others, that the skeptics are also making the same mistakes in terms of context and use, with the word doubt. The point of course is that while use and context tell us much about meaning, one has to be careful about saying, "Meaning is use." Correct use is about the words home, i.e., where it is ordinarily used in a community.

Incorrect use can go on for quite some time. For example, the word soul within a religious community seems to point to something internal to us, as if what gives meaning to the word is the internal thing. This can be seen as incorrect by examining Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box example (PI 293). This is not to say that there aren't things going on internally, viz., pains, emotions, or other internal subjective experiences, but it is to say that in order for us to associate meaning with a word there must be external things that we all can see or observe. So the word pain gets it's meaning from how it's used in a community, but there has to be something external for all to see. There has to be something external for us to say, "You're using that word correctly, or incorrectly." Note that Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box can be associated with any object, there is no way to tell if we are using the word in the same way - no way to tell if there is an error being made. Whatever is in your box IS the beetle, and whatever is in my box IS the beetle, but they may be two or more different things. The way pain, which we feel internally, gets part of it's meaning is that we can see people moan, cry, express anguish for another, etc. So pain has an external component, but note that Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box example has no external component for correct usage to latch onto. The same is true for the word soul in a particular religious context, viz., the religious idea that soul is associated with that mysterious thing that survives death (the internal thing). If one wants to understand the soul one needs only to look at the human bodies in motion - soul is that which animates a body. We observe one's soul while playing music for example, while being kind, while showing empathy, etc.

The point is that many who read Wittgenstein will make the mistake of thinking that Wittgenstein is saying meaning is use, but it's more nuanced than that, or they'll think that context drives meaning; and while use and context are very important, one must be careful about how we think of use and context.

However, how do we know the rules of the language game to start with? — Posty McPostface

The best way to understand the rules of language is to think of how children learn to use different words. For example, using the ostensive definition model, we say cup while pointing to a cup. So we know the child learns the rule/s by observing how they use the word cup. In this case, knowing how to associate the word with the correct object is learning the rule/s. Of course it gets much more complicated, because there are many different kinds of cups. Moreover, some words have no objects associated with them (for e.g., it, and, the, nothing, time, know, etc), but the tendency (and a common mistake) is still to look for the things that correspond to the word, and this is where we can and do go wrong. This is a common mistake that causes confusion across a wide range of subjects. Correctly understanding how rules are developed is also to understand why it is not possible to have a private language. However, don't confuse this with using the language you know, privately, there is a difference. The language you know has its roots in a community, and this is an extremely important point when it comes to understanding what it means to follow a rule, or not follow a rule.

There are other rules that are associated with language, and these rules are the rules of grammar, but these rules tend to be explicit. Here, of course, we are speaking primarily of how we link words together to form sentences, and all the associated rules of English, or German, or French, etc.

Many people think that a dictionary spells out the correct use of words, but if you think about it, dictionaries came much later in the history of language. How did people know how to correctly use a word before the printed word? We simply learned to use words in a community of language users. We learned what it means to correctly use a word, and we learned what it meant to incorrectly use a word. The community, for the most part, decides correct and incorrect uses of words. Also use doesn't always determine the correct use of a word, nor does context. There are groups of people who use (in the Wittgensteinian sense) words incorrectly, and there are groups of people who use words incorrectly within a context. So we have to be careful about being too dogmatic about use and context. Although use and context do tell us much about meaning.

Some examples of not understanding the rules of language are seen in the use of phrases and words like, unconscious bias, unconscious thoughts, beliefs, time, thought, soul, nothing, number, etc.

This isn't it. Its not: 'we look at things from a particular frame of reference'; its: 'the frame brings out the very things we can see to begin with'. I should mention, one of the reasons I called Psuedonym's post a piece of sophistry - which it remains, and yours tends in the same direction - is that the very terms 'subjective' and 'objective' and mostly meaningless: 'framing' - and the vocabulary isn't great because it leads to misunderstandings of the kind in your post - is not merely a 'subjective' act, if by 'subjective' is meant something like 'arbitrary'. A particular framing is always motivated in part by whatever it is that is being framed - it is never arbitrary, nor a matter of whim and fancy. I tried to explore some of this in my more recent 'math' post where I tried to thematize the question of motivation more thoroughly. But yeah, this kind of objection almost entirely misses the mark. This is symptomatic of it: — StreetlightX

I haven't encountered Bryant before, so my response was based on what you wrote. I didn't fully grasp his idea of framing. I agree that the way I framed my criticism wasn't a good response. However, after reading more, and I don't pretend to completely follow his philosophy, I don't find it very convincing. Moreover, to properly respond to his ideas would take more time than I'm willing to invest, so I'll just leave it at that for now; but I would like to read more, and also to read the critiques of his ideas. Do you have any suggestions?

For Bryant - and I agree with him - philosophy operates at a level even more fundamental than truth, which is what he calls framing: philosophy brings things into view in such a way that we can talk about truth at all. Here is how Bryant puts it: "The great debates among philosophers are about something that precedes truthful or veridical statements... The great debates of philosophy are questions of how existence should be framed. Frames make a selection from the infinity of existence, and in doing so draw attention to these features of being rather than those features of being. A frame is an imperative that says attend to or notice this type of existence. And once the frame has been formulated, it then becomes possible to make veridical statements about what appears in the frame." — StreetlightX

I think I agree with Pseudonym about Bryant's philosophy. All this seems to say is that one is looking at philosophy from one's own frame of reference, and while it's true that we all look at things from a particular frame of reference, what's correct or incorrect doesn't depend on any one frame of reference. For example, how we talk about reality is dependent on language, and there are rules of use that have nothing to do with your own frame of reference, but are dependent on how we use language as a society and a culture, so one can't talk or philosophize about things simply from one's own perspective apart from correct and incorrect uses of particular words. It seems that Bryant, or at least the way you've portrayed him, is saying there is no such thing as truth, or that truth doesn't matter, or that the word truth somehow doesn't apply when observed from the view of framing; which seems to be nothing more than one's own subjective view.

There really is nothing new here, it's purely subjective philosophy, moreover, to disagree with anyone would be pointless, because from their frame of reference, or how they describe reality, things only cohere within a particular framework. Thus, there is no true or false, but only talk about things within the frame, no one frame is better than another. Now one could argue that some frames work better than others, but how is it that we decide which works better? When we look at a particular frame of reference if something works better, then there's going to be some kind of objective standard. Otherwise what would it mean to work better?

This kind of philosophy collapses in on itself, and seems to be the worst kind of philosophical jargon.

Yes

What else would it be? — Banno

Yes, we learn what a belief is by what we observe, what we speak, and what is written. There are many observable actions that we correlate with beliefs. We learn the use of the word belief just as we learn the word pain. The outward signs show us what a belief is, just as the outward signs of pain, show us what pain is. The meaning of the words having nothing to do with anything inner, but with the outward sign of the inner process. We learn to associate a moan, a cry, a scream with pain, we use the word in conjunction with others, i.e., as a rule-based linguistic process. We are able to look at an animal and see that it too can show certain behaviors that show signs of pain, not unlike ours. However, the animal can only show us so much. As Wittgenstein pointed out, "A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow?" Some things can only be shown if one has mastered the use of a language.

Part of the problem is trying to simplify things into a neat theory, that's what's problematic. I don't think reducing it to an "explanation" would help, it just begs-the-question, besides it seems quite possible that some reasons or causes have no explanation.

Do his distinction between reason and cause mean the PSR is not an empirical principal? — Cavacava

Good question, and to be honest, I'm not sure. My opinion is that there is something wrong with this principle.

From the SEP:
"A simple formulation of the principle is as follows:

(1) For every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case.

The term “fact” in the above formulation is not intended to express any commitment to an ontology of facts. Still, if one wishes to avoid such connotations, the principle can be formulated more schematically:

(2) For every x, there is a y such that y is the sufficient reason for x

(formally: ∀x∃yRyx [where “Rxy” denotes the binary relation of providing a sufficient reason])."

I have a problem with (1), how does it follow that "For every fact F, there must be some reason why F is the case." Some facts have no reasons, they obtain as a result of causes. Why can't there simply be mechanistic causes for many facts? Even factual propositions needn't have reasons to support them, some do some don't. Moreover, again, why can't there be facts that have no cause or reason?

Sorry, https://is.muni.cz/repo/989715/On_the_Idea_of_Analysis_in_the_Late_Wittgenstein.pdf

Whether or not a belief is unfalsifiable depends on the argument for the belief. One cannot simply list certain beliefs and say, these are unfalsifiable. Many religious arguments are unfalsifiable, and many atheistic arguments are unfalsifiable, and I'm here thinking of self-sealing arguments, which are by definition unfalsifiable. Most of these kinds of arguments fall under the heading of being vacuous.

Whether a belief or argument is falsifiable depends on why you believe it's true, not simply that you have a particular belief. Some arguments may be unfalsifiable in one setting, and not in another, it has to do with how the argument is framed.

An interesting short paper worth reading that has some bearing on this in terms of causes vs reasons is the following: https://is.muni.cz/repo/989715/On_the_Idea_of_Analysis_in_the_Late_Wittgenstein.pdf -- read the second section Cause and Reason.

I haven't read the entire thread; but, words derive their meaning by the way they are used, and currently talking about NDE is grounded by convention of science (although, I think Quantum Mechanics and the 'observer' effect is changing minds about the issue) or the 'rules of the game' at play say that the whole thing must necessarily be empirical. So, what I'm saying is that maybe a new paradigm shift is needed to rescue the subjective validity of Near Death Experiences from the dogmatism of the empirical and whatnot to some objective and palpable phenomenon. — Posty McPostface

While it is true that how we use words tells us something about meaning, and you're right to focus on use, it's also important, though, to understand that use and even context can mislead us. For example, if we take Wittgenstein's point about the beetle-in-the-box, the word beetle is used in a particular way, viz., to point at something in the box; however, because it's used in this way, it doesn't mean it's used correctly. So while it's important to understand that use gives us more information about meaning, it can also be misused. This also points out why people shouldn't try to develop theories of meaning based on use, which by the way, was one of the reasons (I believe) that Wittgenstein was against developing a theory of language.

I don't think we need to rescue the subjective validity of NDEs. In fact, if NDEs were based simply on subjective experiences I would reject them. My point has been that there is good objective evidence to suppose that the experiences are real, and by real I mean that they are just as real as any everyday experience. Remember that any experience has a subjective component. However, if an experience is only subjective, then it would be hard to extract any meaning from the experience. What I mean is, it would be similar to Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box. If you're saying that the objective needs to be brought into the experience I agree.

Hallucinations tend to be person relative, i.e., how is it a hallucination if people are seeing the same things. What makes something a hallucination is that your seeing what others don't see, or that others rarely see or experience. However, with NDEs millions of people are consistently seeing the same things (deceased relatives, going through a tunnel, having a life review, beings of light, returning memories, etc.) What makes something a normal experience is that others are seeing the same things (shared experiences).

Moreover, there is objective evidence or confirmation that what those having an NDE are seeing, is confirmed by those not having the experience, but in the vicinity. For example, the doctor and nurses working on them while there is no heart beat or brain function, the kind of procedures that are being performed, the conversations of those near the body, etc. These kinds of visual experiences are the same kinds of visual and auditory experiences that people are having in the same vicinity of the body, which by definition isn't hallucinatory.

Ultimately Sam, no matter which way you look at this issue the answer always must be "maybe". While there is much fascinating anecdotal evidence for an afterlife, it's still only anecdotal. — Greta

The word anecdotal carries with it the idea of not being reliable, i.e., a story that may or may not be true. However, can we use the word anecdotal when describing millions of stories of the same experience? The answer would depend, but depend on what? It depends on whether the story is consistent, whether the stories come from a variety of sources (different cultures, age groups, different religions, different world views, occurring under a variety of circumstances, whether the stories can be backed up with primary sources, i.e., people who also were there, etc), this would put a higher premium on the stories. Under these circumstance on could say that we have good testimonial evidence. In fact, under these circumstance one could easily argue that this is exactly what it means to have good testimonial evidence. One shouldn't rule out the evidence simply because it doesn't fit a certain narrative or world view.

Consistency is the most important part of these testimonials, and as I've mentioned before there is enough consistency coupled with enough objective verification to assume that there is something much more than just hallucinations taking place.

Further, we know of no mechanism with which the information that makes you "you" can be preserved outside of a brain (or perhaps one day a quantum computer). Maybe the mechanism exists and we haven't yet discovered it? Again, maybe. — Greta

While it's true that there is much that we don't know about how one's consciousness could exist apart from a body, that in itself doesn't mean that what's happening isn't a veridical experience. It's also true that there is much that we don't know about our everyday consciousness, but that doesn't mean we're not conscious, after all there is a huge amount of data that suggests we are. In the same way, there is a huge amount of testimonial evidence that suggests that consciousness survives death, should I be dissuaded because I don't understand all of the mechanistic underpinnings of such an event. I would say yes I should be dissuaded if there wasn't any evidence to support it, but again, there is a huge amount of evidence.

Also, given the extraordinary changes that occur in us between womb and grave, it's rather difficult to see continuity. Wipe our memories and we effectively become someone else. Where did the original "you" - who is now effectively dead or dormant - go? Where is it during deep sleep? — Greta

Good question, since there is no doubt that our memories play a large part in who we are as persons, and continuity of not only our memories, but also our experiences are extremely important in maintaining the continuity of who we are as individuals.

From my own studies of thousands of these testimonials it is clear that not only do we keep the continuity of our memories, but the stories that people have of encountering their deceased relatives is that the relatives also keep the continuity of their memories and their experiences. In fact, if anything is the case, more of our memories return when having the out-of-body experience.

I don't find any of this speculative at all. I find the argument to be very strong.

.